


**Africa Journal of
Public Sector Development and Governance**

**Revue Africaine De
Développement Et De Gouvernance
Du Secteur Public**

**Revista Africana de
Desenvolvimento e Governação
do Sector Público**



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The journal investigates a broad spectrum of matters and issues related to governance, development, policy research and implementation, and leadership and management in the public sector in Africa. These include discipline-based and inter-disciplinary research, with a focus on both theoretical and practical approaches and experiences relevant to development and governance in Africa.

The journal publishes peer-reviewed research articles, discussion papers, policy papers, interviews with eminent persons, and book reviews on major issues related to public sector development and governance in Africa.

The journal's target audience is students, specialists, practitioners, consultants, politicians, policy makers, members of legislatures and those interested in African affairs.

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EDITORIAL

BRINGING CONTINENTAL ISSUES TO THE FORE

Thean Potgieter
Chief Editor

It cannot be doubted that Africa's recent history is marked by considerable development and impressive strides in many spheres. Opportunities are vast as the continent is home to large and growing markets, and in 2019, the fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa. This growth phenomenon is spurred by a number of key factors, such as a vibrant and growing youth, new business opportunities registering impressive returns on investments, the growth of the urban consumer market, as well as structural changes and improved governance that increasingly support development. By properly harnessing of the potential of its people and the many resources available on the continent, Africa is poised to continue on its inspiring development path.

Yet, persistent challenges remain, which can and do inhibit progress in some cases. These include, among others, high levels of poverty and inequality, continued widespread resource theft, rising public debt levels and debt risk in some countries, employment opportunities that are not on par with the number of new entrants into the labour market, and gender issues, which hinder full growth and innovation. Governments, directly and through partnerships, are crucial in addressing these issues in order to support and ensure sustained socio-economic development.

In constitutional democracies, all citizens are equal before the law and must have equal access to justice and public services. States need to endeavour to deliver the right services efficiently, effectively and in a cost-effective manner, at the right time and place, to those who need them. Hence, the emphasis is on the people as the recipients of public services, while the quality, relevance, efficiency and cost of these services must be placed at the heart of the real meaning and purpose of governance.

Governance therefore matters, as David Everatt and his co-authors so poignantly illustrated in their recent publication, *Governance and the Postcolony: Views from Africa* (the book review is available in the previous edition of this journal). The purpose of governance is to serve the people of a country, especially the poorest and most vulnerable. The quality of public administration, bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, and the level of professionalism in service delivery, are a measure of governance on the one hand, but it goes beyond that, as governance is also concerned with cooperation between different role players in society on all levels, to

address collective problems by thrashing out solutions. However, as Everatt indicates, the threat remains that governance could be spread too thinly in various areas, and if linked to insufficient accountability its effects become very limited.

Over the next few decades, Africa will be the stage for some of the most momentous developments of our time due to the influence of unparalleled population growth, substantial urbanisation, economic development, climate change, and competition for scarce resources (such as access to water), to name just a few. As our near future may have the potential to completely reconfigure the socio-economic and political landscapes of our continent, it is important that we rethink and challenge some of our approaches to problems and consider new and alternative solutions.

The research published in this edition of the journal represents wide-ranging issues from across Africa, and as voices from the continent it will hopefully provide some insight into a few problems related to development and governance in Africa. What we learn is that an honest reflection on issues is crucial for addressing problem areas and moving towards solutions. In fact, voices and contributions from Africa are crucial in order to meet the global challenges of our time.

The first article in this edition is an analysis of government performance in service delivery in Africa, with reference to the factors influencing, it by Carlos Shenga. The analysis is based on evidence from Afrobarometer's public opinion data, which covered 35 countries during 2014/15. It indicated that the way in which governments provide services in Africa varies from country to country, but, importantly, it remains insufficient in many cases. As the author explains, government performance in service delivery is often dependent on the strength of a national economy, corruption levels, and to some degree, the effectiveness of the media. Findings indicate that on the one hand, African governments perform relatively well in service delivery if countries have a strong economy and do well in fighting corruption, and the media is effective in uncovering and reporting on mistakes and government corruption. On the other hand, governments perform badly or very badly in service delivery when levels of corruption increase, and most or almost all public officials are perceived as being involved in corruption.

Gbensuglo Bukari and Patrick Tandoh-Offin, in their article on recent elections in sub-Saharan Africa, examine how less contentious electoral outcomes in the region can contribute towards consolidating democracy. They use electoral governance theory to explain how elections should be managed to ensure their credibility and acceptance by all stakeholders. The methodological approach was a desktop analysis and the authors argue that the political elites in sub-Saharan Africa have aimed, through overt and covert strategies, to maintain or change the status quo, which often brings about electoral disputes. They assert that aspects such as the advantage of incumbency of the ruling party and the winner-takes-all concept, ethnic loyalties, and sensational media reportage contribute significantly to contentious electoral outcomes. The article

concludes that political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa have failed in their democratic responsibilities of aggregating social interests, representing specific constituencies and serving as intermediaries between state and society. The authors recommend that while the debate on political issues and the management of elections is important, care must be taken to ensure that such a debate is well-founded in order to ensure less contentious electoral outcomes in the sub-region.

In an interesting case from Uganda, Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija examines the impact of Independent Members of Parliament (IMP) in multi-party democracies. In order to gain a proper understanding of their relevance and challenges in modern democracies, he analyses documentary evidence, considerable literature, and conduct interviews with members of parliament (MPs), media practitioners and researchers. His argument is that the rise of independent candidates is a recurring theme in many elections in Uganda, and the power, roles and relevance of IMPs varies. However, the example of Uganda indicates that IMPs share more rights and obligations than other MPs, who are under the flag of political parties as well as the ten Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) provided for in the Ugandan Constitution. They are deemed to be non-partisan and therefore do not belong to any political party. IMPs in the Ugandan House sit on both sides of the Speaker and can vote for any side. If an IMP is appointed as a cabinet minister in the central government, the member automatically joins the ruling party, and at the same time ceases to hold the parliamentary seat. IMPs have no slots on the Parliamentary Commission, established in terms of the Ugandan Constitution. Although Ugandan IMPs do not enjoy all the privileges reserved for party members, they seem to have more space to freely participate in legislative matters than their colleagues in parties. The eminence of political parties as bases for the aggregation of people's interests, vehicles for representation, and proper channels for the attainment of parliamentary seats is being diminished by the rise of IMPs. Therefore, if these trends continue, they may lead to a redefinition of legislative representation and party politics. Hence, the way forward should be to redefine party democracy; by either strengthening parties and diminishing independents or strengthening independents and diminishing parties, and coming up with a democratic alternative within the consensual democracy paradigm: diminishing both parties and independents; strengthening both parties and independents; or coming up with any other democratic experiment to pursue good governance.

Employment issues are important, and as Najwah Allie-Edries and Evans Mupela indicate, business incubation could support job creation. They conducted a comparative study of Business Incubators supported by the South African Jobs Fund. The South African Jobs Fund is a programme of the country's National Treasury, initiated in 2011 to support innovative job creation ventures that could be scaled up in a relatively short time. It is one of several active labour market policy interventions implemented by the South African government to boost job creation. Three business incubators (A2Pay, Awethu and Shanduka) were supported by the Jobs Fund between 2012 and 2015. The three incubators used different approaches to support the growth of their clients'

businesses over a period of three years. This paper reports the results of a summative evaluation that was done by Impact Economix in 2016 to gauge the levels of client enterprise and job creation success over the three-year period. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach; including interviews with direct job beneficiaries as well as enterprise client managers. Focus group discussions were also held with beneficiaries to investigate the qualitative aspects of the job creation activities of the incubators. The evaluation found that some of the assumptions made at the beginning of the implementation regarding business readiness and job creation capabilities did not hold during the implementation. This resulted in fewer jobs being created than was originally planned. The job creation successes were varied in size and nature and were affected by various factors, including the number of grants disbursed.

The contribution by Julius Babyetsiza is also within the ambit of employment. However, he focusses on the development of gainful self-employment skills amongst tertiary education graduates at Ankole Western University in Uganda. This exploratory study emphasises the need for the development of self-employment and advocates for self-employment to be a goal of education in Uganda. It examines the students' perceptions of the labour market as well as their experiences with and expectations of gainful self-employment. Data was collected through focus group discussions, involving students, entrepreneurs, university staff and officials. In his findings, the author highlights polarised perceptions of self-employment. He points out that the Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education (dubbed 'A-Level') should be scrapped and replaced with a Uganda Vocational/Technical Certificate of Education. He emphasises the fact that besides the Science and Information Technology (IT) curriculum at this specific university, curricula are theoretically orientated as opposed to practical. As a result, the author recommends that students from other faculties should at least enrol for a project with a student from the Science and IT stream and work together to ensure that their project can be replicated into the community or commercialised for gainful self-employment. This will serve as the major ingredient for the university to develop a model of enhancing its graduates' transition to gainful self-employment.

In 'Looking beyond Compliance', Nitasha Ramparsad assesses the role of an enabling environment in the mainstreaming of gender in the public service. An enabling environment is a major factor in the successful mainstreaming of gender. The article unpacks the important role of political will in influencing the creation of an enabling environment. It suggests that several role-players need to possess the political will to ensure an enabling environment is created. Notably, the actions of an individual have an impact on the institutional reforms that are developed and vice versa. Political will is argued as being the most influential component in the development of an enabling environment and therefore creates the enabling environment through political buy-in. In developing her argument the author specifically considers the experiences of the Ministry of Public Service and Administration located in the South African Public Service.

The special case study included in this edition of the journal focusses on the nature and effect of poor wastewater management by the Emfuleni Local Municipality in South Africa, as well as possible solutions to the problem. The study forms part of a transdisciplinary project conducted by a research group at the North-West University in South Africa (specifically JWN Tempelhoff, S Mahabir, M Ginster, N Mthembu, H Jaka, A Kruger and L Nkomo). The objective is to provide insight for governance authorities on the typical perceptions of local residents, non-governmental organisations and the private sector when disaster strikes in the form of municipal infrastructure breaking down and falling apart. Attention is given to participatory and cooperative governance and the need for local government and stakeholders to engage constructively when a critical environmental health disaster occurs. The case study specifically focusses on the 2018 Emfuleni infrastructure collapse. The Emfuleni Local Municipality was at the centre of an environmental health disaster in mid-2018 when vast amounts of raw sewage flowed into the Vaal River Barrage in Gauteng province. The event marked the near collapse of a comprehensive wastewater infrastructure system comprising three treatment plants, 45 pump stations and more than 2 500km of wastewater pipelines. Despite various initiatives to restore a sound sanitary environment, by late 2019 these attempts have proved futile and the situation remains critical. The research team contemplated a variety of mitigating strategies to deal with the 'wicked problem' of local wastewater governance and infrastructure systems. Given the crisis in which the local municipality found itself by the end of 2019, the potential of securing public-private partnerships appeared to be limited, but there were some promising developments before the research project reached completion phase. Apart from case study interpretations, the discourse features Word Cloud illustrations highlighting notable sectoral stakeholder descriptor words. The latter were further refined to outline four potential future scenarios for Emfuleni.

Salim Latib provides a thought-provoking book review article of Nitasha Ramparsad's *Gender Equality at Work: Some are more equal than others* (2019). As a result of the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements, gender bias is attracting new interest and raising awareness of gender inequality and sexual harassment on an international scale. This book emanated from Dr Ramparsad's experience pertaining to gender mainstreaming as a strategy for gender equality and the challenges to achieve desired results. The lessons that have emerged from this experience can be applied to all sectors, as the barriers to gender equality remain the same for Human Resource (HR) practitioners irrespective of the sector in which they practise. A cursory inspection of current programmes and interventions for transformation specifically aimed at gender equality reveal that these tend to be too academic in focus and do not offer enough practical guidance to practitioners as to the "how to" aspects. A big focus is placed on training individuals with few or no mechanisms being present in the workplace to enable change. This book is an attempt to reflect on a common understanding of gender mainstreaming as a strategy for gender equality. It aims to provide practical guidance on how to circumvent the many barriers to the implementation of gender mainstreaming as a strategy for gender quality. It proposes that an enabling

environment be created in order for any initiatives around gender equality to be achieved and suggests tools and strategies to ensure that the overall goal of gender equality in the workplace is met. This excellent book, which is very relevant within our current context and for the future, is crucial to HR managers who are and must remain important champions of gender equality.

ÉDITORIAL

METTRE EN EVIDENCE LES QUESTIONS DU CONTINENT

Thean Potgieter
Rédacteur en chef

On ne peut pas douter que l'histoire récente de l'Afrique soit marquée par un développement considérable, et des progrès impressionnants dans beaucoup de domaines. Nombreuses sont les opportunités sur un continent qui compte des marchés importants et croissants. En 2019, les économies à croissance rapide étaient en Afrique. Ce phénomène de croissance est encouragé par un certain nombre de facteurs clés, tels qu'une jeunesse vibrante et grandissante, des nouvelles opportunités commerciales enregistrant une rentabilité des investissements impressionnante, la croissance du marché des consommateurs urbains, ainsi que les changements structurels et une gouvernance améliorée qui soutient de plus en plus le développement. En exploitant proprement le potentiel de ses populations et les nombreuses ressources disponibles sur le continent, l'Afrique est prête à continuer sur la voie stimulante du développement.

Or, des défis persistent encore, qui sont à même d'empêcher et qui empêchent le progrès dans certains cas. Ils incluent, entre autres, les niveaux élevés de pauvreté et d'inégalité, le vol constant et généralisé des ressources, l'augmentation des niveaux de la dette publique et des risques liés à l'endettement dans certains pays, les opportunités d'emploi qui ne sont pas comparables avec le nombre des nouveaux candidats sur le marché du travail, et les questions liées aux spécificités de chaque sexe, qui empêchent la pleine croissance et l'innovation. La participation directe des gouvernements et à travers des partenariats, est cruciale pour aborder ces questions afin de soutenir et d'assurer un développement socioéconomique soutenu.

Au sein des démocraties constitutionnelles, tous les citoyens sont égaux devant la loi et doivent avoir le même accès à la justice et aux services publics. Les États doivent faire tous leurs efforts pour fournir des services appropriés de manière efficace et rentable, au bon moment et au bon endroit, à ceux qui en ont besoin. D'où le fait que l'accent est mis sur les populations qui sont bénéficiaires des services publics, pendant que la qualité, la pertinence, l'efficacité et le coût de ces services doivent être mis au cœur du vrai sens et du vrai objectif de la gouvernance.

La gouvernance est donc bien importante, comme l'ont si bien illustré David Everatt et ses co-auteurs dans leur publication récente, *Governance and the Postcolony: Views from Africa* [Gouvernance et Post-Colonie : Vues d'Afrique] (le compte rendu de ce livre

est disponible dans l'édition précédente de cette revue). L'objectif de la gouvernance est de servir les habitants d'un pays, surtout les plus pauvres et les plus vulnérables. En revanche, la qualité d'une administration publique, l'efficacité bureaucratique et le niveau de professionnalisme dans la fourniture des services sont une mesure de la gouvernance ; mais cela va au-delà, car la gouvernance s'intéresse également à la coopération entre différents acteurs au sein de la société à tous les niveaux, en vue d'aborder et de résoudre les problèmes collectifs. Toutefois, comme l'indique Everatt, il y a un risque que la gouvernance pourrait ne pas être appliquée de manière suffisante dans certains domaines, et si elle n'est pas soumise à l'obligation de rendre des comptes, ses effets pourraient devenir très limités.

Durant les prochaines décennies, l'Afrique va être la scène des plus grands développements de notre époque, dû à l'influence d'une croissance démographique sans précédent, d'urbanisation substantielle, de développement économique, de changement climatique et de compétition pour des ressources limitées (tel que l'accès à l'eau), pour n'en nommer que quelques-uns. Étant donné qu'il est possible que notre avenir proche finisse par reconfigurer entièrement le paysage socioéconomique et politique de notre continent, il est important que nous repensions et mettions au défi certaines de nos approches aux problèmes, et que nous considérions des nouvelles solutions.

La recherche publiée dans cette édition de la revue représente des questions variées sur l'Afrique entière, et nous espérons qu'elle permettra d'éclairer sur les problèmes du développement et de la gouvernance sur le continent. Ce que nous apprenons est que, pour aborder les domaines problématiques et avancer vers des solutions viables, il est crucial d'adopter une réflexion honnête sur les questions soulevées. Aussi, les opinions et les contributions venant d'Afrique sont cruciales pour répondre aux défis internationaux de notre ère.

Le premier article de cette édition est une analyse des prestations de services des gouvernements en Afrique et des facteurs justifiant celle-ci, de Carlos Shenga. L'analyse est basée sur des données de l'opinion publique obtenues sur Afrobarometer, qui couvraient 35 pays en 2014-2015. Elle permet de montrer que les prestations de services des gouvernements en Afrique varient d'un pays à l'autre, mais que, dans l'ensemble, elles restent insuffisantes dans de nombreux cas. Comme l'explique l'auteur, les prestations de services d'un gouvernement dépendent souvent de la force de l'économie nationale, des niveaux de corruption et, dans une certaine mesure, l'efficacité des médias. Les résultats indiquent que, d'un côté, les prestations de services des gouvernements africains sont relativement bonnes lorsque ce gouvernement a de bons résultats économiques et lutte contre la corruption, et lorsque les médias découvrent et rapportent les erreurs et la corruption au sein d'un gouvernement de manière efficace. De l'autre côté, elles constatent que les prestations de services des gouvernements sont mauvaises ou très mauvaises lorsque les niveaux de corruption augmentent et que la plupart ou presque tous les agents publics sont perçus comme étant impliqués dans les histoires de corruption.

Gbensuglo Bukari et Patrick Tandoh-Offin, dans leur article sur les élections récentes en Afrique subsaharienne, examine comment des résultats électoraux moins controversés au sein de la région peuvent contribuer à la consolidation de la démocratie. Ils se basent sur la théorie de la gouvernance électorale, pour expliquer la manière dont les élections devraient être gérées en vue d'assurer leur crédibilité et leur acceptation par toutes les parties prenantes. L'approche méthodologique utilisée a consisté en une étude documentaire, et les auteurs maintiennent que les élites politiques en Afrique subsaharienne ont, au moyen de stratégies à découvert et secrètes, visé à maintenir ou à changer le statu quo, ce qui entraîne souvent des contestations électorales. Ils maintiennent que des aspects tels l'avantage du mandat du parti au pouvoir et le concept du gagnant qui remporte tout, l'ethnicité ; et les reportages sensationnels des médias, contribuent tous fortement à des résultats électoraux controversés. L'article conclut que les dirigeants politiques en Afrique subsaharienne ont échoué dans leurs responsabilités démocratiques d'agrèger les intérêts sociaux, de représenter des circonscriptions électorales spécifiques, et de servir d'intermédiaires entre l'Etat et la société. Les auteurs, alors que les débats sur les questions politiques et la gestion des élections sont importants, recommandent de bien s'assurer que ces débats soient bien fondés afin de garantir des résultats électoraux moins controversés dans la sous-région.

Dans un cas intéressant d'Ouganda, Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija examine l'impact des membres indépendants du Parlement au sein de démocraties multipartites. Afin de bien comprendre la pertinence et les défis qu'elles constituent au sein des démocraties modernes, il fait une analyse documentaire et une analyse bibliographique, et dirige des entretiens avec certains membres du parlement, des praticiens du monde des médias et des chercheurs. Il soutient que l'augmentation du nombre des candidats indépendants est un thème récurrent dans nombre d'élections en Ouganda, et que le pouvoir, le rôle et la pertinence des membres indépendants du Parlement varie. Cependant, l'exemple d'Ouganda indique que les membres indépendants partagent les mêmes droits et obligations que les autres membres représentant des partis politiques et que les dix Forces de défense du peuple ougandais (UPDF) prévues dans la Constitution ougandaise. On les juge être non partisan et donc n'appartenant pas à un quelconque parti politique. Les membres indépendants au sein du Parlement ougandais s'assoient à droite ou à gauche du Président de la Chambre et votent pour un quelconque parti. Si un membre indépendant est nommé membre du Conseil des ministres du gouvernement central, le membre rejoint automatiquement le parti au pouvoir et abandonne simultanément son siège au Parlement. Les membres indépendants du Parlement n'ont pas accès à la Commission parlementaire établie par la Constitution ougandaise. Bien que les membres indépendants ne bénéficient pas des mêmes privilèges que ceux réservés aux membres des partis, ils semblent bénéficier de meilleurs conditions et d'opportunités pour participer à la législation que d'autres politiques. L'éminence des partis politiques perçus comme bases d'agrégation des intérêts du peuple, comme véhicules de représentation et comme voies appropriées pour l'obtention de sièges parlementaires, se voit diminuer par la montée des membres

indépendants au Parlement. En conséquence, si ces tendances devaient continuer, il est possible qu'elles conduisent à une redéfinition de la représentation législative et des partis politiques. La marche à suivre devrait donc être de redéfinir la démocratie des parties, ou bien en renforçant les partis politiques et en diminuant les membres indépendants, ou bien en renforçant les membres indépendants et en diminuant les partis politiques, et en offrant une autre solution démocratique dans le cadre du paradigme de la démocratie consensuelle, ou bien en diminuant les partis politiques aussi bien que les membres indépendants, ou bien en renforçant les partis politiques aussi bien que les membres indépendants, ou bien en offrant toute autre expérience démocratique pour la poursuite d'une bonne gouvernance.

Les questions liées à l'emploi sont importantes, et comme l'indiquent Najwah Allie-Edries et Evans Mupela, les incubateurs d'entreprises pourraient apporter un soutien à la création d'emplois. Ils ont dirigé une étude comparée des incubateurs d'entreprises soutenus par le South African Jobs Fund. Ce fonds est un programme de la Trésorerie nationale du pays, initié en 2011 pour apporter un soutien aux projets innovateurs de création d'emplois qui pouvaient être augmentés proportionnellement sur une période de temps relativement courte. C'est l'une des diverses interventions sur les politiques actives relatives au marché du travail, mises en œuvre par le gouvernement sud-africain pour stimuler la création d'emplois. Trois incubateurs d'entreprises (A2Pay, Awethu et Shanduka) ont reçu le soutien du Jobs Fund entre 2012 et 2015. Ces trois incubateurs ont utilisé des approches différentes pour soutenir la croissance des affaires de leurs clients, sur une période de trois ans. Cet article présente les résultats d'une évaluation globale effectuée par Impact Economix en 2016, pour mesurer les niveaux d'initiative des clients et de réussite de création d'emplois sur la période de trois ans. L'évaluation a utilisé une approche basée sur des méthodes mixtes ; y inclus des entretiens avec des bénéficiaires d'emplois directs ainsi que des responsables clients des entreprises. Des discussions en groupe ont également été organisées avec des bénéficiaires pour examiner les aspects qualitatifs des activités de création d'emplois des incubateurs. L'évaluation a constaté que certaines des hypothèses suggérées au début de la mise en œuvre, concernant la réactivité aux affaires et la capacité de création d'emplois, n'étaient pas valables durant la mise en œuvre. Cela a entraîné moins de création d'emplois que prévu initialement. Les niveaux de réussite relatifs à la création d'emplois variaient en quantité et en nature, et ont été affectés par divers facteurs, dont les montants de la subvention qui ont été déboursés.

La contribution de Julius Babyetsiza concerne également l'emploi. L'auteur porte son attention sur le développement de compétences pour l'emploi indépendant rémunéré chez les diplômés universitaires de l'Ankole Western University en Ouganda. Cette étude exploratoire souligne le besoin de développer des compétences pour l'emploi indépendant, et recommande ce type d'emploi comme objectif de l'éducation en Ouganda. Elle examine les perceptions des étudiants par rapport au marché du travail ainsi que leurs expériences et leurs attentes pour l'emploi indépendant rémunéré. Des données ont été recueillies à travers des groupes de discussion auprès d'étudiants,

d'entrepreneurs, du personnel et de cadres universitaires. À travers ses résultats, l'auteur souligne la polarisation des perceptions envers l'emploi indépendant. Il fait remarquer qu'il faudrait abandonner le certificat supérieur d'éducation ougandais (appelé 'A-Level') et le remplacer par un certificat technique et vocationnel d'éducation. Il souligne le fait que, autre que le programme d'études universitaires de la faculté des Sciences et de l'Informatique de cette université en particulier, les programmes d'études sont plus théoriques que pratiques. Aussi, l'auteur recommande que les étudiants des autres facultés s'inscrivent à un projet avec un étudiant de la faculté des Sciences et de l'Informatique et travaillent ensemble pour s'assurer que leur projet soit reproduit au sein de la communauté ou commercialisé comme emploi indépendant rémunéré. Cela permettra de servir d'élément majeur à l'Université pour qu'elle développe un modèle qui lui permettra d'améliorer la transition de ses diplômés vers un emploi indépendant rémunéré.

En « allant au-delà de la conformité », Nitasha Ramparsad évalue le rôle qu'un environnement habilitant jouerait dans l'intégration des sexes au sein du service public. Un environnement habilitant est un facteur majeur pour la bonne intégration des sexes. L'article analyse le rôle important que la volonté politique joue dans l'influence de la création d'un environnement habilitant. Il suggère qu'il faut plusieurs joueurs avec une certaine volonté politique pour assurer la création d'un environnement habilitant. Notamment, les actions d'un individu ont un impact sur les réformes institutionnelles développées, et vice versa. Il est soutenu que la volonté politique représente l'élément le plus influent dans le développement d'un environnement habilitant, et donc crée l'environnement habilitant à travers la participation politique. En développant son argument, l'auteur s'intéresse particulièrement aux expériences du ministère des Services publics et de l'administration, qui fait partie des Services publics sud-africains.

L'étude de cas spécial incluse dans cette édition de la revue porte sur la nature et les effets de la mauvaise gestion des eaux usées par la municipalité d'Emfuleni en Afrique du Sud, ainsi que sur l'apport de solutions possibles. L'étude fait partie d'un projet transdisciplinaire dirigé par un groupe de recherche de l'Université du Nord-Ouest (NWU) en Afrique du Sud (composé de J. W. N. Tempelhoff, S. Mahabir, M. Ginster, N. Mthembu, H. Jaka, A. Kruger et L. Nkomo). L'objectif a été de donner aux autorités un aperçu des perceptions typiques des résidents, des organisations non gouvernementales et du secteur privé, lorsqu'une catastrophe arrive sous forme d'une infrastructure municipale qui se détériore et s'effondre. L'attention porte sur la gouvernance participative et coopérative, et sur le besoin de l'administration locale et des parties prenantes de s'engager de manière constructive auprès du public, lorsqu'arrive un désastre sanitaire environnemental critique. L'étude de cas ici est l'effondrement de l'infrastructure de la municipalité d'Emfuleni en 2018. La municipalité d'Emfuleni a été au cœur d'un désastre sanitaire environnemental en mi-2018, lorsque des vastes quantités d'eaux usées brutes ont coulé dans le barrage du fleuve du Vaal, dans la Province du Gauteng. L'évènement a marqué le quasi-effondrement d'un système d'infrastructures d'eaux usées, comprenant trois stations

d'épuration, 45 stations de pompage et plus de 2 500 km de canalisation d'eaux usées. Malgré les diverses initiatives pour remettre l'environnement en bon état, ces tentatives se sont avérées vaines en fin 2019 et la situation reste critique. L'équipe de recherche a envisagé diverses stratégies d'atténuation pour s'occuper du 'problème pernicieux' de la gouvernance locale et des systèmes d'infrastructure des eaux usées. Compte tenu de la crise dans laquelle la municipalité s'est retrouvée en fin 2019, la possibilité d'assurer un partenariat public-privé s'avère peu probable, bien qu'il y ait eu des développements prometteurs avant que le projet de recherche n'atteigne la phase d'achèvement. À part les interprétations de l'étude de cas, le discours fait figurer des illustrations de Word Cloud qui soulignent les mots descripteurs significatifs des parties prenantes des divers secteurs. Ces mots ont ensuite été raffinés pour brosser un tableau des quatre scénarios potentiels de la municipalité d'Emfuleni.

Salim Latib offre un compte rendu stimulant de la publication de Nitasha Ramparsad sur *Gender Equality at Work: Some are more equal than others* (2019). Suite aux mouvements #MeToo et #TimesUp, le parti pris contre les femmes éveille un nouvel intérêt, et sensibilise sur l'inégalité entre les sexes et le harcèlement sexuel à une échelle internationale. Ce livre résulte de l'expérience du Dr Ramparsad concernant l'intégration des sexes comme stratégie d'égalité entre les sexes, et les défis liés à l'accomplissement des résultats voulus. Les leçons tirées de cette expérience peuvent être appliqués à tous les secteurs, alors que les obstacles à l'égalité entre les sexes restent les mêmes pour les praticiens des Ressources humaines, quel que soit le secteur dans lequel ils exercent. Une inspection rapide des programmes et des interventions actuels de transformation visant spécifiquement l'égalité entre les sexes, révèle que ces derniers tendent à être trop théorique, et n'offrent pas assez de conseils pratiques aux praticiens concernant l'aspect du « comment faire ». Une grande attention est portée sur la formation d'individus, avec peu ou pas de mécanismes présents sur le lieu de travail pour faciliter le changement. Ce livre essaie de réfléchir sur une compréhension commune de l'intégration des sexes comme stratégie d'égalité. Il vise à fournir des conseils pratiques sur la manière de contourner les nombreux obstacles à la mise en œuvre de l'intégration des sexes, comme stratégie d'égalité entre les sexes. Il propose qu'un environnement habilitant soit créé, pour que toute initiative autour de l'égalité entre les sexes puisse être accomplie, et suggère des outils et des stratégies pour garantir que l'objectif d'ensemble de l'égalité entre les sexes, sur le lieu de travail, soit atteint. Ce livre excellent, qui est très pertinent dans le contexte actuel et pour l'avenir, est essentiel pour les directeurs des ressources humaines, qui sont et qui doivent rester des défenseurs importants de l'égalité entre les sexes.

EDITORIAL

COLOCANDO QUESTÕES CONTINENTAIS NA VANGUARDA

Thean Potgieter
Chefe de Redacção

Não há dúvida de que a história recente da África está marcada por um desenvolvimento significativo e por grandes avanços em muitos domínios. Dado o facto de o continente ser o lar de grandes e crescentes mercados, as oportunidades são vastas e, em 2019, a África registou as economias em mais rápido crescimento no mundo. Este fenómeno de crescimento é impulsionado por uma série de factores fundamentais, como por exemplo uma juventude vibrante e em crescimento, novas oportunidades de negócio que registam retornos impressionantes nos investimentos, a expansão do mercado de consumo urbano, bem como mudanças estruturais e uma melhor governação que apoiam cada vez mais o desenvolvimento. A África, ao aproveitar devidamente o potencial do seu povo e os muitos recursos disponíveis no continente, está pronta para continuar a trilhar o seu caminho de desenvolvimento inspirador.

No entanto, persistem desafios constantes, que em alguns casos podem inibir, e que, de facto, inibem, o progresso. Estes incluem, entre outros, elevados níveis de pobreza e desigualdade, a continuação do roubo generalizado de recursos, o aumento dos níveis da dívida pública e do risco de endividamento em alguns países, oportunidades de emprego que não estão ao nível do número de novos participantes no mercado de trabalho e questões de género, que impedem o pleno crescimento e inovação. Os governos, directamente e através de parcerias, são cruciais na abordagem destas questões, a fim de apoiar e assegurar um desenvolvimento socioeconómico sustentável.

Nas democracias constitucionais, todos os cidadãos são iguais perante a lei e devem ter igual acesso à justiça e aos serviços públicos. Os Estados devem esforçar-se por prestar os serviços correctos de forma eficiente, eficaz e rentável, no momento e local certos, àqueles que deles necessitam. Assim, a ênfase recai sobre as pessoas como destinatários dos serviços públicos, enquanto a qualidade, relevância, eficiência e custo destes serviços devem ser colocados no centro do verdadeiro significado e objectivo da governação.

A governação é, portanto, importante, tal como David Everatt e os seus co-autores tão pungentemente ilustraram na sua recente publicação, *Governance and the Postcolony: Views from Africa* [Governação e a Pós-Colónia: Visões da África] (a resenha do livro está

disponível na edição anterior desta revista). O propósito da governação é servir o povo de um país, especialmente os mais pobres e vulneráveis. Por um lado, a qualidade da administração pública, a eficiência e eficácia burocráticas e o nível de profissionalismo na prestação de serviços são uma medida de governação, porém há mais envolvido, uma vez que a governação também diz respeito à cooperação entre os diferentes actores da sociedade a todos os níveis, na resolução de problemas colectivos através da procura de soluções. No entanto, como Everatt indica, a ameaça continua a ser a de que a governação pode ser demasiado dispersa em vários domínios e, os seus efeitos tornam-se muito limitados se estiverem associados a uma responsabilização insuficiente.

Ao longo das próximas décadas, a África será palco de alguns dos mais importantes desenvolvimentos do nosso tempo, devido à influência de um crescimento populacional sem paralelo, de uma urbanização substancial, do desenvolvimento económico, das alterações climáticas e da concorrência por recursos escassos (como o acesso à água), para citar apenas alguns. Uma vez que o nosso futuro próximo pode ter o potencial de reconfigurar completamente as paisagens socioeconómicas e políticas do nosso continente, é importante repensar e desafiar algumas das nossas abordagens aos problemas e considerar soluções e alternativas novas.

A pesquisa publicada nesta edição da revista representa uma vasta gama de questões oriundas de toda a África e, como voz do continente, espera-se que forneça alguma informação sobre alguns problemas relacionados com o desenvolvimento e a governação em África. O que aprendemos é que a reflexão honesta sobre estas questões é crucial para abordar as áreas problemáticas e avançar para soluções. De facto, as vozes e contribuições de África são cruciais para fazer face aos desafios globais do nosso tempo.

O primeiro artigo desta edição, por Carlos Shenga, é uma análise do desempenho do governo na prestação de serviços em África, com referência aos factores que o influenciam. A análise baseia-se em evidências dos dados Afro-barómetro de opinião pública, recolhidos em 35 países durante 2014/15. Ela indicou que a forma como os governos prestam serviços em África varia de país para país, mas, ainda assim, esses serviços continuam a ser insuficientes em muitos casos. Como o autor explica, o desempenho do governo na prestação de serviços depende muitas vezes da força de uma economia nacional, dos níveis de corrupção e, até certo ponto, da eficácia dos meios de comunicação social. Os resultados indicam que, por um lado, os governos africanos têm um desempenho relativamente bom na prestação de serviços, desde que tenham uma economia forte e se saiam bem no combate à corrupção, e se os meios de comunicação social forem eficazes na descoberta e divulgação de erros e corrupção governamental. Por outro lado, os governos têm um desempenho mau ou muito mau na prestação de serviços quando os níveis de corrupção aumentam e a maioria ou quase todos os funcionários públicos são vistos como agentes de corrupção.

Gbensuglo Bukari e Patrick Tandoh-Offin, no seu artigo sobre as recentes eleições na África Subsariana, examinam como resultados eleitorais menos controversos na região podem contribuir para a consolidação da democracia. Eles usam a teoria da governação eleitoral para explicar como as eleições devem ser geridas para garantir a sua credibilidade e aceitação por todas as partes interessadas. A abordagem metodológica foi uma análise documental e os autores argumentam que as elites políticas na África Subsariana têm como objectivo, através de estratégias abertas e encobertas, manter ou alterar o status quo, o que muitas vezes provoca disputas eleitorais. Eles afirmam que aspectos como a vantagem da incumbência do partido no poder e o conceito de “o vencedor ganha tudo”, lealdades étnicas e reportagens sensacionais nos meios de comunicação contribuem significativamente para resultados eleitorais controversos. O artigo conclui que os líderes políticos na África Subsariana falharam nas suas responsabilidades democráticas de agregar interesses sociais, representar círculos eleitorais específicos e servir como intermediários entre o Estado e a sociedade. Os autores recomendam que, embora o debate sobre questões políticas e a gestão das eleições seja importante, é preciso ter cuidado para garantir que tal debate seja bem fundamentado, a fim de garantir resultados eleitorais menos controversos na sub-região.

Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija, na sequência de um caso interessante do Uganda, analisa o impacto de Deputados Independentes do Parlamento (IMP) nas democracias multipartidárias. A fim de obter uma compreensão adequada da sua relevância e desafios nas democracias modernas, ele examina provas documentais, literatura considerável e faz entrevistas a deputados, profissionais da comunicação social e investigadores. O seu argumento é que a ascensão de candidatos independentes é um tema recorrente em muitas eleições no Uganda, e o poder, funções e relevância dos Deputados Independentes varia. No entanto, o exemplo do Uganda indica que os esses deputados partilham mais direitos e obrigações do que outros deputados, que se encontram sob a bandeira de partidos políticos, bem como das dez Forças de Defesa Popular do Uganda (UPDF) previstas na Constituição do Uganda. Eles são considerados apartidários e, portanto, não pertencem a nenhum partido político. Os deputados independentes do parlamento ugandês sentam-se de ambos os lados do Presidente do Parlamento e podem votar a favor de qualquer uma das partes. Se um deputado independente for nomeado ministro do gabinete do governo central, ele junta-se automaticamente ao partido no poder e, ao mesmo tempo, deixa de deter o assento parlamentar. Os Deputados Independentes não dispõem de quaisquer assentos na Comissão Parlamentar, criada nos termos da Constituição do Uganda. Embora estes deputados não gozem de todos os privilégios reservados aos membros dos partidos, parecem ter mais espaço para participar livremente nas questões legislativas do que os seus colegas dos partidos. A eminência dos partidos políticos como bases para a agregação dos interesses das pessoas, veículos de representação e canais adequados para a obtenção de assentos parlamentares está a ser reduzida pelo aumento dos Deputados Independentes. Portanto, se estas tendências continuarem, elas poderão resultar numa redefinição da representação legislativa e da política

partidária. Assim, a via a seguir deverá ser a da redefinição da democracia partidária, quer através do reforço dos partidos e da diminuição dos independentes ou do reforço dos independentes e da diminuição dos partidos, quer através da apresentação de uma alternativa democrática dentro do paradigma da democracia consensual: a diminuição dos partidos e dos independentes; o reforço tanto dos partidos como dos independentes; ou a realização de qualquer outra experiência democrática para promover a boa governação.

As questões de emprego são importantes e, como Najwah Allie-Edries e Evans Mupela indicam, a incubação empresarial poderia apoiar a criação de emprego. Eles realizaram um estudo comparativo das incubadoras de empresas apoiadas pelo Fundo de Emprego da África do Sul. O Fundo Sul-Africano de Emprego é um programa da Tesouraria Nacional do país, iniciado em 2011 para apoiar empreendimentos inovadores de criação de empregos que poderiam ser ampliados num prazo relativamente curto. É uma das várias intervenções políticas activas do mercado de trabalho implementadas pelo governo sul-africano para impulsionar a criação de emprego. Três incubadoras empresariais (A2Pay, Awethu e Shanduka) foram apoiadas pelo Fundo de Emprego entre 2012 e 2015. As três incubadoras usaram diferentes abordagens para apoiar o crescimento das empresas de seus clientes durante um período de três anos. Este artigo relata os resultados de uma avaliação sumativa efetuada pela Impact Economix em 2016 para medir os níveis de sucesso da empresa cliente e da criação de empregos durante o período de três anos. A avaliação usou uma abordagem de métodos mistos, incluindo entrevistas com beneficiários diretos de emprego, bem como com gestores de clientes empresariais. Discussões de grupos focais foram também debatidas com os beneficiários para investigar os aspectos qualitativos das actividades de criação de emprego por parte das empresas incubadoras. A mesma avaliação constatou que alguns dos pressupostos assumidos no início da implementação no que se refere à prontidão do negócio e às capacidades de criação de emprego não se concretizaram durante a implementação. Isto resultou na criação de menos postos de trabalho do que o inicialmente previsto. Os êxitos em termos de criação de postos de trabalho variaram em dimensão e natureza e foram afectados por vários factores, incluindo o número de subvenções pagas.

A contribuição de Julius Babyetsiza insere-se também no âmbito laboral. No entanto, ele concentra-se no desenvolvimento de habilidades de auto-emprego entre os graduados do ensino superior na Ankole Western University, em Uganda. Este estudo exploratório enfatiza a necessidade do desenvolvimento de auto-emprego e defende que o mesmo seja um objetivo da educação em Uganda. O estudo examina as percepções dos alunos sobre o mercado de trabalho, bem como as suas experiências e expectativas de auto-emprego remunerado. Foram recolhidos dados através de discussões com grupos focais, envolvendo estudantes, empresários, funcionários e oficiais universitários. Nas suas conclusões, o autor destaca percepções polarizadas de auto-emprego. Ele salienta que o Certificado Avançado de Educação do Uganda (apelidado de "Nível A") deve ser eliminado e substituído por um Certificado de

Educação Vocacional/Técnico do Uganda. Ele enfatiza o facto de que, para além do currículo de Ciência e Tecnologia de Informação (TI) nesta universidade específica, os currículos são teoricamente orientados e não práticos. Por isso, o autor recomenda que os estudantes de outras faculdades se inscrevam, pelo menos, num projecto com um estudante da área de Ciência e Tecnologia de Informação e trabalhem em conjunto para garantir que o seu projecto possa ser replicado na comunidade ou comercializado para auto-emprego remunerado. Isso servirá como o principal ingrediente para que a universidade desenvolva um modelo que melhore a transição de seus graduados para o auto-emprego remunerado.

Nitasha Ramparsad, em “Looking beyond Compliance”, [Olhando para Além da Conformidade], avalia o papel de um ambiente propício à integração de género na função pública. A criação desse tipo de ambiente é um factor essencial para o êxito da integração de género. O artigo desmistifica o importante papel da vontade política para influenciar a criação de um ambiente propício. Sugere que vários intervenientes têm de possuir vontade política para assegurar a criação desse ambiente. Note-se que as acções de um indivíduo têm um impacto nas reformas institucionais desenvolvidas e vice-versa. A vontade política é argumentada como sendo o componente mais influente no desenvolvimento de um ambiente capacitante e, portanto, cria esse ambiente através da adesão política. Ao desenvolver o seu argumento, a autora considera especificamente as experiências do Ministério da Função Pública e da Administração Pública no seio da Função Pública da África do Sul

O estudo de caso especial incluído nesta edição da revista foca a natureza e o efeito de uma gestão deficiente das águas residuais pelo município local de Emfuleni na África do Sul, bem como possíveis soluções para o problema. O estudo faz parte de um projecto transdisciplinar conduzido por um grupo de investigação da Universidade do Noroeste (NWU) da África do Sul (especificamente JWN Tempelhoff, S Mahabir, M Ginster, N Mthembu, H Jaka, A Kruger e L Nkomo). O objectivo é fornecer às autoridades de governação informações sobre as percepções típicas dos residentes locais, das organizações não-governamentais e do sector privado quando a catástrofe ocorre sob a forma de destruição e desmoronamento da infra-estrutura municipal. É dada atenção à governação participativa e cooperativa e à necessidade do governo local e dos intervenientes se envolverem de forma construtiva quando ocorre um desastre ambiental crítico de saúde. O estudo de caso focaliza especificamente o colapso da infra-estrutura de Emfuleni em 2018. O município local de Emfuleni estava no centro de um desastre ambiental de saúde em meados de 2018, quando grandes quantidades de esgoto bruto fluíram para a barragem do rio Vaal, na província de Gauteng. O evento marcou praticamente o colapso de um abrangente sistema de infra-estrutura de águas residuais, incluindo três estações de tratamento, 45 estações de bombagem e mais de 2 500 km de condutas de águas residuais. Apesar de várias iniciativas para restaurar um ambiente sanitário sadio, até o final de 2019 essas tentativas revelaram-se inúteis e a situação continua crítica. A equipe de pesquisa contemplou uma variedade de estratégias de mitigação para lidar com o “problema perverso” da governação local

de águas residuais e sistemas de infraestrutura. Dada a crise em que o município local se encontrava no final de 2019, o potencial de assegurar parcerias público-privadas parecia ser limitado, mas houve alguns desenvolvimentos promissores antes de o projecto de investigação chegar à fase de conclusão. Para além das interpretações dos estudos de caso, o discurso apresenta ilustrações do Word Cloud destacando palavras descritoras de intervenientes sectoriais notáveis. Estas últimas foram aperfeiçoadas para delinear quatro potenciais cenários futuros para Emfuleni.

