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Les opinions exprimées dans l’AJPSDG appartiennent à leurs auteurs et n’impliquent aucunement une approbation de la part d’AMDIN ou des rédacteurs.

As opiniões expressas na AJPSDG são exclusivamente as do(s) autor(es) e não implicam o seu endosso por parte da AMDIN ou dos editores.
“I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in their efforts to solve the problems of this continent.” Nelson Mandela

This centenary year of the birth of President Nelson Mandela serves to remind us of the potential richness when there is unity of purpose on this continent. This first edition of the African Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) reflecting a collective African experience of public sector innovations and interventions speaks to that sense of purpose. The substance aligns with a Pan African vision and the importance of integration across the Continent.

The European Union supports such a vision. This is articulated in the strategic partnership between the African Union and the European Union and expressed in the Joint Road Map 2014-17 adopted by African and European Union Heads of State. This academic and practical Journal reflecting continental experiences among the many Management Development Institutes underpins the strategic objectives of the European and African Partnership. Such a sharing of practise and research also contributes to Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the overall objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals globally.

The SA–EU Strategic Partnership established in 2006 and the Joint Action Plan remains a forward looking platform facilitating wide ranging cooperation between the European Union and South Africa. Within that context, the European Union is delighted to support the Government of South Africa in its efforts to enhance and develop the Public Sector in pursuit of an efficient and effective cadre of public servants. Specifically, that support has included support to the NSG across a broad range of training and capacity development initiatives to provide the appropriate context for learning research and sharing of knowledge. The role the NSG plays as secretariat to AMDIN has facilitated the launch and the compilation of this journal. We are proud to financially support this compilation of scholarly articles which speaks to the breadth of expertise available and the leveraging of knowledge to nurture African experiences.

Supporting the Public Sector and Local Government is central to the EU support to building a capable and developmental state: one of the pillars of the National Development Plan of South Africa. We wholeheartedly support and commend all those involved in compiling this Journal and hope that it will be the first of many more editions to come.

Marcus Cornaro
Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of South Africa
“Je rêve de la réalisation d’une unité de l’Afrique, grâce à laquelle ses dirigeants vont unir leurs efforts afin de résoudre les problèmes de ce continent.” Nelson Mandela


Le partenariat stratégique AS-UE établi en 2006 et le plan d’action commun restent une plate-forme prospective facilitant une coopération de grande envergure entre l’Union européenne et l’Afrique du Sud. Dans ce contexte, l’Union européenne est ravie de soutenir le gouvernement sud-africain dans ses efforts visant à renforcer et à développer le secteur public afin de mettre en place un cadre efficace de fonctionnaires. Plus précisément, ce soutien a englobé un appui au GSN dans le cadre d’un large éventail d’initiatives de formation et de développement des capacités afin de fournir le contexte approprié de l’apprentissage de la recherche et le partage des connaissances. Le rôle joué par le NSG en tant que secrétariat d’AMIDIN a facilité le lancement et la compilation de ce journal. Nous sommes fiers d’apporter notre soutien financier à cette compilation d’articles scientifiques qui reflète le souffle de l’expertise disponible et l’utilisation des connaissances afin de nourrir les expériences africaines.

Soutenir le secteur public et les gouvernements locaux est au cœur du soutien de l’UE à la construction d’un État capable et en développement: l’un des piliers du plan de développement national de l’Afrique du Sud. Nous appuyons et félicitons sans réserve tous ceux qui ont participé à la rédaction de ce journal et espérons que ce sera la première de nombreuses autres éditions à venir.

**Marcus Cornaro**
Ambassadeur de l’Union européenne en République d’Afrique du Sud
“Eu sonho com a realização da unidade da África, onde seus líderes se unem em seus esforços para resolver os problemas deste continente.” Nelson Mandela


A União Europeia apoia essa visão. Isto é articulado na parceria estratégica entre a União Africana e a União Europeia e expressa no roteiro conjunto 2014-17 adotado pelos chefes de Estado africanos e da União Europeia. Este Jornal académico e prático que reflete as experiências continentais entre os muitos Institutos de Desenvolvimento Gerencial sustenta os objetivos estratégicos da Parceria Européia e Africana. Tal compartilhamento de prática e pesquisa também contribui para a Agenda 2063 de África e para os objetivos globais dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável em todo o mundo.