Salim Latib fornece um artigo instigante sobre a resenha do livro *Gender Equality at Work: Some are more equal than others* (2019) de Nitasha Ramparsad. Na sequência dos movimentos #MeToo e #TimesUp, o preconceito de género está a atrair novos interesses e a aumentar a sensibilização para a desigualdade de género e o assédio sexual numa escala internacional. Este livro emanou da experiência da Dra. Ramparsad sobre a integração de género como estratégia para a igualdade de género e os desafios para alcançar os resultados desejados. As lições que emergiram desta experiência podem ser aplicadas a todos os sectores, uma vez que as barreiras à igualdade de género permanecem as mesmas para os profissionais de Recursos Humanos (RH), independentemente do sector em que exercem a sua actividade. Uma análise superficial dos programas e intervenções actuais para a transformação especificamente direccionada à igualdade de género revela que os mesmos tendem a ser demasiado académicos em foco e não oferecem orientação prática suficiente aos profissionais quanto aos aspectos de “como fazer”. Um enfoque especial é colocado na formação de indivíduos com poucos ou nenhuns mecanismos presentes no local de trabalho para permitir a mudança. Este livro é uma tentativa de reflectir sobre o entendimento comum da integração de género como estratégia para a sua igualdade. O seu objectivo é fornecer orientações práticas sobre como contornar as muitas barreiras que impedem a implementação da integração de género como estratégia para a qualidade do mesmo. Ele propõe a criação de um ambiente propício à realização de quaisquer iniciativas em torno da igualdade de género e sugere instrumentos e estratégias para assegurar que o objectivo global da igualdade de género no local de trabalho seja alcançado. Este excelente livro, que é muito relevante no nosso contexto actual e para o futuro, é crucial para os gestores de RH, que são e devem continuar a ser importantes defensores da igualdade de género.

ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA AND FACTORS INFLUENCING RESULTS

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Carlos Shenga¹

INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, most African countries have implemented both political and economic reforms towards greater democratisation and support for a free market system. Many African leaders competed in a multi-party environment to get elected into office, and those in office have often tried to improve their service delivery performance in order to reduce the levels of poverty that so often characterise the continent. However, studies on how well, or how poorly, African governments perform in delivering services to their citizens are limited. Much of the information on this important subject in Africa comes from isolated and varied case studies that focus on a single country, or even a specific city, town and/or village.

The result is that cross-national analysis of service delivery performance in Africa tends to be rare. One of the exceptions is Afrobarometer, a pan-African, non-partisan research network. Afrobarometer has, over a period of time, conducted a number of surveys in countries across Africa; focusing on public attitudes towards a variety of issues. Their results provide invaluable data on issues, including citizen's views of the quality of democracy and governance, their attitudes towards civil society, economic conditions and market reform, as well as government performance in service delivery. However, even in the case of Afrobarometer, the comparative focus on service delivery is not sufficient: neither of the two Afrobarometer books (Bratton et al. 2005 and Bratton 2013) have dealt with service delivery, and only six of their 181 working papers focussed on service delivery – these were by Blimpo and co-authors (2018), Leo and co-authors (2015), Bratton and Sibanyoni (2006), Bratton (2007), Hounsounon (2016) and Bleck and Michelich (2015).

As this is a neglected area in our study of Africa that requires more systematic examination, this study examines government performance in service delivery in Africa, as well as the factors that influence it. The analysis is firstly descriptive in nature: it investigates the extent to which African governments perform the function of service delivery to their citizens, as well as how government performance relating to service delivery varies amongst African countries. Secondly, it goes on to provide an explanatory analysis by investigating possible factors accounting for variations of government performance in the delivery of services in Africa.

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DATA AND METHODS

The paper, separately and then simultaneously, tests and examines the effects of four different explanations or factors that might influence government performance in service delivery, using Afrobarometer public opinion surveys conducted in 36 African countries (see discussion of the different factors below). The Afrobarometer surveys occurred by way of face-to-face interviews with a structured questionnaire. The surveys are nationally representative, multi-stratified, random, probability samples of 1 200 to 1 400 ordinary citizens in each of the participating countries. In total, 53 935 adult Africans were interviewed. The Afrobarometer data is publicly available on its website (see Afrobarometer 2016). The samples were drawn by taking the smallest geographic units, census Enumeration Areas (EAs) and stratifying all EAs across countries into separate lists, according to province and urban or rural status. A random selection of 150 to 300 AEs from these lists then occurred, with the probability proportionate to its size in the overall population, ensuring that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being selected. Eight households were then randomly selected within each EA, and a respondent aged 18 years or older was randomly selected from each household. A gender quota ensured that every other interviewee must be female.

In order to analyse the data, a quantitative method to conduct statistical tests using a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression tests at individual (i.e. micro) level analysis was used. In addition, since the country variable (in essence, the country region) is included in the analysis, hypotheses were also tested at country regional (i.e. macro) level. Thus, the final test is conducted at a multi-level analysis, as it includes both the micro- and macro-level variables. Items seemingly measuring the same area were merged into a single item – that is, a multidimensional concept or index in order to merge them into an index factor, and reliability analyses were used. The factor analysis extracted one single factor using the maximum likelihood method, and reliability analysis showed the internal consistency of the index to be at least 60 per cent.

VARIATIONS IN GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN SERVICE DELIVERY

A noteworthy feature when analysing service delivery across the African continent, like elsewhere in the world, is the fact that much difference or variation in service delivery quality exists, as shown later on in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In order to understand these differences, one could identify four possible reasons or factors; namely, economic realities, the role of the media, corruption, and a specific or unique context.

The first possible factor that could account for the variation in government performance in service delivery identified in this study is specific economic realities. One can argue that governments will or could potentially perform relatively well in delivering services if the economy also performs well in the specific country. It is obvious that economic production and growth, as represented by the gross domestic product (GDP) (one of

the main indicators to measure the performance of a country's economy), significantly impacts nearly all citizens and structures within an economy:

When GDP growth is strong, firms hire more workers and can afford to pay higher salaries and wages, which leads to more spending by consumers on goods and services.

Firms also have the confidence to invest more when economic growth is strong, and investment lays the foundation for economic growth in the future. When GDP growth is very low or the economy goes into a recession, the opposite applies (workers may be retrenched and/or paid lower wages, and firms are reluctant to invest) (Stats SA 2013).

Similarly, it can be assumed that the public sector is also strengthened in its ability to provide more and better services as, if well managed, growth will be distributed among the population. Instead of simply focussing on economic production and GDP growth, in this study government performance in the economy is instead defined within the context of how the economy is managed, the improvement in living standards, job creation, keeping prices down, the narrowing of income gaps, as well as the past, present and future economic conditions of a country. The items measuring government economic performance are later on merged in a respective composite index. In this study's statistical model, they are coded "0" for response categories of "very bad" or "bad", a response of "1" for "don't know" and a "2" for "well/very well" from the following survey question: "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: managing the economy, improving living standards, creating jobs, keeping prices down and narrowing income gaps?" Items measuring country economic conditions are merged in a composite index of economic conditions coded "0" for "very bad" or "bad", a "1" for "don't know", "same" or "neither", and a "2" for "well", "very good" from the question: "How would you describe the present, past and future condition of this country?"

The working hypothesis is that ordinary citizens who see the government as performing well in managing the economy, improving living standards, creating jobs, keeping prices down and narrowing income gaps, and who also evaluate their country's economic conditions as being better or much better, are likely to form attitudes that lead them to the interpretation that the government is performing well in delivering services. This is because, as referred to above, economic growth and development has a large impact on almost everyone; including delivering services to people.

The second explanation has to do with the role of the media. The media shapes public opinion (Bratton *et al.* 2005 and Gunther *et al.* 2007) and strengthens society. Besides being informative, in democracies the media also performs the role of government watchdog (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer 2007). It uncovers mistakes and exposes corruption within government (Camaj 2012; Starke *et al.* 2016; Andersen *et al.* 2011;

Brunetti and Weder 2003). People who often assess the role of the news media and support the view that the news media is effective in revealing government mistakes and corruption are expected to have the view that the government perform negatively in service delivery. The media often accentuates negative aspects, and sometimes the news might appear worse than what it is in reality (Rosenthal 2009).

In this study, the role of the media is measured by examining media exposure as well as the effectiveness of the media in revealing corruption. The various cases of exposure on the radio and television as well as in newspapers were merged to create a composite index of 'traditional news media', and the following question was asked: "How often do you get news from radio, television, newspapers?" However, media exposure that occurred via the internet or social media were seen as separate items, represented by the notion 'new news media' and the following question was asked: "How often do you get news from internet and social media?" All these occurrences of media exposure were coded "0" for those who answered "never" or "do not know", a "1" for "less than once a month", a "2" for "a few times a month", a "3" for "a few times a week", and a "4" for "every day." Media effectiveness was judged based on the following question: "In this country, how effective is the news media in revealing government mistakes and corruption?" Responses were coded as follows: "0" for response categories indicating "not at all", "not very effective" or "don't know", a "1" for "somewhat effective", and a "2" for "very effective."

The third possible reason or factor explaining the differences or variations in the quality of service delivery is corruption. Corruption undermines service delivery and the provision of goods to society in the broadest sense (Kayode et al. 2013 and Pandey 2010). Instead of allocating funds for public goods and services, funds can be applied for private and individual gains. Here, I hypothesise that individuals who perceive corruption as having increased somewhat, or a lot, and that most or all officials (in the presidency, legislative, executive, judiciary, local government, civil service, private sector and religious leaders) are corrupt, are likely to view the government as performing negatively in delivering services. Yet, those who see positive performance of government fighting corruption are also likely to see positive government performance in delivering services.

In this study, corruption is measured at the level of corruption among officials and government performance in fighting corruption. The relative level of corruption is measured through the question: "In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?" Answers were coded as follows: a "0" for "decreased somewhat or a lot", a "1" for "stayed about the same" or "don't know" and a "2" for "increased somewhat" or "increased a lot". The perceived corruption levels amongst officials were assessed from the question: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption: the president and officials in his office, members of parliament, government officials, police, tax officials, judges and magistrates, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and business executives?" Responses

were coded as a “0” for “none” or “don’t know”, a “1” for “some of them”, a “2” for “most of them” and a “3” for “all”. In order to measure government performance in fighting corruption, the following question was asked: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: fighting corruption in government?” Responses were coded as follows: a “0” for “very bad” or “bad”, a “1” for “don’t know” and a “2” for “well” or “very well.”

The fourth explanation for variations in service delivery quality is context. The context where people live matters in shaping their views and behaviours (Goodin and Tilly 2006). It is crucial to consider the geopolitical or regional context of the place of residence of the African respondents, divided into the following regions: West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo); East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda); North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia); Southern Africa (Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); or Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, and São Tomé e Príncipe). These regional distinctions were used in the dataset and for the purpose of this study analysis. The contextual variables were dummies coded “1” to indicate a specific regional category and “0” for something else. The regional category referenced in the statistical model is West Africa. What are the regional contexts that affect government performance, either positively or negatively, in delivering services?


RESULTS

Government performance in service delivery

Service delivery is the act of providing services to customers – in this case, citizens. Thus, government performance in service delivery is the extent to which governments provide services to citizens. In this study, the performance of government in delivering services was measured by the following survey question from Afrobarometer (2016): “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters: reducing crime; improving basic health services; addressing educational needs; providing water and sanitation services; ensuring enough to eat; maintaining roads and bridges; and providing reliable electricity supply?”

Overall, government performance in service delivery is low in Africa (see Figure 1, where the results indicated represent the “well” and “very well” responses). With the exception of addressing educational needs (53%) and improving basic health services (52%), the averages on how governments conduct service delivery are below 50 percent. Of these the respondents tended to be more critical of government’s performance in providing food (33%); reliable electricity supply (40%); water and sanitation services (42%); maintaining roads and bridges (46%); and reducing crime (46%). These results suggest that government performance tends to be higher in areas that typically attract donor funding, such as education and health. An exception applies, however, to water and sanitation.


Figure 1: Government performance in service delivery in Africa, continental averages



Instead of analysing government performance in service delivery at continental level only, this study also analyses performance at country level, to compare countries. Starting with crime, at least two-thirds of Africans from Niger (82%), Uganda (73%), Botswana (68%) and eSwatini (67%) are likely to express that their government is performing well or very well in reducing crime; while less than a third of Africans from Gabon (19%), South Africa (23%), Madagascar and Mauritius (both with 26%), Nigeria (29%) and Cape Verde (30%) are less likely to say so. The rest of the countries are between the one-third and two-thirds thresholds (see Afrobarometer 2016).

When the focus falls on health services, the results (represented by Figure 2) indicate that respondents from Mauritius (79%) were most impressed by government performance. Others that viewed their governments as performing well or very well in improving basic health services were citizens from eSwatini (76%), Namibia and Botswana (both with 73%), São Tomé e Príncipe (69%) and Burundi (66%). However, at the bottom are the following countries whose citizens are of the view that their governments are lagging behind in improving basic health services: Madagascar (32%), Morocco (32%) and Tunisia (33%).


Figure 2: Government performance in improving basic health services, by country



In terms of perceptions of how well government addresses citizens’ educational needs (represented by Figure 3), the results from African countries ranges from a very positive to quite a poor outlook (Afrobarometer 2016). Citizens of Namibia are most impressed by service delivery in education (81%), followed by Mauritius (80%), eSwatini (75%), São Tomé e Príncipe and Kenya (both with 71%), Botswana (70%) and Burundi (69%). In contrast, at the

bottom of the ranges, citizens in following countries are of the opinion that their governments are not performing well in addressing educational needs: Morocco (23%), Tunisia (26%) and Gabon (32%).


Figure 3: Government performance in addressing educational needs, by country



Mauritius came out top as far as service delivery in the sphere of water and sanitation is concerned as 79% of citizens indicated that they are most satisfied by government performance. The citizens of Sierra Leone were the least satisfied, at 17%; followed by Gabon and Madagascar (23%), Burkina Faso (24%), Guinea (27%), Liberia (30%), Zimbabwe and Lesotho (31%), and Ghana (32%).

Ensuring that people have enough to eat, or food security, is the most critical issue in relation to the citizens' perceptions (or dissatisfaction) with essential services. In fact, none of the countries have a rating indicating that two-thirds or more of their citizenry are satisfied with government performance in ensuring that there is enough to eat (this is represented by Figure 4). Although Algeria, with 58%, came out at the top, 27 of the 36 African countries surveyed are 50% or lower when judging government performance in ensuring that there is enough to eat. In fact, the lowest ratings (Sierra Leone 17%, Gabon and Madagascar 23%, and Burkina Faso 24%), were all below 30%. (Afrobarometer 2016).

Figure 4: Government performance ensuring food security by country



Infrastructure is also a matter of much concern for African countries. Respondents in only three countries rated their governments as performing well or very well in maintaining roads and bridges (implying a rating above two-thirds). These countries are Mauritius (79%), Cote d'Ivoire (69%) and Namibia (68%). However, in the following seven countries, citizens viewed their governments' performance in maintaining roads and bridges as below the one-third mark: Madagascar (19%), Benin (26%), Zimbabwe (27%), Ghana (29%), Tunisia (30%), Burkina Faso (30%) and Lesotho (32%).

On the issue of providing reliable electricity supply, only two countries are above the two-thirds level; namely, Mauritius (91%) and Sao Tomé e Príncipe (66%). However, respondents in as many as 13 countries view government performance as below the one-third level; namely, Madagascar (8%), Burkina Faso (17%), Guinea, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe (all with 19%), Benin (21%), Ghana (24%), Burundi and Gabon (both with 27%), Mali and Lesotho (both with 28%), Senegal (30%) and Nigeria (32%).

In the regression analysis below, the seven items highlighted above are used to measure government performance in service delivery as a single item – that is, the government performance in service delivery index. As outlined in the methodology section, composite indices were constructed using factor and reliability analyses. The items in the composite index of government performance in service delivery were coded in the statistical model, as "0" for responses categorised as being "very bad or bad", a response of "1" for "don't know" and "2" for "well or very well" (see Afrobarometer 2016).

Explaining variations of government performance in service delivery

In this section, the factors accounting for variations in government performance in service delivery are tested and analysed. The ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regression tests are represented in Table 1. The first tests are on the effect of each possible explanation individually and then, secondly, the relationship between all explanations are tested. It commences with a test of the economic realities as an explanation. The initial test of the two considerations measuring the economy (Model 1) appears to be positive and significant. Africans who view their governments as performing well or very well in managing the economy, improving living standards, creating jobs, keeping prices down and narrowing income gaps; as well as past, present and future country economic conditions are better or much better, are likely to express that the government is performing well or very in service delivery.

Secondly, the role of the media (Model 2) is considered. In general, the media certainly plays a role, however, indications are that one of the new forms of news media has a negative influence on attitudes towards government performance in service delivery. Africans who frequently obtain news from traditional media sources (that is, the radio, television and newspapers) are likely to the government as performing relatively well in service delivery. Africans who get news from new and modern media (specifically the internet), on the other hand, are less likely to do so. This is probably due to the

effect of the internet, which is more likely to stimulate a negative view of government performance in service delivery. But social media also has a positive side, as data suggest that Africans who obtain news from social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) are likely to evaluate government performance in service delivery positively. As the role of the media is also indicated by the effectiveness of the media, its effect is also analysed. The results of the initial tests show that Africans who perceive the news media as being effective in revealing government mistakes and corruption are likely to perceive the government as performing well in service delivery.

The third focus is on the effect of corruption (Model 3). The results show that corruption is mainly harmful to service delivery. Of all nine significant effects measuring corruption, only three have a positive effect on service delivery. Africans who perceived that there are high levels of corruption in their countries are less likely to see their government as performing well or very well in service delivery. Those who see corruption among officials in the presidency, tax officials, judges and magistrates, traditional leaders and business executives are also less likely to evaluate government performance in service delivery positively. Surprisingly, Africans who see corruption among government officials and police are likely to perceive their government as performing well or very well delivering services. As expected, however, those Africans who perceive the government as performing well or very well in fighting corruption tend to positively evaluate government performance in service delivery.

After testing the hypotheses at the individual level, the next stage is to do so at the contextual level (Model 4). The results reveal that context certainly matters. Africans living in Southern Africa and East Africa, and to some extent, in Central and North Africa, are likely to evaluate government performance in delivering services positively.

Considering all of these four explanations simultaneously (Model 5), the results indicate that, firstly, regardless of the changing magnitude, all effects continue to be significant with the exception of the level of corruption and Central Africa. Secondly, the effect of corruption among business executives changed to a positive outlook; suggesting that Africans who perceive corruption among business executives are likely to perceive the government as performing relatively well in service delivery – however, the magnitude (.009) of this relationship is almost insignificant. Third, some of the indicators (for example, perceptions of corruption amongst local councillors and religious leaders) could be viewed as significant.

Assessing the contribution of each of these explanations individually, the explanatory power of economy (.39) and corruption (.26) considerations appear to be higher than that of media (.02) and context (.02). Overall, the four models contribute with 46 percent explaining government performance in service delivery.

Table 1: OLS Multivariate Regression Model explaining government performance in service delivery in Africa

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ECONOMY					
Government economic performance index	0.587***				0.458***
Economic conditions index	0.105***				0.091***
MEDIA INFLUENCE					
News media index		0.111***			0.083***
Internet news access		-0.02*			-0.022**
Social media news access		0.027**			0.051***
Media effectiveness		0.097***			0.038***
CORRUPTION					
Level of corruption			-0.031***		0.001
Corruption in the presidency			-0.088***		-0.024***
Corruption among members of parliament			-0.003		-0.003
Corruption among government officials			0.024**		0.031***
Corruption among local councillors			-0.007		-0.016**
Corruption in police			0.031***		0.023***
Corruption among tax officials			-0.026***		-0.018***
Corruption among judges and magistrates			-0.04***		-0.021***
Corruption among traditional leaders			-0.011*		-0.011**
Corruption among religious leaders			-0.001		-0.02***
Corruption among business executives			-0.013**		0.009**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Government performance fighting corruption			0.46***		0.225***
REGIONAL CONTEXTS					
East Africa				0.113***	0.113***
Southern Africa				0.117***	0.052***
North Africa				0.048***	0.032**
Central Africa				0.047**	-0.002
Adjusted R Square	.39	.02	.26	.02	.46

Level of significance: ***p=.001, **p=.01, *p=.05. Number of observations (N) = 53,935.

SUMMATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The results of the perceptions of Africans reveal that government performance in service delivery on the African continent is low. Of the seven indicators measuring the act of providing services to citizens, only two – addressing educational needs and improving basic health services – represent levels above 50 percent. While the other five indicators are below the 50% threshold, the most critically ranked service performed by African governments is ensuring that everyone has enough to eat. Only 33% of Africans say that their government is performing well or very well in ensuring that there is enough to eat. Although the two well-performed services (education and health) correspond to areas that typically attract more donor funding, the same does not apply to water and sanitation, which also tends to be an area of donor support. This suggests that maybe factors other than donor support may explain the act of providing services to the people.

By testing the four competing factors simultaneously, it could be concluded that the government act of delivering services is explained mainly by the status of the economy. The evidence shows that when the economy performs well or very well, and the country's economic conditions were said to be better or much better, individuals also expressed that the government performed well or very well in service delivery. This effect continued to hold even when all other theories were tested against the economic theory.

Following on the effects of economic aspects on service delivery, is the issue of corruption. When corruption appeared to on the increase and officials are perceived as being involved in corrupt activities, Africans perceived government as not doing well in providing public services. Conversely, when Africans perceived their government to be performing relatively well in fighting corruption, they also indicated that services were well provided.

The third factor is the role of the news media. The media's influence on explaining government service delivery is very low, but its effectiveness is critical. Those who see the media as being effective in uncovering mistakes and corruption within government tended to perceive government to be handling service delivery well or very well. While we expected the remainder of the news media exposure indicators to have a negative effects, as news media tend to enhance the negative (Rosenthal 2009), this study data shows the contrary, with the exception of internet news. Africans who frequently obtain traditional news media from radio, television and newspaper and social media, tend to perceive government as performing well or very well in providing services to citizens.

A more thorough investigation of this requires one to consider the difference between 'state aligned' and 'private' news media. 'State aligned media' tend to favour the incumbent party and be more informative of government performance (specifically good performance), while 'private media' tend to be critical of government performance and thus emphasise the negative more. The Comparative National Election Project (CNEP) is a public opinion survey that also distinguishes between news media sources and although this analysis do not focus on media sources, Shenga (2007) indicated how 'state aligned' and 'private' sources effected the attitudes toward democracy in Mozambique. In order to fully understand the role of the media the media plurality in a country is also of relevance. In countries with greater media plurality, a more critical analysis with more emphasis on negative aspects relating to government performance can be expect than in countries with less media plurality.

The regional African context had little explanation of government handling of services. In order to better investigate the impact of the context, further studies have to consider country contexts by selecting specific countries with particular characteristics.

In the final analysis, the important assumptions from this study are that, for African countries to improve their performance in service delivery, their governments first have to improve their economic performance, and second, tackle corruption. A very good legal framework that can empower anti-corruption structure with autonomy and real capacity to act is necessary so that they can detect corruption and bring corrupt officials to justice. The same applies to the necessity for efficient courts and judicial system. To be more effective in serving the people, public services need to be critical about adopting the most applicable public administrative arrangements and not just implement New Public Management principles (Ferlie 2017). African countries must have governments that can also ensure press freedom so that the media can be more effective in highlighting government blunders and exposing corruption. This suggests the need for more media plurality and less control of the media by state agencies.

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TOWARDS A LESS CONTENTIOUS ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the 20th Century was characterised by a concerted struggle for democracy and the clamour for improved governance and development. The clarion call for greater freedom and justice coincided with the political fall-outs following the dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall, on 9 November 1989, and the collapse of the then Soviet Union (USSR) on 26 December 1991; coupled with the influence or pressure of Western governments and donors converging with the activism of domestic forces in demand of democratic reforms (Fukuyama 1992). These events have seemingly become push factors for the democratic discourse. This has provided the incentive and legitimacy for popular democratic struggles in the early 1990s, in what is known in literature as the 'Third Wave' of democratisation (Huntington 1991) that engulfed the entire world in the early 1990s.

Thus, the late 1980s and early 1990s were characterised by the need for democracy and elections, and the clamour for good governance in Africa (Ayee 1999). In the midst of this struggle, rather entrenched autocratic political systems were dominant in the larger part of post-colonial African's political history (Linz and Stepan 1997). The fall of the Soviet Union was followed by a clear expansion in the use of elections across a swathe of autocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, electoral competition for state power has become the norm, and many countries have since held more than three successive elections (Ayee 1999).

Democratic struggles triggered constitutional and political changes and reforms in many countries, including Africa, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. This propelled the holding of elections and granting of civil liberty and political freedom. Since the 'democratisation' of the 1990s, African countries have been attempting to make democratic elections the cornerstone of their emerging democracies (Huntington 1991; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2009). As Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:7) indicated, 38 out of a total of 47 countries in SSA held elections between 1990 and 1994, and many of these were considered to be founding elections in the sense that they paved a route away from the monopoly politics of authoritarian regimes to multiparty democracy. Lindberg (2009: 2-3) noted further that 'the sheer magnitude

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of this shift was in itself a watershed; from fewer than 50 democracies in the early 1980s, 123 nations are presently electoral democracies'. Between 1996 and 2006, 44 elections were conducted in SSA, and between 2005 and 2007, 26 presidential and 28 parliamentary elections were held in Africa.

Since the introduction of multiparty politics in SSA in the early 1990s, electoral competition for state power has become the norm for the contemporary Africa democracy and governance agenda. While the frequency of elections and advancements in the quality of democracy across the continent have generated a sense of optimism for multiparty politics, this development has been closely accompanied by another, much more worrying trend, of election-related contestation as a result of disputed electoral outcomes (Bentham 1994; Linz and Stepan 1997). This trend not only poses a threat to peace and security on the continent; it also threatens the long-term sustainability of these democratisation processes.

Democracy has to be nurtured in SSA countries for the speedy realisation of much desired democratic dividends (Bentham 1994). In this regard, free and fair elections that are devoid of rancorous disputations and violent eruptions are key to deepening democracy and building a pluralistic society. As an acceptable electoral outcome is the norm in the ideal democratic society, SSA countries must prioritise the organisation of peaceful, free and fair elections. This is because the credibility of election results has so many ramifications, including the central question of the legitimacy of authority or the elected government. Elections therefore constitute one of the primary means through which the people express their political will, and the means by which governments gain legitimacy. The integrity of the electoral process must be guaranteed.

However, while democracy across SSA has generated a sense of optimism, multiparty politics has been closely accompanied by the much more worrying trend of election-related violence. In recent years, there have been disputed electoral cases in sub-Saharan countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. A more common scenario has been that of low-intensity electoral disputes; widespread coercive intimidation of both candidates and voters including harassment, imprisonment and assassinations; violent riots and clashes between supporters or security elements of the competing political parties; and attacks on local party headquarters and party symbols. Countries that have displayed such characteristics during elections include Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Uganda.

The coups d'état staged during and prior to the elections in both Guinea Bissau and Mali in April 2012 are also examples of election-related incidents. These all happened where the electoral process was neither free nor fair and thus produced unacceptable electoral outcomes. Given that elections are currently the only satisfactory method of choosing political leaders in Africa, it is important that they are conducted in such a way as to make them acceptable to all stakeholders. Democracy and elections are

gaining traction in countries like Benin and Ghana, since their return to constitutional democracy in the early 1990. For instance, the successive democratic elections in Ghana in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 resulted in a peaceful transfer of power between the major political parties (in 2000, 2008 and 2016), as well as in continuing improvements in the performance of Ghana's formal institutions, notably the Electoral Commission (EC), the judiciary and security forces.

There is also a demonstrable increase in the oversight function of civil society organisations and the media. Unlike other SSA countries, Ghana's democratic success story since 1992 has been hailed by stakeholders, national and international media, diplomatic missions and international scholars alike as another step forward to consolidating its multiparty democracy, and as a model for the whole of Africa (Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Loetzer and Monikes 2009:95; Whitfield 2009). Yet, persistently inflated voters' registers and block voting remained a concern, at least with respect to the strongholds of the two major contesting parties, the NDC and the NPP. Furthermore, the 2012 general election in Ghana was followed by allegations of irregularities by the incumbent government. The main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), prior to the 2012 general elections, subsequently lodged a petition at the country's Supreme Court which dragged on until judgment was delivered in favour of the incumbent on 29 August 2013. Again, the most contested results in that election came from Ashanti and the Volta Regions. Thus, despite the impression of a generally free and fair election, serious malpractices and electoral fraud seem to have occurred in the Ghanaian elections since 1992. Also, Ghana's electoral processes under the Fourth Republic of Ghana show that, at least in popular perception, ethnicity matters in electoral politics more than any other socio-economic variable (Friday 2007: 281, 302; Tonah 2009). In this regard, many voters view the two major parties in Ghana; the NDC and the NPP, as representing mainly Ewe and Ashanti interests respectively (Loetzer and Monikes 2009: 64, 78). Fortunately, this did not result in a large-scale electoral dispute as happened in other African states.

However, against the backdrop of an expected increase in the number of democratic elections in the sub-region and informed by recent electoral outcomes in Kenya (2007), Côte d'Ivoire (2010) and Nigeria (2007) in particular, praise for Ghana's peaceful general elections is understandable. Therefore, in view of the high tensions and uncertainties that have characterised elections in SSA generally, it is important that steps are taken to make future elections less contentious and more acceptable towards consolidating democracy in the sub-region. This paper first considers the various ways in which electoral disputes are manifested and discusses the danger of such manifestations resulting in unacceptable electoral outcomes. Finally, a discussion of possible solutions for an acceptable election outcome considers the use of technology, a comprehensive electoral regulatory framework and a code of conduct acceptable to all stakeholders in SSA elections.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The search for the most appropriate means of managing credible elections has encouraged the emergence of models in contemporary discourse on election management to ensure acceptable electoral outcomes. The analytical framework for the present paper is the theory of electoral governance developed by Mozaffar and Schedler (2002). They identified the provision of procedural certainty to secure the substantive uncertainty of democratic elections as the principal task of electoral governance. Electoral governance, according to them, has assumed a high degree of importance in emerging democracies due to its central role in legitimising the authority of governments.

The theory of electoral governance governs a wide set of activities that creates and maintains the broad institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition take place. It is an important element in securing the credibility of elections in emerging democracies (Bentham 1994). Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) indicated that electoral governance is a set of related activities that involves rule making, rule adjudication, and rule application. Rulemaking involves designing the basic rules of the electoral game; rule application involves implementing these rules to execute the electoral game; while rule adjudication involves resolving disputes arising within the processes. Electoral governance also involves the design of institutions to define the basic framework of democratic elections. Rules of electoral competition and rules of electoral organisation define this framework. Electoral governance theory thus considers political origins and covers a wide range of electoral rules; traditional as well as formal rules that govern electoral processes; laws establishing the structures and operational framework of electoral management bodies; and dispute settlement authorities. The electoral governance theory was adopted as the framework for this analysis. Information was obtained from a desk review of relevant texts, journals, magazines, newspapers, official publications, and other materials sourced largely from the internet. It is expected that this paper will further enrich the existing literature on the evolution of democratic elections that has impacted democratic deepening and overall political development in SSA.

DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS

According to Schumpeter, the expectation of the classical theory of democracy that 'all adult males contributed to the making of public policy' was deficient because it could not explain the concept of popular participation in modern terms. Consequently, in his book, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1947), Schumpeter proposes a definition of democracy that stresses institutional procedures for arriving at political decisions by means of a competitive struggle for citizens' votes. Once this has taken place, the democratic voter is expected to respect the political division of labour by leaving decisions or issues (in government) to the leaders whom they have elected. Elections are thus expected to serve as instruments through which the electorate can exercise

some control over the actions of governments. This brings to the fore the modern (representative) practice of democratic competition between candidates representing different political parties (Bentham 1994). This, in turn, forms the point of departure in looking at democratic consolidation vis-à-vis the conduct of elections, their credibility and acceptability in the emerging African democracies.

Diamond and Plattner (1999) define democracy as 'a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realms of citizens, acting indirectly through competition and cooperation of their elected representatives'. This implies extensive competition for power, citizen inclusivity and civil and political liberties. Also, between elections, citizens are able to influence public policy through various non-electoral means such as interest group associations and civil society movements, which invariably involve cooperation and competition among citizens (Diamond and Plattner 1999). In a democracy, a balance is normally found between competing values and political actors who cooperate in order to compete. To be effective and stable, there must be a belief in the legitimacy of democracy, tolerance for opposition parties and willingness to compromise with political opponents, pragmatism and flexibility. There must also be trust in the political environment, cooperation among political competitors, moderation in political positions and partisan identifications, civility of political discourse and efficacy and participation based on the principles of political equality (Bentham 1994; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Linz and Lipset 1995). Coalition building therefore becomes an essential component of democratic actions. It teaches interest groups to negotiate, to compromise and to work within the constitutional system. In so doing, groups with differences learn how to argue peacefully, how to pursue their goals in a democratic manner and ultimately how to live in a world of diversity. Democracy is embedded in a complex architecture of norms which is embodied in, and implemented by an ensemble of institutions including the multiparty system, an independent judiciary, the free press, and an electoral system. The stability of a democratic order in any country is ultimately determined by the extent to which the institutions listed above are able to function in a sustainable manner (Ninsin 2006).

Elections are major institutional pillars of liberal democracy. They provide a platform for exercising the core rights associated with democracy, freedom of speech, association, choice and movement. Elections are also an expression of the right of participation in the political process. For the masses, elections provide the opportunity to make political leaders accountable for their stewardship during their time in office as well as being subject to electoral authority as the sovereign in the country. The political class sees election as an opportunity to renew their mandate to exercise legitimate power. In this sense, elections constitute a vital bridge, linking the masses to the political class (Ninsin 2006). In addition, growing commitment to democratic elections is also an affirmation of a growing popular commitment to the rule of law (Frempong 2007). In order to ensure quality elections, advances have been made in the apparent competitiveness of elections in Africa with renewed participation of opposition parties.

In a few cases, elections represent real opportunities for the populace to determine who governs, but in many cases they reflect more the character of the political order and the coefficient of an incumbent's tolerance for opposition (Joseph 1999). Elections in Africa have often been stage-managed, won before the election day, rigged or corrupted, and electoral verdicts 'stolen'. In some SSA countries the rules governing elections are yet to be institutionalised. Even the most ordinary issues, such as the choice of election day and the candidate's position on the ballot paper, which normally should normally be an administrative decision, become highly politicised. The contest for power itself is one of winner-takes-all, marked by tensions, acrimony and a vicious cycle of political distrust. These aberrations indicate that holding regular elections per se without having a democratic culture may not be sufficiently indicative of democratic consolidation (Ninsin 2006).

MANIFESTATION OF ELECTION DISPUTES

Since the introduction of multiparty politics in SSA in the early 1990s, electoral competition for state power has become the norm for the contemporary African democracy and governance agenda. While the frequency of elections and advancements in the quality of democracy across the continent have generated a sense of optimism for multiparty politics, this development has been closely accompanied by another, much more worrying trend, of election-related contestation as a result of disputed electoral outcomes. Not only does this trend pose a threat to peace and security on the continent; it also risks undermining the long-term sustainability of these democratisation processes that began after the 1990s (Makau 2000).

In recent years, there have been disputed electoral cases in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe amongst others. There are also widespread, violent riots and clashes between supporters or security elements of the competing political parties; and attacks on local party headquarters and party symbols (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2014). The rise of election-related violence in many SSA countries; according to scholars, security experts and spectators; is due to the failure of political leadership in Africa to protect their citizens (Botha 2015). In Ghana, the rate of political violence associated with vigilante groups has reached alarming levels. By-election violence in Chereponi, Talensi and Atiwa constituencies was known to have been perpetuated by vigilante groups associated with the two major political parties – "Invisible Forces" for the NPP and "Azoka Boys" for the NDC (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2014). The by-election violence in the Ayawaso-West Wagon on 31 January 2019 prompted civil society, academia, the media and the clergy to call on the two major political parties to disband their vigilante groups. President Nana Akufo-Addo delivering his 2019 State of the Nation Address in Parliament, said he had instructed the leadership of the NPP, which he belongs to, to extend an invitation to the opposition NDC to discuss how to disband their respective vigilante groups. The Ghanaian President intimated that the phenomenon of political vigilantism has the potential to destabilise the country and reverse the democratic gains it has made over the years. Electoral violence in its many manifestations poses serious problems for policing of the state and democracy in general.

Generally, SSA has been bedevilled by a growing number of unacceptable election outcomes, leading to protracted post-election conflicts. Ivorian post-election disturbances in 2010/2011 are a reference point for post-electoral disputes. Following the presidential elections of Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, there were widespread contestations resulting from the disputed election outcomes in that country. This unfortunate development caused the death of least one thousand persons, and another 200,000 fled the country to escape the violence. In the town of Duékoué, foreign aid workers reported that hundreds of civilians were killed by machete-wielding attackers in an incident in late March 2011. Although the election crisis has ended, long-standing hostilities between different groups may prove difficult to resolve. On 25 April 2011, two weeks after Gbagbo's arrest, fighting broke out in Abidjan between two rival warlords, both of whom had helped Ouattara battle against pro-Gbagbo forces. According to a UN human rights officer in Ivory Coast, villagers in the southern and western parts of Côte d'Ivoire were attacked, some with machetes, and the populations of entire villages were forced to flee into the forest. Election-related conflicts were equally experienced in Kenya (2007), Nigeria (2007) and Mali (2012).

Albert (2007) notes that people could become apathetic to election issues owing to the perception that government cannot conduct or guarantee free, fair and violence-free elections, or due to poor management of past election disputes (as he highlighted, poor management of election-related petitions is a major source of post-election dispute). Some groups boycott elections in situations where their complaints are not attended to by the Electoral Monitoring Body (EMB). Another form of electoral violence manifestation is the creation of institutional or legal frameworks targeting opponents or individuals to disenfranchise or remove them from political relevance. Such legal and institutional frameworks work against the equal access of citizens to political positions of authority, while at the same promoting the interest of other people. In other words, forms of structural violence are instruments of political exclusion by a privileged few, as was evident in Nigeria's 2007 presidential and state elections.

Election disputes may also result in severe violent eruptions when it is perceived that justice will be served correctly and on time by the courts. The history of elections, especially in SSA and other developing regions, is replete with a cocktail of electoral disputes. This is particularly the case when the incumbent uses strategic means to remain in power after losing the elections. Albert (2007) maintains that this creates fear in the mind of political opponents, the electorate, observers, electoral officials and even security agencies. This is achieved through threat of violence, especially the threat of attacking polling stations and other voting venues. Also, acts such as bomb explosions and shootings on election day are capable of causing psychological electoral violence and can provoke violent conflicts, and in extreme cases, full-scale civil war.

REASONS FOR ELECTION DISPUTES

This paper asserts that the advantage of incumbency and the winner-takes-all concept, ethnicity and sensational media reportage, contribute significantly to contentious electoral outcomes. Albert (2007) identifies four reasons for election disputes: resources, values, psychological needs and communication. The term *resource* is used here in the context of power politics. Dahl (1996) defines political resources as almost anything including money; reputation, legal status, social capital and knowledge, to name a few that have value and can be used to achieve political ends. Too much focus on these as opposed to a public service ethics pushes politicians into generating disputes during elections. It accounts for why people want to violate the rules of the electoral game. This can result in tampering with the electoral process, with a view to ensuring that their organisation achieves or retains power by all means. Also, the activities of the political vigilante groups are based on the notion of reciprocity and the provision of personalised goods (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2014). Consequently, they expect the political elite to share state resources with them once they are in government; therefore, they work hard to win and retain power for their political elite. There is therefore a linkage between vigilante groups and election-related disputes in SSA in recent times.

Scholars have given several reasons for election disputes. For instance, Rasak and Garuba (2017) identified the absence of good governance, low political culture, hunger, marginalisation, incapacitation, intolerance, domination, apathy and cynicism as contributory factors to political violence. Esey (2003) also summarises the causes of political violence as follows: domination and marginalisation of sections and groups and persons in the acquisition and sharing of political positions; rigging of elections and manipulation of political process in favour of or against certain groups, sections and persons; and falling apart of sponsors and those sponsored over contracts, appointments or methods of management of states.

Albert (2007) considers elections as a value-based social experience. They are based, according to him, on the understanding that the best way to rule a society is through popular consent. This requires that those participating in politics recognise and work within the ambit of this value. Disputes arise when politicians or their supporters are opposed to the basic value of an election, most especially the rule of law. In many cases, African politics is threatened by various forms of undemocratic values that people seek to bring into the political arena, including ethnicity, religion, gender bias and ageism. The matter is further compounded when the politicians themselves are not bound by any cogent political ideology, even though they belong to the same party. In this case, they are simply strange bedfellows who could easily fragment into different feuding groups within a short time. In Kenya, for example, the opposition won the elections, but was later declared in favour of the incumbent, and as a result the political situation soon degenerated into violence: Electoral democracy leads to disputes when the psychological needs of individuals and groups do not support an orderly political transition.

It is often the case that the incumbent president or head of state moves to impose his/her will on his political party or the electorate, the EMB and other election stakeholders. A common practice is to hire thugs to intimidate political opponents. In Liberia (during the war) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), powerful politicians engage ex-combatants, retired military men and jobless youths to cause trouble, and engage in activities that could threaten the security environment of the elections (Albert 2007). What people say or fail to say during elections could affect the legitimacy of an electoral process. In this respect, disputes could arise in any of the following situations: where people are not sufficiently informed about their electoral rights and duties; where people lack knowledge of the electoral laws or the aspects of their national constitutions dealing with elections; where political campaigns are reduced to mudslinging matches; and where journalists report election-related issues in a manner that could engender more conflicts.

The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa convened a symposium from 17-18 November 2009 on the theme 'Preventing and managing violent election-related conflicts in Africa: exploring good practices.' This paper asserts that the issues raised with respect to causes of election disputes in Africa are of direct relevance to the Ghanaian situation. Elections are, by their very nature, uncertain and competitive processes. Election disputes ensue in situations where there is a strong possibility of changing existing power relations and the incumbents are unwilling to cede power. This has been the case in Africa and particularly in Ghana, as elections are often associated with tension and the eruption of social antagonism over the capture and control of state resources. Much can be attributed to the dominance of one party and an intolerant political culture relating to the opposition. The winner-takes-all concept often produces a single dominance in all spheres of public life and this triggers a power struggle.

The conduct of democratic and peaceful elections requires a tolerant political culture, which seldom exists in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. In most illiberal democracies or hybrid regimes, political intolerance and repression are rife. In the context of authoritarian regimes, the strategic intent and practical consequences of violent acts are designed in many ways either to vitiate the elections altogether, or to influence voting behaviour through threat or intimidation. As the opposition, and even the incumbents, want to win the elections at all costs, disputes takes the form of intimidation and threats. Motsamai (2010) of the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA) observes that the structure of an electoral system can either exacerbate or de-escalate electoral conflict as it has a direct impact on identity and ideology. The extent to which a system is regarded as fair and inclusive may determine the possibility of post-electoral conflict. Violence often occurs when elections are zero-sum events and the losers are excluded from participation in governance. The role of EMBs is vital during the electoral cycle, as if the EMB is suspected of a lack of impartiality, the credibility of the electoral process is diminished and there are high levels of violence when the results are announced.

Further, it is important for EMBs to have conflict prevention and management systems in place to enable them to handle any incidents of violence that may emerge at any stage in the electoral cycle (Motsamai 2010). As Opalo (2012: 83) indicated they also need to manage resurgent institutions of representation and accountability as well as the rise of constitutionalism in SSA. However, recent hopes that these would usher in an African future of fairer political competition and better governance have mostly failed to materialise. According to his research, elections happen regularly, but sitting presidents almost always win them. Since 2007, there have been fourteen changes in top leadership following a nationwide vote, but in only three cases (Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Zambia) did an incumbent lose. In the other eleven cases, incumbents died in office, were term-limited, or were ousted in coups prior to new elections. In all 46 elections held over this period, the winning presidential candidate garnered an average of 66% of the vote. Even more disconcerting than these lopsided victory margins, however, was the continued dominance of ruling parties (or parties allied to the president) in many of Africa's legislatures. Over the same period the average ruling party in Africa held 62.4% of the seats in parliament, virtually guaranteeing incumbents a free hand to legislate opponents out of future contention through strategic constitutional amendments. There is, however, reason to be hopeful because the aggregate figures do not capture the whole story. This is because even though the figures may point to a conscious effort to manipulate the outcome of the elections, it is possible that the electorates have just been more charitable to incumbent governments in order to allow them to complete any developmental projects they might have initiated, or promises they might have made to them (Motsamai 2010).

Sensational media reporting arouses people's emotions and the danger is that such reportage may elicit violent response. Electoral victory and defeat have become emotional as candidates invest considerable resources to prosecute their campaigns. If the electoral atmosphere is so emotionally charged, people tend to lose a sense of logical reasoning and believe and act on any sensational reportage by the media. The only possible reason for sensational media reporting is monetary or political benefit; but if violence can destroy the economic gains made by individuals and by a nation, what is the worth? The media in Ghana must exhibit a very high sense of professionalism and responsibility in order to make a meaningful contribution to the sustenance of our democracy (Motsamai 2010: 3-4).

In Ghana, ethnicity is a major determinant of vote choice and political parties often identify with particular ethnic groups. For example, Ichino and Nathan (2013) note that Ghana has been the site of several recent empirical studies on ethnic voting. Polling by Ferree and co-authors (2009) indicated that Ghanaian voters did not all express support for the party affiliated with their own ethnic group in the 2008 election, although the associations between each party and their traditional ethnic coalitions remain strong (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2014). In an exit poll conducted just after the 2008 election. Hoffman and Long (2012) found that 67% of Akans supported the NPP presidential candidate, while 71% of Ewes supported the NDC candidate. Voters from other ethnic groups were more evenly divided between the parties (Ichino & Nathan 2013). While

the presence of a strong affiliation with political parties may not be a problem in itself, Ichino and Nathan (2013) assert that such strong ethnic affiliation probably affects individual participation in local ethnic violence. The incidence of communal violence over access to local political power or resources varies in the extent to which they are locally excludable. A likely consequence is that politicians could whip up ethnic sentiments against the winning party in an effort to divert blame from them after losing an election.

Even though ignorance of the electoral process is a threat to peace, some acts of election violence are perpetrated by people who do know about the electoral process and its rules and regulations. In the recent biometric registration of voters in Ghana, some politicians publicly declared that they would physically prevent applicants they deemed ineligible to register and would not abide by the regulations and procedures outlined by the Electoral Commission to deal with such cases (Frempong 2007: 189-210). Moreover, it is now common practice for government officials, especially regional ministers and district chief executives, to visit polling stations — ostensibly to supervise the electoral process — without accreditation from the Electoral Commission. The electoral regulations governing the conduct of elections in Ghana (C.I 15) clearly stipulate who is permitted to enter polling stations. The list includes voters, candidates and their spouses, candidate agents, persons authorised by the Electoral Commission (accredited media personnel and observers), security officers on duty, persons who are accompanying physically incapacitated voters, and Electoral Commission officials. This list does not include regional ministers and district chief executives who have no right to arrogate the power to supervise elections to themselves when they know very well that they are not authorised to do so. On an election day, when the opposition political party agents object to their unauthorised presence at the polling station, this usually leads to confrontation between their body guards and those agents who are diligently discharging their duties. The fact is that such government officials, unless they are candidates, are unauthorised persons and should stay away from the process (Frempong 2007; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2014).

Strong democratic institutions aid good governance, but in SSA, many of the democratic institutions are not adequately resourced due to budgetary constraints. Two major institutions that have primary responsibility to ensure violence-free elections (the Electoral Commission and the Police Service) are subjected to political manipulation and corruption. When such institutions are not adequately resourced and loyal to the state, they become too weak to provide adequate security during elections. This situation then gives rise to people resorting to unprofessional and illegal means to protect their votes, and in most cases, this leads to violent clashes. Since electoral violence has the potential to destabilise a country, it is critical that SSA countries allocate enough resources to prevent such violence. The cost of conflict (social, cultural, political, and economic) is very expensive, and if a nation is capable of forecasting how much a looming conflict would cost, that nation would mobilise every available resource to prevent it (Frempong 2007).

The use of strong-armed 'bodybuilder-types' by politicians has become an emerging phenomenon in SSA electoral politics as such 'macho men' (strongmen) are used as bodyguards by political leaders. They intimidate voters, especially in areas considered to be strongholds of opposing parties, and disrupt the electoral process when their employers face possible defeat. Frempong (2007) and Daddieh and Bob-Milliar (2014) have noted that in the Ghanaian elections, the organisation and use of 'macho men' to prevent ballot boxes from being snatched is becoming problematic. Whatever the intentions (good or bad) for the use of these 'macho men', this state of affairs is likely to create unnecessary tension and breed violence. This phenomenon should therefore not be countenanced in any way. State institutions like police services have the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order and should be supported by all peace-loving people to provide security for the electoral process.

It is clear that stakeholders in an election, particularly the Electoral Commission or the election management bodies, political parties, civil society organisations, media and the general public, contribute immensely to the success of presidential and parliamentary elections in democracy. Without their contributions, the outcome of any election may not be favourable and acceptable by all. Moreover, if their contributions have not met expectations, the general outcome of elections may also not be satisfactory (Botchway 2018).

The organisation of rallies and the election of flag bearers to represent their parties are among some of the important ways that political parties participate in the electoral process. It is a truism that the media play an indispensable role in the proper functioning of a democracy through education and political socialisation. Thus, discussion of the media's contribution to elections usually focusses on their watchdog role of unfettered scrutiny and discussion of the successes and failures of governments. In terms of education, civil society groups have been very active in voter education and observing election proceedings (Gyimah-Bodi 2004). Electorates are the most important of all stakeholders in elections since they determine who will win an election. Thus, voters can make or unmake a candidate, and create a victor or a loser (Mensa 2009). It is wrong to assume that, since political parties, civil society, and government are the institutions which by and large represent the electorate, election management bodies need only deal with these institutions without involving individual voters (Frempong 2006).

TOWARDS A LESS CONTENTIOUS ELECTORAL OUTCOME

In many parts of the world, the conduct of elections is no longer a manual enterprise. Different types of technology are being used by election administrators, voters and election monitors. Albert (2007) states that: '[the] term technology is broadly used to capture three critical elements in election administration and monitoring'. First and foremost, this refers broadly to the application of science and engineering in elections. Specifically, it also captures issues relating to the use of such new technologies as

telephones, the internet, software programmes and electronic equipment; such as computers, printers, scanners, bar code readers, optical scanners, digital mapping and direct capture data machines.

The use of technology in elections is not an end in itself, but assists in the various aspects of electoral administration. These include the compilation of voter lists, material inventories, electoral personnel management, election results dissemination and statistics on delimitation of electoral boundaries, training of officials, printing of ballots, conduct of voter education, monitoring early warning signs, counting and recording votes, and publishing results. There is also an emerging trend of electronic voting (e-voting). It is always important to highlight that machines alone cannot make an electoral system work properly. The human factor, especially the political culture, is very crucial in relation to how these machines are put to use for the purpose of ensuring free, fair and credible elections (Albert 2007). Altman and Klass (2005) recommend that technology could be used for election administration as well as in support the following activities: voter registration, regulating parties and candidates, outreach to voters, voting operations, and corporate management purposes.

The application of these technologies is believed to have the capacity to increase administrative efficiency, reduce long-term costs and enhance political transparency. But disputes arise as to the appropriateness of a particular technology, and on why and how the technology is used. Technology helps to speed up the time it takes to finish counting the vote; thus making for an early declaration of results. Technology may have an impact on the resolution of disputes if the electoral data captured can be retrieved and used as evidence to support the position of any of the contenders in an electoral dispute. However, technology is not fool-proof. The custodians of these technologies have to be people of integrity who will not tinker with the machines in order to rig the results. It is also important that the rules of evidence accommodate material drawn from electoral technologies; otherwise it would be a waste of time to mount these machines and not be able to use them for the purpose of resolving electoral disputes.

Albert (2007) recommends that EMBs have a comprehensive policy towards the design, procurement, deployment, management and disposal of all elements in the organisation's technology infrastructure. According to Yard (2010) Technology Lifecycle Management (TLM) can provide a realistic estimate of the total cost of ownership, training needs and deployment schedules, and can assist election administrators with the difficult task of coordinating the introduction of technology within the election timeline. Equally important, TLM provides a tool for anticipating the budgeting requirements necessary to ensure the sustainability of new technology.

The technologies used by candidates and voters are usually not as elaborate as those of EMBs. What are basically needed here are technologies for exchanging information. For example, candidates for elections can alert their supporters through e-mail

and bulk text messaging. Supporters of candidates can also use the same media to reach prospective voters. Mobile phones, social network media, and digital cameras now improve citizen participation and election observation. However, opinions are divided over whether such recorded information can actually be used in a court of law to support the claims of election irregularities. The laws of evidence have to be reconsidered in this regard. It is also important that officials of the electoral dispute mechanism have the means of verifying digital evidence in these days of photo-shop where it is possible to mount a coherent collage of images from elements taken from disparate and unrelated sources (Albert 2007). It is now possible for reporters to rely on the internet and the EMB's website to get election results and transmit these to their respective offices for processing as news. However, connectivity issues still arise in many parts of rural Ghana. On the whole, however, new forms of connectivity are an important, positive step for democracy in the country.

Albert (2007) observes that the electoral legal framework establishes the status and role of observers in the electoral process. It further stipulates the scope and limitations of their functions, qualifications and process of accreditation. Observers should thus endeavour to have access to that part of the electoral legal framework that concerns them and follow the stipulations religiously. Dispute monitoring has to be an integral part of what they have to do during elections. It is the result of such an exercise that eventually enables them to write actionable reports that could help to improve the conduct of future elections.

In addition, the election dispute management component of an election monitoring agency must be headed by a legal adviser (Albert 2007). The mission should have two major objectives. The first is to be able to engage in rapid response activities during the election by helping to manage or cause to manage any disputes that could be easily handled with a view to reducing tensions in the electoral process. The second objective is to be able to compile reports that could help the EMB prevent future conflicts and deal with the ones that could not be attended to under the rapid response system. A standard election dispute monitoring system should at the least cover the following five aspects: first, pre-election registration; the election campaign; issues on the day of election; issues raised post-voting; and finally general issues in the political system. It is not enough to document the conflict issues; efforts must also be made to follow up regarding the extent to which they are dealt with or not attended to. All of these go a long way in measuring the quality of electoral democracy in society.

An early warning is basically a process of communicating judgments about threats early enough for decision-makers to take action to deter whatever outcome is threatened; or failing that, to manage events in such a way that the worst consequences are mitigated (McCarthy 1997: 15-16). To Diller (1997: 7), early warning systems are sets of procedures designed to detect, process and communicate signals of potential or impending threat, to allow early counter-measures to prevent or mitigate negative impact. The process focusses on three key issues: identifying causes of conflict,

predicting the outbreak of conflict, and mitigating the conflict. Two methodological categories of early warning systems (EWS) are examined here. The first, as proposed by Gurr and Harff (1996: 8-9), consists of the following:

Field monitoring: the systematic registration of local precursor events and the gathering of intelligence in the potential conflict region by local experts, native or foreign.

Indicator monitoring: establishing trends based on statistical indicators which are deemed to measure (de)escalation. This method assumes that there are no discontinuities.

Model-based forecasting: if a set of statistical variables is based on a theory of social change, or conflict evolution, and/or is enriched by qualitative, field-monitoring-based data, the prognosis would be better developed and more sophisticated. A formalised procedure of gathering and weighing data that is based on cause-effect relationships can provide model-based forecasting.

The second typology consists of the following four categories: quantitative warning, qualitative warning, a dual qualitative-quantitative approach, and networks. Qualitative early warning refers to the responsibility of an analyst staying in a conflict zone for a fairly long period of time to assemble qualitative data from which research reports are produced about impending problems and their possible solutions. This approach is usually adopted by special envoys and human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Crisis Group (ICG), for occasional reports which are usually sent to decision makers, policymakers and the general public for action. This is often referred to as qualitative early warning, largely because the data to write the reports come from interviews, group discussions and other data sources peculiar to the qualitative research tradition. This kind of approach starts with the collection of some baseline data which is constantly updated. The warning signs are derived from the emerging continuity and changes in the observed society on specific aspects of its lived experience.

Quantitative early warning manifests in terms of systematic collection and coding of empirical data according to a given set of criteria. Whereas qualitative early warning tries to paint and generate pictures of an emerging scenario, the quantitative approach seeks to understand the critical levels that could literally cause the 'bottle to explode'. In practice, it is aimed at constructing theoretical models for isolating and understanding the antecedent contextual structures, events and processes leading to the outbreak of conflicts and crises (Colaresi and Thompson 2002).

The legal framework of an election refers to all legislation and pertinent legal and quasi-legal materials or documents related to the elections (Albert 2007). The legal framework protects the rights of all those involved in the electoral process and gives

possible complainants an effective avenue of redress. The legal framework should provide effective mechanisms and remedies for compliance with the law and the enforcement of electoral rights, and defines penalties for specific electoral offences. Without this kind of framework, an election could become a disorderly competition that could lead to anarchy. The law must be clearly defined to cover all aspects of the election: the right to vote and be voted for, the mandate to conduct the election, the legality of elections, procedures for voting and announcing results, and the conditions for contesting declared results. Despite the importance of having a legal structure in place to deal with election complaints, the character of those responsible for administering legal procedures relating to electoral matters determines outcomes and resolutions. Institutions are shaped by the personnel that run them. In addition, there is also the problem of how people perceive the functionality of the legal framework. Laws are meant to be obeyed. It is therefore expected that those participating in an election process; whether as candidates, voters or election administrators, must be aware of what the law says and conduct themselves accordingly. It is expected that the sanctions of the law will be clear to all and duly applied in any event of non-compliance (Albert 2007).

Nations are expected to adhere to international legal instruments and regional standards they have ratified in respect to human rights, including election-related matters. The most historical and applicable document in this respect is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 21 of the Declaration states in its clauses (1) and (3) respectively that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives, and the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

The formal application of such standards to a particular country will depend on its international undertakings in relation to the relevant documents. It is hoped that the overall normative guidance they provide will condition the activities of those conducting or participating in elections. Albert (2007) noted that for transparency and credibility, the legal framework could provide for election observers to observe all stages of the electoral processes. But these laws and institutions will have to be operated by people; and until the rule of law rises from the status of being a maxim and is elevated to the norm in society, we must remain vigilant monitors of our electoral systems.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

An emerging democracy is expected to be nurtured to bring into fruition the democratic aspirations of the body politic as captured in the letter and spirit of democracy. Elections are an important function of multi-party democracy and electoral disputes are the climax of the election process. For an election to be legitimate, the process depends in part on the integrity of the process and the objectivity and impartiality of dispute resolution mechanisms. Objectivity and impartiality are therefore important elements in building public confidence in democratic institutions and the election process. For African countries practicing Western-style democracy, one of the challenges of the democratic process is to master the election process and ensure that any dispute that raises a challenge about election results is resolved in a timely, fair and effective manner.

Election dispute may be expressed through several channels; such as petitions, press conferences, peaceful protests, boycotts, litigation and violent protests. In Ghana, for instance, the validity of the 2012 general election outcome was challenged in the Supreme Court. However, in Africa generally, and specifically in Ghana, prominent causal factors of election disputes include the protection of incumbency; absence of a tolerant political culture; design of the electoral system; the winner-takes-all concept; sensational media reporting; ethnicity; and deliberate acts by political parties. In order to make elections more acceptable and less contentious, it is necessary to employ extensive use of technology. The use of technology must be pervasive and reliable enough to be an acceptable option for all stakeholders. In addition, an early warning election dispute monitoring system is a *sine qua non* for a less contentious election system. This should include a qualitative and quantitative early warning system that is capable of quickly processing the warning signals and addressing them before they escalate.

The paper argues that political elites in sub-Saharan Africa have used overt and covert strategies aimed at maintaining or changing the status quo, and this often brings about electoral disputes. The paper finds that an acceptable electoral outcome is an arbiter of a democratic society and it is imperative that the organisation of elections is given adequate weight in any political system. The paper thus asserts that the advantage of incumbency and the winner-takes-all concept, ethnicity and sensational media reportage contribute significantly to contentious electoral outcomes. Political leadership in sub-Saharan Africa has failed in its democratic responsibility to aggregate social interests, represent specific constituencies and serve as an intermediary between state and society.

Finally, there is a need to have a comprehensive legal framework that protects the rights of all those involved in the electoral process and gives possible complainants an effective avenue of redress. The legal framework should provide effective mechanisms and remedies for compliance with the law and the enforcement of electoral rights, and

should define penalties for specific electoral offences. Without this kind of framework, an election could become a disorderly competition that could lead to anarchy. It thus concludes that whereas a debate on political issues, including the management of elections, is important, care must be taken to ensure that such debate is well founded in order to ensure less contentious electoral outcomes in the sub-region. In addition to technology and legal framework suggested by Albert (2007) as stated above, for elections to be free and fair and acceptable to all stakeholders, the following should be considered:

The winner-takes-all concept embedded in the spirit of constitutionalism in fledgling African democracy is a major concern. Constitutional democracy should not be a zero-sum game or event; a situation where the losers are completely cut off from all spheres of public and political life. That does not augur well for constitutional governance in Africa. In Ghana, for instance, when the then main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party, won the 2000 Ghanaian General elections, the newly formed government led by J.A. Kufour introduced a 'proceed on leave concept' for all officials, both public and political appointees of the outgoing government. This development often creates and culminates in political tension and violence in the Ghanaian elections in particular and Africa in general. The reason is that people fear they will hunger and poverty if they lose power, or not winning power as an opposition party. This paper suggests an inclusive governance system in which the losers should not be excluded from participation in governance.

Secondly, attention must be paid to irregularities such as an uneven playing field, a bloated voter's register, and violence by both the election body and other stakeholders such as candidates, political parties as well as interested citizens. This creates political tension and sometimes foments violence. There is therefore a need for all stakeholders to learn from the experiences of the past and to put in place mechanisms to avert this development and build consensus and trust among themselves. However, addressing these shortfalls in the African electoral process requires a certain code of conduct. This code must become law to make it mandatory for all to comply with, so that it becomes an infraction of the law when the provisions of this code are violated and punitive actions may thus be applied.

Third, the election management body should be truly independent and devoid of executive interference or undue advantage in the electoral process. Thus, a special fund must be established, a percentage of government's revenue must be compulsorily paid into the fund for the use of the election body and the spending of such funds must be regulated by parliament. This makes the responsible body truly independent of incumbent interference.

The people who manage the polls at the polling stations on election day must be properly recruited and trained. This training should take a little longer to enable them to acquire much-needed skills and knowledge so that they are able to discharge

their functions credibly. This, in turn, should avoid complicity in the results in favour of any candidate in an election. The issue of public suspicion over the independence of commissioners must be addressed by reviewing the current appointment arrangement. In Ghana, for instance, the 1992 Constitution gave the appointment of an election commissioner to the president. It is therefore suggested that the appointing authority of commissioners should be vested in the parliamentary vetting committee. Citizens interested in these positions must apply to the Public Service Commission and shortlisted candidates should be vetted by the Parliamentary Vetting Committee and approved by a two-thirds majority of members of Parliament. This will avoid a situation such as, 'I don't appoint you to conduct election and I contest election and lose'.

Lastly, the history of adjudicatory function in election management portrays a very bad system which needs to be corrected. Some specific courts should be given special responsibility to adjudicate. Judges who are given the additional responsibility of handling such cases must be trained in election-related disputes and offences to enable them to dispense justice without fear or favour. There should be a time limit within which all elections petitions must be adjudicated. There should be high sense of professionalism and responsibility to sustain a meaningful contribution to the substance of elections and democracy in Africa. This should involve tolerance of political culture in Africa. Poverty and inequality is the fundamental root cause of electoral disputes in Africa. The famous statement the 'devil finds work for idle hands' holds true in Africa when it comes to electioneering. In Ghana, for instance, unemployed youth are often recruited by political parties to snatch ballot boxes and these young men and women are rewarded by their paymasters. To avoid this form of corruption, there is a need to distribute state resources equally and to create equal opportunity for all citizens. This will help stop the use of strong-armed men like the 'macho men' from snatching ballot boxes, which has the potential for electoral disputes on the continent.

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THE IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACIES: THE CASE OF UGANDA

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INTRODUCTION

The prominence of political parties as the most appropriate organs for the aggregation of people's interests and the proper channel for attainment of parliamentary seats may diminish if the trend and interest in non-party candidature continues to grow in developing countries. The phenomenal rise of independent candidates is attributed to the decline in partisanship (Berglund, Holmberg, & Schmitt 2005), the rise of anti-party sentiments (Belanger 2004), internal party democracy flaws, dissatisfaction, personal and selfish reasons, and factionalism. In Uganda, it is widely believed it is as a result of resentment of parties arising from disputes in party primaries. It has continually been evidenced by the number of Independent Members of Parliament (IMPs) who make it to parliament that the independent candidates have been doing well in elections and performing actively in parliament. The number of IMPs in Uganda's parliament has steadily been rising, from 38 in the Eighth Parliament, to 43 in the Ninth Parliament and now, to 69 in the Tenth Parliament (Parliament of Uganda 2019). The 69 IMPs in the Ugandan parliament are greater in number than the official opposition, which stands at 38.

The aim of this paper is to give a perspective on the incidence of IMPs; their relevance and challenges in Uganda. After the introduction, the paper gives the background, followed by the methodology. The fourth section provides a conceptualisation of the incidence of IMPs; explaining why independents run for office. The fifth section deals with the relevance and power of IMPs, globally and in Uganda. Section six looks into the challenges of IMPs. Finally, the last section contains critical reflections for the future of the phenomenon of IMPs.

The method used to compile this paper is qualitative data collection and analysis. It include a review of a number of relevant official documents, available literature, content from various websites, and parliamentary records. Using purposive sampling, a total of forty (40) interviews were conducted. The participants in the interviews included thirty (30) Members of Parliament (MPs), two parliamentary workers and three media practitioners reporting on parliament, two researchers, and three opinion leaders who observe parliament. Valuable information was obtained through these interviews and discussions, which in essence supports and verifies the information obtained through a study of written and electronic sources.

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BACKGROUND

The available literature on this phenomenon indicates that independent candidates tend to perform better in new democracies than old democracies, and in the first democratic elections compared to subsequent ones (Ashenafi 2015, Bhattacharya 2010 and Bolarinwa 2015). It has also been discussed that regardless of the age of the electoral system, independent candidates perform better in contexts marked by party system instability, low levels of partisan attachment and high electoral volatility (Ehin et al. 2013), factionalism and populism. Further still, independent candidates (Independents) benefit from anti-party sentiments among the electorate.

From a historical and global standpoint, Independents have much in common with the members of the loose party groupings which characterised Australian politics from the granting of self-government in the 1850s until about 1910 (Queensland Parliament 2015). Such party groupings, or factions, were linked by shared values, commitment to similar policies, admiration of a particular leader, and the hope of holding office. They formed fluid coalitions in parliament, the largest of which would support the government of the day and for that reason were often referred to as 'ministerialists' (Sharman 2002). In Great Britain for example, with its level of development and political maturity, there are only four IMPs in a 650-member House of Commons, while the United States Congress has two elected independent senators. The United Kingdom House of Commons has five IMPs. In Kenya, the concept of independent legislators came with the 2010 Constitution that envisaged a new era where people would not be held captive by parties. From the 290 elected MPs in 2013, four of them are Independents (Menya 2016). It is plausible that some IMPs start their life in reaction to the pressures of being a member of a parliamentary party. In other instances, IMPs have had a disagreement with their party and decide to leave the caucus, sit as IMPs and vote in Parliament as they, rather than the party, choose.

In Uganda, the feeling of being let down by the major parties appears as a continuing theme in the increase of IMPs. According to available documents and workers within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party electoral commission, in 2006, the majority of NRM independent candidates were protesting the Electoral College system and all the attendant irregularities associated with it. That was one of the possible reasons why adult suffrage primaries were introduced in 2010. The occurrence of IMPs in Uganda is premised on an *expressis verbis* provision, in Article 72(4) of the 1995 Constitution; stating that any person is free to stand for an election, independently of a political organisation or political party (Uganda 1995). Therefore, Uganda's transition from the movement system to multiparty democracy in 2005 saw many disgruntled members, especially from the ruling NRM party, running for the parliamentary seats as independent candidates in the 2006 elections. The 'movement system' was introduced in Uganda in 1986 and terminated in 2005 in preference of multiparty democracy. Under the movement system, candidates for political office (e.g. councilors, MPs, district leaders, mayors, president) stand as individuals to

be elected on personal merit, and not as members of a political party. In order to provide for Independent candidates, political parties have worked with the Electoral Commission and came up with the Regulation of Independent Candidates Bill 2019 (Kaaya 2019). At the centre of the proposed law is a provision that a person is only eligible to stand as an independent candidate for election if they are not a member of a registered political party. Otherwise, they can only qualify for election if they have ceased political party membership for at least eight months before the date of the election. When the bill goes through, it will prevent politicians from becoming Independents after losing party primaries, whereby in some cases they even defeat party flag bearers. The proposal is intended to give political parties more control of the selection of parliamentary election candidates. In the next section, I conceptualise the term of Independent Member of Parliament.

INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT – CONCEPTUALISING THE TERM

What is an IMP?

IMPs have had several labels. They have been referred to as unaffiliated candidates, party dissidents, political oddities, remnants of former parties, and one-person crusades. Thus the notion of an IMP to some suggests self-governing, self-regulating, freedom, and open-mindedness.

Accordingly, descriptions have also been formulated. For example Sharman (2002) sees an IMP as someone who refuses to run with a party label and seeks the support of voters because of the candidate's personal political values rather than those of a party. The term "independent candidate" is used to denote electoral candidates whose nomination is not subject to appointment or endorsement by a political party. Thus, independence is often not a principled position but a temporary status resulting from circumstantial choices made by individuals competing for political office (Ehin et al. 2013). Finally, independence does not imply a particular ideological position, worldview or political style (Brancati 2008). The category of independent candidates includes politicians of all hues within the ideological spectrum, representing diverse views.

In the Ugandan context therefore, we could define an IMP as one whose candidature is not sponsored by a political party. It is common to have party members run as Independents; in effect, without ceasing their party membership. There are some who simply reject parties because they see themselves as belonging to none, and others who become independent after having been voted out in party primaries, especially when they attribute the failure to win primaries to a cheated endeavour.

In a number of countries, it is not allowed for a substantive MP to retain his or her seat in the event of leaving a party. These countries include: Guyana, India, Ghana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Namibia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand (Weeks 2009;

Ehin 2013). In Uganda, an MP automatically loses the seat in such a scenario and a by-election is arranged. The individual who may have left their party is, however, allowed to contest the by-election as an independent. The Ugandan Constitutional Court, on 1 February 2011, issued a ruling that an MP who won a seat in Parliament as an independent could not continue to hold his/her seat after joining a party midstream. The court further ruled that it was unconstitutional for an IMP to be nominated as a flag bearer of a party while still an MP.

Why do Independents run for the office of MP in Uganda and why do they succeed?

According to some MPs who came to parliament for the second time or more as IMPs, the overt reason for being an IMP is because it is their constitutional right. Article 72(4) of the Uganda constitution (Uganda 1995) states that any person is free to stand for election, independently of a political organisation or political party. Therefore, they find it opportune to exercise their democratic right.

Second, Independents run for office because they have some values or ideology that they represent, which they think no existent political party in Uganda embraces. For instance, one of the IMPs indicated that he is so passionate about climate change and environmental issues that the current political parties just give lip service to. So, for him the reason for going to Parliament is because no political party represents his views and the same time, he has no capacity to register a political party. Therefore, the best option to have him legislate on environmental issues is by going to Parliament as an Independent (Interviews 2019).

The third element that came up during the study, was that Independents run for the office of MP in Uganda because they want to represent a particular category of Ugandans based on their constituency – representatives for example of women, workers or the youth, as the case may be, but not specific party affiliation. The idea here is that such representation for a specific interest group is of greater political value than party politics.

The fourth reason is rooted in the notion of individual merit whereby a candidate for parliamentary elections believes that his or her popularity is more than that of the political party and therefore prefers to run as an individual rather than as a political party flag bearer. This is because when one runs as an individual, they may be able to get voters from across party lines as well as from those who do not identify with other parties.

The fifth reason is financial. It has been argued by participants that one needs about 200 to 300 million Uganda Shillings (roughly between USD \$54 000 and \$82,000 in 2019 value) to run for primaries and double the amount when one becomes a flag bearer. In a study by the Alliance for Finance Monitoring, a local NGO in Uganda, the cost is lower, but still high. Their findings indicated that the mean expenditure for NRM

MPs interviewed is 233 million Shillings, 187 million Shillings for opposition MPs and 189 million Shillings for IMPs (Independent Magazine 2019). Therefore as a cost saving strategy, some of the candidates prefer to run as Independents so that they do not have to spend on the primaries, after all the monetary contribution from the party after winning the primaries may not cover all the electoral costs.

The other reason advanced is personal career ambitions. Parliamentary candidates have different ambitions regarding their future political careers. Some are just kicking off their political careers, while others are using it as a springboard to hold higher office and yet, to others, it is the peak of their political career and after they have served a term, they wish to leave politics altogether. Whatever the reason, it was observed that career ambition takes precedence and they will follow the independent path to satisfy the constituency as well as their personal ambition.

IMPs normally have leverage and advantage over party MPs. This leverage is manifested in the fact that Independents are the ones who determine which committee they want to join. They are independent of each other and thus cannot be dealt with as a group, though their chief whip is the Speaker of Parliament. IMPs will always speak their mind, as opposed to party MPs, who are at times constrained by the party position, even when they have a contrary view. As such, they may be assumed to effectively represent their people. One of the IMPs interviewed as part of this study stated, "I am not gagged by the party. I can get it out and say what I want without reservations" (Interviews 2019). Since IMPs do not have ties to a party, they are likely to be more flexible in the way they act for the benefit of their constituency. IMPs also sometimes find themselves in a better position for negotiations. The different political parties will court IMPs when there is a contentious issue. Occasionally, and allegedly, this may be accompanied by incentives for personal benefit; something decried by some voters as corruption. Overall, there is a possibility that IMPs are able to represent their constituency beyond the boundaries of the party and are unpredictable.

Observations as part of the study indicated that not being a party member in Uganda is favourable because one may spend less than a party member during elections. As argued by one former MP, some parties, such as the NRM, require an MP to pay an application fee of two million Uganda shillings to be considered a candidate for party primaries. Then you have to spend on voters to be elected a flag bearer. It has also become costly because it is rather difficult to determine the voting day for the primaries. For instance, in the 2016 parliamentary elections, the NRM extended party primaries severally (Kakaire 2015). This, in turn, may lead to increased campaign expenditure.

There are also claims that IMPs can give people a credible alternative to the parties. One can even advance an argument that a wider choice of candidates for the seat of MP presents opportunities to fight voter apathy. Political parties have been criticised for focussing their activities on office-seeking and holding. The vote for IMPs has

elements of a protest vote. Those who vote for independent candidates tend to be more critical of the government and less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than party-voters (Ehin et al. 2013). The gradual disconnection of the citizen from political parties and party failures acts as a spur to IMPs (Copus et al. 2009).

THE RELEVANCE AND POWER OF INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN PARLIAMENT

Although IMPs have the same rights and obligations as Party MPs, they do not enjoy all the privileges of their counterparts. These include chairing committees of parliament and having a designated sitting position on parliament. They are sometimes in a position to hold the balance of power when a critical vote is taken in parliament; especially at a time of a hung Parliament (which in a parliamentary system implies a situation where no single political party, or bloc of allied parties, has an absolute majority of seats in the parliament or legislature). In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJPs) in May 2008 fell short of the halfway mark by two seats (winning 110 seats in the 224 - member House), requiring the support of independent legislators to muster a majority and form the government (Padmavathi and Shastri 2009). This situation does not pertain in Uganda because the country's parliamentary democracy is not such that it rests with Parliament to form government.

According to a study by Bolarinwa (2015), the arrival of a new, young, educated and professional class of parliamentarian all over Africa has not only advanced the power of legislatures, but has resulted in increased pressure on presidents to embrace democratisation. This may include the Independents. Uganda's Ninth Parliament saw the force and pressure for democratisation by the IMPs, who are always pushing for boundaries for democracy to be enlarged. For instance, 22 of the 30 IMPs interviewed noted that they worked closely with civil society to table Private Members Bills on electoral and constitutional reforms (Interviews 2019). Though their efforts were unsuccessful, it is a clear indication that IMPs have been able to create a partnership composed of the ruling party and opposition members to pursue their aspirations. Those fighting for democracy must realise that ruling parties and governments sometimes block democratic transitions. For instance, in Egypt the government is not only stifling group development, but also preventing high-profile IMPs from challenging the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The government has stopped popular independent MPs from reviving licensed, inactive opposition parties (Stacher 2004).

Relevance of Independents and parliamentary party-based groups

As both Weeks (2009) and Ehin (2013) have argued, the ability of IMPs to perform in Parliament largely depends on the degree to which a) organised groups dominate the main functions of parliament, and (b) non-partisan representatives are allowed to form parliamentary groups that enjoy rights similar to party-based groups (Weeks

2009; Ehin et al. 2013). In the case of Uganda, Article 81 (h)(i) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda bars IMPs from participating in the activities of political parties (Walusimbi 2015).

Legislative work

Proposing draft laws and amendments

Parliamentary rules regulating sponsorship of legislation vary widely. Primary legislation is initiated predominantly by governments and bills submitted by parliamentary actors as IMPs have low chances of success in Western Europe (Marsh and Marsch 2002; Däubler 2011; Bräuninger, Brunner and Däubler 2012) as well as in Central and Eastern Europe (Zubek 2011; Olson and Ilonszki 2011). There are a number of restrictions such as the minimum number of sponsors, time limits as well as technical requirements to bills. The severest restriction is in Germany where only party groups or at least 5% of the deputies have the right to initiate draft bills. In Spain and Poland, the minimum number of sponsoring MPs is 15; in Austria and Latvia, the number is only five (Ehin et al. 2013).

This seems not to be the case in Africa, where there are various opportunities for IMPs to sponsor laws (Bolarinwa 2015). The prospects for Ugandan IMPs to initiate legislation are less restricted. Nonetheless, IMPs do not seem to use this opportunity maximally. A review of parliamentary business transacted by the Ninth Parliament reflects that out of the 15 private members bills, only one IMP, Jacob Oboth Oboth (West BudamaSouth), sought leave to table the Prevention of Genocide Commission.

Serving on parliamentary committees

Parliamentary committees are central to reshaping proposed legislation. Therefore, serving on parliamentary committees is pivotal for IMPs who want to influence law-making. In countries like France, Independents occupy seats in committees after the parties have been served. In Estonia and Lithuania, the express wishes of the individual members of parliament are included, while in Germany and Italy, the parliamentary leadership (Speaker) appoints Independents to the committees (Ehin et al. 2013). The situation in Uganda appears to be more inclusive of IMP participation. Parties have strong incentives to control committee appointments, although IMPs in Uganda even chair committees or hold other central positions in parliamentary committees. This is seen as increasing the space and influence of IMPs in this country.

Attaching minority opinions to committee decisions

The work of parliamentary committees in most legislatures is the most hidden of all parliamentary business. This is because committee meetings are usually closed to the public. As a consequence, the contributions of IMPs to the work of committees remain largely “invisible” (Mattson 1995). So, in those legislatures where the work of IMPs remain “invisible”, an individual can gain visibility by attaching minority opinions to committee reports. Minority opinions are offered by members of a committee

when they dissent from the process or findings of the report. While a decision is being established, minority opinions are also weighed in. By doing so, MPs can communicate an alternative policy stance to the parliamentary floor. The Uganda experience shows that parliamentary committee work is not so hidden. It is covered by the press, rendering IMP efforts visible. Therefore, the Uganda IMP can explore visibility by participating in committees effectively and attaching minority opinions to committee decisions where necessary.

Executive oversight

An individual MP engages in executive oversight in a number of ways that are subject to specific rules regulating the oversight function of parliaments. Though there are some variations across countries, certain elements are common to most parliaments. One of these is the MPs' right to question ministers and other government officials. Three types of questioning instruments can be distinguished: a) simple oral questions usually put to ministers or to representatives of government agencies during question time; b) written questions that are answered orally on the parliament floor or in written communiqués to the questioner; c) interpellations, which deal with matters of national importance. These tend to be more thorough and can be followed by a formal vote in the plenary. All these provisions are catered for by the Ugandan rules of procedure and thus IMPs have sufficient occasion to excel in their role as legislators.

CHALLENGES FACING INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Though twelve of the IMPs interviewed said that it is less costly to run for election as an individual, in many places independent candidates face tremendous obstacles in elections because they compete with political parties (Interviews 2019). Parties serve a number of functions in a political system: they lower the cost of voting, allow individual candidates to benefit from association and provide candidates with organisational and financial support (Brancati 2008: 650). A party like the National Resistance Movement in Uganda has structures up to the level of each village. It has experience and is designed to win elections. IMPs also face procedural and other constraints. They are restricted in participation during question time. For instance, in Uganda, when the president presents the budget, in the subsequent meetings, the leader of the opposition is given opportunity to respond; a privilege not bestowed on IMPs.

In some countries, Independents are barred from competing as candidates in general elections, unlike in Uganda. Candidate nomination is strictly list-based and single-candidate lists are not allowed. This is the case in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, where ballot access requirements deny independents participation (Ehin et al. 2013).

The caucusing of independent members of parliament is limited. They cannot caucus because they are independent of each other. Much as the IMPs can access leadership positions in cabinet, parliamentary commission and committees of parliament, IMPs

feel that their own leadership as a group in the House may be necessary. In fact one of the IMPs interviewed mulled; *"Is there a possibility of having a deputy chief whip who is not a speaker to manage the independents?"* (Interviews 2019).

Uganda is a parliamentary democracy but with heavy elements of presidentialism (Stacher 2004; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Presidentialism in Uganda is not only seen in the provisions of the constitution, but also in the conduct of public affairs. As such, the role and dominance of the presidency in decision-making processes and appointments is high. Sometimes Independents may wish to meet the president and confide in him or make some specific requests but have limited opportunities to do so as compared to members of the ruling party.

In Egypt, quite often the IMPs are considered as the opposition. For that matter, therefore, IMPs have been targeted by the government through interfering with their work, harassment, blackmail and conducting negative media campaigns. This makes becoming an IMP a risky business in emerging democracies.

For the voters, one can only find out about IMPs' real beliefs after they are elected, since they purposefully distance themselves from any core principle or ideology projected by the political parties represented in Parliament. So the question that confronts us is whether it is for the benefit of society or for the individual MP. One can arguably state that independent politicians are said to be all about personal ego. As observed by East Herts (2016), quite often IMPs are reported to have said that they will act in the interests of the community, but is this not simply promising everything to everyone and in a way immunising themselves against being held to account.

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The reasons for the presence and rise of independent politicians in Africa and other polities may differ. But what is clear is that they are becoming more and more recognised in parliamentary democracy. In Uganda, they are increasing in number and the speaker has considered giving them a particular sitting area. Being an IMP seems to be both a joy and a limitation. People are dissatisfied with how governments operate and in some countries citizens feel they can no longer influence governments (Huntington 2012), hence spurring the rise of IMPs.

What does the future hold for IMPs? There are good reasons to believe that the future of IMPs will be relatively bright in Uganda because they are even influencing constitutional reforms to be more reorganised as a special category of MPs. The Ugandan electoral process provides openings for independents to thrive, unlike in other countries, where they are barred from participating as political candidates.

One of the most significant elements is the personalisation of politics. Though in the west generally, the levels of partisanship continue to decline, in Uganda, the levels

of partisanship seem not to be growing fast enough. Under the no-party democracy, Ugandans got so used to the idea of individual merit whereby voting was candidate-based and not party-centred.

The phenomenon of Independents calls for further interrogation since there is evidence for an exponential rise in IMPs. Independents are thus not an idiosyncrasy but a manifestation of the need to focus on the individual as an embodiment of perceived aggregated interests. Therefore, a proposal emanating from this study is that Uganda may have to start thinking about redefining multi-party democracy by either (a) strengthening parties and diminishing independents, (b) strengthening independents and diminishing parties, (c) diminishing both parties and independents, (d) strengthening both parties and independents, or coming up with any other innovative democratic experiment to pursue good governance.

In the first proposition of strengthening parties and diminishing independents, it means that legislation will be made to suggest that Independents are barred from contesting under a multiparty dispensation. Here, the definition of multiparty democracy will be re-defined in a way that some may consider exclusive, but yet the proposal has the potential to nurture and mature party politics so that politicians can learn and be socialised to place their ambitions below party interests.

The second proposition is to strengthen Independents and diminish parties. This idea builds on the concept of individual which was practiced in the movement type of political dispensation, whereby merit pre-supposes that the candidate is not running on the ticket of a political organisation but on her ability, and it is candidate-centred. This further means that the financing is not from any political group but largely from the individual.

The third proposition postulates diminishing both parties and independents. This calls for another democratic experiment that is novel and has not been tested. It may be time to question whether democracy as it is known today is capable of leading humanity to the next level of development and confronting the challenges of politics and governance. Think tanks and research centres could be tasked to come up with innovative governance paradigms that do not necessarily conform to the known. This could be the time to start such a debate that will redefine our parliamentary democracy.

The fourth proposition is calling for clear and increased recognition of Independents. The speaker of Ugandan Parliament, Rt.Hon. Rebecca Kadaga has asked Commonwealth Parliaments to pay attention to IMPs, whom she claims are claiming for wider space in the multiparty arrangements. This indicates that the way we define, recruit, mentor, manage and treat IMPs needs a rethink.

Democratisation and the parliamentary system have driven modernity. Parliamentary

democracy has also manifested itself in many ways and it keeps changing. Now we are faced with the increase in number and influence of independent MPs in Uganda, and it is time that we examine the way in which this may shape parliamentary democracy in the future.

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BUSINESS INCUBATION AS A JOB CREATION MODEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BUSINESS INCUBATORS SUPPORTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN JOBS FUND

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INTRODUCTION

Business incubation is a concept and practice aimed at nurturing start-up enterprises to achieve success. The practice of incubation is well grounded in South African business practice, as evidenced by the existence of an Association of Business Incubators in the country. The main reason for this is that it has been well established that the failure rate of start-up businesses in the country is very high; with some studies estimating rates as high as 60 and 80 per cent (Ndabeni 2008). It is assumed that start-up entrepreneurs are more successful if they are well prepared and supported in the early stages of their business.

The concept of incubation hinges heavily on support for budding or fledgling entrepreneurs in the economy. But what is entrepreneurship? An earlier definition by Stevenson (1983) describes it as the pursuit of opportunity without regard to currently controlled resources, where “opportunity” implies an offering that is novel in one or more of four ways, i.e. pioneering a truly innovative product; devising a new business model; creating a better or cheaper version of an existing product; or targeting an existing product to new sets of customers (Stevenson 1983). Dorf, Buyers and Nelson (2004) define entrepreneurship as a process of “undertaking the creation of an enterprise or business that has the chance of profit or success”. Entrepreneurship is also described as the process of discovering new ways of combining resources (Sobel 2008).

A more recent definition of entrepreneurship infuses the idea of economic inclusion by offering a definition for “inclusive entrepreneurship” (also closely related to the idea of social entrepreneurship), as entrepreneurship that contributes to social inclusion to give all people an equal opportunity to start and operate businesses (European Commission 2014). Here, profit is not the only motivation for entrepreneurial activity. Social impact is embedded in the design of the enterprise. With all these definitions, the objective is either to introduce new or better products in the market or to increase the productivity of current processes by affecting structural and systemic changes leading to higher economic activity and more jobs.

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The literature also identifies several types of entrepreneurs according to different criteria which include, among others, the size of the enterprise, area of focus, and stage of enterprise development. Most important for the discussion presented in this paper is the classification of entrepreneurs by their reason for creating the enterprise. Two types of entrepreneurs are identified in this way: necessity entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs.

A necessity entrepreneur is a needs-based entrepreneur who starts a business because it is the best available option for survival at the time. A large part of this type of entrepreneurs are those who have involuntarily left employment and need to survive by other means. Starting a business is therefore a means of survival for this type of entrepreneur (Block and Wagner 2007).

On the other hand, an opportunity entrepreneur starts a business because he wants to exploit an identified opportunity. This entrepreneur will leave employment voluntarily and pursue the identified opportunity with a predefined growth plan and possible exit strategy (Block and Wagner 2007).

The entrepreneurship space is therefore a fluid operating environment and, as stated earlier, many start-up businesses fail in their first year of existence. This gives rise to the concept of an incubator as an operating environment where start-up businesses are given a chance to stabilise and prosper before standing on their own.

The South African Jobs Fund partnered with three business incubation initiatives in the country; namely A2Pay, Black Umbrellas and Awethu, to catalyse their job creation capacities and see if the model could be replicated to contribute to the reduction of unemployment.

The Jobs Fund is a programme of the South African National Treasury, initiated in 2011 to support innovative job creation ventures that could be scaled up in a relatively short time. It is one of several Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) interventions implemented by the government of South Africa to boost job creation in the country. The Fund was set up as a Challenge Fund and employs Challenge Fund principles in the execution of its mandate. While the literature is divided over the efficacy, suitability and use of Challenge Funds to address socio-economic problems in the country, scholars seem to agree on the necessity of the approach to bring the private and the public sectors together in an effort to address social economic ills in society; chiefly unemployment and poverty.

The business incubators were supported to create a predefined target number of permanent jobs over a three-year period. The Jobs Fund (2019) defines a new permanent full time job as “a new full time position/job that has been created as a result of the project, for which a permanent employment contract has been signed. The new position/job is expected to exist beyond the grant funding period and is

not directly maintained or paid for using Jobs Fund grant funds”). The word “new” refers to a position/job that did not exist in the project before; it has been created as a result of the efforts of the project. For example, the growth of an incubated SMME necessitates the need to create new positions/jobs within the company to handle the new workload as it expands. New staff are hired to fill these newly created positions/jobs. This is a result of new demand for labour in the enterprise.

This paper looks at the performance of the three supported incubators from the data collected through a survey as reported to the Jobs Fund in August 2016 (The Jobs fund 2016). The paper discusses whether the enterprise incubation models were able to help enterprises grow and create employment as a result of their participation in the incubation.