A Parceria Estratégica SA-UE, estabelecida em 2006, e o Plano de Ação Conjunto continuam a ser uma plataforma prospectiva, facilitando uma ampla cooperação entre a União Europeia e a África do Sul. Neste contexto, a União Europeia tem o prazer de apoiar o Governo da África do Sul nos seus esforços para melhorar e desenvolver o Sector Público, na busca de um quadro eficiente e eficaz de funcionários públicos. Especificamente, esse apoio incluiu apoio ao NSG em uma ampla gama de iniciativas de treinamento e desenvolvimento de capacidade para fornecer o contexto apropriado para o aprendizado de pesquisa e compartilhamento de conhecimento. O papel que o NSG desempenha como secretariado para a AMDIN facilitou o lançamento e a compilação desta revista. Estamos orgulhosos de apoiar financeiramente esta compilação de artigos académicos que fala sobre o sopro de conhecimento disponível e a alavancagem do conhecimento para alimentar as experiências africanas.

O apoio ao sector público e ao governo local é fundamental para o apoio da UE à construção de um Estado capaz e desenvolvimentista: um dos pilares do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento da África do Sul. Apoiamos e elogiamos todos os envolvidos na elaboração deste Jornal e esperamos que seja a primeira de muitas edições futuras.

Marcus Cornaro
Embaixador da União Europeia na República da África do Sul.
The beginning is the toughest part of the work!
Dear reader, you have before you the first edition of the *Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance* (AJPSDG), a peer-reviewed scholarly publication of the African Management Development Institutes’ Network (AMIDIN).

The journal draws the outlines of a dream: for AMIDIN to become an excellent network of African government management development institutes (MDIs) and schools of government so as to create a platform for these African institutions to articulate their collective voice and promote mutual partnership, peer support and collaboration in developing leadership and management capacity in response to the needs of the African people and their governments.

AMIDIN was launched in 2005 as an inclusive and dynamic organisation representing institutions from across the continent. In line with its objectives, AMIDIN would like to contribute to learning and development and promote interaction across the continent. This Journal is a good example of promoting the free flow of ideas and knowledge, and it has articles on various topics from various countries of Africa, resulting from investigations into a broad spectrum of matters and issues related to policy research and implementation in public sector leadership, management and development in Africa. It publishes discipline-based and inter-disciplinary research, with a focus on both theoretical and practical approaches and experiences relevant to development and governance in Africa.

The AJPSDG seeks to publish research articles, discussion papers, policy papers, interviews with eminent persons, and book reviews on major issues related to public sector development and governance in Africa. It provides for a wide focus, which includes research on the development, implementation and analysis of policies, legislation and regulatory frameworks; values and principles; governance; research, monitoring and evaluation; leadership and management; capacity building, teaching and learning; development studies; socio-economic issues; regional cooperation; human and environmental security; civil society and its functions; service delivery; and public sector organisational development.

With an annual edition, shortly progressing to bi-annual publication, the AJPSDG is aimed at students and trainees, specialists, practitioners, consultants, politicians, policy makers, members of legislatures and those interested in public African affairs.

The game has started and the challenge now is the commitment of all of us to the success of this initiative. Yes, we can! Let’s roll up our sleeves and walk together for the success of the journal so as to achieve our dream!

Eduardo Chilundo
President of AMIDIN

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_Foreword by the President of the African Management Development Institutes’ Network_
AVANT-PROPOS DU PRÉSIDENT DU RÉSEAU DES INSTITUTS AFRICAINS DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE LA GESTION

Le début est la partie la plus difficile d’une tâche ! Cher lecteur, vous avez devant vous la première édition de la Revue africaine du développement et de la gouvernance du secteur public (Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance) (AJPSDG), une publication scientifique à comité de lecture du Réseau des instituts africains de développement de la gestion (AM DIN).

La revue dessine les contours d’un rêve : qu’AM DIN devienne un excellent réseau d’instituts de développement de la gestion [MDI] et d’écoles d’administration africains afin de créer une plateforme permettant à ces instituts africains d’exprimer leur voix collective et de promouvoir des partenariats à bénéfices réciproques, le soutien des pairs et la collaboration pour développer les capacités de leadership et de gestion en réponse aux besoins des populations africaines et de leurs gouvernements.