The next section provides a brief review of the literature with respect to the concept of incubators. A description of the Jobs Fund partners that were funded to create jobs is then given, followed by a description of the evaluation design and methodology. The overall presentation of the results of the evaluation is followed by some concluding remarks.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although it is widely accepted that the first incubator was created by Joseph Mancuso in Batavia, New York in 1957, the interest in incubators as a tool for stimulating a depressed economy through entrepreneurial energy only began around the late 1970s (Zhang, Wang, Sahli and Cornelis 2014). Business incubation expanded in the U.S. in the 1980s and spread to the UK and Europe through various related forms (e.g. innovation centres, and technology/science parks, etc.).

There has been rapid growth in the number of incubators in both developed and developing countries, starting in the mid-1980s in developed countries and in the mid-1990s in developing countries (Akçomak 2009). In addition, different types of incubators have developed over time, starting from classic business incubators, to university incubators and sector-specific incubators, to venture and corporate incubators (Akçomak 2009).

Incubation (Stevenson 1983) has been identified as a means of meeting a variety of economic and socio-economic policy needs. Policy needs may include job creation, fostering a community's entrepreneurial climate, technology commercialisation, diversifying local economies, and building or accelerating growth of local industry clusters. Business incubators have also been used to encourage women and/or minority entrepreneurship; identifying potential spin-in or spin-out business opportunities, or community revitalisation.

Even though different types of incubators may share common characteristics, it is difficult to find two or more incubators that are exactly the same. Incubation programmes and processes are heavily dependent on the industry in which they operate, their stakeholders, and the nature and required results or outcomes. In short, there is no single golden standard or model for business incubation, but rather a wide set of principles for adoption and adaptation.

Since the country's 1994 democratic elections, the national government of South Africa has introduced a number of new national support programmes intended to assist entrepreneurship development and the advancement of Small, Medium and Micro-enterprises (SMMEs). The White Paper on Small Business in 1995 and the corresponding National Small Business Development Act of 1996 highlight the role of SMMEs in the South African economy. Under the umbrella of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), two agencies, namely the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency and Khula Enterprise Finance, were founded for the provision of non-financial or business development services and the support of a range of retail finance intermediaries respectively that would deal directly with the SMME entrepreneurs (Department of Trade and Industry 2014). These are direct implementations of the incubation concept.

More than 30 definitions of an incubator are available in the academic literature, and just as many are utilised by industry associations and policymakers in different countries, which is reflective of local cultures and national policies (Hamdani 2006). They all generally refer to an organisation that offers a range of business development services and access to space on flexible terms, to meet the needs of new firms. The package of services offered by a business incubator is designed to enhance the success and growth rate of these new firms (Chen 2009 and Duff 1994).

According to the online Entrepreneur South Africa, in the Small Business Encyclopaedia, a business incubator is defined as "an organization designed to accelerate the growth and success of entrepreneurial companies through an array of business support resources and services that could include physical space, capital, coaching, common services, and networking connections" (Entrepreneur South Africa n.d.). An incubator is therefore a deliberately set up environment to nurture new business ventures to maturity. This environment is designed in a public/private space to cater for economic and social processes that contribute to or accelerate the success of start-up business enterprises. Incubators support budding entrepreneurs from idea generation through to comprehensive business support programs, which help them establish and accelerate their growth and success (Valerio, Parton and Robb 2014).

Another definition of business incubation states that it is a business support process that accelerates the successful development of start-up and fledgling companies by providing entrepreneurs with an array of targeted resources and services (Honig and Karlsson 2010).


The Jobs Fund Operating Guidelines define business incubation as:

SMME support interventions designed to assist a business in its development and growth phase. Specific support differs from incubator to incubator, but typically coaching, mentoring, advice, access to networks, finance and education, and sometimes equipped working space is offered. An incubation programme will have defined parameters, with expectations and responsibilities on both sides – the incubatee and the incubator. Incubators can offer the services for free, can charge the incubatee a fee, or can also enter into a profit sharing model (The Jobs Fund 2012).

So, the Jobs Fund's understanding of incubators is not different from the general definition of incubators in the literature. The Jobs Fund classifies incubators under business support initiatives (BSIs) in the Enterprise Development Window, which includes all initiatives meant to stimulate SMMEs to succeed and create more jobs. Some of these BSIs do not provide traditional incubator support, such as business premises and infrastructure.

There are three generic phases of business incubation, as Figure 1 indicates (see Ryzhonkov n. d.). This model proposes an overall incubation period of two-and-a-half to four years, which is further sub-divided into the pre-incubation, incubation, and post-incubation phases.

Figure 1 Generic Business Incubator Phases



THE THREE PHASES OF INCUBATION

Pre-incubation and Client Selection Phase

For the pre-incubation phase, the way in which potential clients are identified, screened, and selected is critical since it is the basis for effective resource allocation with respect to both individual business incubators and to the general economy.

The task of identifying firms that are “weak but promising”, while avoiding those that cannot be helped through business incubation and those that do not need incubation, is a challenge which requires “a sophisticated understanding of the market and the process of new venture formation” (Hackett and Dilts 2004; Lumpkin and Ireland 1988).

Opinions differ, however, with regard to what the appropriate selection criteria for incubation are, which may explain why different incubators put different emphases on dissimilar selection criteria (Hackett and Dilts 2004; Lumpkin and Ireland 1988). Available options include the prior employment experience and technical expertise of the entrepreneur or the venture team, the properties of the market that the venture is aiming at, the properties of the product or service, and the profit potential of the venture (Hackett and Dilts 2004).

There are two overall approaches to selection; namely, selection focussed primarily on the business idea, and selection focused primarily on the entrepreneur and/or the team. In order to pursue an idea-focussed approach, incubator managers must have access to deep knowledge in relevant sectors (and possibly technology fields) in order to evaluate the viability of ideas, i.e. the product, the market and the profit potential related to the combination of these. The entrepreneur-focussed approach, in contrast, requires the ability to judge capability as well as the knowledge of more general business development requirements, in relation to which the experience, skills, characteristics and driving forces of entrepreneurs may be evaluated.

However, selection is not only a matter of criteria – it is also a matter of flexibility or strictness in applying them. Bergek and Norrman (2008) identified the following two basic approaches: first, the ‘picking-the-winners approach’, with incubator managers trying to identify a few potentially successful ventures *ex ante*. When this approach is taken to its extreme, incubators resemble private venture capital firms. Second the ‘survival-of-the-fittest approach’, with incubator managers applying less rigid selection criteria, taking on a larger number of firms, and relying on markets to provide the selection processes that over time will separate winners from losers.

Combining the above approaches, four “selection strategies” are identified by Bergek and Norman (2008), which are likely to result in very different incubator client portfolios:


- Survival-of-the-fittest and idea: the portfolio will presumably consist of quite a large number of idea owners (or upcoming entrepreneurs) with immature ideas related to a broad spectrum of fields.
- Survival-of-the-fittest and entrepreneur: the resulting portfolio will be diversified, and consist of entrepreneurs/teams with strong driving forces representing a broad set of ventures.
- Picking-the-winners and idea: results in a highly niched portfolio of thoroughly screened ideas within a narrow technological area, often sprung from the research of highly ranked universities.

- Picking-the-winners and entrepreneur: the portfolio consists of a few handpicked and carefully evaluated entrepreneurs, commonly with ideas coupled to the research areas of a nearby university.

Incubation Phase

During the incubation phase, incubators provide services to incubates; usually in a centralised setup. In terms of the types of services provided by incubators, the framework in Figure 2 classifies these into four main types: infrastructure, business services, financing, and networking (World Bank 2014).

Figure 2: Services provided during the Incubation Phase



Another similar set of core incubator services classifies these into four slightly different categories, as follows:

- Shared office space, which is rented under more or less favourable conditions to incubates;
- A pool of shared support services to reduce overhead costs;
- Professional business support or advice (“coaching” and mentoring);
- Network provision, internal and/or external.

Post-incubation Phase

A key feature of incubators is the limited duration of assistance, with exit criteria typically specifying that firms should be successful after a fixed period of time (e.g. three to five years). Ideally, clients should be financially viable when they leave the incubator. The literature argues that while the main goal of a business incubator is to create new businesses, the success or survival of these businesses once they graduate is equally, if not more, important (Schwartz 2009).

In some cases, post-incubation contact between graduates and the incubator will be retained with the outgoing companies through the provision of after-care services and/or on-going networking. In other cases, no contact is maintained between incubator graduates and incubators. The issue of monitoring incubator graduates can be important, and the challenge remains how best to achieve this. Some incubators hold regular networking events which naturally attract graduates through the value that these events offer, and as a result, incubators are able to informally get updates on progress made by graduates and their businesses.

These different aspects of incubator phases are seen in the results of the Jobs Fund's partners; namely, A2Pay, Awethu and Shanduka Black Umbrellas.

PARTNERS OF THE JOBS FUND

The Jobs Fund identifies three broad categories of BSIs, based on the primary services offered together with the model of delivery. These are financing institutions, franchise-based models, and traditional incubation-type support. The three Jobs Fund partners reviewed in this paper fall under two of these categories. A2Pay is a franchisee enterprise while Awethu and Shanduka Black Umbrellas (SBU) are traditional business incubators offering space and training as core services. This section provides a brief outline of the three funded incubators, as implemented by the three Jobs Fund partners. Each incubator model is described in terms of its objectives and services offered.

The A2Pay Incubator

The main objective of the A2Pay incubator was to create employment using technology, by providing service relief to people living in technologically under-resourced rural and peri-urban areas in South Africa. These areas have limited access to retail services and residents often have to travel to nearby urban centres to purchase basic pre-paid services like electricity and other products. The money spent on transport could be saved and used for other household items if these services were available closer to them.

A2Pay used wireless retail technologies to provide services in these areas by providing wireless vending machines and training local people to operate them as businesses in their local areas; thus creating jobs and increasing the income of local entrepreneurs.

The aim was to create a saving by eliminating the cost associated with the purchase of pre-paid products for households, many of which are living in poverty in these rural and peri-urban areas. With these vending machines close to them, they would no longer have to travel to the nearby towns to purchase these services.

A2Pay focussed on the national distribution of a core set of products and back-end systems, which include the vending of pre-paid products like airtime and electricity. The small businesses set up to run these services were expected to flourish due to the high demand for services in these areas.

In total, it was envisaged that A2Pay, with the help of the Jobs Fund grant, would incubate and help develop 2 500 new businesses in rural and peri-urban areas; resulting in the creation of at least 2 000 new jobs within three years. Furthermore, the project was expected to have an extended impact with the development of 5 000 entrepreneurs and business owners (SMMEs) over five years as well as 26 permanent internal jobs at A2Pay. The job creation aims of the project were expected to spill over into the community, since communities would now be able to access products and services locally. It was expected that individuals would be able to save on transport costs that would otherwise be incurred to procure these goods and services from urban centres.

Furthermore, it was envisaged that the revenue from the sale of these products would be redistributed back into the community. In so doing, A2Pay technologies would create a community incentive for unemployed individuals to earn a stable income, as this promotes the creation of wider benefits for the entire community.

It can be argued that the migration of these services to mobile technology may render these vending kiosks obsolete in the near future. While mobile is a serious contender to most stationery or fixed service provision, the current cost of data in the country leaves much room for a longer lifespan of these fixed digital services. A2Pay has its own mobile versions of the vending kiosks, and this is another job creation point of the support. Every vendor trained and empowered to operate a mobile vending machine is a job created. Table 1 below shows the services provided through these vending machines.

Table 1: Services provided by A2Pay Vending Machines

Service	Products
Cellular services	Airtime, data, pay phone, RICA, starter packs
Financial services	Debt review offered as an additional service, micro loans (short term 1 month and long term 84 months)
Electricity	Vending to municipal accounts, prepaid meters and Eskom
Insurance services	Infusion funeral cover service
Courier service	(UTI)
Business services	Biz Desk/Box/Booth vending solution (scan, print, copy, fax, email).

The primary mission of A2Pay was to contribute to the creation of sustainable employment in the country through SMME development, while at the same time harnessing and growing the talent and leadership abilities of South Africa's entrepreneurs. In this way, A2Pay would empower people with the opportunity to run their own businesses.

The A2Pay model was operated as a franchise, where every participating entrepreneur was provided with a pre-selected site and a fully functional kiosk registered in the owners' name, as well as the relevant equipment, including a point-of-sale (POS) system, voice over IP telephone for direct customer service, pay phone to sell 90c per minute telephone calls, vending software and a printer to vend a variety of pre-paid products. A cash validator to validate cash and a vault to store cash were also provided. Also included were software to register cell phone contracts and a printer to offer business services; and a wireless hotspot system to provide the sale of internet connectivity. Two mobile systems with cell phones and mobile printers were also provided per kiosk; allowing for business assistants to sell prepaid products remotely on the move and at home.

It was assumed that the participating entrepreneurs would develop their skills and produce revenue through the operation of the kiosks. This would lead to the operation of stable businesses that would grow; enabling the owners to employ people from the community.

The Awethu Project

Awethu sought to harness the skills and leadership talent in the South African economy through entrepreneurship and business growth. Awethu's vision was to be the best business partner for entrepreneurs from under-resourced backgrounds; enabling them to realise their full potential and profoundly improve lives and communities. The theory of change adopted for the implementation of the Awethu project posited that the main reason for the failure of most budding entrepreneurs in South Africa was lack of access to financial networks and services. It was assumed that most entrepreneurs are unaware of the significant financial and non-financial services currently available to them in under-resourced areas that could support potential entrepreneurs to success. Awethu would guide the selected entrepreneurs to these resources in the incubator, and they would be able to use them to become successful and stand on their own during and after the three-year incubation period.

With assistance from the Jobs Fund, Awethu aimed to identify high potential entrepreneurs (through their Talent Identification Program), equip them with enhanced entrepreneurship skills crucial to their success, and connect them with the resources that would allow them to grow their businesses and lead their own communities to economic prosperity. New entrepreneurs were expected to reinforce the job creation loop by employing other individuals as they grow and expand their businesses.

Awethu provided mentoring and coaching services through their trained Entrepreneurship Teams and Incubation Coaches. The interactions were conducted in weekly meetings at different sites. Consultants would also visit the entrepreneur's sites and advise on growth strategies. The entrepreneurs received 20 to 24 weekly training modules; each focussing on a different key business concept.

The entrepreneurs were expected to leave the incubation with improved business and financial planning and management skills. It was also expected that interaction with incubation coaches and entrepreneurship teams would lead to better access to financial resources, better networks and potential partnerships. This would then lead to sustainable, growing businesses that are able to employ additional staff; thus creating jobs.

The incubator assumed that:

- Entrepreneurs want to become successful and increase their income;
- Entrepreneurs can learn the behaviours required to become successful at the same time as building a successful business;
- Entrepreneurs value the knowledge and input they receive in growing their business to the extent that they are willing to pay for it;
- Once entrepreneurs start to grow their revenue they will employ other people;
- South Africans are inherently entrepreneurial; and
- Entrepreneurs are prepared to work hard.

Shanduka Black Umbrellas

Shanduka Black Umbrellas (SBU) is a non-profit incubation enterprise development service provider that aims to facilitate collaboration opportunities between 100 percent black owned businesses and partners in government, the private sector and civil society. SBU's fundamental purpose is to collaborate with partners to provide business support services through an incubator model, in order to alleviate the high failure rate of start-up black businesses in the country. SBU seeks to advance black entrepreneurs and small business development through a multi-stakeholder collaboration, with the common purpose of achieving economic and social change through action, inspiration and support.

In order to create a sustainable programme to harness and strengthen South Africa's black entrepreneurs, SBU works through a platform of co-operation between civil society, the private sector and government to ensure the correct resources, skills development, mentoring and access to markets are in place to support development at all levels.

Through the provision of a structured and subsidised programme, SBU clients were afforded business expertise, office infrastructure and resources over a three-year period, to create the important foundations on which to build sustainable businesses.

SBU aimed to transform the South African economy by linking big business to smaller suppliers and increasing the economic opportunities that arise out of enterprise development.

Through its partnership with the Jobs Fund, SBU sought to develop these businesses to a level where they could gain meaningful access to financial networks and markets.

It was assumed that:

- Clients would be able to pay the monthly subsidised fee for incubation services;
- The matching process between clients and mentors would ensure an effective relationship;
- The nature of training and mentorship provided would be sufficient to generate the required skills and knowledge to sustainably grow black businesses;
- The networking opportunities provided to incubatees would lead to effective partners by effectively matching the respective needs of both parties;
- The incubated business would start to generate orders/services/clients and grow their turnover; and
- At least 50% of businesses would be sustainable within three years of joining SBU.

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A cross-sectional approach was adopted for the evaluation, with data collected after three years of implementation across all implementation sites in all provinces except the Free State province. The bulk of the incubatees (more than 80 per cent) were in Gauteng province. Beneficiaries were requested to respond to a set of interview questions about their current and previous business activities related to their participation in the incubator programs. A more structured longitudinal approach would have been more appropriate, but the circumstances did not allow for this to be the case.

The key evaluation questions addressed in this paper are: if the incubatees succeed in their businesses after the three years of incubation? To what extent was their success a result of the incubation? Were the incubatees able to employ more people in their businesses as a result of their success?

We seek to make inference to the general effectiveness of incubation as a means of addressing unemployment in the context of the South African labour market.

Data Collection Methodology

Both qualitative and quantitative data were obtained from the project participants and managers of the incubators. Three main data sources were used:

1. Survey with incubator beneficiaries: the quantitative data was collected through a survey questionnaire administered to participants in the three incubators, with the following respondents: Awethu 188 respondents; A2Pay 100 respondents; and Shanduka 26 respondents.
2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): the qualitative data was collected through focus group discussions and open ended questions in the survey. FGDs were held, with six to eight clients per incubator, one focus group each for current beneficiaries, and one for beneficiaries that have graduated from Awethu and Shanduka.
3. Grant Management System (GMS) quarterly reporting: the job creation data was collected over three years, through the Jobs Fund Monitoring and Evaluation unit's quarterly reporting mechanism. The Jobs Fund signs a grant agreement with its partners that obliges them to report job creation figures on a quarterly basis. Included in the agreement are target job numbers for each grant awardee. These targets differ depending on the different project specifications, theory of change and grant amount agreed upon with each grant awardee. The data is stored in an automated GMS, which the Jobs Fund partners have access to. They use this system to report their job numbers against the targets in the Grant Agreement. The reported data is verified on-site by monitoring specialists from the Jobs Fund, on a rolling quarterly basis.

Limitations

One limitation of the evaluation was the absence of a counterfactual. Therefore, changes on certain outcome variables that incubator clients were measured on before and after their participation in the incubator program may be influenced by external factors beyond the control or scope of the incubator. However, pre- and post-type questions were asked in the instrument that gave an indication of the status of the incubated businesses before incubation and the status after incubation. This is self-reported data and, as such, it is difficult to fully attribute the causal effect of each incubator to these outcome variables.

Due to the poor quality and availability of incubator project records (e.g. contact details) as well as limited access to the internet to complete an internet-based client questionnaire, other methods of data collection, such as telephonic and face-to-face interviews, were utilised. This led to a reduced pool of total number of respondents as many were unreachable via telephone.

RESULTS

Demographics of Respondents

The Jobs Fund intends to reach more women and youth (under 35 years of age) in all of the projects it supports. These have been shown to be the most vulnerable groups in the country in terms of unemployment. Table 2 shows that Awethu had the highest proportion of youth of the three projects (65 percent of the 21 to 29 and 30 to 35 age groups combined).

Table 2: Age Group of Incubatees by Project

What is your age?	Project			
	A2Pay	Awethu	SBU	Total
36-49 years	40	57	8	105
	38.10%	54.29%	7.62%	100.00%
30-35 years	28	50	11	89
	31.46%	56.18%	12.36%	100.00%
21-29 years	11	49	3	63
	17.46%	77.78%	4.76%	100.00%
50-59 years	16	22	2	40
	40.00%	55.00%	5.00%	100.00%
60 years or older	5	10	2	17
	29.41%	58.82%	11.76%	100.00%
Total	100	188	26	314
	31.85%	59.87%	8.28%	100.00%

(First row has *frequencies* and second row has *row percentages*)

The proportion of women incubatees was much lower than would be desired in all the three incubators, with a total of 36 per cent female incubatees recruited across the board. A2Pay had the highest proportion of female incubates, at 45 per cent, followed by Awethu at 31 per cent (Table 3).

Table 3: Gender of Incubatees by Project

Project	Are you male or female?		
	Female	Male	Total
Awethu	59	129	188
	31.38%	68.62%	100.00%
A2Pay	45	55	100
	45.00%	55.00%	100.00%
SBU	8	18	26
	30.77%	69.23%	100.00%
Total	112	202	314
	35.67%	64.33%	100.00%

(First row has *frequencies* and second row has *row percentages*)

Were the incubatees successful in their businesses?

The respondents were asked what their average turnover was at the beginning of the incubation and at the end of the three-year incubation period. The responses were recorded in rand value terms and were mainly based on what the respondent recalled to be the case. The figures reported were not verified with accounting records or any other written documentation. So success was recorded if an entrepreneur's reported turnover was higher at the end of the incubation than it was at the beginning. Table 4 indicates that 70 per cent of the incubatees reported higher average turnovers at the end of the incubation period, with A2Pay recording the highest success proportion, at 77 per cent of incubatees.

Table 4: Did the business report a positive average turnover after three years?

Project	Success		
	No	Yes	Total
Awethu	61	127	188
	32.45%	67.55%	100.00%
A2Pay	23	77	100
	23.00%	77.00%	100.00%
SBU	9	17	26
	34.62%	65.38%	100.00%
Total	93	221	314
	29.62%	70.38%	100.00%

(First row has *frequencies* and second row has *row percentages*)

More than 70 per cent of respondents indicated that the incubators had a high impact on the development of a range of personal qualities and attitudes, which included the incubatees' motivation to do business, self-discipline, determination to succeed in business, confidence and self-belief, creativity, ability to keep trying when dealing with obstacles, willingness to take risks, and ability to deal with failure.

To what extent was the reported success a result of their involvement with the project?

The limitations of the data collected did not allow for an objective assessment of attribution of success to incubator activity. However, the incubatees were asked to report their subjective perception of attribution of success to incubator activity. They were asked to report to what extent their success was a result of their involvement with the incubators. Overall, 52 per cent of the incubatees said that, "to a high extent", their success was a result of their involvement with the incubation (see Table 5). Combining "high extent" and "moderate extent" respondents gives a 77 per cent overall positive perception of attribution.

Table 5: To what extent was the incubation responsible for your success?

Project	Growth because of involvement with Project				
	High extent	Moderate extent	No extent	Other (please specify)	Total
Awethu	78	44	63	1	186
	41.94%	23.66%	33.87%	0.54%	100.00%
A2Pay	72	24	4	0	100
	72.00%	24.00%	4.00%	0.00%	100.00%
SBU	15	8	3	0	26
	57.69%	30.77%	11.54%	0.00%	100.00%
Total	165	76	70	1	312
	52.88%	24.36%	22.44%	0.32%	100.00%

(First row has *frequencies* and second row has *row percentages*)

Seventy (70) per cent of respondents indicated that the incubators had increased their business knowledge and skills. 60 per cent of respondents generally found the impact of the incubator to be either 'good' or 'excellent' on a range of dimensions; including finding information on business opportunities and identifying market trends, selecting market entry strategies, problem solving and innovation.


A number of weaknesses have undermined the achievement of objectives. However, the following are noteworthy: poor support with networking; inconsistencies in the approach and intensity of mentoring; and challenges in assisting with access to finance. Of relevance to the last point are the very stringent business formalisation requirements and excessively lengthy six- to twelve-month financial assistance application processing time frames by financial service providers.

A2Pay Outcomes

The job creation performance of A2Pay during the three-year period is summarised in Figure 2 (below). A2Pay reached 99.7% of its contracted new permanent jobs target (Figure 3). It is worth noting that the number of beneficiaries trained should necessarily be equal to the number of jobs created because each trained beneficiary was given a machine and trained on how to operate it. It was a requirement that every entrepreneur employ and train at least one employee to operate the A2Pay franchise machine.

However, differences occur because some trained beneficiaries trained more than one person to help them in the business and used a mobile version of the machine to make more sales. In other cases, the machines did not work properly and hence the jobs were not created as expected.

Figure 3: Jobs created by A2Pay Incubator




It must be pointed out that the original job targets for A2Pay agreed upon in the grant agreement were much higher than the figures shown in the graph. As A2Pay had problems reaching the quarterly targets necessary for achieving their original targets, their targets had to be renegotiated downwards. The beneficiaries trained and jobs created were reported through the GMS and verified on-site by the Monitoring and Evaluation unit of the Jobs Fund.

Awethu Outcomes

The project faced challenges in achieving the agreed-to targets of job creation because of high levels of attrition and the general lack of preparedness among the participants. This is seen in the very low number of permanent jobs created, compared to the number of beneficiaries trained in the three-year period. Awethu struggled to harness the potential of the trainees that went through their programme and had to implement remedial measures to mitigate these challenges. They experimented with modifications to their selection criteria and processes. They also had to revisit their profit sharing model, which did not sit well with most of their participants, especially those who were successful. This information came out of the Key Informant interviews with the managers of Awethu.

The selection criteria and processes followed were called into question as the bulk of the incubatees had other ideas about what their role in the incubation was. Overall, the Awethu incubator did not reach its contracted job creation targets; creating only 239 jobs out of the contracted target of 1000 new jobs (see Figure 4).


Figure 4: Awethu-trained beneficiaries and job creation target and actual



Shanduka Outcomes

The SBU also exceeded its contracted job creation targets. However, its targets were much lower than the targets for Awethu and A2Pay. This is related to the amount of funding it received and the activities that its incubatees were involved in. It is worth noting that SBU trained a lot more incubatees than it was contracted to train, which is why there is no target figure for the number of trained beneficiaries. It exceeded its contracted New Permanent Job creation target of 142 by 188 jobs (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Shanduka ttrained beneficiaries and job creation target and actual



Qualitative Feedback

There was significant success among the incubators in terms of improving turnover during the incubation process. There was, however, a significant failure rate amongst incubates, some of whom also faced challenges in trying to create and run a sustainable business. In addition, entrepreneurs from lower income backgrounds often faced cultural constraints related to poverty and the lack of a developed entrepreneurial culture or history.

There was mixed success with job creation where incubators provided business ideas or products to potential entrepreneurs with relatively low levels of education (e.g. A2Pay and Awethu).

Many Awethu incubatees appeared to sustain informal employment for one or two people. This is a positive social outcome and could even be better if the businesses could support more people, even in an informal capacity. In contrast, SBU focussed on entrepreneurs with relatively high levels of education (post-matric).

These entrepreneurs (black, with post-matric qualifications) are more likely to be opportunity-driven entrepreneurs (in that they could probably find formal employment if they so wished) and, as a result, have a stronger motivation for their business to succeed. On the other hand, one could argue that having other employment options would lead to less incentive to see their business succeed, especially if business becomes difficult and there are other, easier ways to earn a decent income.

Older entrepreneurs (generally 40 to 45-year-olds) without children in school and female incubatees who could read and write were most likely to be successful; in part because they had good networks and relationships with their local community (which assisted sales), and also because they had a stronger work ethic. On the other hand, some of the female incubatees from Awethu and SBU reported lack of family support as a constraint, holding back the growth and operation of their business.

The FGDs revealed that most of the promising entrepreneurs who entered into the incubators were more interested in the short-term benefits of participation in the programme. They did not generally buy into the profit share model implemented by Awethu, for example, and most of them dropped out because of this.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The incubation cases reported in this paper are interesting because they represent different objectives from three different players. The incubators' objective was to develop the SMMEs they incubate by providing them with services and mentorship, with the aim of sharing their profits if they become successful and generating revenue from their incubator fees. The incubatees themselves were interested in growing their businesses and turning a profit for themselves. The Jobs Fund as a third participant in the relationship was interested in the creation of new jobs. The first two objectives may seem contradictory, as not all incubatees would be interested in sharing their profits with the incubator. The third objective of job creation is premised on the assumption that business success will lead to growth, which will entail taking on more people to sustain the business.

The assumption that SMMEs were struggling because they were not aware of the financial resources available to them also did not hold because exposure to these financial and non-financial services provided by the Awethu project did not seem to necessarily lead to success (as a lot of the entrepreneurs dropped out.) An attempt was made to rectify the selection criteria and procedures so as to get more highly skilled candidates. This yielded a different kind of problem, where the participants were found wanting in soft skills like discipline and business integrity. A big problem for most participants was the discipline associated with keeping records and timely reporting of financial statements.

A2Pay had a different experience in the sense that they were distributing a tangible asset that new entrepreneurs were trained to operate and make money from. In terms of job creation, this appears to have been a far more effective approach than providing access to finance and mentorship.

SBU also provided a different scenario, where very few highly educated incubatees were enrolled; resulting in the project exceeding its very low job target. SBU did not have a profit share clause in their contracts with the incubatees.

Overall, it can be said that a good proportion of incubatees succeeded in their businesses after three years of incubation, and the majority of them perceived this success to be a result of their participation in the incubation activities. The evaluation reveals a weakness in some of the assumptions of the incubation models for job creation; mainly, the expectation of job creation on the back of turning a profit and becoming a successful business during the incubation. The Jobs Fund project assumed that if the incubated businesses became successful they would automatically create jobs. The evidence seems to suggest that job creation does not automatically follow successful incubation. However, this does not take away from business incubation as an effective way to nurture carefully selected entrepreneurs, but rather suggests that the objectives of the incubator and the incubatees must be aligned from the beginning of incubation. It cannot be assumed that incubatees' businesses will automatically expand and employ more people as a result of their success through incubation.

It is also clear that the provision of technology equipment and business infrastructure coupled with training in operating a business is more likely to create jobs and seems to sustain participants for longer. This would seem to suggest that mentorship programs tied to particular technology or equipment franchises may be a more predictable and successful avenue for rapid job creation.

It is important to note that incubation can be targeted at different problems; keeping in mind that it is not a silver bullet for all economic ills. It could be targeted at poverty alleviation, it could be targeted at development of SMMEs, or it could be strictly targeted at the development or deployment of new technologies or gadgets. The economy needs different interventions for different problems which may all be high touch and may not present instant solutions for job creation.

The criticism that has been levelled at these interventions is the limited support offered, if any, to alumni incubatees. Not a lot of thought, structure and resources seem to go into the planning and execution of post-incubation support, at a stage where the growth of former incubatees is most critical to ensuring their continued survival.

It would appear that technology-based interventions that allow entrepreneurial beneficiaries easy access to markets, offering affordable goods and services, have a much better chance of creating jobs. Technology allows for easier penetration into underserved markets by taking essential goods and services to the customer. More research is needed to determine the different effects of the different elements of incubation and how they influence job creation.

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DEVELOPMENT OF GAINFUL SELF-EMPLOYMENT SKILLS AMONGST TERTIARY EDUCATION GRADUATES: PERCEPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCES AT ANKOLE WESTERN UNIVERSITY IN UGANDA

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Julius Babyetsiza¹

INTRODUCTION

Uganda's economy has grown significantly over the past three decades and may continue to do so in future (World Bank 2014). However, employment creation has not kept pace with economic growth, which in the last three decades averaged 2.7 per cent (%) per annum with little or no increase in the rate of employment (Magelah and Ntambirweki-Karugonjo 2014). One can argue that universities should play a key role in addressing the unemployment rate in Uganda. It is worth noting that 87 943 public and private sector jobs were advertised between 2009 and 2013 (UBOS 2014, 24), while Uganda produces roughly 500 000 tertiary education graduates per year. On average, about 18 000 jobs are created annually (Babyetsiza 2016:13).

The fact that the picture painted above is becoming even grimmer is concerning. Nganga (World Bank 2017) has warned that the East African region risks missing its long-term economic growth targets due to a widening disconnect between the skills demanded by the labour market and what is offered by graduates of higher education institutions. The region is drifting into a crisis with regard to unemployment of tertiary education graduates as the mismatch in skills widens:

Clearly the education system is creating a mass of young people who do not have the skills required for employment or self-employment. This failure is not only exacerbating the unemployment problem, the region is also failing to leverage the demographic dividend of a young and active labour force (Nganga 2017).

As a result, many tertiary education graduates in Uganda are finding it increasingly difficult to find jobs that match their training and educational profile (Sebudde 2013). This has been aggravated by the growing number of students as Uganda's population swells at an annual growth rate of 3.7% (the third highest in the world) which has resulted in an increase in tertiary education institutions. In 1987, Uganda only had

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Makerere University, but there are now 38 universities and other accredited degree-awarding institutions, as well as 113 public and private tertiary education institutions. Tertiary education in Uganda consists of universities and institutions for Business, Technical and Vocational Education Training (BTJET). Notwithstanding the fact that the job market is not growing, universities and graduates alike have kept focussing on wage employment. This has resulted in a mismatch between the skills gained from tertiary education institutions and the demands of the labour market, since the Ugandan economy is predominantly informal (Chigunta 2002; Haile 2003; ILO 2012; and Kellow 2010). This makes graduates chase after elusive jobs, until it dawns on them that self-employment presents open labour market opportunities as an alternative livelihood.

According to Sebudde (2013), there are more than two million self-employed youths in Uganda engaged in the informal sector, who may not be considered to be living in poverty. Nonetheless, they produce too little to really be regarded as prosperous. Another 11 million workers (73%) find themselves working in agriculture. As many are regarded as unproductive, most do not exceed the level of small household farming (Sebudde 2013). This supports the contentious notions in the academic debate on the significance of self-employment in least developed countries (LDCs), on whether self-employment is a choice or a necessity (Pietrobelli, Rabellotti and Aquilina 2004). On the one hand, there is an opinion that although self-employment requires an industrious approach and specific talents, it is not regarded as a meticulous activity in developing countries. On the other hand, there is an alternative view that self-employment is involuntary and only a transitory employment option that provides just enough money to survive as individuals prepare for and seek hired employment. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) indicates, transformational entrepreneurs can create new products and business models and provide dignified employment (UNCTAD 2018). Success can improve the quality of life, bolster fiscal sustainability, and contribute to wealth accumulation and distribution. Although UNCTAD indicates that entrepreneurship is concerned with the extent of self-employment (ownership, management or establishment of new businesses), self-employment in LDCs is driven more by lack of employment alternatives and dominated by necessity-driven entrepreneurs, rather than attractive business conditions – therefore, opportunity-seeking entrepreneurs (UNCTAD 2018). This underlies the distinction between entrepreneurship by necessity and entrepreneurship by choice.

Besides the mismatch between the demands of the labour market and what tertiary education institutions offer students and graduates, unemployment is exacerbated by complexities and shifts in the nature of the labour market, as well as rapidly changing technologies. The transition from being a graduate to competing in the labour market in Uganda is challenging which is, as this study indicates, influenced by the wrong perceptions among students, academicians and parents; who consider education a clear path to gainful employment and a decent living. Zeelen (2015) recommends lifelong learning as a way to self-realisation as well as the need to shift the focus to vocational training for self-employment and employability. On one hand, lifelong

learning provides skills to address the challenges of the continuously changing labour market and the socio-economic and technological complexities that go with it. On the other hand, vocational training equips students and graduates with knowledge ingrained with practical skills that enhance human, social and psychological capital. These areas are essential to developing the desired entrepreneurial mind-set among tertiary-level students for gainful self-employment.

The recent winds of change towards training for self-employment are contributing much to labour market opportunities for tertiary education graduates and alleviating unemployment. The results of tertiary graduates' tracer studies vary: in 2006, the Makerere Institute of Social Research found that 9% of graduates were self-employed (MISR 2006), Ssembatya and Ngobi (2015) found that 10% of the graduates chose self-employment, while a study by the Uganda National Council for Higher Education found that 19.4% graduates are self-employed (NCHE 2013). The above results indicate that gainful self-employment is an alternative for tertiary graduates.

The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the challenges for gainful self-employment among tertiary graduates in Uganda, and the ways in which institutions can develop teaching and guidance programmes to enhance such opportunities for graduates. It focusses specifically on understanding the perceptions, expectations and experiences of students, academic staff and management at Ankole Western University (AWU), as well as on the challenges they face in their transition to gainful self-employment. This study might therefore support the development of new ways to prepare students for the realities of the labour market that is growing slower than the output of graduates; and establish elements for the development of a model to improve the transition to gainful self-employment.

GAINFUL SELF-EMPLOYMENT

It is generally understood that an individual is gainfully self-employed if he or she is conducting his/her own business as his/her main source of income; the earnings come directly from the turnover of the business; and the activity is organized, developed and carried out in expectation of rewarding profit (Revenue Benefits 2015). According to Startienė, Remeikienė and Dumčiuvienė (2010), gainful self-employment is perceived as having the potential to provide attractive earnings compared to salaried/hired employment, and can provide one with a decent standard of living, a satisfactory level of self-realisation as well as an equitable life enjoyment.

Definitions of self-employment are wide ranging. According to Stam (as cited in Startienė, Remeikienė, & Dumčiuvienė 2010), self-employment is an instance where individuals, rather than being hired workers, choose to work for themselves. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), consider self-employment as work wherein wages depend directly on the gains from goods produced or services provided, where the self-employed person personally makes decisions that influence the business.

Conceptualisation of gainful self-employment for tertiary educated graduates requires highlighting its specific requirements, which include: education; working with or without paid workers; initiator providing his/her own capital; being prepared for success and failure; economic gain as the main driver; considerations on business acquisition or start-up; business sustainability; independence; and whether or not the individual is an entrepreneur. Good entrepreneurial skills, however, will boost the chances of success (Grieco 2007; Pedersini and Colette 2009).

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of theories which give insight into the upskilling of students and graduates for self-employment. Many of the previous studies on this topic focussed on independent theories. This study has used an array of theories to underpin gainful self-employment among tertiary graduates in Uganda. These are: Chaos Theory of Careers; New Venture Planning (NVP) Mentoring Model in Entrepreneurship Education; Psychological Capital Theory; Social Capital Theory; Personal Initiative Theory; and the Unified Self-Employment Transition Theory.

Pryor and Bright's (2011) Chaos Theory of Careers emphasises continuous, uncertain and non-linear change, the complexity of influences, and emergent fragmented patterns in careers. The theory gives good insight into understanding how to guide students in addressing the modern labour market shifts and complexities. It has three defining characteristics: chaotic systems that are mathematically deterministic, sensitive to initial conditions, and they appear to be random and disorderly but they actually have a sense of order and pattern. It helps us to recognise and benefit from the unpredictable influences on our careers. The theory sheds light on the complexity of labour market perceptions and, experiences and expectations of educational institution stakeholders. It can be used to counsel students, lecturers, educational institution managers, and policymakers. However, unlike the New Venture Planning (NVP) Mentoring Model in Entrepreneurship Education, the theory does not delve into the mode of training, teaching and coaching that would address the increasing rates of graduate unemployment.

Kubberoed and Hagen's (2015) NVP mentoring model on entrepreneurship education is premised on experiential action learning paradigms to challenge learners to initiate and apply knowledge as well as to strategise and act, rather than just passively acquiring knowledge or observing, describing and analysing. The NVP model simulates the actual experience of developing a new venture by creating an educational setting where "real life" entrepreneurial learning is more likely to happen. It is experiential action learning that is student-centred. The student is actively in charge while the lecturer often plays a proactive role as facilitator; ensuring the optimal supported learning environment. Coaching and mentoring in NVP are regarded as essential ingredients of the entrepreneurial learning process which contribute to increased learning outcomes. NVP supports Uganda's National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) indication that

entrepreneurship should be taught in all tertiary education institutions. The aim is to instil entrepreneurial skills in students in order to increase self-employment levels in the country. However, self-employed graduates have tended to be reluctant to become entrepreneurs. They treat self-employment as a “survival strategy,” instead of a generator of ideas or a way towards self-realisation, satisfaction and possibility for higher earnings and independent decision-making. Against the backdrop of this weakness, socio-psychological theories have also been used to understand the route to gainful self-employment for tertiary education graduates.

Psychological Capital Theory explains the need to amass an entrepreneurial mind-set (Luthans and Youssef 2007). By riding on self-efficacy, optimism, hope and resilience, entrepreneurial students/graduates will be guaranteed to become gainfully self-employed. Social Capital Theory explains the crucial role that networking and trust play in self-employment initiatives for students and graduates (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; and Putnam 1993). Networks such as student entrepreneurship clubs and societies are essential. Social Capital Theory provides useful insights into feeling a sense of belonging. In this light, networks bring benefits of connectedness—revealed through students’ efforts to find business resources through cohesion among their communities, family members and acquaintances. However, Psychological Capital and Social Capital theories do not explain student/graduate innovativeness, while Personal Initiative (PI) theory does (Frese, Kring, Soose and Zempel 1996).

Under the umbrella of Personal Initiative (PI) theory self-starting, pro-activeness, and persistence are paramount for gainful self-employment. We see students exhibiting these facets of PI by spotting business opportunities, designing business models, and starting and sustainably running businesses. However, PI alone does not fully explain the path to gainful self-employment as does the Unified Self-Employment Transition Theory (USETT).

PI theory, reinforced by USETT, best explains the path of students towards gainful self-employment. USETT assumes a set of personal, organisational and external potential qualities and support which ensures a successful transition to self-employment (Olien 1997). These facets of USETT will support the establishment of businesses as well as their growth, expansion and sustainability.


METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

There are various approaches to action-oriented research designs. These include, among others, participatory action research (PAR), collaborative inquiry, action learning, appreciative inquiry, and exemplary action research (Boog 2003; Boog, Preece, Slagter and Zeelen 2008; Coenen and Khonraad 2003; Greenwood and Levin 1998; Reason and Bradbury 2001). This exploratory study was based on the general characteristics of action research derived from the collaborative learning and participatory approaches. The two approaches are presented as partly comparable approaches of action research;

differing only in terms of emphasis on certain aspects. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the collaborative inquiry approach is that it is focussed on human experience as well as being more oriented towards interventions (Angucia, Zeelen and De Jong 2010) – in this case, addressing graduate unemployment rates. The participatory approach was used to generate knowledge from the very parties affected by graduate unemployment in order to identify perspectives for improving and implementing gainful self-employment among tertiary education graduates.

The study has attempted to understand the labour market perceptions and expectations of AWU students, lecturers and graduates as well as the challenges they face in the transition to gainful self-employment. The data scope of this action research project was three-fold: ethno-methodological and phenomenological; building trust by way of creating partnerships with participants and jointly exploring the labour market realities for university graduates; and planting a seed of social justice that ensures social transformation. In order to cause the said social justice, Stephen Kemmis' cyclical model of four steps (i.e. plan, act, observe, and reflect) that is typical of action research, has been sought, see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Simple Action Research Model



(Adopted from Maclsaac 1995)

Data Collection Process and Analysis

According to Boog (2003), action research is participatory and practice-oriented. It empowers and finds solutions to social problems. Action research is a reciprocal learning process as the researcher and the researched are partners. This reciprocal learning process requires all partners to be open, truthful and satisfied with the communication of facts; which is called reciprocal adequacy. This is achieved through building trust with the participants in the first place.

Audio data was captured from five focus group discussions (FGD) sessions, namely: student social entrepreneurs in a sitting with some residents of the areas; students; lecturers; faculty deans; and AWU Management; as well as an interview of a Sheema District Commercial Officer.

The thematic process of data collection and analysis occurred in a predictable manner: guiding questions were developed; a debriefing of/which each group of participants was held; FGDs and interviews were carried out; and data captured with audio recordings was summarised. At the end of each FGD or interview, participants were asked to verify the summarised discussions; the audio recordings were transcribed into text (Microsoft (MS) Word documents), and data was analysed. Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook (2006) contend that like most types of research, with FGD, the amount of analysis required varies according to the purpose of the research, the complexity of the research design, and the extent to which conclusions can be reached easily based on analyses. The most common analyses of focus group results involve a transcript of the discussion and a summary of the conclusions that can be drawn. As such, in this study the audio recordings were transcribed into text, captured in an MS Word document, and then organised and analysed using Google Sheets and MS Excel.

The data collected satisfies the essential criteria of state-of-the-art qualitative methods (focus group discussions (FGD) and interviews). As with other types of data, the nature of the analysis of focus group and interview data was determined by the research questions and the purpose for which the data are collected (the study objectives). As for specific analysis techniques, of the most widely used methods for FGD and interview data, this study deployed thematic analysis and content analysis, starting with an analysis of the demographic characteristics of the participants, presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Summary of the demographics of the participants

Demographic variable	Variable structures	Number of participants	%
Age (year)	Youths (30 years or younger)	14	67%
	Adults	7	33%
Sex	Male	10	48%
	Female	11	52%
Level of education	Less than O-level or its equivalent	3	14%
	O-level or its equivalent	2	10%
	A-level or its equivalent	6	29%
	Bachelor's degree	3	14%
	Master's degree	5	24%
	PhD	2	10%
Employment status	Not employed	7	32%
	Engaged in self-employment	6	29%
	Paid employment (salaried employment?)	2	10%
	Dual – self-employed and paid employed	6	29%
Area-based origin of participant	Within Sheema district	14	67%
	Outside Sheema district	7	33%

Demographic variable	Variable structures	Number of participants	%
Occupation/Job title	Peasant – farmer	3	14%
	Student	8	38%
	Teacher (Sec. School)	1	5%
	Lecturer	4	19%
	Dean	2	10%
	AWU Management	2	10%
	State actors	1	5%

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The analysis of the FGD and interviews conducted focussed on the way in which tertiary education students and graduates make sense of self-employment as well as their consciousness, thoughts, and experience.


This study touches on a number of “hot” topics, including that of youth unemployment, and in particular, tertiary graduate unemployment. Youth unemployment is not only a big challenge for the Ugandan government; it is also a global phenomenon that has eluded employment scholars and policymakers alike. In this study, the proportion of youths among the participants was 67% (see Table 1 above).

While youth self-employment is a well-trodden area, this research addresses interesting and novel issues; in particular, gainful self-employment among tertiary education graduates. 59% of participants said that they were self-employed.

In the analysis and deductions, the number of emotion-laden words used during a FGD when referring to a particular issue were counted.

Participant perceptions were more enthusiastic towards self-employment in cases where encouragement and support to youths were present; when youths were involvement in self-employment activities; when focus was placed on creating attitudinal change and awareness; when they could tap into family business experiences; and if they participated in educational programmes that imparted practical skills (see Figure 2 below).


Figure 2: Perception of AWU students and alumni towards self-employment



According to a report by UNCTAD (2018), the weakness of dynamic self-employment has important implications in the LDCs (where Uganda belongs). The perceptions of self-employment among participants in this study are important considerations for policy formulation by educational institutions and their regulatory bodies. According to UNCTAD, entrepreneurship policy in the LDCs is often assembled as an alternative to address youth unemployment and a remedy for structural inequalities (UNCTAD 2018). This alludes to that the fact that this type of policy is often an imperfect way of fostering high-impact and dynamic self-employment, which requires a distinct and strategic approach and deliberate long-term nurturing that entail coordinated and coherent action and smart policies across a range of relevant policy areas. These participants' views regarding the perception of AWU students towards self-employment, in Figure 2, in part constitute the distinct and strategic approach.

However, a pertinent issue highlighted by this study is that the participants preferred paid jobs over self-employment (Figure 3 below), which is in line with UNCTAD's observations and a point to be noted by tertiary institutions as well as policymakers.

Figure 3: Preference between paid employment and self-employment




Self-employment is seen as a diverse and multifaceted phenomenon that has been conceptualised as Behavioural and Occupational (UNCTAD 2018). Behavioural definitions of self-employment define the undertaker as a coordinator of production and an agent of change through innovation. Occupational entrepreneurship is the result of an individual's choice between a paid job and self-employment (Lucas 1978; Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny 1991) and the choice to become an entrepreneur is viewed as the result of an evaluation of the returns generated by self-employment (profits plus non-pecuniary benefits), relative to the wages and other benefits available through salaried employment. This distinction therefore refers to opportunity-driven entrepreneurs, rather than necessity-driven entrepreneurs.

However, much of the self-employment among tertiary education graduates in Uganda is necessity-driven and the result of disheartening youth unemployment. The participants' shared views (in Figure 3 above) about preference between self-employment and formal employment are influenced by the necessity of self-employment rather than by choice.

It goes without saying that these survivalist self-employment-by-necessity views of participants are typically less innovative, operate mostly in low productivity and low value added activities, and produce traditional goods and services with minimal new technologies. Limited potential is shown in comparison with what is required for being enthusiastic about self-employment. Their business initiatives, although important to their survival as self-employed individuals, do not generate significant wider benefits. However, survivalist self-employed persons may become opportunity-driven entrepreneurs and have a more positive impact, even if such instances are rare (UNCTAD 2018).


The study sought advice from the participants regarding ways in which students and graduates could stimulate passion for self-employment. These views are reflected in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Participants' perceptions on how to encourage passion for self-employment




According to UNCTAD (2018), most definitions of self-employment share some basics, in particular: innovation, opportunity seizing and opportunity creation, risk-taking, judgment in decision-making and the development of business organisations. The views of participants regarding the advice to students to encourage passion for self-employment (in Figure 4) concurs with the UNCTAD (2018) conclusions and support teaching based on practical illustrations. This necessitates an examination of the involvement of entrepreneurial start-ups in the courses/programmes in the university's curriculum. Figure 5 below shows how participants rated the entrepreneurial-start-up value of the curriculum of AWU courses/programmes.

Figure 5: Participants' views on entrepreneurship in AWU's curriculum



The participants' views on AWU's curriculum attaining the desired effect (in Figure 5) leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to AWU's curriculum meeting the challenge of instilling a self-employment mindset and skills among its students and graduates. This prompts examination of the government's contribution, among the stakeholder support system, in the development of self-employment (provided in Figure 6 below).

Figure 6: Stakeholder support system: Government promotion of entrepreneurship



The views in figure 6 were deduced from the research data collected. The participants contended that government has hardly helped young graduates. This view relates to the laws, policies and procedures linked to accessing Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) funds, a government financial portal where the youth can get funding for

start-ups. They also indicated that the YLP is marred with flaws and that procedures are not enabling. The youth have hardly managed to get government support and government's endeavour to support self-employment amongst graduates has not been successful. Their hopes of benefiting from the YLP were slashed as beneficiaries are required to form groups. Since the youths have different interests, this leads to failure and subsequent a denial of financial assistance. One participant said:

They have introduced it [YLP] but the policies are very difficult. If you are to get that money, you should form a group of 10 people or above and it is difficult to know the heart of every person. For me I am the Vice Chairperson of my Sub-County, but it has been hard for me to get YLP funds, and the challenge has been to get those 10 people, because after getting them, everyone wants to part away with his/her own share. People are not trustworthy ... it is difficult for us and we don't know what we can do...

Another government short-coming relates to a lack of close monitoring and supervision of the projects of YLP beneficiaries – a recipe for failure. According to the participants, the YLP is flawed by bribes and corruption, in the form of kickbacks that beneficiaries have to pay in order to qualify for YLP funding.


Another participant attributed government's weakness in cultivating and nurturing self-employment to a lack of public information. One participant contended that all developmental information should be made public and asked where the public can access information from the National Research Bureaus, such as the National Agriculture Research Organization (NARO), and if there is a specific portal on which government disseminates information. Other problems cited were impressions that public offices were held by persons that are not experts in the specific field. A participant expressed discontent with government, stating that in his view the *"Ugandan government has not even contributed 1% ... to the youth in general"*, while another remarked that when State created a Ministry for Karamoja Affairs (responsible for coordinating government programs in the Karamoja sub-region) it should have rather created a Ministry for Youth as youth unemployment is a greater challenge to the government than Karamoja's backwardness.

Some participants, however, acknowledged the efforts made by the Ugandan government to support self-employment. They appreciated government's acknowledgement that youth unemployment is a great challenge and the establishment of the YLP (as government availed financial assistance for business start-up by the youth in every district). However, they also noted that poor policies and the ill-motives of the YLP managers have made support ineffective. Other participants were grateful to the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) for providing seeds to farmers at no cost to enable youths to become self-employed in agriculture. Appreciation was also expressed to government for supporting tertiary education institutions, specifically technical institutes that provide practical skills training that will contribute to self-employment.

Participants indicated that dual investments occur in education by both the private sector and government. Private institutions were created with the government providing guidelines to syllabuses and examinations. So, government is involved with planning and implementation and has therefore become a partner by providing policy as well as opportunities. As government sponsors some students at tertiary education institutions and provide loan schemes for a number of courses and programmes, it supports self-employment. One participant was of the view that government is doing its best insofar as developing self-employment is concerned, and that the “ball” for the development of [gainful] self-employment skills amongst graduates is in the “courts” of the educational institutions’ approaches to training.

The participants’ views on the [gainful] self-employment training approach, curriculum, and policy of AWU are reflected in Figure 7 below.

Figure 7: Participants’ views on the training model for gainful self-employment



The participants’ views, in Figure 7, concur with the ingredients of a training model for gainful self-employment as highlighted in a United Nations’ report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1985). This report recommends that training be integrated with production, so as to develop both technical and social skills and reap the rewards of efficiency. In addition to setting up youth in production units of their own with subsequent assistance from industry, parts of the training model for universities and other tertiary education institutions referred to above are also essential (FAO, UNESCO and ILO, 1985). For his part, Prasad (1988) says that strategies favouring the promotion of gainful self-employment requires entrepreneurial orientation among beneficiaries in addition to the need to possess skills in modern technology and managerial capabilities.

The relationship between gainful self-employment and its predictors (Cognitive patterns, Entrepreneurship mentoring, Psychological Capital, Social Capital, and Personal Initiative) has become evident through causal connections depicted in the various matrices of the variables and themes, as well as descriptive graphical representations – even more than they would in the quasi-experimental tradition, which seems to operate with simple efficient causes producing stimulus and response (Eikeland 2008:34).

In terms of content for developing gainful self-employment among students and graduates, the participants indicated that students must be encouraged to start up and take advantage of YLP financing; students need to partner with the business community through networking; AWU needs to make skilling programmes available to all students and make the curriculum practical; and lastly, support the creation of a positive work culture among students. The government and its partners that have vested interests in combating graduate unemployment are calling on the youth to re-equip themselves with vocational skills even after the completion of university in order to survive in the modern labour market with its shifts and complexities.

The results of this study support the notion to replace the Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education (UACE), with a Uganda Vocational/Technical Certificate of Education (UVTCE). Such a move is supported by the views of numerous participants, who call for university studies to also focus on a vocational approach. This view was also expressed by the Sheema District Commercial Officer who stated that “the problem is education system... just give you the qualification but not the skill. It awards a Bachelor’s Degree in the Social Sciences, but with such a degree you can only look for a job”. He continued:

Someone who has gone to a technical institute, may have learned brick-laying, which can earn him a living because everyone builds. An example is the engineers in the district who started at technical institutes which gave them skills unlike engineers from universities who finish with merely theoretical knowledge. Someone at technical institutions completes a certificate at technical institutions, works, then does a diploma and continues working or completes a degree. Starting with a skill, such a person ends up with a qualification and a job.

The opinion expressed by the District Commercial Officer points to the huge gap in Uganda’s education system. The UACE level is achieved at a point in time when students are maturing and joining the workforce; however, the classroom is still purely academic, with little imparting of life skills. As stated, the call to vocationalise university studies amount to scrapping the UACE and replacing it with a UVTCE – this should be part of the agenda of the Ministry of Education.

Another main finding is that other than the students of the faculty of Science and Information Technology (IT), in other faculties (Management, Humanities and Education), studies are theoretical or devoid of practical experience. Following this, the study recommends that every student from the other faculties participates in at least one of the projects pitched by students from the faculties of Science and Information Technology (IT), and the group should work together to ensure that their project is replicated in the community or commercialised for gainful self-employment. This will serve as the major ingredient for AWU to develop a model of enhancing its graduates' transition to gainful self-employment.

Past studies on self-employment have stressed the sociological and psychological characteristics of the self-employed and investigated their role in providing jobs for the unemployed, with most papers analysing the relationship between the rates of unemployment and self-employment. These studies deployed micro- and macro-level analyses (such as Evans and Leighton 1989; Blanchflower and Meyer 1992; and Banchflower 2000) – among others. In reviewing evidence relating to unemployment rates and the start-up of new firms, it seems that an important requirement is proper guiding and skills for creating new enterprises.

According to Laing (2011) the reasons as to why people may choose self-employment include the desire to sell their skills and/or expertise; the need to prove an idea; relishing the challenge; generating a second income stream; reacting to an ill-informed first career decision; peer or family pressure; and a feeling that there are no other options. Of much importance in the case of this study is the feeling that there are no other options which often stems from the disheartening phenomenon of graduate unemployment and from an ill-informed first career decision – by studying for salaried or hired employment. However, the other reasons listed by Laing are also of relevance. Participants noted that self-employment implied independence in making business decisions and indicated that with the disheartening problem of graduate unemployment, self-employment is simply the way to go.

Kubberoed and Hagen's (2015) NVP mentoring model in entrepreneurship education sheds light on the views expressed in the FGDs and during interviews. Calls for coaching and mentoring, as in "problem definition" and "proposed solution" are regarded as essential ingredients of the entrepreneurial learning process and will contribute to improved outcomes. This study is an effort to make some practical rather than theoretical suggestions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Relevant theoretical aspects relating to the value of gainful self-employment were highlighted through the Chaos Theory of Careers, the NVP Mentoring Model in Entrepreneurship Education, Psychological Capital Theory, Social Capital Theory, Personal initiative Theory, and the Unified Self-Employment Transition Theory. The connection between theory and practice was evident in the analysis that formed part of this study.

By and large, participants' enthusiasm for self-employment were divided between positive and negative, however they preferred fixed job offers and employment to self-employment, which could be interpreted as the "writing on the wall" for the development of self-employment programmes by universities and other tertiary educational institutions as well as government. The participants are of the view that they would become more enthusiastic about self-employment if there was more encouragement and support to the youth; greater involvement of the youth in self-employment-yielding activities; awareness creation and changing of students and graduates' attitudes; learning more from family business experiences; and provisioning of education that imparts real-life practical skills. In the participants' view, the relevance of AWU's curriculum in achieving the desired effects mentioned above, was found wanting and leaving a lot to be desired in meeting the challenge of instilling a mindset of self-employment and skills among students and graduates.

The participants found government's contribution as a stakeholder support system in the development of self-employment equally lacking. Government's policies for YLP were found to be restrictive instead of helping youths/students and graduates to access the government portal for financing self-employment initiatives among students and graduates. Nonetheless, government was commended for acknowledging that the problem of unemployment of tertiary graduates is a ticking time bomb that could undo the socio-economic and security gains of government during the last three decades. Government programmes such as the YLP kindred programmes and the NAADS which distributes seeds to farmers at no cost, were viewed in a positive light. These are the deliberate efforts by government to promote self-employment in agriculture and among tertiary education graduates. Government was also commended as a partner in the education system, and providing policy guidelines for education that is sensitive to the promotion of self-employment.

Taken together, self-employment by many tertiary education students and graduates is survivalist and by necessity, and is seen as less productive than opportunity-seeking. Due to disheartening unemployment being the driver of survivalist self-employment, tertiary education graduates are typically less innovative, operate mostly in low productivity and low value-added activities, and produce traditional goods and services with minimal latest technologies. This impedes the growth potential of their business start-ups and limits their success in self-employment. Their business initiatives,

although important to the survival of the self-employed, do not generate significant wider benefits. However, survivalist self-employed persons may become opportunity-driven entrepreneurs that could have a more positive impact on economic growth. This signals to educational institutions and government that all is not dismal, but that encouragement should continue to increase the success associated with survivalist self-employment. This could be achieved by developing new ways of preparing students to face the realities of a labour market that is in track with a growing number of tertiary graduates and establishes ingredients for educational institutions to develop a model to enhance transition to gainful self-employment.

It is the duty of educational institutions and government to react to the abovementioned challenges. They can learn from FAO, UNESCO and ILO (1984) and, Mittal's (1988) components for a training model for gainful self-employment, which envisages training that is integrated with production so as to develop technical and social skills and reap the benefits of efficiency; and set up youth in their own production units with assistance from the industry. These are essential components of a training model for tertiary education institutions as they need to extensively plan for promoting gainful self-employment skills, entrepreneurial orientation, skills in modern technology and managerial capabilities.

Drawing from the conclusions above, it is recommended that the development of gainful self-employment skills for tertiary graduates are prioritised by the Ugandan government, universities and other tertiary education institutions. Those interested in combating Uganda's disheartening levels of graduate unemployment call on tertiary graduates to retool themselves with vocational skills even after the completion of university studies in order to survive the shifts and complexities of the modern labour market. As this study is also aimed at improving social justice and ensuring social transformation, it recommends replacing the UACE with UVTCE.

As the focus areas of students that are not part of the faculties on Science and IT are often devoid of sufficient practical applications, the study recommends that students from all faculties participate in at least one project pitched by students from the Science and IT environment, and that they work together on projects that could be replicated in the community or be commercialised for gainful self-employment. This could serve as a major ingredient for AWU to develop a model to enhance its graduates' transition to gainful self-employment.

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LOOKING BEYOND COMPLIANCE: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT IN THE MAINSTREAMING OF GENDER IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

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Nitasha Ramparsad¹

INTRODUCTION

This article analyses the role of an enabling environment as a factor in the successful mainstreaming of gender for gender equality at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration in South Africa. Gumede (2008:10) claims that in post-Apartheid South Africa, the significant challenges the democratic government faced included “rebuilding the institutional mechanisms and initiating and implementing legislation and policies that are in line with the Constitution to usher in a new era of a developmental State.” Gumede speaks to the important role of an enabling environment in facilitating the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the public service. This aspect is crucial to ensuring gender mainstreaming implementation in government.

Ultimately, Gumede’s assessment of what he deems the South African post-Apartheid civil service is a summation of the existing state of policy implementation barriers to gender mainstreaming. The major focus of this article is on the role of an enabling environment in ensuring the successful rollout of the two key projects at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration; namely, the Gender Mainstreaming Project (GMP) and the 8- Point Principle Plan.

The Gender Mainstreaming Project is a skills project aimed at capacitating public service officials working in the area of gender mainstreaming as a core function (namely, gender focal points and Human Resource Directorates) and extends to targeting senior managers whose responsibility it is to mainstream gender into operations. The 8-Point Principle Plan is a guide for Directors General to ensure that these principles are mainstreamed into the operations of their respective Departments (DPSA 2007).

The enabling environment is assessed in terms of the prioritisation and participation of Senior Management Service (SMS) and operational staff in driving the gender agenda at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration; the availing of resources (both human and financial); and the support from external structures to the operations of the Ministry of Public Service and Administration in mainstreaming gender. These

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criteria are measured through an analysis of reports generated for both projects as well as through testimonies of relevant staff at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration. In addition, the creation of an enabling environment is also assessed as it relates to external support for gender mainstreaming such as the National Gender Machinery, the Department of Women and the Commission for Gender Equality.

DEFINING THE TERM “ENABLING ENVIRONMENT”

The enabling environment is inextricably linked to the overriding factor of political will. Without the political will and buy-in from key role-players, both internal and external to the Ministry of Public Service and Administration, the success of the gender projects is ultimately unachievable. Here, the institutional environment is assessed through the demonstrated commitment of operational staff and senior management, the availing of resources (both human and financial) by senior management and the support from external structures to the mainstreaming of gender at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration through the successful implementation of the GMP and 8- Point Principle Plan. The institutional environment at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration is in a state of flux, with constant re-structuring and re-allocation of political heads; namely, the Minister for Public Service and Administration and the Head of Department, the Director-General.

The fluid nature of the political environment has a major role to play in the construction of an enabling environment. As evidenced by testimonies that will be discussed in this article, the appointment of a progressive Minister is critical to the success of the gender projects at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration, and in my opinion, is a major influencing factor for the rollout and implementation of any policy put forward by government. The political will of internal actors plays a major role in the success of projects, as operational staff must possess the political will to ensure the success of their projects. The latter, as is evident from the featured testimonies, is a critical success factor as the commitment from project staff ensures that at least some if not all objectives of the existing gender projects are met to some extent at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration. Without this political will from internal actors, and with reliance only on political heads, the projects will ultimately be ineffectual.

Giacchino and Kakabadse (2003:150) have identified two dimensions of location that coexist simultaneously. The one dimension is regarding the individual who is to assume responsibility for the policy initiative. The other dimension is institutional and concerns decisions regarding the organisation responsible for policy initiation. These two dimensions are critical in the implementation of policy as the analysis reflects the important role of the implementer within an institution. These two dimensions are evident in the implementation of the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan as there is a distinct connection between the individual and the institution in the implementation of policy initiatives. There is a strong interplay between individual and organisation in terms of responsibility for the rollout of the gender projects. Both are inter-dependent and must be viewed as instrumental in achieving mutual success.

In the case of the implementation of the Tanzanian Community Health Fund Policy,

...it was clear that the implementers influence how policies are experienced and how their impact is achieved. The apparently powerless implementers, at the interface between bureaucracy and citizenry, are difficult to control because they have a high margin of discretion and consequently re-interpret and reshape policy in unexpected ways. In some instances, implementers may react against efforts to impose policy change on them. The support of the implementers is therefore critical to the success of a specific policy, or its lack of success (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007:95).

Political will has a strong role to play in availing of tools to ensure the successful mainstreaming of gender. The power dynamics at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration and in the culture of the South African State creates barriers for implementation, as departmental staff are bound by the bureaucracy of the system. The staff cannot circumvent their barriers without approval from their seniors. This becomes more complex when one considers the need to work with actors outside of the Ministry of Public Service and Administration in the implementation of the gender projects. Notably, then, power is ultimately regulated by bureaucracy as employee "titles" and ultimately ranks enable or disable the success of gender projects and projects generally, at State departments.

Dror (1975) offers some thoughts on policy implementation and the role of an enabling environment. He claims that public policy tends to be precedent-based rather than goal-oriented:

However, goal-opaqueness can reduce conflict and promote consensus by enabling the public participants to adjust and interpret the objectives to suit themselves, hence ascertaining the acceptability of policy (Dror 1975:60).

Dror (1975:80) goes further to discuss the critical role of policy-makers:

Policy-makers may prefer not to compromise themselves and may avoid explicit policy on controversial questions. Decisions are vague and are taken on an *ad-hoc* basis. Although this affects long-term planning, yet it facilitates intellectual and political tension in the system.

There is often resistance to change, as has been described by interviewees above. Dror (1975:80) claims that

...this is because policy actors tend to cling to common ways and to resist change, since the outcomes of new public policies are not always predictable. Also, there are vested interests in the *status quo* which involve a compromise between participants (Dror 1975:75).

Despite all these deficiencies and weaknesses of the policy-making system in public participation, it is possible to improve some of them. The extent to which this can be realised will be explored in the conclusions and recommendations. Notably, transformation initiatives are at the mercy of those in senior management positions and thus true transformation cannot be effected without the political buy-in required.

Mannell (2012:52), in her discussion on the barriers to implementing gender policy, puts forward an argument that resistance to social change is a major stumbling block in the plethora of barriers that face gender mainstreaming. She argues that because of a masculinist culture, gender is not prioritised in organisations. This perception shapes gender projects within the organisation. Notably, this point speaks to the broader focus of this article in the creation of an enabling environment. With prevailing patriarchy, an enabling environment for gender mainstreaming cannot be achieved. Mannell (2012:52) goes further to state "This ultimately impacts on the distribution of resources to those individuals or communities the organisation is trying to help."

A huge failing is the assumption that an organisation is a gender-neutral space. Rao and Kelleher (2005) claim that gender inequalities are ignored in development work. They argue that development practitioners incorrectly perceive organisations as gender-neutral spaces. Gender work is viewed as something separate and not embedded (Tiessen 2007). The projects delivered by the Ministry of Public Service and Administration in the rollout of the 8- Point Principle Plan and the GMP essentially seek to challenge the gender stereotypes and patriarchal notions in government.

Transformation is met with resistance from departments that attempt to implement it. Resistance, however, can be overcome through the influence of politicians, as can be seen with the experience of the Department in 2008 as shared by Roanne². The presence of a progressive Minister who pushed the gender agenda was notable in the implementation of the project in the same year. With the change of Minister, political will became poor at departmental head level as well as within the Department. This is noteworthy as it speaks to the interplay between political will and the enabling environment. When engaged on the factors that enable gender to be mainstreamed at departmental level, interviewee Roanne said:

The Minister at the time, Honourable Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi was the driver of this (gender) agenda. Her openness to champion the gender work assisted in making the gender initiatives happen. The former Minister would discuss this with the cabinet colleagues and hence create buy-in at a very senior level. This meant that at cabinet level gender mainstreaming was discussed. In terms of resources, funding was not made available; human resources were not readily available either, the Diversity Management Unit was expected to make this happen on our own. The political buy-in however made it easier to rollout projects through the Diversity Management unit and the then, Public

² Pseudonym.

Administration, Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) through the GMP. Currently, due to what I feel are competing priorities, gender mainstreaming is now shelved.

Mannell (2012:53) claims that staff training was identified as the major method to ensure that gender mainstreaming would be effected. This, however, is not the lived experiences of Gender Focal Points and the Department staff. Rao and Kelleher (2005:59) argue: "All approaches to bringing about gender equality must have a political component. This is because gender relations exist within a force field of power relations, and power is used to maintain existing privilege." Their assessment looks at the role of power relations in (dis)abling the environment for gender mainstreaming and therefore creating a major stumbling block for the effective mainstreaming of gender projects. The power relations are often alluded to by authors however in this article, the power relations influencing the mainstreaming of gender is very evident in regulating how gender is prioritised at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration.

This sentiment on power relations is echoed by Goetz (1997:28), who says: "The social relations embedded in social institutions and development organisations cannot be changed just by getting a structural blueprint right – in the end, it is a matter of political struggle." Thus, social relations in an organisation cannot simply be circumvented by training. Training is therefore only one element that may or may not bring about a mind-shift and therefore a possible change in the environment in which practitioners operate.

The GMP attempted to provide training to close the skills gap identified in 2006. Notably, the Evaluation Report by PALAMA (2013) reflects that training can only be one aspect to be addressed in the broader context of gender mainstreaming initiatives in public service departments. A large part of the report's findings centre on the need for political will to access resources both internal and external to a Department; as well as the need for an enabling environment where initiatives are developed yet not well received (PALAMA 2013). Here, it is noted that skills training is only one aspect of the solution. In order to ensure that those skills are indeed implemented, political will is needed by the attendees' departments in unlocking the barriers to success, thus creating an enabling environment for the mainstreaming of gender into operations.

Mannell (2012), in her study on gender practitioners and the conflict over gender mainstreaming in South Africa, claims that respondents in her study expressed that gender is "invisible" in organisations:

The backlash against gender mainstreaming policy by organisations working on gender issues in South Africa has led in some cases to a rejection of gender policies for organisations. These organisations reject gender because of the way it has been adopted by other organisations in South Africa without critical reflection (Mannell, 2012:148).

These observations mirror the experiences of the Department staff in the rollout of the 8-Point Principle Plan and the GMP. Efforts to participate in these projects are often undertaken as compliance when addressing the 8-Point Principle Plan.

As explained in the interview with Roanne, the 8-Point Principle Plan is not largely supported by the Department; and is rather enforced through compliance reporting:

The 8- Point Principle Plan emanated from the strategic framework, the Department rolled this out through enforcing reporting. This was reinforced through conscientising departments through the rollout of advocacy workshops and then monitoring them through reports from departments. Here, the Department is looking at challenges and an analysis of departments' challenges. This effort is ongoing until now, the unit supports the departments.

The compliance element attached to reporting is worth noting, as this speaks to an environment that may not necessarily be receptive or conducive to the mainstreaming of gender but rather focussed on compliance reporting. The question of meaningful mainstreaming is raised. Ongoing support is still provided to departments ten years after inception. This observation speaks to the need for more active leadership in departments in being able to take the 8-Point Principle Plan forward. With regard to the GMP, a large part of the enabling environment was influenced by the funded nature of the project. Therefore, practitioners and departments had minimal investment in the skills course in terms of monetary outlay. The only requirement was to complete the relevant portfolio to attain an accredited certificate. The investment, however, is noteworthy, as attendance of the skills programme is evidence that these Gender Focal Points saw a gap in their skill-set that needed to be closed. Enabling these skills is what will ultimately unlock the gender barriers in their departments, which is out of the control of the Ministry of Public Service and Administration.

The role of donors in creating enabling environments is a highly politicised area that must be looked at in order to close the critique of the (dis)enabling actors in the operationalising of gender mainstreaming in the Department. Eyben (2008) claims: "The relationship between international development donors and the organisations they fund is a 'gift relationship' meaning that it is far easier for donors to promote policies that may have little relevance to the context for which they are intended." This is an astute observation and is conspicuous by its absence in the report on gender mainstreaming (PALAMA 2013). Mannell (2012:37) argues that:

The relationship between funding organisations and gender practice in South Africa needs to be interpreted through this dynamic. Bilateral donors may design policies that have more appeal to the national population to which they are accountable than for the recipient population. Power in the relationship is largely in the hands of the donor organisation to determine what the intervention should look like and how it should be carried out. Larger sums of money give donors even greater ability to influence organisational priorities

and implementation practices. While funding structures do not provide the entire picture of the dynamics affecting the gender and development field in South Africa, they do offer a portion of the picture about which types of interventions are put into practice.

Notably, the final evaluation report is written by NB Ideas and Associates for CIDA. This observation clearly points out the blurred lines in being the proverbial player and referee. Recommendations made by the donor were sweeping and reflect the lack of cognisance of the scope of work needed to implement the recommendations made and the extent to which each recommendation is, by and large, out of the control of the existing project staff and the Department as a whole.

As part of the broad recommendations, the Department was advised to ensure "...the requisite government machinery is in place to effect gender mainstreaming" (PALAMA 2013:5). This recommendation as discussed by project staff is out of the scope of control of the Department and is largely dependent on the actions of a completely separate Ministry, namely the Department of Women as the key driver of the National Gender Machinery. Notably, a key recommendation by the final evaluation report points to the need for closer engagement with CIDA as the funding agency. "More intensive donor engagement drawing on the lessons from other contexts and encouraging more holistic project logics, programmatic approaches and monitoring of impacts as part of the project monitoring process" (PALAMA 2013:5). These recommendations echo the sentiments of Mannell (2013) in her assessment of the relationship between funders and a recipient organisation. To a large extent, the Public Administration, Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), now the National School of Government (NSG), kept their autonomy in the rollout of the GMP, however many reporting restrictions and scope creep affected the management of the project and are evident from the final evaluation report.

In the development of an enabling environment, Leftwich (1995) emphasises the role of politics. Political dynamics significantly impacts on public policy. After all, the agenda of the public sector is set largely by politicians. In fact, Dror (2006:81) alludes to this when he argues that policy and politics "closely interact, often overlap, and in part cannot be separated even analytically". Other scholars, such as Stone (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2002), have dealt with this issue, in different contexts. These views are evidenced by the testimony presented by Roanne.

PRIORITISATION AND PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES IN DRIVING THE GENDER AGENDA

As noted earlier, the role of political will is a great influence in the uptake of the projects implementing gender mainstreaming as a strategy for gender equality. Interviews with project staff rolling out the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan indicate the need for an enabling environment to ensure implementation and the influence of political

will in the creation thereof, as discussed below. The interviewees were selected in terms of their seniority in implementing the projects. One former Chief Director, one current Director, one Assistant Director and one administrator were interviewed. The limitation that exists in interviewing this sample of implementers is that many would be faced with the barrier of protocol “speak” and their own biases. To a great extent, this was managed in the selection of interview quotations. The interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and were encouraged to speak as freely as possible. All signed relevant consent forms and were informed that their interviews would be used for the development of research publications. Political will is expressed as political behaviour but behaviour is influenced by various factors (Post *et al.* 2010). Many studies confirm that in the life of an individual, values and value systems represent the main influences in political behaviour (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Values possess the most influence on views and behaviours (Eysenck 1954; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). These are used as the criteria for evaluating people and events. Values are central in politics and political judgements as well as preferences. Schwartz (1992:4) defines political will as “ideas or beliefs related to desirable goals or behaviours that go beyond specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and which are hierarchically ordered by relative importance to an individual.” The behaviour of individuals ultimately influences the outcome of the gender projects at the Department. This is evident from the testimonies of officials featured later in this article.

Interviewee Anna³ indicated: “The biggest obstacle is management. Until such a time that the management of a department recognises gender mainstreaming as the key, we will not be able to make as good a progress as we should. It is noted that management has been identified as one of the key drivers of implementation in a department and therefore has a major influence on the development of an enabling environment. Interviewee Roanne commented:

Despite having implemented gender mainstreaming training in departments over the years, there are managers who still regard gender mainstreaming as a ‘nice to have’ issue. Gender mainstreaming should be one of the key projects within departments and should be reflected in departments’ Strategic and Annual Performance Plans but it is not yet happening. The primary focus in departments is the achievement of EE targets. Gender Mainstreaming is much more than numbers.

Roanne’s testimony speaks to the lack of prioritisation and support for the gender mainstreaming projects at the Department. Brynard (2009) claims that although commitment as a factor is critical, it is not always clear what determines commitment. Studies into the performance of policy implementation indicate the complex and dynamic nature of the subject matter. Investigations have constantly been plagued by the problem of too many variables (Goggin 1986:329). According to Goggin (1986:329),

³ Pseudonym.

...three clusters of independent variables can be identified. The first is the form and content of the policy itself. The second cluster is the capacity of the organisations responsible for making the policy work. The third cluster refers to the qualifications of the people in charge of policy operations.

The categories identified by Roanne are, however, not an end in itself. Again, the recognition of political will as a major influence on creating an enabling environment must be acknowledged.

Interviewee Ardie commented: "...responsibility is metered out too widely and invariably no one took responsibility (for gender mainstreaming). Incompetence in the Ministry means that there is no champion of gender mainstreaming in government." These astute observations speak to the role of additional key players in the gender landscape and the lack of a key driver for the gender agenda in creating an enabling environment for the rollout of the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan. This comment also speaks to Goggin's wider debate on responsibility. Here it is noted that responsibility is in fact meted out too widely, resulting in no responsibility being taken in any significant manner by State structures or government departments:

Implementation involves different behaviours in both the administrative and the political dimensions. The exact manner or style of implementation is a result of certain implementing decisions that shape implementation behaviour. The success or failure of implementation is due to behaviour during the course of implementation (Goggin 1986:330).

Interestingly, Goggin (1986:330) remarks that the process should be divorced from the product. Thus, a distinction should be made between performance and consequence. This is noted in the experience of the trainees in the GMP. Essentially, attendance of the programme does not necessarily translate to successful performance. Each trainee faces barriers to implementation which are not within the control of the Department. According to the PALAMA Gender Mainstreaming Final Report (PALAMA 2013:40) attendance of the GMP by officials in the DOE in and of itself was insufficient to galvanise change due to barriers in their line department. This speaks to the needs of attendees of the programme to have an enabling environment to allow for implementation beyond a skills programme.

The Gender Mainstreaming Final Evaluation Report by PALAMA also reiterates the views of the gender expert cited earlier. The report most notably points to the wider machinery and the then DWCPD, now known as the Department of Women. The report notes that:

The GMP should be located within a broader gender mainstreaming strategy and programme, and as the Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities holds the mandate around gender, it needs to create an enabling environment for gender to be mainstreamed. It is recommended that this should include: locating the training in a broader gender mainstream programme; coordinating all the stakeholders involved in gender work; and supporting the establishment of a community of practice (PALAMA 2013:5).

The PALAMA Gender Mainstreaming Project Evaluation Report (2013) calls for institutional reform, which has been echoed by interviewees. The institutional reform being called for points to the need for an enabling environment and the need for gender champions at departmental level who are at a senior level. The PALAMA Gender Mainstreaming Project Evaluation Report (2013) also points to the role of the then DWCPD as being a major role-player in creating an enabling environment for the successful mainstreaming of gender:

For the full impact of the course to be realised, the course needed to be an integral part of a much larger gender mainstreaming intervention. The scope of this falls outside of PALAMA's mandate. The DWCPD is the obvious lead for the broader initiative (PALAMA 2013:24).

The evaluation also noted the importance of senior management attendance in developing an enabling environment for the sustaining of gender mainstreaming initiatives. The role of senior managers is highlighted as a key element in the effective implementation of gender mainstreaming initiatives in a department:

The Deputy Director for Social Cohesion and Equity in Education who said the course was very useful was careful to outline a 'disclaimer': 'At the level where I am, the course is ok to get the information, but we do not influence key decisions therefore it becomes frustrating... It would be really useful if we were attending with senior people' namely Chief Director, Deputy Director General and Director General (PALAMA 2013:27).

The report goes further to explain the absence of senior managers from the process:

Several reasons were cited for the lack of senior management participation including a lack of political will, pressures on senior managers' diaries, a lack of buy-in from managers, the way the course is marketed, PALAMA's reputation amongst senior managers and a reluctance to participate in a course with more junior staff. These issues were picked up early on in the programme's delivery and various initiatives taken to mobilise senior managers. In the main, however, these were unsuccessful (PALAMA 2013:27).

Again, the recurring theme of political will emerges. Political will is therefore a critical factor in creating an enabling environment. Notably, an enabling environment is greatly influenced by the need for the necessary structures within a department. In the analysis the barriers to a department is discussed in the PALAMA Gender Mainstreaming Evaluation Report (2013:33):

Respondents spoke about their frustrations with the delay in operationalising the organisation's Gender Mainstreaming Strategy. Respondents noted that the first priority is to establish a Gender Focal Point and a Gender Mainstreaming Advisory and Compliance Committee. This recognition of the need for leadership and accountability is clearly set out in the Gender Mainstreaming strategy of the department...In the absence of these structures the strategic push on gender is shared between the HR Department and the Gender Mainstreaming Project staff. Overall reflections on the lack of movement on setting up the internal gender structures give rise to strong feelings and perceptions that work on gender in the Department and are not that important.

The need for internal structures has been a recurring theme from those working in the gender arena within the public service. Mikkola and Miles (2007:37) claim that

... the exact characteristics of hierarchical gender valuations differ across countries, but there is no doubt that hierarchy itself exists to different degrees in most (one might argue, to some extent, in all) cultures. Its existence can be more vividly seen when looking at cultures in which practices differ from our own.

This argument is also reiterated by Kandiyoti (2002:17), stating that "The appearance of patriarchy differs in Africa from the form of patriarchy in Muslim countries or Asia."

Generally, gender hierarchy is not necessarily implied by gender specific specialisation, but rather by the restricted opportunities and perspectives for the future that this specialisation typically carries with it. This specialisation or role might be culturally prescribed or taken on by individuals freely. Roanne, when engaged on how to approach gender mainstreaming, stated:

Political will is awkward to address, the talk does not necessarily translate to change. There is a male-dominated cohort being appointed at a senior level, the Ministers must take into consideration the achievement of equity targets. Political will must be addressed in order to address the gender parity in senior appointments. The role of cabinet must also be questioned for political will. When only males are recommended for appointment, there does not seem to be consideration of transformation. Have they thought about what the Women's Ministry is supposed to achieve, the Bill for gender equality is not publicised?

The response is noteworthy as it reiterates the link between an enabling environment and political will. It is also important to reflect on the role of patriarchy in creating the “male dominated cohort” as described above. This is a critical factor to the implementation of gender mainstreaming for gender equality. Notably, it is evident that a committed internal staff complement, responsible for implementing the project ultimately reflected their own political will in driving the project’s success. The onus therefore cannot be squarely placed on the shoulders of the SMS echelon. The small successes achieved through the GMP is clearly an indication of what can be achieved with political will from operational staff.

THE AVAILING OF HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN BUILDING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

The availing of both human and financial resources is important when assessing the development of an enabling environment for successful gender mainstreaming. Major gaps are discerned between policy and practice in the South African Beijing +20 Report (Department of Women 2015). The report highlights the need for strengthening of the enforcement of laws and policies in the country:

There is a clear gap between compliance requirements and measures implemented. Although the law prohibits gender and related forms of discrimination, women continue to experience systemic gender discrimination and inequality in all aspects of life and during all phases of their lifecycle, the worst being as girl children and elderly women (Department of Women 2015:11).

A major challenge identified in the report notes:

Overall there is mostly an implementation of a combination of human rights and a basic needs approach to gender transformation in the country with most of its policies and programmes pointing to a leaning towards a basic needs approach. This meant that at times there was very little attention paid to the international compliance framework on women’s human rights (Department of Women 2015:14).

Here again, there is a direct analysis of the inability of the South African public service to adequately enforce the laws and policies on gender into its operations. Compliance requirements are not met and are also attributed to the fact that attention is being paid to basic needs. The report forthrightly indicates:

At the implementation level, there is a general failure to systematically implement both gender mainstreaming and women empowerment. In general, decision-makers and implementers appear to be more comfortable with equity aspects of gender equality, as it relates to the “numbers issue”, where success sometimes is judged on a numbers only basis. Sometimes

the agenda is narrowed to the issue of placing women in decision-making positions and occupational categories where they were historically excluded (Department of Women 2015:14).

Further to this, the Towards a Fifteen Year Review (2009) explains in its analysis of the barriers for the mainstreaming of gender policy that

... while these institutional arrangements for driving the issues of gender equality tend to be acknowledged internationally as best practice, closer to home one finds challenges in their operation. Chief among these is the matter of entrenched negative attitudes towards gender equality, lack of understanding and accountability to address this coherently, and inadequate mechanisms and resourcing, financially and in terms of human capacity, for effective implementation.

Resourcing is thus clearly affected by a lack of accountability and sustained leadership. This point links to the role of political will in driving an agenda for policy implementation. It is also noted that the analysis of the South African Beijing +20 Report (Department of Women 2015) equates the disparity with allocation of resources to the disparity in levels of appointment and location – and therefore authority – of gender focal persons, impacting on the extent to which they can effect gender mainstreaming in government processes (Department of Women 2015:14) Therefore, the authority level of a Gender Focal Point has a major role to play in the creation of an enabling environment for the mainstreaming of gender.

The availability and access to resources for the use of gender mainstreaming for gender equality is also attributed to the lack of institutional mechanisms. The South African Beijing +20 Report (Department of Women 2015) praises public service interventions for the issue of quotas, the establishment of a National Gender Machinery and the subsequent elevation of the then Office on Status of Women to the Department of Women, Children and Persons with Disability:

The Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities encountered challenges of inadequate resources - financial and human - resulting in failure to meet the expectation of women in the country. In this regard, following the National Election in May 2014, His Excellency President Zuma announced that this Ministry will become the Ministry for Women located in the Presidency. The Women's Ministry will champion the achievement of women's socio-economic empowerment and women's rights. This is a clear indication that the mandate on women empowerment and gender equality will receive better attention and support when it is located in the highest office in the land and be more authoritative over accountability by stakeholders in meeting the empowerment of women and the achievement of gender equality in the country (Department of Women 2015:41).

The creation of an enabling environment is therefore absent from the key role-players identified by this report. The claims made herein are refuted by the lived experiences of gender focal points and the various experiences cited by interviewees in their interactions with both the National Gender Machinery and the Department of Women. Anna, at the NSG, when engaged on her major challenges in implementing GMP rollout, commented:

The biggest obstacle is management. Until such a time that the management of a department recognises gender mainstreaming as key, we will not be able to make as good a progress as we should. Despite having implemented gender mainstreaming training in departments over the years, there are managers who still regard gender mainstreaming as a 'nice to have' issue. Gender mainstreaming should be one of the key projects within departments and should be reflected in departments' Strategic and Annual Performance Plans but it is not yet happening. The primary focus in departments is the achievement of EE targets. Gender mainstreaming is much more than numbers.

As has been discussed earlier, the funded nature of the GMP was a noteworthy factor in the success of the project rollout. The enabling environment for the uptake of the course was therefore influenced by resource availability. The Ministry of Public Service and Administration has taken a strong stance in creating a receptive environment for the rollout of the 8-Point Principle Plan. The former Chief Director of the Diversity Management Unit, when engaged on the role of the Department in creating an enabling environment for the mainstreaming of gender, commented:

The 8-Point Principle Plan emanated from the strategic framework, the Department rolled this out through enforcing reporting. This was reinforced through conscientising departments through the rollout of advocacy workshops and then monitoring them through reports from departments. Here the Department is looking at challenges and an analysis of departments' challenges. This effort is ongoing until now, the unit supports the departments.

These efforts are to be commended as they reflect the role of the Department in attempting to develop an enabling environment through the availing of resources for the implementation of the 8-Point Principle Plan. Roanne counters the availing of resources for the delivery of training on the GMP and 8-Point Principle Plan with her assessment of the rollout:

Critical involvement by the former PALAMA, now NSG, in the imparting of skills is very important in creating a common understanding of gender mainstreaming in the public service. The main challenge experienced (in my opinion) was the accredited status of the programme; this created a barrier for some learners. People are reluctant to submit a portfolio. An informal strategy

could go a long way in addressing this, in making the course more accessible. The course could be reframed to target different groups such as the Gender Focal Points separate to those working outside of this space.

The inputs by Roanne are of value as they speak to the lived experiences of Gender Focal Points in developing an enabling environment for not only implementation but access to the tools for implementation. Therefore, resource availing for training is but one element for the successful creation of an enabling environment.

EXTERNAL STRUCTURES

The role of external structures in the development of an enabling environment at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration is necessary to provide a complete picture of the support provided to the implementation of the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan. The Department cannot achieve the success with the rollout of the gender projects without the assistance and support of the external structures responsible for the mainstreaming of gender in the South African State. The report of the Inaugural Gender Indaba (DPSA 2008) highlighted the need for an enabling environment before the formal rollout of the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan. A major obstacle identified at the Indaba was the need for an enabling environment. One of the key solutions was: "All Departments should create an enabling environment for individuals to report harassment" (DPSA 2008:25).