L’AJPSDG cherche à publier des articles de recherche, des articles de discussion, des documents de politiques, des entretiens avec de hautes personnalités et des critiques de livres sur les principales questions liées au développement du secteur public et à la gouvernance en Afrique. Elle aborde une large gamme de sujets, y compris la recherche sur l’élaboration, l’application et l’analyse de politiques, de législations et de cadres réglementaires; les valeurs et principes; la gouvernance, la recherche, le suivi et l’évaluation; le leadership et la gestion; le renforcement des capacités, l’enseignement et l’apprentissage; les études de développement; les questions socio-économiques; la coopération régionale; la sécurité humaine et environnementale; la société civile et ses fonctions; la prestations de services; et le développement organisationnel du secteur public.

Avec une édition annuelle qui passera bientôt à une publication semestrielle, l’AJPSDG s’adresse aux étudiants et aux stagiaires, aux spécialistes, aux praticiens, aux consultants, aux politiciens, aux décideurs politiques, aux membres des législatures et à ceux qui s’intéressent aux affaires publiques africaines.

Le jeu a commencé et le défi pour nous tous consiste maintenant de réaliser l’engagement à la réussite de cette initiative. Oui, nous pouvons ! Retroussons-nous les manches et cheminons ensemble sur la voie du succès de la revue afin de réaliser notre rêve !

Eduardo Chilundo
Président d’AMDIN
PREFÁCIO PELO PRESIDENTE DA REDE DOS INSTITUTOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DE GESTÃO DE ÁFRICA

O início é a parte mais difícil do trabalho. Caro leitor, tem à sua disposição a primeira edição da Revista Africana de Desenvolvimento do Sector Público e Governação (AJPSDG), uma publicação académica com revisão de pares, da rede dos Institutos de Desenvolvimento de Gestão de África (AM DIN)!

A revista desenha os contornos de um sonho para a AMDIN se tornar numa excelente rede de Institutos de Desenvolvimento de Gestão e de Escolas de Governo de África, de modo a criar uma plataforma para essas instituições articularem colectivamente a sua voz e promover parcerias mútuas, apoio e colaboração no desenvolvimento da capacidade de liderança e gestão em resposta às necessidades dos povos africanos e seus governos.

A AMDIN foi criada em 2005 como uma organização dinâmica e inclusiva de instituições a representar todo o continente. Em consonância com os seus objetivos, a AMDIN pretende contribuir para o desenvolvimento, aprendizagem e promoção da interacção no continente. A revista é um exemplo da promoção da livre troca de ideias e conhecimentos e compreende artigos sobre diversos temas de vários países da África, resultantes de investigações sobre um amplo espectro de questões e problemas relacionados à investigação e implementação de políticas de liderança no sector público, de gestão e desenvolvimento em África. Ela publica resultados de pesquisa disciplinar e interdisciplinar, com enfoque em abordagens teóricas e práticas e experiências relevantes ao desenvolvimento e à governação no continente.

A AJPSDG procura publicar artigos de pesquisa, documentos de debate e de políticas, entrevistas com personalidades e resenhas de livros sobre questões importantes relacionadas com o desenvolvimento do sector público e de governação em África. Abarca um foco amplo, que inclui pesquisa sobre desenvolvimento; implementação e análise de políticas; quadro jurídico e legislação; valores e princípios; governação; pesquisa, acompanhamento e avaliação; liderança e gestão; desenvolvimento institucional, ensino e aprendizagem; estudos de desenvolvimento; questões socioeconómicas; cooperação regional; segurança humana e ambiental; sociedade civil e sua função; prestação de serviços; e desenvolvimento organizacional do sector público.

Com uma edição anual e progredindo em breve para uma publicação bianual, a revista AJPSDG é direcionada para estudantes e formandos, especialistas, profissionais, consultores, políticos, decisores, parlamentares e todos aqueles interessados em assuntos públicos Africanos.

O exercício já começou e o grande desafio agora é o compromisso de todos nós para o êxito desta iniciativa. Sim, podemos! Vamos arregaçar as mangas e caminhar juntos para o sucesso da revista, de modo a alcançarmos o nosso sonho!