Notably, a major challenge with female managers was "Female managers do not take responsibility for their own enabling environment." The report, however, is silent on how these barriers would be overcome and the role of male managers in supporting the process. The report appears to suggest that female managers are responsible for the development of their environment and fails to acknowledge the role of patriarchy and the macho culture of the State. An overarching suggestion that an enabling environment must be created was not useful to implementing departments as it did not provide the concrete details as to how this would be undertaken and importantly, who would lead this. The report should be revised to include a clearer strategy on the major role players and how the appointment of women to senior management is only the beginning of a change. For change to be sustained, systemic change must be addressed and all processes within departments addressed to incorporate a gender lens.

The South African Beijing +20 Report (Department of Women 2015:7) clearly notes the importance of this factor in the successful mainstreaming of gender for gender equality:

There is a particular highlight with regard to *de jure* equality or equality in the eyes of the law, where law reform has seen to the removal of

various discriminatory laws and enactment of laws that foster an enabling environment for the advancement of women and the achievement of gender equality. With regard to *de facto* equality, significant progress has been made but there is still much to be done especially with the full and effective implementation of laws, policies and strategies.

The report notes a move beyond policy and a focus on implementation. An enabling environment is highlighted as a major factor in enabling gender to be effectively mainstreamed. Interestingly, the South African Beijing +20 Report is hailed as a national review (Department of Women 2015). The report, while commenting on an enabling environment, goes further to note:

One of the key successes on women empowerment and gender equality has been the creation of an enabling environment through favourable laws, policies and encouraging informal policy pronouncements. One of the key policy instruments in this regard is the South African National Policy Framework for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality adopted by the South African Government (PMG 2002). This Gender Policy Framework sets the tone in the country for gender mainstreaming across all sectors of society while at the same adopting an approach for women's empowerment and gender equality. It furthermore outlines the National Gender Machinery to support gender transformation as well as priorities and structural arrangements towards women's empowerment and gender equality in the country (Department of Women 2015:23).

The inclusion of these comments in the South African Beijing +20 Report provides loaded statements and is refuted through interviewees and implementation reports at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration (Department of Women 2015). The barriers to effective implementation are related to various factors one of which, as has been noted before, is the inability of the National Gender Machinery to support gender transformation in the Public service. The currently non-functional National Gender Machinery creates an implementation void. Many partners are affected by the absence of the National Gender Machinery and the lack of accountability by the Department of Women in ensuring that the National Gender Machinery is led and managed well.

As mentioned earlier, the PALAMA Gender Mainstreaming Project Evaluation indicated that the Department of Women Children and Persons with Disabilities, now known as the Department of Women, is the obvious lead to create institutional reform. In the absence of resources being availed by the relevant Ministry, PALAMA (now the NSG), has availed resources for the GMP. In this case the staff, trainers and gender experts made these available through donor funding. The 8- Point Principle Plan has a greater reliance on political will in order to drive its agenda. As explained earlier, this has not been institutionalised into DGs performance agreements as and as such time, the

Department efforts are limited to the SMS Women's Round Table hosted once a year in August under the theme of Women's Month. Resource allocation or availability in terms of finance and/or other factors are therefore inextricably linked to the political will of an organisation which again, is also a great influence on the creation of an enabling environment:

Mainstreaming gender requires change at every level of an organisation; a transformation which requires dedicated capacity and time to drive the change agenda. Developing policies, strategies and other resources are important but only really effective if they are tools in a larger process of change that tackles the organisational culture, individual behaviour, and programme and project outcomes. Where participants were able to galvanise a broader support base which included leadership, more change was possible (PALAMA 2013:43-44).

Thus, most significantly it is noted that there is a distinct interplay between resource availability and support from external structures in creating an enabling environment. Resource allocation is not the only answer to the complexity of gender projects in the South African State. The evaluation report points to the need for a change in behaviour which will in effect lead to a change in organisational culture and will enable more support for the rollout of gender projects. The availing of resources must therefore be tied to these elements to be successful. In this article, it is revealed that all elements are in fact influenced by political will and that this overarching factor is indeed the key to the success of gender projects in the South African State.

Ardrie⁴, when engaged on the role of the National Gender Machinery in creating an enabling environment for the mainstreaming of gender for gender equality, commented:

A big problem in how the Act was written was that the CGE is accountable to Parliament but has oversight of government. Any interaction with civil society was dismissed in favour of Parliament. Public hearings were held on gender discrimination and such issues with the private and public sector, the problem was, however, with the departments. The CGE has no "teeth" when a department does not want to implement. It may have the power to issue fines but falls flat when it comes to implementation. One of the four pillars to their mandate is to build the CGE. A lot of energies went into this and making policies on dealing with the organisation than a focus on the projects.

The internal management issues, therefore, have also created a barrier to the effective functioning of the National Gender Machinery. The Commission for Gender Equality, being a key element of the National Gender Machinery, needs to be well functioning to also play its significant role in the mainstreaming of gender within the public service.

⁴ Pseudonym

The Commission for Gender Equality, as a major player in the gender landscape, must therefore fulfil its role in the creation of an enabling environment. The Commission for Gender Equality is well-positioned as a Chapter 9 institution outside of government to enable the mainstreaming of gender through “neutral” interventions which would lead to holding the State accountable for the rollout of gender projects. The neutrality of the Commission for Gender Equality must be protected in order for this body to be effective.

The interviewee went further to comment on the need for the Commission for Gender Equality to play a leading role in the work of the Department:

The Commission for Gender Equality is like the public protector in the gender space. They must protect the rights of women in the workplace. Their focus must be in all sectors but they could be the watchdog for gender mainstreaming in the public service for example requesting reports on gender programmes, achievements, challenges, looking at offenders for sexual harassment/ areas of concern that need to be flagged in the public service. The Commission for Gender Equality could play a more direct role in an evaluation role in producing knowledge, impact studies and advising departments on trends emerging from the evaluation reports. This could assist the Department in policy revision for implementation.

Here, it is noted that other role-players must take the lead in contributing to the creation of an enabling environment. External role-players are crucial to the success of the gender projects at the Department as political will and buy-in is a central element. The Department, as the policy Ministry, can be successful to a point; however, the onus is on other departments to implement gender considerations into their operations.

As has been alluded to earlier, the gender components of the South African Constitution of 1996 represented a major accomplishment for those involved in the women’s movement. The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) guarantees equal and inalienable rights to men and women and instructs the government and civil society to uphold the values of equality. The Constitution specifically stipulates the creation of the CGE “to promote respect for gender equality’ and its ‘protection, development and attainment” (1996, ss.187). While the Commission on Gender Equality and government machinery for gender in South Africa represent a major change by the actors involved in fighting for women’s rights, today the movement in South Africa is fragmented, with little coordination between women’s organisations. The blame for this is often put on the absorption of talented women activists into government positions with the launch of the ANC into power in 1994 (111 women became Parliamentarians in 1994), thus creating a ‘vacuum’ at the grassroots level (Geisler, 2000: 624).

Women's movements refer to alliances among women's organisations around issues of gender equality, while women's organisations refer to individual organisations. There exists heterogeneity of organisations such as professional associations, networks and service providers (Tripp et al. 2008: 13) The slow retreat of the Women's Movement, according to Gouws (2005), is attributed to the sectoral organisation of women around issues such as health, domestic violence and notably comments on the impact of rural women on influencing the impact of the passing of certain legislation. This mobilisation was influenced by a decline in optimism and a degree of scepticism in the National Gender Machinery. Many women activists had been absorbed into government and this had a major impact on their effectiveness (Fester 1998). Further to this, Hassim (2003) claims that the Women's Movement wanted equality in the norms and procedures of government and wanted to reduce a reliance on political will for the success of gender equality. This was not being met by the National Gender Machinery, and thus a retreat by the Women's Movement was perhaps inevitable in order to mobilise around key issues. See also Hassim (2006) in her analysis of the trajectory of Women's organisations in South Africa.

The decline, however, was preceded by many critical actions to ensure gender mainstreaming occurred within the State. The Department will be assessed in terms of its interactions with the Women's Movement and reflect on the critical role of civil society in building the gender agenda. Gouws (2005: 113) expands on the acceptance of the National Gender Machinery, "The acceptance of the National Gender Machinery followed on a long and hard struggle by South African women to put gender on the agenda." This work is currently largely unacknowledged by the Department and is evident in the current focus on policy without any interest in engaging other sectors. In its current state, the Women's Movement is therefore not a clear network of organisations, but rather a few scattered organisations. The transfer of women activists to official government cannot only be seen as a loss to the South African Women's Movement. More questions need to be asked around the impact of these women leaders twenty four years after democracy and their role in creating an enabling environment.

SUPPORT FROM THE NGO SECTOR IN CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

The Africa Regional Shadow Report (FEMNET 2009:38) notes that women are largely under-represented in decision-making in the public service and from leadership positions even within tribal and/or traditional settings. The report also goes further to address the lack of internal democracy within political parties. The NGO sector has historically had a large role to play in the gender agenda in South Africa. The South African Shadow Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) reflects a strong emphasis on the need for the State to create enabling structural and societal conditions necessary to ensure that women can fully participate and exercise their relevant rights in the

political, social, economic and cultural fields (CEDAW 2011). The support from structures is critical for developing the necessary societal conditions for the implementation of gender projects. These structures are tasked with developing the necessary conditions, which include the availing of resources, the development and sustenance of political will, which contribute to the development of an enabling environment.

Mannell (2012) discusses the role of “actors” and notably extends this to include various organisations and individuals with mandates that relate to gender and development policy issues. She claims that in South Africa, this is defined as practitioners and non-practitioners. The latter is referred to as the NGO sector (Mannell, 2012:32). A key element of the National Gender Machinery is membership by non-governmental organisations. The criteria for which selection and “membership” is allowed are, however, not forthcoming although repeated attempts have been made to ascertain this information from the Department of Women. The criteria for membership, once availed, will explain how membership from the NGO sector is vetted. The inclusion of Faith Based Organisations (FBO) is also of interest as much work is undertaken by these organisations to enable the effective implementation of gender projects.

In South Africa, the NGO sector is made up of Trusts and Section twenty one organisations (not-for-profit companies or associations that report budgets publicly). In 2010/11, there were 76 175 registered non-profit organisations (NPOs) in South Africa, ninety-five percent of which were voluntary organisations under the government’s categories. Notably Mannell (2012:32) indicates the overburden on NGOs:

Gender is not an area of NPO practice according to the South African DSD categorisation scheme. Rather, gender is taken up within other areas of NPO practice including law, social services, development and housing, and health, making the actual number of organisations carrying out gender-related interventions in South Africa at one particular moment in time difficult to measure.

The burden of care, therefore, places a restriction on resources available for influence to gender mainstreaming alone whilst there are conflicting priorities. This observation may explain the lack of sufficient pressure from the NGO sector on the Department to implement the 8-Point Principle Plan and the GMP. It is assumed that the absence of voices from the NGO and FBO sectors in the reports availed for this article is indicative of the absence of collaborations with these sectors.

According to an independent database of development organisations in South Africa, there are approximately seventy-eight organisations (including NGOs, community-based organisations and faith-based organisations) in South Africa currently listing gender as one of their programme areas; two percent of the total organisations registered in the database. Gender-focussed organisations therefore appear to make up only a small number of the organisations working in development in South Africa.

They exist within a field where advocacy and politics, environment, and religion are the dominant development sectors. Mannell (2012) puts forward that the resource restrictions on NGOs in South Africa further constrain NGOs' ability to influence the public service operations and thus also has an effect on their ability to create an enabling environment:

NGOs often receive funds in order to carry out their work from a variety of sources. This includes multilateral and bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) and funding from multinational NGOs. The amount of funding provided to gender interventions in South Africa from multilateral ODA is limited. In the first instance because the majority of multilateral development assistance is allocated to 'low-income' states while South Africa is considered by the World Bank to be a 'middle-income' State. Secondly, there is no UNIFEM presence in South Africa, meaning that gender-related funding is primarily managed under the UNDP and largely restricted to achieving the SDGs outlined previously (i.e. funding from national development aid organisations and institutions) (Mannell, 2012:33-34).

In the remainder of this section, I summarise the two other types of funding sources most relevant for gender and development practice in South Africa: multinational NGOs and bilateral donors. In addition to the funding availed to the public service, routed through the Department of Treasury, there is a substantial amount of aid coming into South Africa and being routed to the NGO sector:

Large multinational NGOs, CARE International and Oxfam in particular, provide large amounts of money to local organisational partners to carry out gender interventions in South Africa. CARE International reported spending USD263 million on programme activities across the African continent in 2010. Broadly, CARE focuses on providing support for community development projects. Gender-related funding provided by CARE in South Africa has focused on empowering women through 'local economic development' and 'voluntary savings and loans projects'; and strengthening civil society 'to deal with gender and rights issues' (Oxfam 2014).

Oxfam is an international advocacy and humanitarian organisation that provided USD275.1 million to charitable projects in 2010/11. Ten per cent of this amount (USD27.5 million) was allocated to 'equity' projects under which much of Oxfam's gender activities resort. Oxfam's emphasis on funding gender interventions in South Africa is on gender-based violence and women's political and economic leadership, whereas for CARE (an international humanitarian agency), economic development for women and women's rights represent key priorities. There is some overlap between these strategic priorities.

Broadly, much of the funding for gender interventions from these multinational donor organisations is targeted at addressing women's economic empowerment, women's political leadership, and gender-based violence as advocated by institutions such as CARE. The substantial funding being ploughed into NGOs, however, does not translate to a loud enough voice within the public service realm. Interviews with Department staff indicate that the only interactions experienced are to a limited extent with the National Gender Machinery, Department of Women and the Commission for Gender Equality. The voice of the NGO sector is conspicuous by absence and must also be held accountable for the creation of an enabling environment for the mainstreaming of gender into public service operations.

The cohesiveness of the Women's Movement post-democracy has had a great influence on its ability to adequately fulfil the role of public service watchdog for gender equality. McEwan (2000) explains that gender was brought to the forefront in the 1990s in South Africa as a result of women of the ANC through the 1980s and the influence this had on intellectual discussions about the differential impact of Apartheid on men and women; and the potential a new constitution held for bringing women's concerns and the activities of ANC women activists to the table.

These factors contributed to a commitment from South African women activists to ensuring that gender equality was established as part of the new constitution and that "mechanisms for mainstreaming gender equality" were put in place (Meer, 2005). The Women's Movement is also conspicuous by its absence from official reports by the Department. No formal interactions have been documented in any of the literature in the public domain. This critical element of the South African gender landscape must be reignited in some way in order to influence the current *status quo*.

The work of the Women's Movement in South Africa seems to have slowed to the extent to which its clout can only be felt through marches. The everyday impact of the Movement is absent from the operations of government. The inclusion of voices from the Movement is absent in the reports availed for this article; indicating a lack of influence by the Movement on the Department's operations. Ideally, the Women's Movement should be holding the State accountable for the implementation of gender projects. By the same token, there are no sustained or documented efforts that assess how the Department seeks to engage the non-government organisations working in the area of gender equality. Efforts by the Department are currently limited to the bureaucracy it finds itself in. The Department navigates this bureaucratic system through political relationships that require protocol implementation and thus its own levels of engagement are further politicised. The latter is constraining on the Department's ability to interact with the NGO sector but does not absolve the Department from seeking collaboration with the civil society sector.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article analysed the role of an enabling environment in furthering the ends of gender mainstreaming in at the Department. Gumede (2008), in his assessment of the South African post-Apartheid public service, cited many policy implementation problems. This article analysed the role of an enabling environment as a factor in the successful mainstreaming of gender for gender equality at the Department. The major focus of the article was on the role of an enabling environment in ensuring the successful rollout of the two key projects being rolled out at the Department namely, the GMP and the 8-Point Principle Plan. The enabling environment was assessed in terms of the prioritisation and participation of SMS in driving the gender agenda at the Department; the availing of resources (both human and financial); and the support from external structures to the operations of the Ministry of Public Service and Administration in mainstreaming gender. This criteria were measured through an analysis of reports generated for both projects, as well as through testimonies of relevant staff at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration. In addition, experts were consulted as to the creation of an enabling environment as it related to external support such as the National Gender Machinery, Department of Women and the Commission for Gender Equality.

It is recommended that the Ministry of Public Service and Administration engages key organisations such as the Commission for Gender Equality, the Department of Women and the civil society sector in the development of a holistic strategy to address gender mainstreaming initiatives in the State. The projects, in their current form, cannot be effective and lack reach. In order to go to scale, an integrated strategy must be developed with the assistance of a revived National Gender Machinery.

The article reveals the major influence of political will in the bureaucratisation of gender mainstreaming which is therefore a major influencer on the environment in which gender must be mainstreamed. Several role-players need to possess the political will to ensure an enabling environment is created. Notably, the actions of an individual have an impact on the institutional reforms developed and created and thus *vice versa*, as was discussed earlier. Political will is thus the most important factor in the development of an enabling environment as it creates an enabling environment through political buy-in.

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SPECIAL CASE STUDY ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT

PERSPECTIVES FROM BELOW ON EMFULENI'S WASTEWATER WOES: IN SEARCH OF RESOLVING A WICKED PROBLEM¹

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Introduction

South Africa's 1994 transition to a non-racial democracy received international acclaim. It was a remarkable accomplishment for a country at the southern tip of Africa in a rapidly globalising world. Apartheid was put to rest after four decades of exclusive white rule. However, a quarter of a century later, the lofty ideals of the 'Rainbow nation', a proud country where all its people would enjoy a life of dignity, led by a caring government, in some areas remains a project under construction.

Although many human rights ideals have been realised, there remain areas that need considerably more attention. One is the realisation of the basic human right to an environment that is not harmful to one's health. In the case under study, the potential cause of the lapse must be sought in the field of municipal government.

South Africa has outstanding legislation; describing and providing guidelines for the three tiers of government, from the central to the provincial and local level. But the system has only been partially successfully implemented. At the third tier, municipal government, operational lapses are most apparent. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the municipal water and sanitation sector.

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In governance studies, 'wicked problems' are said to be complex. They highlight the inadequacy of existing patterns of sectoral policy responsibilities and specialisation, along with insufficient horizontal and vertical policy coordination in areas of complex and cross-cutting policy problems (Daviter 2019:63). These circumstances lead to wicked problems.

In South Africa's municipal water sector, where water security is often compromised because of extended delays in adequate maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure, wicked problems have become commonplace. Municipal wastewater treatment systems are especially prone to intermittent collapse.

Most recently, a countrywide drought that began in 2014 has wreaked havoc on mitigation strategies at all levels of government. In the field of sanitation services, there is a wicked problem that thrives on uncertainty and misunderstandings. This can partially be ascribed to an inappropriate awareness of anthropogenic climate change, caused by population growth, urbanisation, excessive resource consumption and continued industrial development. It has put paid to disaster risk mitigation strategies at critical times in many parts of the world (Bos and Brown 2012; Larsen, Hoffmann, Lüthi, Truffer, and Maurer 2016; Mulyana and Suganda 2018). This is also apparent in South African municipalities. In the Emfuleni and the neighbouring Midvaal Local Municipality, the impact of population growth on the performance of wastewater treatment works has already been investigated (Teklehaimanot, Kamika, Coetzee and Momba 2015). The findings correspond with the socio-ecological understanding of anthropogenic climate change.

In some quarters, moves are afoot to promote greater urgency in addressing climate change. One trend is the use of the concept of the Anthropocene. A respected group of researchers have identified a globally 'great global acceleration' of unsustainable development, since the mid-20th century, in which human beings have been the primary drivers of climate change (Davison 2019; McNeill and Engelke 2014; Waters et al. 2016; Zalasiewicz, Waters, Summerhayes, and Williams 2018). The Anthropocene has not yet received universal acceptance, but it underlines the need for an awareness of significant change processes.

Problems experienced in many South African local authorities, in respect of water governance, are similar to what is happening elsewhere in the world – even in some of the most developed countries. Change is so rapid that there is a need to manage circumstances of uncertainty. For some time now, water sector researchers have incorporated uncertainty and complexity in their reporting (Scoones 1999: 494-496). Developed countries have applied new mitigating strategies, based on thorough planning, since the early 2000s (Allan 2004: 137-138).

However, the water sector in developing countries is still not on the mark. A recent study suggests that developing countries have become more vulnerable to pollution threats, catchment disruption and problems with water resources. Biotic factors are evident in most river catchments (Gober 2018:16). The problems usually have their origins in highly populated and rapidly growing urban areas. There is a clear correlation between vulnerable river systems and dysfunctional wastewater systems in urban areas.

When the Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) was placed under administration by the Gauteng provincial government in mid-2018, it coincided with a series of unexpected wastewater spills into the Vaal River. The failure of ELM's comprehensive wastewater infrastructure system proved to be near-fatal for the cash-strapped local municipality. Consequently, the disastrous circumstances of 'things falling apart' had a negative impact on the lives of thousands of water and sanitation services users, as well as downstream farming and urban communities in the Vaal River system.

OUTLINE

In the discussion to follow, attention is given to the methodologies used in the compilation of the report. Then follows an exposition, based on perspectives gained from people at the grassroots level on a number of significant topics as well as sets of word clouds garnered from members research group as well as a stakeholder leadership group. The word cloud formations are then integrated into a set of potential future scenarios that describe alternative pathways in which the local authority could be capable of directing the restoration of the wastewater infrastructure problem.

The focus of the investigation falls primarily on ELM's domestic, industrial, commercial and financial municipal service users. The objective is to articulate the voices of local residents, NGOs and the private sector at grassroots level. By focussing from the bottom up on how stakeholders feel about sanitation service delivery, the research team sought to form an impression of the dire circumstances in which the governance of one of the country's largest local municipalities found itself in 2019. By providing an impression of views of the public, specifically the interested and affected communities, the project aims to inform municipal officials and political leaders on stakeholder views.

METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

For the purposes of this research project, a transdisciplinary research methodology was used to garner views and insights from a broad spectrum of individuals and groups who could be classified as stakeholders. These stakeholders include individuals and some officials with a vested civic interest in adequate sanitation services provided by ELM and its water services authority, Metsi a Leko.

The research group consisted of three experienced members of the project conducted under the auspices of the Research Niche for the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) who are familiar with transdisciplinary research, one consultant, three members of local and national NGOs, as well as three final-year undergraduate students. The collective disciplinary knowledge fields included Chemistry, Zoology, Botany, Earth Science, Political Science, History, and Development Studies. The group agreed that the focus was on integrating useful insights gained at the time of fieldwork and internal discussion sessions. A willingness to integrate, collaborate and share useful information was an important prerequisite. The synthesis of all views into the content of the report took priority.

There were more than two weeks of research fieldwork. In some cases, groups of people as well as individuals were interviewed. Interviews were conducted primarily in ELM's urban suburbs (Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark.) There was also a brief intervention at Deneysville's Refengkgotso to locate a potential external site where a preliminary assessment could be made for internal purposes. Interviews were conducted in the form of one-on-one discussions and focus group discussions. There were also follow-up interviews in some cases to secure more information.

As the research project gained momentum, the team became familiar with leading local people who were familiar with the wastewater situation. Many were representatives of stakeholders who had a vested interest in the well-being of Emfuleni's environmental health. A wastewater stakeholder leadership group was identified to represent Emfuleni's industrial and commercial private sector, local residents, civil society organisations, and some Emfuleni officials and elected councillors.

The identified stakeholder leadership group was invited for a special engagement at a local riverside hotel in mid-August 2019, where it participated in an open discussion on Emfuleni's wastewater crisis. After the event, a Whatsapp group was created where, up to the present, there is an open discussion on matters that can potentially contribute to resolving the ELM wastewater problem.

At the time of the engagement, the stakeholder leadership sector were were asked to define the problem of Emfuleni's local authority and its wastewater service delivery. Then followed questions on how the problems could be resolved. With the group's permission, CuDyWat team members garnered a considerable amount of important information on individual and stakeholder group perceptions and views. The research team also disseminated question sheets of randomly grouped words to be grouped in terms of priorities related to specific leading issues. The word-based data provided information for the compilation of word clouds.

Earlier members of CuDyWat held a similar internal word harvesting session. One CuDyWat member operating outside the empirical fieldwork activities was responsible for the compilation of the word clouds. First, the CuDyWat team's response to specific

words and questions was based on the reflexive, visual and verbal impressions they had become aware of at the time of conducting research fieldwork. The first words and clouds developed then informed the basis of questions and words asked at the time of the session with the wastewater stakeholder leadership group. The two sets of word cloud data (from the CuDyWat research group and the stakeholder leadership group) provided the guidelines to develop a set of future scenarios.

CuDyWat's research focus was not on management or governance per se. For the purposes of this discourse, the concept of governance can be linked to wicked problems, in which it is required of governance decision-makers to have capacity to be reflexive and deal with multiple frames; be resilient and able to respond to change under uncertain circumstances; have a sense of responsiveness to changing agendas and expectations; and revitalisation insight, or the capacity to unblock things (Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller 2015:680).

Thus, CuDyWat's objective was to garner unique empirical evidence of people's views, by means of participatory engagements, and then present the evidence to management and governance experts. It also had to fit in well with governance and the phenomena of wicked problems, uncertainty and resilience. It was necessary to look beyond policy perspectives to locate clues regarding the needs of residents, the vitally important local private sector, and civil society, and find out what they regard as proper governance fit for purpose under local conditions.

The views of residents, civil society and business interests are important. They make local government officials and political leaders aware of the value of taking note of key stakeholder sectors which are, more than often, bluntly ignored at times when governance is not up to standard; the need to find solutions to wicked problems in a faltering governance system of wastewater management at the level of a municipal authority; and the need to be aware of the potentially disastrous implications if and when important wastewater infrastructure systems start collapsing.

It is accepted that the circumstances of a local authority like Emfuleni are unique. ELM is situated on the banks of the Vaal River Barrage. There is the need for all and sundry to constantly bear in mind that South Africa is a water-stressed country. Therefore, it is important to observe sound principles of water security by using water parsimoniously, and preferably treating and re-using wastewater before spilling waste into the river system.

The findings of the research, apart from an interpretive exposition, are also presented in a relatively new type of analysis; that of word cloud formations assembled from data and insights gained by the members of the research group at the time of their fieldwork. In addition, data was generated by a wastewater stakeholder leadership group, comprising local residents, NGOs, the private sector, local political leaders, and municipal officials. Based on the qualitative findings, an analysis is offered of four

alternative future scenarios for wastewater governance and the well-being of the ELM urban community in the future.

Scenarios are plausible stories of the future which can be used to broaden thinking about a situation in order to build better resilience into future strategies (Chermack *et al* 2001). The application of scenarios is suitable for individuals, institutions, industries and communities to improve preparedness for unforeseen future events. In particular, scenarios provide a way of exploring the implications of plausible futures. Scenarios are built on (extreme) ranges of key driving forces and how they can possibly play out in the future. The scenario development methodology applied was adapted from the Pierre Wack scenario approach (Wack 1985). The traditional Wack methodology interviews were workshops with affected parties are used to extract a list of issues relevant to the situation. The issues identified are then clustered and ranked to identify the key driving forces. In this case, various interviews and workshops were held with affected parties to identify the issues applicable to the Emfuleni situation. The Pierre Wack methodology was adapted by using word clouds to extract the key issues as voted by the stakeholders. The ranges (extremes) of behaviour for each identified key driving force were then determined.

The development of scenarios uses a matrix approach where typically four quadrants explore the extreme ranges of the two most relevant issues. In this case, the identified macro factors were used to create extreme alternative futures within the range of behaviours of the key driving forces. For these scenarios, the issues identified as having the highest impact and lowest predictability were applied as the following two axes:

- Corruption: with a range from chaos to controlled.
- Socio-economic: with a range from inequality to equality.

With the four quadrants defined, the key driving forces were evaluated based on how they could play out in each specific quadrant. Four story-lines were developed from this approach. These stories (scenarios) can then be applied to broaden thinking about the future and how the current situation can play out, and to test future solutions to be more resilient.


Attention is given to the evolution of ELM's governance process against the backdrop of trends in South Africa. The focus is primarily on local wastewater sanitation service delivery and what may be considered to be the governance problems that emerged over more than two decades in a typical large municipal authority. A number of issues were singled out as starting points for discussion, as listed below. In essence, the focus is on cooperative and participatory governance.

ABOUT EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

The Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) is situated on the northern banks of the Vaal River Barrage, is one of three local municipalities within the geographical area of the Sedibeng District Municipality in the southern parts of Gauteng province (see Map 1). The Sedibeng District is in the greater Gauteng province. (Htonl 2019; Municipalities of South Africa 2019)

The ELM has been singled out as a case study of a local government crisis in the second decade of the 21st century – one that posed a major problem. ELM's wastewater treatment infrastructure compromises the principles of proper environmental health. It poses a threat to local residents, as well as the Vaal River Barrage, which is an important component of the 1300 km long Vaal River system that makes critically important water supplies to the hub of South Africa's economy in the Gauteng province.

Map 1: Emfuleni Municipality and Sedibeng District Municipality



(Htonl 2019; Municipalities of South Africa 2019)

A fairly recent socio-economic assessment suggested that the population of Emfuleni stood at 731 000. An estimated 36.4% of residents were unemployed and as much as 45% of local youths were unemployed. Between 1996 and 2014, Emfuleni's gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 1.2% to -0.5% of the regional growth GDP, calculated at R1 000 000 (Meyer, Meyer and Molefe 2016:125).

PERSPECTIVES FROM BELOW

In an effort to determine to what extent ELM's wastewater infrastructure collapse influenced its residents, the research group conducted a number of interviews. The objective was to contemplate governance, literally from the bottom up – from the perspective of local residents, civil society organisations and the private sector, at grassroots level. A number of issues were explored; such as corruption, confidence in the local authority, lack of remorse, lack of government money, communications between ELM and residents, and poverty.

Corruption

At the time of the internal research group discussions, following the fieldwork sessions, the stigma of corruption was singled out as the primary issue that needed to be addressed in the context of the Emfuleni Local Municipality. It was identified as a requirement for restoring proper systems of governance and trust among local residents. Any symptoms of corruption may be seen as a leadership attitude among politicians and officials who assume they need not act in an accountable manner. However, local residents feel their actions have to be transparent and well communicated (NMPA 20190725). It must be borne in mind that corruption in municipal wastewater is not confined to Emfuleni (Timse 2019). In the era of the Zuma administration it was rife in many parts of the country. With the advent of the Ramaphosa administration, strict auditing measures were introduced.

In August 2019, a leaked forensic report suggested that Emfuleni had spent as much as R1bn on vehicles in 2018, without respecting existing official service-level agreements (Mabena 2019). The reluctance of officials and conniving politicians to be transparent in their dealings with local government funds are doing local government a disservice. For example, in one focus group discussion officials advised on the need for the decentralisation of power, to reduce corruption and ensure fairness in service provision. One official explained:

(S)ometimes when you receive a complaint and take it up to the bosses we are told that we have to solve problems in some areas while the problems (in) other areas are ignored (HJPA/20190711/FGD3/SWCW 2019; NMPA 20190725).

Local residents, in discussions with the research group, contended that in some cases funding given to promote service delivery could not be accounted for. Some projects had been signed off without proper planning of implementation or supervision of the process. There is a need to follow correct procedures; this promotes good governance, which in turn boosts development and economic growth (HJPA/20190706-22/ Personal notes 2019). In that way appropriate procedures may contribute to greater public trust.

In almost every discussion with residents of Emfuleni, NGO representatives and local officials had grave concerns about corruption. The wastewater stakeholder leadership deliberations, at one stage of the process, saw significant local political-style debates starting up between members of the parties in Emfuleni's council (TPA 20190815 2019). The political speak did not provide solutions. One shortcoming was the apparent unwillingness of some councillors to engage in a proper process of communicating with the residents they represent at the council level.

Confidence

At the time of engagement between the research group and officials (not senior management), it was evident that even the officials were aware that there had been a loss of confidence in Emfuleni's local government. Clear reasons for civil disdain with the municipality included serious spillage hotspots in Emfuleni in April 2019 that included: Peacehaven, a residential area in Vereeniging; the Shingwedzi apartment building in General Hertzog Road; and the Vereeniging CBD, where some buildings were said to be 'sinking' under sewage. The prime aquatic recipient of the untreated wastewater from the Sebokeng and Rietspruit wastewater treatment works was Loch Vaal, close to the Barrage weir on the Vaal River where extremely high counts of *E. coli* were registered. Independent tests revealed a count of 130 000 000 ppm/100ml. The legal count is a maximum of 400 ppm/100ml (Pretorius 2019). Matters had not changed much by July 2019 when the research group conducted its fieldwork.

Without a proper budget Emfuleni's water officials could not procure essential items such as water meters and important infrastructure equipment (TPA 20190711a 2019). According to the officials, their inability to perform brought the water workers, along with Emfuleni, into the residents' bad books.

At the time of interviews a wastewater leadership group stated there were very weak checks and balances in ELM. There was a centralisation of power vested in certain individuals which caused setbacks in service delivery processes. There was also a need for various avenues to reduce red tape in government systems (HJPA/20190706-22/ Personal notes 2019). The extent to which unlawful procurement practices in goods and services might have been behind ELM's lethargy was not disclosed.

The lack of confidence in political leadership also featured in discussions in the wastewater stakeholder leadership group. It was explained that some senior management officials and elected councillors did not reside in Emfuleni. Not only were they unaware of what was happening in Emfuleni; they were spending the money they earned in Emfuleni in either Johannesburg or Ekurhuleni (TPA 20190815 2019). At the time of the interviews, residents of Sebokeng confirmed that their councillors were not resident in the wards they represented. This was seen as a serious shortcoming of basic civil courtesy towards the residents of Emfuleni. NGOs, such as the Organisation to Undo Tax Abuse (OUTA) and the Vaal Action Group (VAG), expressed reservations about the effectiveness of ward committees, whose members came from various areas

of Emfuleni. A Vereeniging resident explained that his local councillor served a diverse group of people, ranging from members of the commercial sector to those resident in old and well-established suburban areas (TPA 20190709a 2019). It appeared as if the specific councillor was unable to rise above his political allegiances and work in the interests of the ratepayers in his ward.

Remorse

There has been no admission of wrongdoing by ELM. This is despite the reports of malfeasance circulating in the local and national media. Nor has there been any indication of remorse in matters relating to corruption and/or the actions or inactions of local officials in the execution of their tasks. According to the wastewater sector leadership stakeholders, a statement of some sort by ELM could speak of finding common ground for trust between the local government and its residents (NM/LN 20190815 2019).

There is also the need for the local authority and its leadership to articulate why the crisis emerged; what had changed in 2019? The wastewater system that prevailed previously was adequate although far from exemplary; why did it collapse in 2018? Members of the wastewater stakeholder leadership group appeared to be cynical about the answer. One spoke of 'reinventing the past', which in the case of wastewater, did not have a long history of positive outcomes (TPA 20190815 2019). It was evident that water sector experts were more than familiar with the fact that wastewater treatment processes would always be subject to sudden and unexpected changes. The deliberations underlined, for the research team, that proper channels of communication between the local authority and the inhabitants it serves are of cardinal importance. By communicating properly, the local authority can show willingness to acknowledge some form of remorse.

'Not enough' money government

The lack of effective control over spending was evident in Emfuleni's water services authority, Metsi a Lekoa (TPA 20190711a 2019). By 2018, government simply had insufficient money to randomly throw at a dark pit of unpredictable spending on local infrastructure.

In April 2019, government announced that R341 million was available to deal with the ELM sewage crisis. Part of the plan was to train up to 2 000 young trainees as carpenters, plumbers and builders – and as guards, for keeping an eye on the Emfuleni wastewater pump stations (Pretorius 2019). Even in the preliminary phases of planning the programme to address the crisis, estimates suggested that at least R800 million would be required to do all the work. It seemed to respondents as if the local authority's management merely sat back and relied on central government to pay for whatever happened in the local water sector. For the local authorities, water rates represent a sound source of revenue. There appears to be lethargy on the part of Emfuleni's politicians and officials to explore this avenue further. It is a matter that

needs concerted attention. All Emfuleni residents should be surveyed to ensure that all residents who are in a position to pay for services are urged to do so.

Public distrust in the operations of the local authority is deep seated. People want greater transparency. At the stakeholder wastewater leadership session, participants stated that there was a need for the Emfuleni local municipality to, report back on progress made and expenditures incurred, on a daily basis (TPA 20190815 2019).

Communication issues

At the municipal leadership level, local politicians admitted that there was insufficient communication with the public (TPA 20190715b 2019). Officials, in turn, have also been alerted by the national Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) that the local municipality's customer engagement programme does not operate satisfactorily. At the time of the formal engagements with officials there was clear evidence of a significant shortfall in the number of officials who had to respond to the public's queries at Metsi a Leko's customer care centre (TPA 20190711a 2019). Private sector partnerships with Emfuleni Local Municipality are important. In discussions with local entrepreneurs, the responses to questions regarding communication with the Emfuleni Municipality varied from 'very amicable and constructive', to 'most unhealthy' (SMPA20190712 2019; SMPA20190725 2019).

The unhealthy relationships are characterised by conflict, mistrust, legal action and accusations of fraud on the part of the municipality (TPA 20190711 2019; TPA 20190815 2019). The respondents interviewed cited a complete lack of communication between the public and ELM. Residents argued that municipal officials were rude and unhelpful and did not bother to respond to emails. An anonymous participant claimed the municipality had been involved in a questionable awarding of a contract to repair a pump station, and had set fire to a municipal building to destroy evidence of fraudulent activities (SMPA20190707).

A leading proponent of Vaal River Barrage tourism, entrepreneur Rosemary Anderson, indicated that there was a complete lack of public communication with the municipality. Even in the confines of the municipality there are no communication channels between officials (SMPA20190716b). There is a lack of understanding of the true nature of the problems, as well as a lack of expertise. Anderson insisted that stakeholders need to understand the issues at hand and be informed regularly of good and/or bad news. Ultimately, ELM is running on taxpayer money and the taxpayers themselves had the right to know what was going on, according to Anderson.

At the time of the wastewater stakeholder leadership session, the public was eager to establish cooperative relations with ELM (NM/LN20190815 2019). A friendly atmosphere prevailed in the first round of discussions when the wastewater stakeholder leadership was asked to outline the wastewater problems. The communication was prompt and to the point. But that soon diminished when they were asked to speak about solutions.

The topic spontaneously transformed contributions from all parties into altercations between councillors (elected representatives of the various political parties) in Emfuleni. The political talk was a repeat of the arguments in the council chamber. Things took an ironic turn when members of some civil society organisations, such as the Emfuleni Ratepayers Association (ERPA) and the VAG, pointed out that they had been trying to engage with local government in the search for solutions. Their endeavours had stalled because their representatives (the councillors) were at ‘two ends of the stick’ and could not find common ground (TPA 20190815 2019).

But all was not lost. The Golden Triangle Chamber of Commerce and Proudly Three Rivers reported that their respective leaders maintained sound relations with the municipality. The newly formed ELM Business Forum, an initiative of Mayor Gift Moerane, paved the way for frequent meetings between the private sector and Emfuleni. The forum is intended to be participatory and a memorandum of understanding is already underway. According to Stephan Olivier, the management of the Chamber of Commerce and Proudly Three Rivers explained in an earlier interview that the Chamber members have a mutual support agreement with ELM. Members subsequently grouped together and sponsored materials for the repair of potholes in parts of Emfuleni. The relationship between ELM and the Chamber is said to be one of mutual trust and cohesion. They are determined to work together to resolve issues (SMPA20190729).

While conducting fieldwork, the research team found evidence that all ties of friendship have not quite been restored. A senior manager at a local steel manufacturing plant indicated that historically, relationships with Emfuleni had been good, but in recent years they had become more strained due to court actions taken against the municipality over electricity load shedding (SMPA 20190724). It is unclear why some organisations have these unhealthy relationships with the municipality. This is contrary to the tenets of participatory governance emphasised by advisors to the political leadership of Emfuleni (SMPA20190715).

The wastewater stakeholder leadership was of the view that judicial measures have in the past proved ineffective in resolving Emfuleni’s wastewater issues (TPA 20190815 2019). However, under extreme circumstances, local business leaders still feel that legal measures are perhaps the only way to ensure that their operations do not suffer crippling losses (TPA 20190711 2019).

In the interviews conducted by the research group, business people stressed that Emfuleni’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) required the municipality to consult with communities on their needs. However, not all communities have shown to be consulted. Examples were cited of affected residents in certain suburbs having asked the municipality to intervene on their behalf and receiving a negative response. In what used to be “decent” residential areas, homes have been turned into hostels with as many as 19 bedrooms, only one kitchen and a bathroom-toilet chamber.

This has placed a severe strain on the existing municipal infrastructure and poses a major environmental health threat, with blocked drain pipes frequently flowing into the streets (TPA 20190725 2019). The municipality is yet to meet with residents and respond to suggestions to take appropriate steps.

From the municipal leadership side, it was argued that ELM has struggled with service delivery over the last five years. One may speculate whether it is the unhealthy relations between the municipality and the private sector that have caused Emfuleni's poor governance record. Some stakeholder leaders explained that there was a problem with the institutional culture of ELM (TPA 20190815 2019).

The current mayor, Gift Moerane, was appointed in January 2019. In an interview held with one of the mayor's senior colleagues, it was said that mid-2019 was still 'early days'. Emfuleni was working on resolving issues but needed 18 months. Emfuleni, he said, was the first of a kind. For example, it was the first local authority to be placed under administration by a provincial government. In effect, it had been agreed by government that in future, before municipalities are placed under administration, there should first be a proper audited plan in place. This would be a plan of listed problems and their proposed solutions before steps were taken to place the authority under administration (SMPA 20190715 2019).

And yet, inexplicably, many of the plans for setting things right have, up to the present, not been communicated to residents and members of the public who are impacted most closely by the crisis. Importantly, by the end of August 2019, there were still no signs of the wastewater infrastructure crisis being addressed in any significant way. Communications, although somewhat better in the mainstream news media, did not reach all residents.

Poverty and governance

Local residents in Sebokeng told the research team that there was a distinct divide between rich and poor in Emfuleni. The poor tended to be somewhat more excluded and 'at an even greater distance' from the authorities. There is evidence of poverty in many parts of greater Sebokeng. In one interview, one working-class resident observed that people in Sebokeng did not have money and were unwilling to do anything for nothing (TPA 20190706a 2019). Thus, an unwillingness to do anything to improve their own conditions such as to seek jobs. They had 'given up'.

From discussions with a broad spectrum of residents it was evident that the wastewater crisis was potentially a divide between the rich and the poor. At the deliberations of the wastewater stakeholder leaders, only one member spoke out on the need to give attention to social justice and the redress of disparities between the rich and poor residents of ELM (TPA 20190815 2019).

Ultimately, all people in Emfuleni are affected. However, the responses vary. Whereas residents in the more impoverished parts of Sebokeng tend to resort to violent protest, most working class residents of Sebokeng, Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging resolve to slog away and continue to pay rates and taxes. Although there were some ratepayers, at the time of the interviews, who took a strong stand in favour of withholding their monthly rates payments to the local authority, it appears that this has not materialised in any organised manner. In some quarters there was even talk, at one stage, of 'ring-fencing' certain payments (SMPA20190802). Emfuleni ratepayers were also at the forefront of direct face-to-face engagements with officials at the municipal offices, but more often, issues were apparently unresolved.

Feelings of disrupted living conditions, have angered all residents. There was consensus among well-informed residents that wastewater poses a major environmental health threat. Residents in poorer areas were also angry, but tended to feel helpless about improvements and were not aware of the health implications of exposure to wastewater. There was evidence among the poorest of the poor of a loss of trust in the local authority and its ability for set things right (HJPA/20190709c/Sharpeville 2019).

Amid the poverty there was also evidence of human kindness. In parts of Emfuleni people started joining hands. In Sharpeville, members of one family reported a gesture of good-neighbourliness in a poverty-stricken area. A local resident told a member of the research team that his/her house was on the verge of collapse. He/She had not received any assistance from the authorities. After seeing the decrepit state of his/her house, another resident donated a shack for the desperate family to live in (LNPA20190709d, 1:1, Sharpeville).

The poorest residents appear to be settled in the peripheral areas of Sebokeng. At the core of the well-developed parts of Sebokeng, residents are closer to shops and transport facilities. Those living in the outlying areas of Sebokeng have to commute long distances to jobs and centres of commerce and trade. This means that some do not have much money left for their personal livelihoods after paying transportation fares (TPA 201907806b 2019).

Numerous households in Sebokeng lack reliable access to basic services. Residents of Westside Park have reasonable access to water and energy, but have no health services. Their sense of material poverty is deepened by the awareness of the growing incidence of crime and a high local death rate. Women are being raped in open spaces and there are reports of children who die at a very young age. Residents are aware that the bodily remains of people have been found in the open spaces of Westside Park (HJPA/20190706c/FGD1). Most respondents, at the time of the interview, were unemployed. Some received no government grants. These people have limited choices to help themselves. At Sebokeng Hostel, poverty is evident everywhere and the stench of sewers is pervasive. Events of sewage flooding are frequent (HJPA/20190709/FGD2; NMPA/20190706c2019). These people, at the time of a focus group discussion,

expressed their anger in no uncertain terms. They were articulate in their political opposition to the ruling party.

Respondents of Westside Park explained that they feel they have been neglected by politicians, who only remember them during elections. One explained that they still relied on 'mobile' (chemical) toilets with buckets, which are seldom cleaned. There are reportedly worms that make it impossible to use outside toilets late at night. According to the respondents interviewed, contractors who are supposed to do maintenance of these buckets are aware of these problems but choose to ignore the plight of the people (HJPA/20190706/FGD1). Residents said they were sick as a result of living in what was a 'hopeless area'. In addition, they intimated that the municipality was aware of the high local death rate among children in Westside Park (NMPA/ 20190706c). The area appears to be hazardous to everyone living there. Some people in a nearby informal settlement have reported finding snakes inside their homes (NMPA/ 20190706c). The perceived threat prevents them from going to toilets outside their home at night.

Some local residents, especially the poor and unemployed, tend to look at local government as the local representative of a 'wealthy welfare' state. But local residents have become increasingly cynical about the performance of the State in providing services. Evidence of this is the fact that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) tends to have significant support in the poorer areas of Emfuleni. Middle class residents of Sebokeng, on the other hand, tend to maintain their support for the ruling ANC (TPA 20190706a 2019; TPA 20190706c 2019). They have vested interests in their homes and are primarily interested in maintaining their local property investments.

However, maintaining resilience in Sebokeng is becoming more difficult. As the country struggles to restore the economy in the aftermath of the Zuma era, unemployment remains high, especially among the younger generation. It is the youth who are the most vociferous in questioning what they perceive as inefficient systems of local government. The State is not always able to support its poor and destitute citizens; it is these people who suffer the most.

Working within the framework of coping strategies for resilience in poverty-stricken areas, the research team determined that many local residents collect water in containers and seldom have access to proper sanitation in parts of Sebokeng (HJPA/2019.07.06-22 2019; HJPA/20190706 2019). Residents provided information on acute lapses in resilience. Ironically, in the poor areas of Sharpeville, the Dlomo Dam, a sewage dam, is a 'popular area' for destitute and depressed residents to commit suicide (NMPA20190709a 1:1 Sharpeville – Steven Lerato Matswameng). Little wonder then that a sense of dystopia prevails under these circumstances. Local residents, both white and black, tended to suffer from a form of depression that sets in when 'things fall apart' (Tempelhoff 2019: 34-36).

Because ELM's top leadership changes so frequently, municipal management officials keep their communication with the public to the bare minimum. Local public pressure groups are aware of the state of affairs. Consequently, they were in full support in September 2018, when the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) held hearings in Emfuleni. Civil society groups articulated their views by sending a clear message to the local authority that they were exasperated and discontent with the way municipal officials and political leaders were treating them. Things had evidently fallen apart at the time (Tempelhoff 2019:23-32). Ultimately, it is the marginalised poor and destitute residents of Sebokeng who remain at the receiving end of serious wastewater leaks in nearby Rietspruit (TPA 20190706c 2019).

Deneysville sample survey outside Emfuleni

Members of the research team interviewed residents of Refengkgotso, near Deneysville, on the Free State side of the Vaal River Barrage. There was evidence of (at least some) local residents who had started their own gardens to secure food supplies (LNPA20190708b, 1:1, Refengkgotso). On the other hand, there were few instances of residential vegetable gardens in Sebokeng; presumably because local residents were in a more advanced phase of urbanisation, finding themselves in a money-based local economy. In Refengkgotso, people merely spoke about being unemployed and even asked members of the research team if they knew of any job opportunities.

The situation of the Refengkgotso residents is somewhat different to their (industrial and highly urbanised) Emfuleni counterparts. Although local NGOs are active in promoting farming and local vegetable gardens, Emfuleni residents are primarily focussed on employment opportunities associated with urban commercial and industrial enterprise. Emfuleni's population also appears to be more transient and migrant than that of Refengkgotso, where new incoming residents primarily come from rural parts of the Free State and Lesotho. However, there are also some Refengkgotso residents who are day commuters to and from Vereeniging, where they are employed in various capacities.

Although the two urban areas of Deneysville and Vereeniging are situated less than 50 km apart, there is evidence of different social ecologies. The one is rural while the other is an urban area that is grappling with major problems usually associated with highly urbanised centres.

WORD CLOUDS AND SCENARIOS

In this section, attention is given to the research initiative of using word clouds; a unique strategy to depict the views held by residents, activists, and wastewater leadership stakeholders at the time of the fieldwork conducted by the research team during July and August 2019.

Word clouds

Shortly after the research project began, it was decided to use word clouds as a strategy to compound a vast body of ideas succinctly. The information featured in the word clouds was shared with members of the research team by respondents from all walks of life who reside in the Emfuleni municipal area. Making use of word clouds was considered an appropriate way to analyse and present a large volume of information. A total of 256 words or phrases were generated, applying the De Bono “six hats methodology” (De Bono 2016). Words and/or phrases were placed into one of the following groups:

- Macro factors – i.e., words associated with issues or themes that are outside of the direct control of the Emfuleni municipality and can be regarded as country level challenges. Blue was associated with this list.
- Facts – i.e., verified information about the Emfuleni water and sewage situation; notably information reported in the media, i.e. factual rather than subjective opinions. White (neutral) was associated with this list.
- Shortcomings – i.e., typical problems (shortcomings) associated with the Emfuleni water and sanitation situation; perceptions and not necessarily verified facts or so-called “truths”. Black (negative) was associated with this list.
- Emotions – i.e., words that describe an emotion (feeling/ sentiment/ reaction) with regards to the Emfuleni situation. Red was associated with this list.
- Actions – i.e., current actions or interventions, irrespective of the success or outcome, which are relevant to addressing the situation in Emfuleni. Yellow was associated with this list.
- Ideas – i.e., future solutions, irrespective of the success or outcome, which are relevant to addressing the situation in Emfuleni. Green was associated with this list.

Once duplications were removed, tabulated lists of the categorised words and phrases were prepared. Through a facilitated process, workshop participants were invited to indicate by voting (for the top 25% of each list) for the words or word phrases which could best be associated with the Emfuleni water and sewage crisis in the context of the Vaal River. Word clouds were generated (see Figure 1) of the aggregated results, to identify the words or phrases for which the greatest consensus had been received, as measured through the number of votes received.

Working with scenarios

As described in the methodology, four plausible storylines were created to explore a range of possible futures for Emfuleni. The narratives were anchored around the extreme ranges of the key driving forces of “corruption” (ranging from extreme chaos to controlled) and “socio-economic equality” (ranging from high levels of inequality to high levels of equality). The word cloud analysis (described above) was used to identify those issues (macro factors) from which the key driving forces (corruption and socio-economic equality) were identified as well as additional driving forces used to develop storylines of the alternative plausible futures. The driving forces and trends incorporated into the different stories (or scenarios) is presented in Table 1. From the outset, it is important to note that the future outlooks generated provide at best only a preliminary view of the future, to inform more detailed discussions on future trends and possible societal responses. A summary of each of the four storylines developed is provided below.

Table 1: Driving forces and trends incorporated into the different scenarios

Driving Force	Me, myself and I	Controlled crash landing	You “pay” to stay	Forced equality
Inequality	High	High	Low	Low
Corruption	High	Low	Low	High
Unemployment	Increases significantly	Unchanged	Decreases	Decreases
Poverty	Big gap (super rich and very poor, middle class evaporates)	Income gap continues	Expanding middle class	Those with power get richer
Criminality	Extremely high	Sporadic	Low (“police state”)	High
Human rights	Little focus	Unequal	High on agenda	Poor (money buys you)
Corruption	Off the charts	Controlled	Under control (severe punishment)	Prevalent
Urbanisation	Medium (land grabbing)	High	High (smart cities)	Uncontrolled (informal settlements)

Driving Force	Me, myself and I	Controlled crash landing	You “pay” to stay	Forced equality
Inequality	High	High	Low	Low
Corruption	High	Low	Low	High
Economy	“Rock bottom”	Trying but going no where	Economy booming	Slow growth
Climate change	Reality	Worse case (extreme)	More resilience	Reality
Political will	None	Trying, but cannot cope with disasters	Strong (big brother)	Low

Me myself and I (corruption high; inequality high)

The setting for “me, myself and I”, depicts a future of poor government control resulting in chaos, lawlessness and a fight for survival. The level of inequality is high and everybody fend for themselves against a background of infrastructure failure and high levels of corruption. The “haves” (affluent and employed) are able to find ways to create an existence and somehow prosper; while the “have-nots” (poor, unemployed, uneducated) become increasingly poorer, unhealthy and vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, since actions needed to adapt to climate change are inadequate.

Emfuleni becomes a very unstable and unequal society where people fight for land, services and their survival. Everybody is in it for him/herself with the rich getting richer and the poor becoming extremely poor. The Vaal River is a continuous stream of sewage with a growing backlog of sewage infrastructure maintenance and upgrading due largely to financial mismanagement, corruption and debt. Health risks associated with sewage persist and the economic impact is felt downstream, up to Parys (in the Free State) and beyond. Cholera outbreaks are frequent as the degraded infrastructure and skills shortage cannot cope. Political will to address the challenges facing the municipality is low. Water security becomes a big issue.

Money talks and the super-rich pay for lifestyle and “services”. Political power buys you “comforts”; the rich live comfortably behind high perimeter walls and security guards; the poor live miserable lives. Inequality increases. Political instability is the order of the day with continuous leadership changes. There is no political will to solve the most basic problems. The economy declines rapidly. Given the significant under-investment in infrastructure, the impact of climate change is harsh; resulting in flood damage (absence of early warning and effective emergency response), water security (non-adherence to water restrictions and failure to introduce water conservation measures)

and heat stress (failure to provide shelters and adequate potable drinking water supplies during extremely hot days).

Forced equality (corruption high; inequality low)

In the “forced equality” scenario, government introduces significant measures to achieve a greater degree of (forced) equality but lacks the political will and control to govern. Land and wealth distribution are high on the agenda and a higher degree of equality is achieved; forcing the closure of the gap between the rich and the poor somewhat. Government funding at all levels is utilised to upgrade the poorer communities, to the detriment of the middle-class suburbs.

Crime, corruption and fraud are at their highest levels ever, and tender processes are totally geared towards those in power. Land redistribution is a daily occurrence and industry, mining and banks are nationalised one by one. In the workplace, schools and in the public service, an enforced “reverse apartheid” approach is in place, in the hope of increasing social and economic equality.

Political will is for “own benefit” only, and leads to incompetence, bad decision-making, continued cadre deployment (without consideration of competence) and uneven land distribution. Fraud and corruption levels are high; resulting in irregular and wasteful expenditure. Funding allocations are distorted in favour of certain schools and universities. It is who you know and not what you know that will get you the job, contract or service.

The environment takes a backseat and the infrastructure degradation and incompetence cannot handle the unregulated pollution levels. Uncontrolled urbanisation adds to the problem. The new Vaal River City is more a power move by politicians than a way to solve the systemic crises that the area faces. Unemployment drops slightly while equality improves (at least in numbers), but coming from a significantly unequal base, it fails to create stability. With political factions causing a lack of political will, the ability to govern and control criminality is lost. Human rights violations are high (“money buys you...”) and corruption remains prevalent. Slow economic growth coupled with failing and poorly maintained infrastructure reduces the resilience of residents to adapt to the vagaries of climate change.

Controlled crash landing (corruption low; inequality high)

In this scenario, government has greater political will and control but is unable to address the social and economic inequalities meaningfully due to bureaucracy and legal challenges. Climate change impacts are extreme; placing a greater burden on communities and government.

Climate plays havoc, and extreme rainfall results in two flood events in a single year. The number of days with extreme heat increases significantly. Weather is unpredictable; it can swing from severe drought to flooding in a single season.

Ageing infrastructure cannot cope with the sudden and unpredictable changes in weather patterns and the unavailability of funding, although the political will is there to change and fix it. The increase in bureaucracy makes changes on every level of government slow and inefficient. The lack of foreign investment due to problems elsewhere, such as Brexit; war in the Middle East, and a brewing trade war between China and Japan are cause for concern. Government must spend money at home to cope with natural disasters and combat economic turmoil due to climate change, failing crops, drowning cities, etc.

Urbanisation is on the increase because people have to move due to the unavailability of water or the flooding of coastal cities. Skills shortages increase as only the rich have access to education, but they soon leave the region to secure better employment elsewhere. The school system remains divided (unequal) and the poverty cycle is not broken. Everybody is slowly getting poorer.

Poverty, unemployment and sporadic criminality stay about the same as they were in 2019. Although municipalities and government act with accountability, they cannot cope due to a lack of funds and consecutive disasters; including natural disasters and disease outbreaks. Occasional sewage spills, load shedding and an unreliable water supply are the order of the day. Fraud prevention is in place but the prosecution process is lengthy.

You “pay” to stay (corruption low; inequality low)

In the scenario inequality levels decrease, but higher taxes, environmental fines and penalties create both winners and losers. Big Brother is in control. The government has put in place significant measures to alleviate poverty, decrease the income gap and reduce inequality. The higher income taxpayers are required to help drive focussed education, new industrial development and job creation. At first, there is a huge brain drain of people who cannot live under the new laws and the increase in taxes. They leave for greener pastures.

Education is focussed on meeting the needs of the new industrial revolution and quotas on required skills are strictly controlled by government. Competition for places at top schools and universities is high. Research in specialised technical fields prospers, but the humanities suffer because funding for these disciplines declines rapidly.

Slowly, poverty and unemployment levels fall and the gap between poor and rich becomes smaller. Smart cities (such as Vaal City) are built to accommodate the up-and-coming middle class, with all the facilities such as education, health, transport and entertainment at close range. The economy begins to grow and international investors show interest in investing in the region, especially China. A climate-friendly nuclear power station is built to help meet the energy demands of the new industrial South Africa.

The government introduces measures to improve resilience against climate change and the municipality becomes more capable of responding appropriately because infrastructure is upgraded and maintained. Fraud and corruption are at the lowest levels reached because the government takes a “Big Brother” approach. All wrongdoing is severely punished. For example, polluters pay extremely high penalties or are forced to shut down. Laws are enforced with heavy fines and taxes. The community of Parys successfully sues both the Emfuleni Municipality and the municipal manager in his personal capacity; forcing them once and for all to address the sewage pollution in the Vaal River.

CONCLUSION

The scenarios were constructed and included in this article to broaden thinking and perceptions of the Emfuleni situation. Leaders and individuals can apply this new knowledge to make their future strategies and planning more robust, flexible and relevant. Future strategies can then be tested against the four story-lines to identify gaps and future focus areas. It is important to recognise that scenarios are not predictions of how the future will play out. The future is likely to contain elements of all scenarios which can play out simultaneously.

Consistent in the narratives of the future is the value of improved governance, notably in reducing corruption and inequality. Furthermore, the word clouds provide direct insight into deep thinking by groups of participants and the members of the research team.

The interpretive narrative on governance, local government and wastewater in ELM has been developed to underline the complexity the 2018-19 crisis, and the complexity of a South African local authority at the time of a debilitating environmental disaster. It is apparent that municipal governance in Emfuleni remains a project under construction, in a country where non-racial democracy is still in its infancy. While sound legislative foundations and guidelines do exist, there remains a need to generate the necessary political will and governance skills to start making the systems work properly.

Cooperative and participatory governance are valuable tools to resolve critical issues related to water and sanitation service delivery at local government level. However, there needs to be political will to start setting things right. In addition, it is important for thorough and reliable lines of communication to be established between the local authority, the residents and the local private sector role players, at political and formal governance level.

The rejuvenation of the economy in a post-industrial phase of development in Emfuleni requires close collaboration between the municipality’s political leaders and officials in and local commercial, financial and industrial stakeholders. Emfuleni’s infrastructure fault lines are too deep to rely entirely on central government to drive the recovery

process. The private sector has a key role to play in terms of potential finance and the necessary human resources to resolve wicked problems that may become malignant.

Emfuleni is a prime example of a typical urban area in South Africa in the 21st century. There is dynamic population growth, an increasing demand for resources such as water and energy, and a need for economic development. These factors contribute collectively to a state of anthropogenic climate change that has a knock-on effect on the vitally important Vaal River, which flows along Emfuleni's southern border. By ignoring the responsibility of nurturing South Africa's hardest-working river, the residents of Emfuleni run the risk of compromising their own environmental safety, as well as that of downstream rural and urban communities.

The recovery of Emfuleni's wastewater infrastructure requires more than just support from central government. There has to be a sense of cohesion and public will within the community as a whole. There should be collective awareness of the need for all and sundry to stand side by side in support of a reliable local authority, whose officials and political leaders engage with residents to steer clear of an abyss of imminent moral and material collapse.

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**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES IN THIS EDITION
RÉSUMÉS DES ARTICLES DE CETTE ÉDITION
SUMÁRIO DOS ARTIGOS NESTA EDIÇÃO**

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**ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
IN SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA AND FACTORS
INFLUENCING RESULTS**

Carlos Shenga

This study analyses government performance in service delivery in Africa and the factors accounting for it. Evidence from Afrobarometer's public opinion data covering 35 countries in 2014/15 shows that the government act of providing services in Africa is low, and varies across countries. Tests of different competing theories prove that government performance in service delivery is explained mainly by the status of the economy, corruption and, to some extent, media effectiveness. The study finds, on the one hand, that African governments perform relatively well in delivering services when the government performs well or very well in the economy and fighting corruption, the country's economic conditions are better or much better; and media is effective in uncovering mistakes and corruption within government. On the other hand, governments perform badly or very badly in delivering services when levels of corruption increase and most or almost all public officials are perceived as being involved in corruption.

Keywords: *service delivery, government performance, economy, corruption, public opinion, Africa*

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ANALYSE DE L'EFFICACITE DES PRESTATIONS DE SERVICES DES GOUVERNEMENTS EN AFRIQUE ET FACTEURS LA JUSTIFIANT

Carlos Shenga

Cette étude analyse l'efficacité des prestations de services des gouvernements en Afrique et les facteurs justifiant celle-ci. Les données de l'opinion publique obtenues sur Afrobarometer qui couvraient 35 pays en 2014-2015, montrent que les prestations de services des gouvernements en Afrique sont faibles et varient entre les pays. L'application des différentes théories contradictoires prouvent que l'efficacité des prestations de services d'un gouvernement s'explique principalement par l'état de l'économie, la corruption et, dans une certaine mesure, l'efficacité des médias. L'étude constate que, d'un côté, les prestations de services d'un gouvernement africain sont relativement bonnes lorsque ce gouvernement a de bons ou très bons résultats quant à l'économie et la lutte contre la corruption, lorsque les conditions économiques du pays sont meilleures ou très améliorées, et lorsque les médias découvrent les erreurs et la corruption au sein d'un gouvernement de manière efficace. De l'autre côté, elle constate que les prestations de services des gouvernements sont mauvaises ou très mauvaises lorsque les niveaux de corruption augmentent et que la plupart ou presque tous les agents publics sont perçus comme étant impliqués dans les histoires de corruption.

Mots clés : *Prestation de service, efficacité du gouvernement, économie, corruption, opinion publique, Afrique*

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ANÁLISE DO DESEMPENHO DOS GOVERNOS NA PRESTAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS EM ÁFRICA E DOS FACTORES QUE O INFLUENCIAM

Carlos Shenga

Este estudo analisa o desempenho do governo na prestação de serviços em África e os factores que o influenciam. Evidências de dados de opinião pública do Afro-barómetro cobrindo 35 países em 2014/15 mostram que o desempenho do governo em providenciar serviços aos cidadãos em África é baixo e varia de país para país. Testes de diferentes teorias provaram que o desempenho do governo na prestação de serviços é justificado principalmente pelo estado da economia, corrupção e até certo ponto pela efectividade dos meios de comunicação social. O estudo conclui, por um lado, que os governos africanos desempenham relativamente bem a função de prestação de serviços ao cidadão quando o seu desempenho na economia e combate à corrupção é bom ou muito bom; as condições económicas do país são melhores ou muito melhores, e a comunicação social mostra-se eficaz na detecção de erros e corrupção no seio do governo. Por outro lado, os governos desempenham mal ou muito mal na prestação de serviços quando os níveis de corrupção aumentam e a maioria ou quase todos os funcionários públicos são vistos como parte da corrupção.

Palavras-chave: prestação de serviços, desempenho do governo, economia, corrupção, opinião pública, África

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TOWARDS A LESS CONTENTIOUS ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Gbensuglo A. Bukari and Patrick Tandoh-Offin

This paper examines recent elections in sub-Saharan Africa and ways in which the sub-region can produce electoral outcomes that can contribute towards consolidating its democracy. It uses electoral governance theory to explain how elections should be managed to ensure their credibility and acceptance by all stakeholders. The methodological approach used was desktop analysis. The paper argues that political elites in sub-Saharan Africa have aimed, through overt and covert strategies, at maintaining or changing the status quo, and this often brings about electoral disputes. The paper asserts that the advantage of incumbency of the ruling party and the winner-takes-all concept; ethnicity; and sensational media reportage, all contribute significantly to contentious electoral outcomes. It concludes that political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa have failed in their democratic responsibilities of aggregating social interests, representing specific constituencies, and serving as intermediaries between state and society. It recommends that while debate on political issues, including the management of elections, is important, care must be taken to ensure that such debate is well-founded in order to ensure less contentious electoral outcomes in the sub-region.

Keywords: *Less electoral violence, electoral outcome, democracy, sub-Saharan Africa, democratic consolidation*

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VERS DES RESULTATS ELECTORAUX MOINS CONTROVERSES EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE

Gbensuglo A. Bukari et Patrick Tandoh-Offin

Cet article examine les élections récentes en Afrique subsaharienne, et les manières dont la sous-région peut produire des résultats électoraux qui peuvent contribuer à la consolidation de sa démocratie. Il repose sur la théorie de la gouvernance électorale, pour expliquer la manière dont les élections devraient être gérées en vue d'assurer leur crédibilité et leur acceptation par toutes les parties prenantes. L'approche méthodologique utilisée a consisté en une étude documentaire. L'article maintient

que les élites politiques en Afrique subsaharienne ont, au moyen de stratégies à découvert et secrètes, visé à maintenir ou à changer le statu quo, entraînant souvent des contestations électorales. L'article soutient que l'avantage du mandat du parti au pouvoir et le concept du gagnant qui remporte tout ; l'ethnicité ; et les reportages sensationnels des médias, contribuent tous fortement à des résultats électoraux controversés. Il conclut que les dirigeants politiques en Afrique subsaharienne ont échoué dans leurs responsabilités démocratiques d'agrèger les intérêts sociaux, de représenter des circonscriptions électorales spécifiques, et de servir d'intermédiaires entre l'Etat et la société. Alors que les débats sur les questions politiques sont importants, y inclus la gestion des élections, l'article recommande de bien s'assurer que ces débats soient bien fondés afin de garantir des résultats électoraux moins controversés dans la sous-région.

Mots clés : *Moins de violence électorale, résultats électoraux, démocratie, Afrique subsaharienne, consolidation démocratique*

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PARA UM DESFECHO ELEITORAL MENOS POLÊMICO NA ÁFRICA SUBSARIANA

Gbensuglo A. Bukari e Patrick Tandoh-Offin

Este relatório examina as recentes eleições na África Subsariana e as formas como a sub-região pode alcançar resultados eleitorais que possam contribuir para a consolidação da sua democracia. A teoria de governação eleitoral é usada no relatório para explicar como as eleições devem ser geridas de modo a garantir a sua credibilidade e aceitação de todos os intervenientes. No mesmo, foi usada uma análise do ambiente de trabalho como uma forma de abordagem metodológica. O documento argumenta que as elites políticas na África Subsariana têm procurado, através de estratégias abertas e encobertas, manter ou alterar o *status quo*, algo que frequentemente provoca disputas eleitorais. O documento afirma que a vantagem da incumbência do partido no poder e o conceito de que "o vencedor leva tudo"; etnia; e reportagens sensacionalistas na comunicação social, são factores que contribuem significativamente para resultados eleitorais polémicos.

O relatório conclui que os líderes políticos da África Subsariana falharam nas suas responsabilidades democráticas de agregar interesses sociais, representar círculos eleitorais específicos e servir de intermediários entre o Estado e a sociedade. Assim,

recomenda que, embora o debate sobre questões políticas, incluindo a gestão das eleições, seja importante, há que ter o cuidado de assegurar que esse debate seja bem fundamentado, a fim de garantir resultados eleitorais menos contenciosos na sub-região.

Palavras-chave: *Menos violência eleitoral, resultados eleitorais, democracia, África Subsariana, consolidação democrática*

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THE IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACIES: THE UGANDAN CASE

Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija

This paper examines the impact of Independent Members of Parliament (IMPs) by looking at the relevance and challenges they present in modern democracies. In order to achieve this objective, the paper used documentary analysis, literature review, interviews with some members of parliament (MPs), media practitioners and researchers. The argument in the paper is that the rise of independent candidates is a recurring theme in many elections in Uganda, and the power, roles and relevance of independent MPs varies. However, reflections from Uganda show that Independent MPs share the same rights and obligations as the other MPs who come under the flagship of political parties and the ten (10) Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) provided for in the Ugandan Constitution. They are deemed to be non-partisan and therefore do not belong to any political party. IMPs in the Ugandan House sit on either side of the Speaker and vote for any side. If an IMP is appointed a cabinet minister in the central government, the member automatically joins the ruling party, and simultaneously ceases to hold the parliamentary seat. IMPs have no slots on the Parliamentary Commission, established in terms of the Ugandan Constitution. Although Ugandan IMPs do not enjoy the same privileges reserved for party members, they seem to have better terms and space for participation in legislation than some developed polities. The eminence of political parties as bases for the aggregation of people's interests, vehicles for representation, and proper channels for the attainment of parliamentary seats is being diminished by the rise of IMPs. Therefore, if these trends continue, they may lead to a redefinition of legislative representation and party politics. The way forward, therefore, should be to redefine party democracy by either a) strengthening parties and diminishing independents, b) strengthening independents and diminishing parties — and coming up with a democratic alternative within the consensual democracy paradigm, c) diminishing both parties and independents, or d) strengthening both parties and independents, or coming up with any other democratic experiment to pursue good governance.

Keywords: *Parliament, Uganda, independents, legislature, democracy, party politics*

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L'IMPACT DES MEMBRES INDEPENDANTS DU PARLEMENT AU SEIN DE DEMOCRATIES PLURIPARTITES : LE CAS OUGANDAIS

Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija

Cet article examine l'impact des membres indépendants du Parlement, en considérant la pertinence et les défis qu'ils constituent au sein des démocraties modernes. A cette fin, l'article se base sur l'analyse documentaire, l'analyse bibliographique, ainsi que des entretiens avec certains membres du parlement, des praticiens du monde des médias et des chercheurs. L'argument de notre article est que l'augmentation du nombre des candidats indépendants est un thème récurrent dans nombre d'élections en Ouganda, et que le pouvoir, le rôle et la pertinence des membres indépendants du Parlement varie. Toutefois, des articles d'Ouganda indiquent que les membres indépendants partagent les mêmes droits et obligations que les autres membres représentant des partis politiques et que les dix (10) Forces de défense du peuple ougandais (UPDF) prévues dans la Constitution ougandaise. On les juge être non partisan et donc n'appartenant pas à un quelconque parti politique. Les membres indépendants au sein du Parlement ougandais s'assoient à droite ou à gauche du Président de la Chambre et votent pour un quelconque parti. Si un membre indépendant est nommé membre du Conseil des ministres du gouvernement central, le membre rejoint automatiquement le parti au pouvoir et abandonne simultanément son siège au Parlement. Les membres indépendants du Parlement n'ont pas accès à la Commission parlementaire établie par la Constitution ougandaise. Bien que les membres indépendants ne bénéficient pas des mêmes privilèges que ceux réservés aux membres des partis, ils semblent bénéficier de meilleures conditions et d'opportunités pour participer à la législation que d'autres politiques. L'éminence des partis politiques perçus comme bases d'agrégation des intérêts du peuple, comme véhicules de représentation et comme voies appropriées pour l'obtention de sièges parlementaires, se voit diminuer par la montée des membres indépendants au Parlement. Si ces tendances devaient continuer ainsi, il est possible qu'elles conduisent à une redéfinition de la représentation législative et des partis politiques. La marche à suivre devrait donc être de redéfinir la démocratie des parties ou bien a) en renforçant les partis politiques et en diminuant les membres indépendants, b) en renforçant les membres indépendants et en diminuant les parties politiques — et en offrant une autre solution démocratique dans le cadre du paradigme de la démocratie consensuelle, c) en diminuant les parties politiques aussi bien que les membres indépendants, ou bien d) en renforçant les parties politiques aussi bien que les membres indépendants, ou en offrant toute autre expérience démocratique pour la poursuite d'une bonne gouvernance.

Mots clés : *Parlement, Ouganda, indépendants, législature, démocratie, politiques des partis*

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O IMPACTO DOS MEMBROS INDEPENDENTES DO PARLAMENTO NAS DEMOCRACIAS MULTIPARTIDÁRIAS: O CASO UGANDÊS

Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija

O presente relatório examina o impacto dos deputados parlamentares independentes (“IMP”), por analisar a relevância e os desafios que estes apresentam nas democracias modernas. A fim de alcançar este objectivo, o relatório usou uma análise documental, revisão de literatura, entrevistas com alguns deputados, profissionais da comunicação social e investigadores. O argumento apresentado no relatório é que a ascensão de candidatos independentes é um tema recorrente em muitas eleições no Uganda, e que o poder, funções e relevância dos deputados independentes variam. No entanto, as reflexões de Uganda mostram que os deputados independentes compartilham os mesmos direitos e obrigações usufruídos por outros deputados que se inserem sob a bandeira dos partidos políticos e das dez (10) Forças de Defesa Popular do Uganda (UPDF) previstas na Constituição ugandesa. Eles são considerados como não partidários e, portanto, não pertencem a nenhum partido político. Os deputados MIP da Câmara do Uganda ocupam posições de ambos os lados do Presidente do Parlamento e votam em qualquer partido. Se um MIP for nomeado ministro de gabinete no governo central, ele junta-se automaticamente ao partido no poder e, simultaneamente, deixa de deter o assento parlamentar. Os deputados não gozam de assentos na Comissão Parlamentar, estabelecida nos termos da Constituição do Uganda. Embora os MIPs ugandeses não usufruam dos mesmos privilégios reservados aos membros do partido, eles parecem dispor de melhores termos e espaço na participação legislativa do que alguns outros políticos desenvolvidos. A eminência dos partidos políticos como base para a agregação dos interesses do povo, veículos de representação e canais adequados para a obtenção de assentos parlamentares está a ser enfraquecida pela ascensão dos MIP’s. A continuação destas tendências poderá, portanto, conduzir a uma redefinição da representação legislativa e da política partidária. Por conseguinte, a redefinição da democracia partidária deverá ser o rumo a ser tomado, através de: a) reforço dos partidos e diminuição dos independentes; b) reforço dos independentes e diminuição dos partidos - e criação de uma alternativa democrática dentro do paradigma da democracia consensual; c) redução dos partidos e dos independentes; d) fortalecimento dos partidos e dos independentes, ou d) desenvolvimento de qualquer outra experiência democrática para promover a boa governação.

Palavras-chave: Parlamento, Uganda, independentes, legislatura, democracia, política partidária

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BUSINESS INCUBATION AS A JOB CREATION MODEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BUSINESS INCUBATORS SUPPORTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN JOBS FUND

Najwah Allie-Edries and Evans Mupela

The South African Jobs Fund is a programme of National Treasury, initiated in 2011 to support innovative job creation ventures that could be scaled up in a relatively short time. It is one of several Active Labour Market Policy interventions implemented by the South African government to boost job creation in the country.

Three business incubators (A2Pay, Awethu and Shanduka) were supported by the Jobs Fund between 2012 and 2015. The three incubators used different approaches to support the growth of their clients' businesses over a three-year period. This paper presents the results of a summative evaluation that was done by Impact Economix in 2016 to gauge the levels of client enterprise and job creation success over the three-year period. The evaluation used a mixed methods approach; including interviews with direct job beneficiaries as well as enterprise client managers. Focus group discussions were also held with beneficiaries to investigate the qualitative aspects of the incubators' job creation activities. The evaluation found that some of the assumptions made at the beginning of the implementation, regarding business readiness and job creation capabilities, did not hold during the implementation. This resulted in fewer jobs being created than was originally planned. Job creation successes were varied in size and nature and were affected by various factors, including the grant amounts disbursed.

Keywords: *business incubators, South African Jobs Fund, job creation, Government Technical Advisory Centre, entrepreneurs, business development*

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L'INCUBATION D'ENTREPRISES COMME MODELE DE CREATION D'EMPLOIS : UNE ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES INCUBATEURS D'ENTREPRISES SOUTENUS PAR LE SOUTH AFRICAN JOBS FUND

Najwah Allie-Edries et Evans Mupela

Le South African Jobs Fund est un programme de la Trésorerie nationale, initié en 2011, pour apporter un soutien aux projets innovateurs de création d'emplois qui pouvaient être augmentés proportionnellement sur une période de temps relativement courte. C'est l'une des diverses interventions sur les politiques actives relatives au marché du travail, mises en œuvre par le gouvernement sud-africain pour stimuler la création d'emplois au sein du pays.

Trois incubateurs d'entreprises (A2Pay, Awethu et Shanduka) ont reçu le soutien du Jobs Fund entre 2012 et 2015. Ces trois incubateurs ont utilisé des approches différentes pour soutenir la croissance des affaires de leurs clients, sur une période de trois ans. Cet article présente les résultats d'une évaluation globale effectuée par Impact Economix en 2016, pour mesurer les niveaux d'initiative des clients et de réussite de création d'emplois sur la période de trois ans. L'évaluation a utilisé une approche basée sur des méthodes mixtes ; y inclus des entretiens avec des bénéficiaires d'emplois directs ainsi que des responsables clients des entreprises. Des discussions en groupe ont également été organisées avec des bénéficiaires pour examiner les aspects qualitatifs des activités de création d'emplois des incubateurs. L'évaluation a constaté que certaines des hypothèses suggérées au début de la mise en œuvre, concernant la réactivité aux affaires et la capacité de création d'emplois, n'étaient pas valables durant la mise en œuvre. Cela a entraîné moins de création d'emplois que prévu initialement. Les niveaux de réussite relatifs à la création d'emplois variaient en quantité et en nature, et ont été affectés par divers facteurs, dont les montants de la subvention qui ont été déboursés.

Mots clés : *incubateurs d'entreprises, South African Jobs Fund, création d'emplois, Government Technical Advisory Centre, entrepreneurs, développement des entreprises*

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INCUBAÇÃO EMPRESARIAL COMO UM MODELO DE CRIAÇÃO DE EMPREGO: UM ESTUDO COMPARATIVO DE INCUBADORAS EMPRESARIAIS APOIADO PELO FUNDO DE EMPREGO SUL-AFRICANO

Najwah Allie-Edries e Evans Mupela

O Fundo de Emprego da África do Sul é um programa da Tesouraria Nacional, iniciado em 2011 para apoiar empreendimentos inovadores de criação de emprego que podem ser expandidos num período de tempo relativamente curto. É uma das várias intervenções da Política Activa do Mercado de Trabalho implementadas pelo governo sul-africano para impulsionar a criação de emprego no país.

Três incubadoras empresariais (A2Pay, Awethu e Shanduka) foram apoiadas pelo Fundo de Emprego entre 2012 e 2015. As três incubadoras usaram abordagens diferentes para apoiar o desenvolvimento do negócio de seus clientes durante um período de três anos. Este relatório apresenta os resultados de uma avaliação sumativa realizada pela Impact Economix em 2016 para avaliar os níveis de sucesso empresarial dos clientes e da geração de emprego durante o referido período. A análise usou uma abordagem de métodos mistos, incluindo entrevistas com beneficiários directos de emprego, bem como com gestores de clientes empresariais. Também foram realizadas discussões entre grupos focais e beneficiários para investigar os aspectos qualitativos das iniciativas de criação de emprego por parte das incubadoras. A análise constatou que alguns dos pressupostos assumidos no início da implementação, no que se refere à prontidão do negócio e às capacidades de criação de emprego, não prevaleceram durante a implementação. Isto resultou num número inferior de postos de trabalho criados em relação ao inicialmente previsto. Os êxitos em termos de criação de emprego variaram em dimensão e natureza e foram afectados por vários factores, incluindo os montantes das subvenções atribuídas.

Palavras-chave: incubadoras empresariais, Fundo de Emprego da África do Sul, criação de emprego, Centro de Assessoria Técnica do Governo, empresários, desenvolvimento empresarial

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DEVELOPMENT OF GAINFUL SELF-EMPLOYMENT SKILLS AMONGST TERTIARY EDUCATION GRADUATES: PERCEPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS AND EXPERIENCES AT ANKOLE WESTERN UNIVERSITY IN UGANDA

Julius Babyetsiza

This exploratory study emphasises the need for the development of self-employment skills and advocates for self-employment as an important educational goal in Uganda. It examines students' labour market perceptions, experiences and expectations for gainful self-employment. Data was collected through focus group discussions and interviews with Ankole Western University in Uganda (AWU) students, lecturers, faculty deans, University management, and a Sheema district officer. The findings highlight that student perceptions towards self-employment are divided between positive and negative, that vocationalising university studies are an important consideration, and that the Ugandan Advanced Certificate of Education (also dubbed 'A-Level') could be replaced with a Uganda Vocational/Technical Certificate of Education. As studies in all faculties (except the Faculty of Science and Information Technology) are theoretical as opposed to practical, the recommendation is that all students should participate in at least one project of the Science and Information Technology students, and that students should work together to ensure that these projects are replicated in the community or commercialised for gainful self-employment purposes. This could be a major ingredient for AWU to develop a model of enhancing its graduates' transition to gainful self-employment.

Keywords: *Action research, gainful self-employment, students, graduates, business start-ups.*

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DEVELOPPEMENT DES COMPETENCES POUR L'EMPLOI INDEPENDANT REMUNERE CHEZ LES DIPLOMES UNIVERSITAIRES : PERCEPTIONS, ATTENTES ET EXPERIENCES A L'ANKOLE WESTERN UNIVERSITY EN OUGANDA

Julius Babyetsiza

Cette étude exploratoire souligne le besoin de développer des compétences pour l'emploi indépendant, et recommande ce type d'emploi comme objectif de l'éducation en Ouganda. Elle examine les perceptions, les expériences et les attentes des étudiants par rapport au marché du travail pour l'emploi indépendant rémunéré. Des données ont été recueillies à travers des groupes de discussion auprès d'entrepreneurs sociaux étudiants, ainsi que d'étudiants, d'enseignants, de doyens de facultés et de cadres universitaires de l'Ankole Western University en Ouganda (AWU), et ont également été recueillies à travers un entretien avec un responsable commercial du District de Sheema. Les résultats soulignent la polarisation des perceptions positives et négatives des étudiants envers l'emploi indépendant, et soulignent qu'il est nécessaire de professionnaliser les études universitaires et d'abandonner le certificat supérieur d'éducation ougandais (*Ugandan Advanced Certificate of Education*), également appelé 'A-Level', au profit d'un certificat technique et vocationnel d'éducation (*Uganda Vocational/Technical Certificate of Education*). L'étude a également permis de révéler que, autre que la faculté des Sciences et de l'Informatique, les études dans les autres facultés s'avèrent plus théoriques que pratiques. Aussi, l'étude recommande que tous les étudiants des autres facultés s'identifient avec au moins un des projets présentés par les étudiants des facultés des Sciences et de l'Informatique, et que les étudiants travaillent ensemble, comme un groupe, pour s'assurer que leur projet soit reproduit au sein de la communauté ou commercialisé comme emploi indépendant rémunéré. Cela permettra de servir d'élément majeur à l'AWU, pour qu'elle développe un modèle qui lui permettra d'améliorer la transition de ses diplômés vers un emploi indépendant rémunéré.

Mots clés: Recherche active, emploi indépendant rémunéré, étudiants, diplômés, start-ups.

Dr Julius Babyetsiza, Ankole Western University (AWU), Kabwohe, Sheema, Ouganda.

DESENVOLVIMENTO DE COMPETÊNCIAS DE AUTO-EMPREGO REMUNERADO ENTRE LICENCIADOS DO ENSINO TERCIÁRIO: PERCEPÇÕES, EXPECTATIVAS E EXPERIÊNCIAS NA ANKOLE WESTERN UNIVERSITY, UGANDA

Julius Babyetsiza

Este estudo exploratório enfatiza a necessidade do desenvolvimento de competências de auto-emprego e defende-o como o objetivo da educação no Uganda. Examina as percepções, experiências e expectativas dos estudantes sobre o mercado de trabalho em relação ao auto-emprego remunerado. Os dados foram coletados a partir de discussões entre grupos focais, estudantes de Empreendedorismo Social, estudantes da Ankole Western University in Uganda (AWU), professores, reitores de faculdades e gestores da Universidade; e de uma entrevista com um agente comercial do distrito de Sheema. As conclusões destacam a polarização das percepções positivas e negativas dos alunos em relação ao auto-emprego e o apelo à profissionalização dos estudos universitários e à eliminação do Certificado Avançado de Educação do Uganda, também designado por “Nível A”, e à sua substituição por um Certificado de Educação Vocacional/Técnico do Uganda. Constatou-se também que, para além da faculdade de Ciência e Tecnologia de Informação (TI), os estudos oferecidos noutras faculdades são teóricos e não práticos. Em seguida, o estudo recomenda que cada estudante de qualquer faculdade se identifique com pelo menos um dos projetos propostos pelos estudantes das faculdades de Ciência e Tecnologia de Informação, e que trabalhem em grupo para garantir que o seu projecto seja replicado na comunidade ou comercializado para fins auto-emprego remunerado. Isto servirá como o ingrediente principal para a AWU desenvolver um modelo para melhorar a transição de seus graduados para o auto-emprego remunerado.

Palavras-chave: Pesquisa de ação, auto-emprego remunerado, estudantes, graduados, criação de empresas.

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LOOKING BEYOND COMPLIANCE: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT IN THE MAINSTREAMING OF GENDER IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Nitasha Ramparsad

This article assesses the role of an enabling environment as a major factor in the successful mainstreaming of gender. It unpacks the important role of political will in influencing the creation of an enabling environment and suggests that several role-players need to possess the political will to ensure an enabling environment is created. Notably, it is found that the actions of an individual have an impact on the institutional reforms developed and thus vice versa. Political will is argued as being the most influential component in the development of an enabling environment, and therefore creates the enabling environment through political buy-in. The argument specifically looks at the Ministry of Public Service and Administration, located in the South African Public Service.

Keywords: *Gender mainstreaming, equality, enabling environment, South Africa, public service.*

Dr Nitasha Ramparsad, Director: Leadership Support, at the South African National School of Government

AU-DELA DE LA CONFORMITE : EVALUER LE ROLE QU'UN ENVIRONNEMENT HABILITANT JOUERAIT DANS L'INTEGRATION DES SEXES AU SEIN DU SERVICE PUBLIC

Nitasha Ramparsad

Cet article évalue le rôle d'un environnement habilitant comme facteur majeur pour la bonne intégration des sexes. Il analyse le rôle important que la volonté politique joue dans l'influence de la création d'un environnement habilitant, et suggère qu'il faut plusieurs joueurs avec une certaine volonté politique pour assurer la création d'un environnement habilitant. Il s'avère, notamment, que les actions d'un individu ont un impact sur les réformes institutionnelles développées, et vice versa. La volonté politique, est-il soutenu, représente l'élément le plus influent dans le développement d'un environnement habilitant, et donc crée l'environnement habilitant à travers

la participation politique. L'argument s'intéresse particulièrement au Ministère des Services publics et de l'administration, qui fait partie des Services publics sud-africains.

Mots clés : *Intégration des sexes, égalité, environnement habitant, Afrique du Sud, service public.*

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OLHAR PARA ALÉM DA CONFORMIDADE: AVALIAR O PAPEL DE UM AMBIENTE PROPÍCIO À INTEGRAÇÃO DO GÉNERO NA FUNÇÃO PÚBLICA

Nitasha Ramparsad

Este artigo avalia o papel de um ambiente propício como factor determinante para o êxito da integração do género. Ele descreve o importante papel da vontade política em influenciar a criação de um ambiente propício e sugere que os diversos intervenientes precisam de ter determinação política para garantir uma conjuntura favorável. Verifica-se, a título de exemplo, que as acções de um indivíduo têm um impacto nas reformas institucionais desenvolvidas e, inversamente. A vontade política é argumentada como sendo o componente mais influente no desenvolvimento de um ambiente propício e, portanto, cria esse ambiente através da adesão política. O argumento analisa especificamente o Ministério de Serviço e Administração Pública, sito na Função Pública da África do Sul.

Palavras-chave: *Integração do género, igualdade, ambiente propício, África do Sul, serviço público.*

Dr. Nitasha Ramparsad, Director: Apoio à Liderança, na South African National School of Government.