Eduardo Chilundo
Presidente da AMDIN
EDITORIAL

THE AFRICAN VOICE MUST BE HEARD: CREATING A JOURNAL FOR THE AFRICAN MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTES’ NETWORK (AMDIN)

Thean Potgieter
Editor

Over a number of years the need for an initiative to create a unique journal for Africa was articulated at several meetings at which representatives of the Africa Management Development Institutes’ Network (AMDIN), the African Union (AU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) participated. The impression was that representatives of schools of government and management development institutes (MDIs), scholars and practitioners should have a more effective voice in a pan-African forum to contribute to policy research and knowledge creation and dissemination on development and governance issues on the continent.

Although public sector MDIs and schools of government share largely similar mandates across the continent, their institutional capacity and scope of work vary from country to country. As no coordinating efforts have yet been made to collect, review and document research on public sector development, management, governance and policy issues at these institutions the idea of an AMDIN journal to record research and boost research capacity development among continental institutions became relevant. To this end, stakeholders proposed the establishment of an Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) as an AMDIN-driven initiative to create a forum that will encourage a public policy discourse through cutting-edge research and provide information on appropriate policies and approaches for enhancing public service delivery.

The Kenya School of Government in Nairobi ran with the initiative and became the interim secretariat. An inception meeting was held in Nairobi in 2016 with representatives from institutions in East, West, South and Central Africa participating. During this meeting the preliminary guidelines for a new journal were agreed upon, whereafter they were developed, and in June 2017 these guidelines were formally accepted by AMDIN. An editorial board was created, and the process of soliciting support from across the continent commenced.

The AJPSDG is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal that investigates a broad spectrum of matters and issues related to policy research and implementation in public sector leadership, management and development in Africa. Africa has a rich and diverse language culture and history. However, for the purpose of the inception edition of the Journal the working languages selected are English, French or Portuguese. Although full papers are published in the language in which they were submitted, a summary of the paper will also be published in the other two languages. Most of the submissions received were in English and only one article in Portuguese was received. Unfortunately no French-language submissions were received, but the editors are continuing with all efforts to attract wider submissions.

The AJPSDG seeks to publish discipline-based and inter-disciplinary research articles, discussion papers, policy papers, interviews with eminent persons, and book reviews on major issues related to public sector development and governance in Africa. The focus is on both theoretical and practical approaches and experiences, including research on the development, implementation and analysis of policies, legislation and regulatory frameworks; values and principles;
governance; research, monitoring and evaluation; leadership and management; capacity building, teaching and learning; development studies; socio-economic issues; regional cooperation; human and environmental security; civil society and its functions; service delivery; and public sector organisational development. The above constitute the substantive, but not necessarily the exclusive, contents of the Journal. The target audience of the Journal is students, specialists, practitioners, specialists, consultants, politicians, policy makers, members of legislatures and those interested in African affairs.

The first edition of the Journal lives up to the founding conception of having a varied and trans-continental view of the diverse development and governance-related issues Africa is grappling with and which it has to manage. These are provided from the vantage point of different disciplines and countries. Articles’ contributions are on national, provincial and local government spheres, on socio-economic development, the importance of people-centred, people-driven public service and administration, as well as very relevant service-delivery issues in Africa, specifically regarding HIV/AIDS and road infrastructure.

The article by Richard Levin focuses on the important issue of building a people-centred, people-driven public service and administration culture in Africa for youth empowerment and development. The article emanated from a paper he delivered at the African Union Africa Public Service Day Celebrations in Rwanda during June 2017. He indicates that the global discourses on (new) public administration, good governance as well as the corporate capture of the state have influenced and shaped people-centred and people-driven approaches to governance and development. A new relationship between the public service and broader society characterised by a social contract that puts the interests of people first and at the centre of policy implementation is required. An overall development orientation based on people’s needs, participation in policy formulation and implementation are central for partnership-building between state and society to drive Africa’s transformation. The youth of Africa is a growing demographic in contrast with other continents and its aspirations must be met in the context of ongoing corporate capture of the state by global forces of monopoly capital through multinational companies, which continue to drain billions of US$ from the continent through illegal activities and “misinvoicing”. Empowering the youth requires foresight and innovation and the leveraging of technology for capacity development and sustainable interventions driven by communities and their youth. New thinking, doing things differently and securing regular and predictable labour-intensive work is a challenge that we need to overcome on the continent. The African Union’s commitment to building capable developmental states and people-centred development through Agenda 2063, the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, together with the African Youth Charter provide frameworks through which these objectives can be attained.