SPECIAL CASE STUDY ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT

PERSPECTIVES FROM BELOW ON EMFULENI'S WASTEWATER WOES: IN SEARCH OF RESOLVING A WICKED PROBLEM

**JWN Tempelhoff, S Mahabir, M Ginster, N Mthembu, H Jaka,
A Kruger, and L Nkomo**

The Emfuleni Local Municipality was at the centre of an environmental health disaster in mid-2018 when a large volume of raw sewage flowed into the Vaal River Barrage in the province of Gauteng, in South Africa. The event marked the near-collapse of a comprehensive wastewater infrastructure system comprising three treatment plants, 45 pump stations and more than 2 500km of wastewater pipelines. Despite various initiatives to restore a sound sanitary environment, by late 2019 these attempts have proved futile and the situation remains critical.

In a transdisciplinary project conducted by a North-West University (NWU) research group, the objective was to provide insight for governance authorities on the typical perceptions of local residents, non-governmental organisations and the private sector when disaster strikes in the form of municipal infrastructure breaking down and falling apart. Attention is given to participatory and cooperative governance and the need for local government and stakeholders to engage constructively when a critical environmental health disaster occurs. Here, the case study is Emfuleni's 2018 infrastructure collapse.

The research team contemplated a variety of mitigating strategies to deal with the 'wicked problem' of local wastewater governance and infrastructure systems. Given the crisis in which the local municipality found itself by the end of 2019, the potential of securing public-private partnerships (PPPs), appeared to be far-fetched. But there were promising developments before the research project reached completion phase. Apart from case study interpretations, the discourse features Word Cloud illustrations highlighting the descriptor words of notable sectoral stakeholders. The latter were further refined to outline four potential future scenarios for Emfuleni.

Keywords: *Wastewater infrastructure, municipal governance, cooperative governance, participatory governance, Emfuleni Local Municipality; private sector, Save the Vaal Environment, Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, Emfuleni Ratepayers' Association, Sedibeng District Municipality, water security, environmental disaster, Integrated Vaal River System (IVRS).*

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ETUDE DE CAS SPECIAL SUR LA GESTION DES EAUX USEES

PERSPECTIVES SUR LE DESASTRE D'EMFULENI : RECHERCHE D'UNE SOLUTION A UN PROBLEME PERNICIEUX

JWN Tempelhoff, S Mahabir, M Ginster, N Mthembu, H Jaka, A Kruger et L Nkomo

La municipalité d'Emfuleni a été au cœur d'un désastre sanitaire environnemental en mi-2018, lorsque des vastes quantités d'eaux usées brutes ont coulé dans le barrage du fleuve du Vaal, dans la Province du Gauteng, en Afrique du Sud. L'évènement a marqué le quasi-effondrement d'un système d'infrastructures d'eaux usées, comprenant trois stations d'épuration, 45 stations de pompage et plus de 2 500 km de canalisation d'eaux usées. Malgré les diverses initiatives pour remettre l'environnement en bon état, ces tentatives se sont avérées vaines en fin 2019 et la situation reste critique.

Dans le cadre d'un projet transdisciplinaire dirigé par un groupe de recherche de l'Université du Nord-Ouest (NWU), l'objectif a été de donner aux autorités un aperçu des perceptions typiques des résidents, des organisations non gouvernementales et du secteur privé, lorsqu'une catastrophe arrive sous forme d'une infrastructure municipale qui se détériore et s'effondre. L'attention porte sur la gouvernance

participative et coopérative, et sur le besoin de l'administration locale et des parties prenantes de s'engager de manière constructive auprès du public, lorsqu'arrive un désastre sanitaire environnemental critique. L'étude de cas ici est l'effondrement de l'infrastructure de la municipalité d'Emfuleni en 2018.

L'équipe de recherche a envisagé diverses stratégies d'atténuation pour s'occuper du 'problème pernicieux' de la gouvernance locale et des systèmes d'infrastructure des eaux usées. Compte tenu de la crise dans laquelle la municipalité s'est retrouvée en fin 2019, la possibilité d'assurer un partenariat public-privé s'avère peu probable. Mais il y avait des développements prometteurs avant que le projet de recherche n'atteigne la phase d'achèvement. À part les interprétations de l'étude de cas, le discours fait figurer des illustrations de Word Cloud qui soulignent les mots descripteurs significatifs des parties prenantes des divers secteurs. Ces mots ont ensuite été raffinés pour broser un tableau des quatre scénarios potentiels de la municipalité d'Emfuleni.

Mots clés : *Infrastructure des eaux usées, gouvernance municipale, gouvernance coopérative, gouvernance participative, Municipalité d'Emfuleni; secteur privé, Save the Vaal Environment, Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, Emfuleni Ratepayers' Association, Municipalité du District de Sedibeng, sécurité de l'eau, désastre environnemental, Integrated Vaal River System (IVRS).*

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ESTUDO DE CASO ESPECIAL SOBRE GESTÃO DE ÁGUAS RESIDUAIS

PERSPECTIVAS A PARTIR DE BAIXO SOBRE OS PROBLEMAS DAS ÁGUAS RESIDUAIS DE EMFULENI: EM BUSCA DA RESOLUÇÃO DE UM PROBLEMA PERVERSO

**JWN Tempelhoff, S Mahabir, M Ginster, N Mthembu,
H Jaka, A Kruger, e L Nkomo**

O Município de Emfuleni foi o centro de um desastre ambiental de saúde em meados de 2018, quando grandes quantidades de esgoto bruto fluíram para a barragem do rio Vaal, na província de Gauteng, África do Sul. O evento quase provocou o colapso de um sistema de infra-estrutura de águas residuais muito abrangente composto por três estações de tratamento, 45 estações de bombagem e mais de 2 500 km de condutas de águas residuais. Apesar de várias iniciativas para restaurar um ambiente sanitário sadio, essas tentativas se mostraram inúteis até à data e a situação continua crítica.

Num projecto transdisciplinar conduzido por um grupo de investigação da Universidade do Noroeste (NWU), o objectivo era fornecer informação às autoridades de governação sobre as percepções típicas dos residentes locais, organizações não-governamentais e do sector privado quando uma catástrofe ocorre na forma de colapso e desmoronamento das infra-estruturas municipais. Atenta-se à governação participativa e cooperativa e à necessidade do governo local e das partes interessadas se envolverem de forma construtiva quando ocorre um desastre ambiental crítico de saúde. Aqui, o estudo de caso é o colapso da infraestrutura de Emfuleni em 2018.

A equipe de pesquisa contemplou uma variedade de estratégias de mitigação para lidar com o 'problema perverso' da gestão de águas residuais e sistemas de infraestrutura locais. Dada a crise em que o município se encontrava até o final de 2019, o potencial de assegurar parcerias público-privadas (PPPs) parecia improvável. Mas houve desenvolvimentos promissores antes de o projecto de investigação chegar à fase de conclusão. Além das interpretações do estudo de caso, o discurso apresenta ilustrações do Word Cloud destacando as palavras descritoras de intervenientes sectoriais notáveis. Estas últimas foram aperfeiçoadas para delinear quatro potenciais cenários futuros para Emfuleni

Palavras-chave: *Infra-estrutura de águas residuais, governação municipal, governação cooperativa, governação participativa, Município de Emfuleni; sector privado, Save the Vaal Environment, Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, Emfuleni Ratepayers' Association, Sedibeng District Municipality, segurança hídrica, desastres ambientais, Integrated Vaal River System (IVRS).*

Johann Tempelhoff é professor extraordinário na North-West University (NWU) na África do Sul e líder do projeto conduzido sob os auspícios do Núcleo de Pesquisa para a Dinâmica Cultural da Água (CuDyWat).

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
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BOOK REVIEW

Nitasha Ramparsad (2019)
Gender Equality at Work:
Some are more equal than others

KR Publishing: Randburg, South Africa.
170 pages



Reviewed by Salim Latib

This single-authored paperback by Dr Ramparsad can be located in the broader context of identity and inclusion social action that has unfolded globally. The more recent impetus towards securing deeper forms of incorporation has arisen from the #MeToo campaign and the 'fallist' movement that stems from student activism on the payment of tuition fees and the 'decolonisation' of curriculum content at South African universities (Habib 2019). The 'About the Author' introductory note affirms that the writer has a keen interest in social justice and responds to the challenges posed by aggrieved social groups (in this case, women who experience injustice and various forms of overt and covert exclusion from the formal economy and institutions). The biographical note outlines that the author is committed to the African continent and on 'producing knowledge unique to the African diaspora'. An activist orientation in producing a book on 'gender equality' is understandable, given the discriminatory challenges faced by women. It is also admirable as the author situates the text in her desire to make a difference and drive change in South Africa.

All indications are that the author lives and works in South Africa and the contribution is African rather than that of the diaspora community. Perhaps the reference to

'diaspora' relates to something unsaid about the author's history or sense of difference. This information is essential to understand, as the writer's identity appears to be a significant motivator to the way in which the book is crafted. Dr Ramparsad declares that much of what is asserted 'emanated from' her own experiences. It would have been good to know if the experiences are purely based on South African institutions or whether she was indeed a member of the African diaspora community and lived through or witnessed discriminatory practices outside of the continent. Building normative perspectives based on lived experiences in South Africa and across the world is intellectually valuable and perhaps most necessary in the instance of a text which focusses on the 'how to' when it comes to changing organisations and securing gender equality.

It is a fair challenge to write a review of a book on gender equality; especially when the author, perhaps correctly, states that men need to come to terms with the reality that they are innately biased. Prejudice is suggested to be either deliberate and malicious or passive and subconscious. While men are often beneficiaries of gender discrimination, the extent to which biases are innate requires deeper introspection. Even as a writer needs to reflect on possible prejudice in research and review, the notion of inherent bias in perspective may well be a little challenging to accept. The propensity of men to engage on gender equality issues from the vantage point of their 'masculinity' is demonstrated by way of example throughout the book and based on secondary research and literature. Understanding prejudices and the lack of real commitment to gender equality featured very strongly as a core concern and is captured in the subtitle: 'some are more equal than others'. To fully appreciate the prejudices that women face, it may be imperative to accept some element of inherent bias and recognise that no matter how some men might feel that they are not guilty of such practices, there may be subconscious actions that reinforce particular prejudicial patterns in institutions and society in general.

People often get so caught up on the life of an organisation and the momentum of work in a manner that precludes recognising that certain practices are inherently discriminatory and may cause harm to some. Be engaging in detail on the realities that confront women and how some are more equal than others in organisations, the author's analysis helps us reflect on numerous aspects of institutional life. The details serve to build appreciation on how seemingly innocent actions, such as comments on performance or questions in an interview, can have a devastating impact on overall equality realities. By highlighting the numerous ways in which gender inequality is sustained, the author not only helps individual self-examination, but also assists greatly with wider institutional introspection on what needs to be done. Dr Ramparsad goes further than just providing a critique of current practices; as she offers numerous tools and strategies to overcome challenges. These range from the application of planning tools, such as SWOT and PEST analysis to understanding current realities, to more focussed analytical research tools for appreciating and changing existing realities. The book is a valuable contribution to the practice of building gender equality at work and will stand as an essential reference text for managers. The author talks directly to

human resource managers, whom she believes should be at the forefront of securing gender equality in the workplace. The collection of chapters purportedly unfolds from the author's frustration that 'current programmes/interventions reveal that these tend to be too academic in focus and do not offer enough practical guidance to practitioners as to the "how to" aspects.' We can only take the word of the author on this as she has substantive experience in both the public and private sector for over 15 years. Her frustration with existing programmes and interventions creatively translates into a wonderful collection of normative chapters, with a sprinkling of examples and templates, directed at assisting individuals and organisations to drive forward a change approach to secure gender equality. Each chapter contains data and literature from a variety of sources and numerous cases of what works in a wide range of institutional contexts.

Chapter 1 is aptly titled: Not another feminist rant! It captures the essence of the text, which is to move beyond broad policy pronouncements towards what needs to be done. It provides a candid overview of the challenges, and draws from a variety of sources and reports on gender discrimination. The author does well by intertwining data with vivid examples of 'disparate treatment' and discrimination. In this and the subsequent chapter, the author lives up to her dictum of using a KISS (Keep it Simple, Stupid) approach to implementation. Relevant international reports on gender diversity and related issues are fittingly summarised to give the reader a good sense of some of the practical challenges on the ground.

Chapters 2 to 6 serve as the heart of the text, as they provide a practical basis for developing and outlining a strategy and implementation plan for gender equality and institutional mainstreaming within formal organisations. Convenient guidelines are provided to human resource managers. While the author asserts a wider audience for the text, there is constant reference to the role of human resource managers. No institution is static, and leadership support must be continuously built and reaffirmed through the direct agency of human resource managers and others within institutions. The author provides some very practical steps in making a case for gender equality. Simple and useful tools are provided to propel the exercise of gender equality mainstreaming.

In addition to providing relevant and workable tools for actions at an institutional level, Dr Ramparsad outlines several macro- and micro-level cases on gender mainstreaming. These cases offer insight into positive actions across a range of countries and the successes registered at national levels and within institutions. She very cleverly provides benchmarking tools and checklists to assist managers. While retaining a normative institutional approach, she is by no means shy of expressing the importance of broader mobilisation to ensure action. She notes that gender mainstreaming can be a lonely road, which requires that those leading such processes work on nurturing a supportive environment. In this respect, she identifies the institutions available in South Africa and the work they do to assist gender mainstreaming. Chapter 6, Setting the Rules, is a reminder that localised actions are often contingent on ensuring that

proper policies and regulations are established. She provides numerous examples at institutional level and hence comprehensively captures various aspects necessary for effective, efficient, responsive and innovative equity-oriented actions.

Chapters 7 to 8 are particularly useful as they focus on building capacity for future actions. While the author provides many tools for action, she recognises that we may not know everything and thus need to engage in introspection and research on an ongoing basis within organisations. Chapter 7, on holding up a mirror, provides indicators for measuring actions and for establishing effective monitoring and evaluation frameworks to secure accountability for gender equality. Chapter 8 outlines a process for learning, through the development of a variety of research cases that capture success and failures. The author provides guidelines and practical steps for documenting case studies that would be useful for any practitioner. Chapters 9 and 10 are devoted to the future and capture the broader issues that need to be considered in building gender equality and sustaining actions.

The book does not shy away from incorporating broader policy issues and related global developments in the field of gender equality. While the text may well be practitioner-oriented, it is imperative to engage with it from the broader academic discourse to appreciate its full value and limitations. The drive for gender equality cannot be isolated from the global evolution of identity politics and the feminist movement that was at the forefront of the struggle for equality. The movement, as with many identity-driven groups, emerges from a sense of aggrievement with more significant systematic issues and related discriminatory practices that give rise to the exclusion of women. They are a product of historical circumstances and discord with discrimination (Fukuyama 2018). Identity mobilisation, while understandable, comes with consequences that often shift attention away from the practices that are being fought against. An overemphasis on difference, to accommodate gender concerns, can unfold at the expense of fighting discrimination in all its forms. A further consequence of the politics of identity is excluding some and affirming perspectives based on distinctiveness. The idea that some are innately prone to discriminate is rather unfortunate as it affirms a view that if you are not of a specific identity because of physical appearance, you cannot be fully part of the solution. The politics of identity and the consequences for society are aptly captured by Fukuyama (2018) in his seminal work on identity and should be read by all, especially those steeped in the political sciences.

There is grave uncertainty in the world on the structural direction of economies and whether the future will be made up of numerous large corporations or millions of smaller organisations (Walden 2013). Current evidence indicates that the small organisation sector of economy and society is growing (Fioramonti 2017). The handbook is primarily directed at institutions that can sustain high levels of structure, including a variety of formalised organisational arrangements, policies and budgeted actions directed at enhancing gender inclusivity. The real challenge in building gender

equality often emerges in the small struggling institutions, which must also establish equality without necessarily having the kind of formal structure, budgets and policy processes suggested in this text. The real test for society is on how gender equality can be constructed in multiple terrains, irrespective of the size of an organisation and the modalities of employment and value creation. Chances are that many enterprises may emerge as family-owned enterprises or cooperatives that do not necessarily generate the kind of surpluses that facilitate the setting aside of budgets for elaborate systems and practices to secure equality. As with this text, much of current management thinking tends to fixate on big corporate structures in a world which is rapidly evolving, and where new technologies and more networked forms of production and distribution are likely to shape institutional life for all, irrespective of gender.

Over the past few decades, the dominant form of capacity interventions has been on of borrowing best practices and seeking to adapt these to local circumstances (Andrews 2013; Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2013). The solution-oriented approach often comes into play by way of benchmarks, case studies from other contexts, and the transfer of tools. While a fair amount of adaptation is propagated, the shift globally is towards avoiding a solution-driven approach to one that focusses on engaging on problems within context. The idea would be to tackle harmful discrimination within context, in an iterative manner and in a framework that appreciates the agency of various actors, the power exercised by different groups, and the need for constant learning and adaptation to solve a problem. A more iterative problem-solving approach would serve to build more in-depth local knowledge and creativity to resolve equity challenges. Such an approach does not exclude international benchmarks (Andrews 2013), the use of larger policy frameworks and best practices; hence, this excellent handbook will continue to remain relevant for the future. It is a must for human resource managers who serve as champions and custodians of gender equality.

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
COMPTE RENDU DE LIVRE

Nitasha Ramparsad (2019)
*Gender Equality at Work:
Some are more equal than others*

(L'égalité entre les sexes au travail :
certains sont plus égaux que d'autres)

KR Publishing: Randburg, Afrique du Sud.
170 pages

ISBN: 9781869228026



Compte rendu de Salim Latib

Le livre de poche de la Dr Ramparsad se situe dans le contexte plus large de l'identité et de l'action sociale d'inclusion qui s'est développé globalement. L'impulsion plus récente vers la garantie de formes plus profondes d'incorporation, a été donnée par la campagne #MeToo et le mouvement « Fallist » dérivé de l'activisme des étudiants relatif aux frais de scolarité, et à la « décolonisation » du programme d'études dans les universités sud-africaines (Habib 2019). La note d'introduction sur l'auteure affirme que celle-ci s'intéresse beaucoup à la justice sociale, et qu'elle répond aux défis posés

par les groupes sociaux contrariés (dans ce cas-ci, les femmes qui vivent l'injustice et diverses formes d'exclusion manifeste et cachée, dans le monde du travail et les institutions formelles). La note biographique révèle que l'auteure est engagée envers le continent africain et envers « la production de connaissances uniques aux diasporas africaines ». L'orientation activiste adoptée dans la rédaction d'un livre sur « l'égalité entre les sexes » est tout-à-fait compréhensible, vu les défis discriminatoires auxquels les femmes doivent faire face. Ce qui est également admirable alors que l'auteure situe le texte dans le cadre de son désir d'agir concrètement, et d'apporter un changement en Afrique du Sud.

Tout indique que l'auteure vit et travaille en Afrique du Sud, et que sa contribution est une contribution africaine plutôt que de la diaspora. Peut-être la référence à « diaspora » a un rapport avec quelque chose qui n'a pas été dit sur l'histoire ou le sentiment de différence de l'auteure. Il est essentiel de comprendre cette information, en ce sens où l'identité de l'auteure semble être un motivateur significatif de la manière dont le livre a été réalisé. La Dr Ramparsad déclare que la plupart de ce qui est affirmé a « émané de » sa propre expérience. Il aurait été bien de savoir si son expérience est basée purement sur des institutions sud-africaines, ou si elle a en effet fait partie de la diaspora africaine et a vécu ou a été témoin de pratiques discriminatoires en dehors du continent. Développer des perspectives normatives, sur la base d'expériences vécues en Afrique du Sud et à travers le monde, est intellectuellement très utile et peut-être très nécessaire dans le cas d'un texte qui porte sur le « comment faire », lorsqu'il s'agit de changer les organisations et de garantir l'égalité entre les sexes.

C'est un beau défi d'écrire le compte rendu d'un livre sur l'égalité entre les sexes ; surtout lorsque l'auteure, peut-être correctement, déclare que les hommes doivent accepter la réalité qu'ils sont d'une impartialité innée. Les préjugés, suggère-t-elle, sont ou bien délibérés et méchants, ou bien passifs et subconscients. Alors que les hommes bénéficient souvent de la discrimination sexuelle, la mesure dans laquelle l'impartialité est innée nécessite une réflexion approfondie. Même lorsqu'un écrivain a besoin de refléter sur les préjudices possibles au sein de la recherche et la critique, la notion d'un préjugé inné dans ce contexte peut être un peu difficile à accepter. La tendance naturelle des hommes à s'engager dans les questions relatives à l'égalité entre les sexes, du point de vue de leur « masculinité », est démontré au moyen d'exemples tout au long du livre, et est basée sur une recherche et une revue de la littérature secondaire. La compréhension des préjugés, et du manque d'un véritable engagement envers l'égalité entre les sexes, y a beaucoup figuré comme une préoccupation essentielle et est reproduite dans le sous-titre: « certains sont plus égaux que d'autres ». pour apprécier pleinement les préjudices auxquels les femmes sont confrontées, il peut être impératif d'accepter certains éléments d'un préjugé inné et de reconnaître que, même si certains hommes pensent qu'ils ne sont pas coupables de telles pratiques, il est possible que des actes subconscients renforcent des tendances préjudiciables particulières dans les institutions et la société en général.

Les gens sont souvent prisonniers de la vie d'une organisation et de la dynamique du travail, de sorte que cela les empêche de reconnaître que certaines pratiques sont discriminatoires en soi et peuvent nuire à certains. En s'engageant dans des détails sur les réalités auxquelles les femmes sont confrontées, et sur le fait que certains sont plus égaux que d'autres au sein d'organisations, l'auteure nous aide à réfléchir à divers aspects de la vie institutionnelle. Les détails permettent de développer une appréciation de la manière dont des actes d'apparence innocents, tels que des commentaires sur le rendement ou des questions lors d'entretiens, peuvent avoir un impact désastreux sur les réalités relatives à l'égalité en général. En soulignant les nombreuses manières dont l'inégalité entre les sexes est soutenue, l'auteure non seulement contribue à l'introspection de l'individu, mais également à celle des institutions sur ce qui devrait être fait. La Dr Ramparsad fait plus que de fournir une critique des pratiques actuelles ; elle offre divers outils et stratégies pour surmonter les défis. Ils vont de l'application d'outils de planification, tels que les outils d'analyse SWOT et PEST pour comprendre les réalités actuelles, à des outils de recherche analytique plus ciblés pour apprécier et changer les réalités actuelles.

Le livre contribue d'une manière inestimable à la pratique du développement de l'égalité entre les sexes dans le lieu de travail, et pourra servir de texte de référence essentiel aux dirigeants. L'auteure parle directement aux directeurs des ressources humaines lesquels, pense-t-elle, devraient être au centre de l'action permettant de garantir l'égalité entre les sexes dans le lieu de travail. C'est au fur et à mesure des chapitres que l'on ressent la frustration de l'auteure sur le fait que « les programmes et interventions actuels s'avèrent trop théoriques, et n'offrent pas assez de conseils pratiques aux praticiens sur le « comment faire ». » Nous ne pouvons que croire l'auteure sur parole à ce sujet, considérant son expérience substantielle dans les secteurs public et privé depuis plus de 15 ans. Sa frustration par rapport aux programmes et interventions actuels se traduit, de manière créative, par une merveilleuse collection de chapitres normatifs, avec quelques exemples et modèles, visant à aider les individus et les organisations à œuvrer pour un changement d'approche, afin de garantir l'égalité entre les sexes. Chaque chapitre contient des données et des références littéraires qui proviennent de diverses sources, et des nombreux cas de ce qui marche dans un grand nombre de contextes institutionnels.

Le Chapitre 1 est judicieusement intitulé : Pas une autre tirade féministe ! Il reproduit l'essence du texte, qui est d'aller au-delà des déclarations de politiques générales vers ce qui a besoin d'être fait. Il offre une vue d'ensemble sincère des défis, et s'inspire d'une variété de sources et de rapports sur la discrimination sexuelle. L'auteure réussit à entrelacer les données avec des exemples frappants de « traitement disparate » et de discrimination. Dans les premier et second chapitres, l'auteure est fidèle à son principe selon lequel elle utilise une approche de mise en œuvre basée sur la simplicité. Des rapports internationaux pertinents sur la diversité des sexes et autres questions apparentées sont résumés de manière appropriée, donnant au lecteur une bonne idée des défis pratiques sur le terrain.

Les Chapitres 2 à 6 représentent la substance du livre, en fournissant une base pratique pour le développement et la définition d'une stratégie et d'un projet de mise en œuvre pour l'égalité entre les sexes, et pour l'intégration institutionnelle au sein d'organisations formelles. Des directives pratiques sont fournies aux directeurs des ressources humaines. Alors que l'auteure soutient que le texte vise une large audience, elle réfère constamment au rôle que jouent les directeurs des ressources humaines. Aucune institution n'est statique, et le soutien des dirigeants doit être continuellement développé et réaffirmé par l'entremise directe des directeurs des ressources humaines et autres, au sein des institutions. L'auteure fournit des démarches très pratiques en plaidant en faveur de l'égalité entre les sexes. Des outils simples et utiles sont fournis pour faire avancer l'exercice d'intégration de l'égalité.

En plus de fournir des outils d'action pertinents et viables au niveau institutionnel, la Dr Ramparsad expose les grandes lignes de plusieurs cas aux niveaux macro et micro sur l'intégration des sexes. Ces cas offrent un aperçu des initiatives positives à travers divers pays, et des succès enregistrés aux niveaux nationaux et au sein des institutions. Elle offre, de manière très astucieuse, des outils d'évaluation comparative et des listes de contrôle pour aider les directeurs. Tout en gardant une approche institutionnelle normative, elle exprime très clairement l'importance d'une plus grande mobilisation pour garantir l'action visée. Elle remarque que l'intégration des sexes peut être une route solitaire, et que les personnes dirigeant de telles processus devraient s'assurer de créer autour d'eux un environnement favorable. À cet égard, elle identifie les institutions disponibles en Afrique du Sud et le travail qu'elles font pour assister l'intégration des sexes. Le Chapitre 6, Définition des règles, est un rappel que les initiatives localisées dépendent souvent de l'établissement de politiques et de règles appropriées. L'auteure offre divers exemples au niveau institutionnel, et reproduit entièrement divers aspects nécessaires pour une action efficace, réceptive et innovative orientée vers l'égalité.

Les Chapitres 7 et 8 sont particulièrement utiles en ce qu'ils portent sur le renforcement des capacités par rapport à l'avenir. Alors que l'auteure fournit de nombreux outils d'intervention, elle reconnaît qu'il est possible qu'on ne sache pas tout et que, donc, nous avons besoin d'engager une réflexion et de diriger des recherches sur une base continue au sein des organisations. Le Chapitre 7 offre des indicateurs qui permettent de mesurer les interventions et d'établir des cadres de travail de suivi et d'évaluation efficaces, afin de garantir le besoin de rendre compte par rapport à l'égalité entre les sexes. Le Chapitre 8 expose les grandes lignes d'un processus d'apprentissage, à travers le développement d'une variété de cas de recherche qui reproduisent les succès et les échecs. L'auteure fournit des directives et des procédures pratiques pour documenter les études de cas qui seraient utiles à tout praticien. Les Chapitres 9 et 10 sont consacrés à l'avenir et reproduisent les questions plus générales qui doivent être prises en considération dans le développement de l'égalité entre les sexes, et les interventions de maintien.

Le livre ne manque pas d'incorporer des questions de politiques plus générales et de développements internationaux apparentés, dans le domaine de l'égalité entre les sexes. Même si le texte est orienté vers les praticiens, il est impératif de le lire dans un cadre théorique plus large, pour en apprécier sa valeur et ses limites. L'action pour l'égalité entre les sexes ne peut pas être isolée de l'évolution des politiques identitaires, ni du mouvement féministe qui a été au centre de la lutte pour l'égalité entre les sexes. Le mouvement, comme pour nombre de groupes basés sur l'identité, émerge d'un sentiment de mécontentement par rapport à des questions systématiques importantes, et à des pratiques discriminatoires apparentées qui donnent lieu à l'exclusion des femmes. Ces groupes sont le produit de circonstances historiques et de discordance relative à la discrimination (Fukuyama 2018). La mobilisation identitaire, qui est compréhensible, vient avec des conséquences qui dévient souvent l'attention des pratiques qui font l'objet de la lutte. Accorder trop d'importance à la différence, pour convenir aux préoccupations relatives aux sexes, peut se faire aux frais de la lutte contre la discrimination dans toutes ses formes. Une autre conséquence des politiques identitaires est l'exclusion de certains et l'affirmation de perspectives basées sur le caractère distinctif des autres. L'idée que certains sont enclins par nature à discriminer est plutôt malencontreuse, en ce sens qu'elle affirme le vu selon laquelle si vous n'êtes pas d'une identité spécifique, à cause d'une apparence physique, vous ne pouvez absolument pas faire partie de la solution. Les politiques identitaires et les conséquences pour la société sont reproduites de manière appropriée par Fukuyama (2018), dans son œuvre majeure sur l'identité qui devrait être lue par tous, surtout ceux qui sont imprégnés des sciences politiques.

Il existe une incertitude sérieuse de par le monde sur la direction structurelle des économies, et sur le fait de savoir si l'avenir sera composé de nombreuses grandes sociétés ou de millions de petites organisations (Walden 2013). Il y a lieu de penser qu'au sein du secteur de l'économie et de la société, ce sont les petites organisations qui se multiplieront (Fioramonti 2017). Le manuel vise principalement les institutions qui peuvent soutenir des niveaux structurels élevés, y compris une variété d'arrangements organisationnels, de politiques et d'initiatives budgétées formalisés, visant l'amélioration de l'inclusivité des sexes. Le vrai défi du développement de l'égalité entre les sexes émerge souvent dans les petites institutions, qui se débrouillent tant bien que mal, et qui doivent aussi établir l'égalité sans nécessairement bénéficier du genre de structure formelle, de budgets et de processus de politiques suggérés dans le texte. Le vrai test, pour la société, concerne la manière dont l'égalité entre les sexes peut être développée en terrains multiples, quelle que soit la taille de l'organisation et les modalités d'emploi et la création de valeur. Il y a de grandes chances que de nombreuses entreprises soient des entreprises familiales, ou des coopératives, qui ne génèrent pas nécessairement le genre de surplus qui permette de budgéter des dépenses relatives à des systèmes et des pratiques élaborés, en vue de garantir l'égalité entre les sexes. Tout comme pour ce texte, la plupart des pensées actuelles des dirigeants tendent à faire une fixation sur les structures des grandes sociétés, dans un monde qui évolue rapidement, et où les nouvelles technologies et plus de

formes de production et de distribution en réseau ont des chances de façonner la vie institutionnelle de tous, quel que soit le sexe des gens.

Durant les dernières décennies, la forme dominante des interventions de capacité a été d'emprunter les meilleures pratiques et de chercher à adapter ces dernières aux circonstances locales (Andrews 2013 ; Andrews, Pritchett et Woolcock 2013). L'approche orientée vers les solutions entre souvent en jeu au moyen d'évaluations, d'études de cas en provenance d'autres contextes, et de transferts d'outils. Alors qu'il y a un certain niveau d'adaptation, globalement, le changement tend à éviter une approche orientée vers les solutions et à embrasser une approche qui porte plus sur l'engagement des problèmes au sein de leurs contextes. L'idée serait d'aborder la discrimination préjudiciable dans son contexte, d'une manière itérative et dans un cadre qui apprécie l'entremise des divers acteurs, le pouvoir exercé par différents groupes, et le besoin continu d'apprentissage et d'adaptation pour résoudre un problème. Une approche plus itérative de la résolution de problème servirait à développer des connaissances locales plus approfondies, ainsi qu'une créativité, pour résoudre les défis liés à l'égalité entre les sexes. Une telle approche n'exclut pas les évaluations internationales (Andrews 2013), l'utilisation de plus larges cadres de politiques ni les meilleures pratiques. Cet excellent manuel continuera ainsi de rester pertinent à l'avenir. C'est un livre que doivent lire absolument les directeurs des ressources humaines qui défendent et protègent l'égalité entre les sexes.

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
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RESENHA DE LIVRO

Nitasha Ramparsad (2019)
*Gender Equality at Work:
Some are more equal than others*

(Igualdade de Género no Trabalho:
Alguns São Mais Iguais que Outros)

KR Publishing: Randburg, África do Sul
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Resenhado por Salim Latib

Este livro de autoria única pelo Dr Ramparsad pode ser localizado no contexto mais amplo da acção social de identidade e inclusão que se tem desenvolvido globalmente. O impulso mais recente para garantir formas mais profundas de incorporação surgiu da campanha #MeToo e do movimento “fallist” que deriva do activismo estudantil no pagamento das propinas e da “descolonização” do conteúdo curricular nas universidades sul-africanas (Habib 2019). A nota introdutória “Sobre o Autor” afirma que a escritora tem um grande interesse na justiça social e responde aos desafios colocados

por grupos sociais lesados (neste caso, mulheres que experienciam injustiça e várias formas de exclusão aberta e encoberta da economia e instituições formais). A nota biográfica sublinha que a autora se compromete com o continente africano e com a “produção de conhecimento específico para a diáspora africana”. Uma orientação activista na produção de um livro sobre “igualdade de género” é compreensível, dados os desafios discriminatórios enfrentados pelas mulheres. Também é admirável, pois a autora situa o texto no seu desejo de criar uma diferença e impulsionar a mudança na África do Sul.

Tudo indica que a autora vive e trabalha na África do Sul e que a contribuição é mais africana do que de uma comunidade da diáspora. Talvez a referência à “diáspora” se relacione com algo não dito sobre a história da autora ou sentido de diferença. É essencial compreender esta informação, uma vez que a identidade da escritora parece ser um factor de motivação significativo para a forma como o livro é elaborado. A Dr^a Ramparsad declara que muito do que é afirmado “emanou de” suas próprias experiências. Seria bom saber se as experiências são puramente baseadas em instituições sul-africanas ou se ela de facto fez parte da comunidade da diáspora africana e viveu ou testemunhou práticas discriminatórias fora do continente. A criação de perspectivas normativas baseadas em experiências vividas na África do Sul e em todo o mundo é intelectualmente valiosa e talvez mais necessária no caso de um texto que se concentra no “como fazer” no que diz respeito à mudança de organizações e garantir a igualdade de género.

É um desafio sério fazer uma resenha de um livro sobre igualdade de género; especialmente quando o autor, talvez correctamente, afirma que os homens têm de aceitar a realidade de que são inatamente preconceituosos. Sugere-se que o preconceito é deliberado e malicioso ou passivo e subconsciente. Embora os homens sejam frequentemente beneficiários de discriminação de género, a medida em que os preconceitos são inatos requer uma introspecção mais profunda. Mesmo que um escritor precise de reflectir sobre possíveis preconceitos na investigação e revisão, a noção de preconceito inerente em perspectiva pode muito bem ser um pouco difícil de aceitar. A propensão dos homens a participar em questões de igualdade de género do ponto de vista da sua “masculinidade” é demonstrada a título de exemplo ao longo do livro e baseada em pesquisas secundárias e literatura. A compreensão dos preconceitos e a falta de um compromisso real para com a igualdade de género foi muito fortemente apresentada como uma preocupação central e está incluída no subtítulo: “alguns são mais iguais do que outros”. A fim de apreciar plenamente os preconceitos que as mulheres enfrentam, talvez seja imperativo aceitar algum elemento de preconceito inerente e admitir que, por mais que alguns homens sintam que não são culpados de tais práticas, poderão existir ações subconscientes que reforcem padrões prejudiciais específicos nas instituições e na sociedade em geral.

As pessoas muitas vezes ficam tão envolvidas nas actividades de uma organização e na dinâmica do trabalho ao ponto de não se dar conta de que certas práticas são intrin-

secamente discriminatórias e podem causar danos a alguns. A análise da autora ajuda-nos a reflectir sobre numerosos aspectos da vida institucional. Os detalhes servem para aumentar a compreensão de como acções aparentemente inocentes, tais como comentários sobre o desempenho ou perguntas durante uma entrevista, podem ter um impacto devastador nas realidades globais da igualdade. Ao destacar as inúmeras formas pelas quais a desigualdade de género é sustentada, a autora não só promove o auto-exame individual, mas também encoraja em grande medida a introspecção institucional sobre o que deve ser feito. A Dr^a Ramparsad vai mais além do que apenas fazer uma crítica das práticas actuais; ela oferece inúmeras ferramentas e estratégias para superar desafios. Estes vão desde a aplicação de ferramentas de planeamento, tais como a análise SWOT e PEST até à compreensão das realidades actuais, passando por instrumentos de investigação analítica mais focados na apreciação e alteração das realidades existentes.

O livro é uma valiosa contribuição para a prática de criação de igualdade de género no trabalho e é visto como um texto de referência essencial para os gestores. A autora fala directamente com os gestores de recursos humanos, que, na sua opinião, devem estar na linha da frente para garantir a igualdade de género no local de trabalho. A coleção de capítulos supostamente se desdobra a partir da frustração da autora de que “os programas/intervenções actuais revelam ser demasiado académicos em foco e não oferecem orientação prática suficiente aos profissionais em relação aos aspectos “como fazer””. Resta-nos apenas acreditar nas palavras da autora sobre isso, uma vez que ela tem experiência substantiva há mais de 15 anos tanto no sector público como privado. A frustração da autora com os programas e intervenções existentes traduz-se criativamente numa maravilhosa colecção de capítulos normativos, com uma série de exemplos e modelos, destinados a ajudar indivíduos e organizações a promover uma abordagem de mudança para garantir a igualdade de género. Cada capítulo contém dados e literatura de uma variedade de fontes, bem como numerosos casos daquilo que funciona numa vasta gama de contextos institucionais.

O capítulo 1 é apropriadamente intitulado: “Não outro discurso feminista! Ele capta a essência do texto, ou seja, ir além dos vastos pronunciamentos políticos em direcção ao que deve ser feito. Ela fornece uma visão geral franca dos desafios e baseia-se numa variedade de fontes e relatórios sobre discriminação de género. A autora sai-se bem ao entrelaçar os dados com exemplos vivos de “tratamento desigual” e discriminação. Neste e no capítulo seguinte, a autora faz jus à sua tese de usar uma abordagem KISS (Keep it Simple, Stupid) para implementação. Relatórios internacionais relevantes sobre a diversidade de género e questões relacionadas estão adequadamente resumidos para proporcionar ao leitor uma boa noção de alguns dos desafios práticos no terreno.

Os Capítulos 2 a 6 constituem o cerne do texto, na medida em que fornecem uma base prática para o desenvolvimento e delineamento de uma estratégia e de um plano de implementação para a igualdade de género e a integração institucional nas organizações formais. Os gestores de recursos humanos recebem orientações práticas. Embora

a autora defenda um público mais vasto para o texto, ela faz referência constante ao papel dos gestores de recursos humanos. Nenhuma instituição é estática, e o apoio da liderança deve ser continuamente edificado e reafirmado através da agência directa dos gestores de recursos humanos e outros dentro das instituições. A autora fornece alguns passos muito práticos para defender a igualdade de género. Ferramentas simples e úteis são fornecidas para impulsionar o exercício da integração da igualdade de género.

A Dr^a Ramparsad descreve vários casos a nível macro e micro sobre a integração de género, para além de fornecer instrumentos relevantes e exequíveis para acções a nível institucional. Estes casos oferecem informações sobre acções positivas em vários países e sobre os êxitos registados a nível nacional e no seio das instituições. Ela fornece de forma muito inteligente ferramentas de referência e listas de verificação para ajudar gestores. Apesar de manter uma abordagem institucional normativa, ela não hesita em expressar a importância de uma mobilização mais ampla para garantir a acção. Ela observa que a integração de género pode ser um caminho solitário, que exige aos líderes desses processos trabalharem na criação de um ambiente de apoio. A este respeito, ela identifica as instituições disponíveis na África do Sul e o trabalho que fazem para apoiar a integração do género. O Capítulo 6, Definição das Regras, é um lembrete de que as acções localizadas muitas vezes dependem da garantia de que as políticas e regulamentos adequados estão devidamente definidos. Ela fornece numerosos exemplos a nível institucional e, portanto, capta de forma abrangente vários aspectos necessários para acções eficazes, eficientes, reactivas e inovadoras orientadas à igualdade.

Os capítulos 7 e 8 são particularmente úteis na medida em que se concentram na criação de capacidades para acções futuras. Embora a autora forneça muitas ferramentas para acção, ela reconhece que talvez não saibamos tudo e por isso precisamos de nos envolver em introspecção e investigação numa base contínua dentro das organizações. O Capítulo 7, sobre como segurar um espelho, fornece indicadores para medir acções e para estabelecer quadros eficazes de monitorização e avaliação para garantir a responsabilização pela igualdade de género. O Capítulo 8 descreve um processo de aprendizagem, através do desenvolvimento de uma variedade de casos de pesquisa que captam o sucesso e os fracassos. A autora fornece diretrizes e passos práticos para documentar estudos de casos, úteis a qualquer profissional. Os Capítulos 9 e 10 são dedicados ao futuro e captam as questões mais amplas que devem ser consideradas na criação da igualdade de género e em acções sustentáveis.

O livro não se abstém de incorporar questões políticas mais amplas e desenvolvimentos globais relacionados à igualdade de género. Embora o texto possa muito bem ser dirigido a profissionais, é imperativo abordar o tema a partir do discurso académico mais amplo para apreciar seu valor total e suas limitações. O impulso para a igualdade de género não pode ficar isolado da evolução global da política de identidade e do movimento feminista que está na vanguarda da luta pela igualdade. O movimento,

como acontece com muitos grupos identitários, emerge de um sentimento de agravamento com questões sistemáticas mais significativas e práticas discriminatórias relacionadas que dão origem à exclusão das mulheres. Essas práticas são produto de circunstâncias históricas e discordam com discriminação (Fukuyama 2018). A mobilização de identidade, embora compreensível, tem consequências que muitas vezes desviam a atenção das práticas que estão a ser contestadas. Uma ênfase exagerada na diferença, para acomodar as preocupações de género, pode desenrolar-se à custa do combate à discriminação em todas as suas formas. Uma outra consequência da política de identidade é a exclusão de algumas perspectivas e a afirmação de outras baseadas na distinção. A ideia de que alguns são inatamente propensos a discriminar é bastante lamentável, pois afirma uma visão de que se alguém não for de uma identidade específica por causa da sua aparência física, dificilmente poderá ser parte integrante da solução. As políticas de identidade e as consequências para a sociedade são apropriadamente capturadas por Fukuyama (2018) em seu trabalho seminal sobre identidade e devem ser lidas por todos, especialmente aqueles mergulhados em ciências políticas.

Há uma grande incerteza no mundo sobre a direção estrutural das economias e se o futuro irá ser constituído por numerosas grandes corporações ou milhões de organizações menores (Walden 2013). As evidências actuais indicam que o sector das pequenas organizações económicas e sociais está a crescer (Fioramonti 2017). O manual é dirigido principalmente a instituições que podem sustentar altos níveis de estrutura, incluindo uma variedade de arranjos organizacionais formalizados, políticas e ações orçamentárias destinadas a aumentar a inclusão de género. O verdadeiro desafio na promoção da igualdade de género surge frequentemente em pequenas instituições com dificuldades, as quais devem também estabelecer a igualdade, sem necessariamente terem o tipo de estrutura formal, orçamentos e processos políticos sugeridos neste texto. O teste real para a sociedade é como a igualdade de género pode ser concebida em múltiplos terrenos, independentemente da dimensão de uma organização e das modalidades de emprego e criação de valor. É provável que muitas empresas possam surgir como empresas familiares ou cooperativas que não geram necessariamente o tipo de excedentes que facilitam a reserva de orçamentos para sistemas e práticas de elaboração que garantam a igualdade. Como neste texto, grande parte do pensamento da gestão actual tende a fixar-se em grandes estruturas empresariais num mundo em rápida evolução, e onde as novas tecnologias e formas de produção e distribuição mais interligadas são susceptíveis a moldar a vida institucional para todos, independentemente do género.

Ao longo das últimas décadas, a forma dominante de intervenções de capacitação tem sido o empréstimo de melhores práticas e a tentativa de adaptá-las às circunstâncias locais (Andrews 2013; Andrews, Pritchett e Woolcock 2013). A abordagem orientada a soluções muitas vezes entra em jogo por meio de referências, estudos de casos de outros contextos e a transferência de ferramentas. Embora uma quantidade razoável de adaptação seja propagada, a mudança global visa evitar uma abordagem orienta-

da pela solução para uma abordagem que enfoca envolvimento em problemas dentro do contexto. A ideia seria combater a discriminação prejudicial dentro do contexto, de forma interactiva e num quadro que aprecie a acção de vários actores, o poder exercido por diferentes grupos e a necessidade de aprendizagem e adaptação contínua para resolver um problema. Uma abordagem de resolução de problemas mais interactiva serviria para desenvolver um conhecimento local mais profundo e a criatividade para resolver os desafios da equidade. Tal abordagem não exclui referências internacionais (Andrews 2013), o uso de quadros políticos mais amplos e melhores práticas; portanto, este excelente manual continuará a ser relevante para o futuro. É imprescindível para os gestores de recursos humanos que agem como defensores e guardiões da igualdade de género.

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