Governance and socio-economic development debate in sub-Saharan Africa with specific reference to Ghana is the focus of the article by Patrick Tandoh-Offin and Gbensuglo A. Bukari. The authors review the discourses on the dichotomy between efforts at democratic governance and socio-economic development in Ghana and examine the intricate relationship between governance and socio-economic development during Ghana’s Fourth Republican Constitutional Democracy (since 1992). They argue that good governance must link a political system with its environment as a development framework within which socio-economic development can be accomplished. To the extent that governance has been accepted as the basis for equitable and more inclusive distribution of development programmes and projects, its potency as an automatic panacea for development generally has been a source of major disagreements. The review of Ghana’s democratic and socio-economic development processes underscores the linkages between good governance and socio-economic development, and the concluding remarks therefore emphasise that good governance has a role to play in sustaining democratic development and generating socio-economic development in emerging democracies like Ghana.

Roberts Kabeba Muriisa and Asasira Simon Rwabyoma make a very relevant contribution on the importance of synergy in social service provision, in this case...
with specific relevance to embeddedness and complementarity in fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Since its discovery in the early nineteen eighties, HIV/AIDS has outstripped other diseases in terms of its spread and impact. With a national prevalence of 6% in 2016 compared to more than 7% in 2011, the country has made significant progress in mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS and related deaths. There is a continued decline in HIV/AIDS-related deaths, fewer new infections in all age groups, and there are over one million people on treatment. Uganda was one of the first countries to embrace open public discussion and disclosure of one’s HIV/AIDS status and to promote access to treatment and medication by people infected with HIV/AIDS. This paper looks at what made Uganda register these successes. Using the synergy lens, this paper discusses managing HIV/AIDS in Uganda. The article is based on secondary data analysis and concludes that without synergy successes in HIV prevention and treatment could not have been registered in Uganda.

In view of the growing number of chronic patients in the public sector, South Africa has made major progress in scaling up access to treatment and care services for priority public health diseases, including HIV. As a result Kurt Firnhaber, Shabir Banoo, Mpato Mokobori and Belinda Strydom argue that an innovative approach to pharmacies is required and in their article they indicate how the appropriate use of technology can assist with creating the pharmacies of the future and improve service delivery. A scaling-up of services for the growing number of chronic patients in public sector facilities has placed significant strain on the health system’s ability to deliver optimum pharmaceutical services to public hospitals and primary health care clinics. In 2012, Right to Care, a non-profit organisation, implemented the first robotically supported pharmacy in a South African public sector facility at the Themba Lethu Clinic, a high-volume HIV treatment and care facility, at Helen Joseph Hospital in Johannesburg. At the time, the Themba Lethu Clinic was the largest HIV clinics in the country, with over 17 000 patients in care. While pharmacy automation demonstrated significant reductions in waiting times and increased the quality of care for patients, other benefits of improved delivery of pharmaceutical services were realised in terms of stock control, operational efficiencies, management reporting and the use of pharmaceutical human resources. Despite its successes, this initial pilot in pharmacy automation also indicated limitations of the current automation technology to meet the needs of the public sector environment in South Africa and highlighted the need for further innovation to meet these unique requirements. In response to this need, Right e-Pharmacy, together with its local and international partners, piloted Pharmacy Dispensing Units to provide chronic medication to public sector patients in South Africa. This pilot explored the decanting strategy of allowing patients who take chronic medication to collect their monthly refill from an alternative site that is easily accessible without compromising the quality of service rendered.

The connection between road infrastructure and local development is certainly an important issue and needs to be considered when infrastructure development programmes are undertaken in Africa. Patrick Mbataru analysed the influence of road infrastructure implementation on local development with specific reference to the Thika superhighway in Kenya. Infrastructure development is taken as a sine qua non of economic development, but this link is increasingly viewed as spurious at worst or not clearly understood at best. In the article the author investigates various arguments that try to dispute that infrastructural development necessarily have an impact on economic development where such projects are rolled out. Whereas the purpose is not to pretend proving the argument on the spuriousness of infrastructure stock on economic development, it adds to similar literature by analysing the impact of a major road project in Kenya ten years after it was commissioned. It confirms the notion that service businesses benefit most from such infrastructural expansion in comparison to manufacturing investment.

As the separation of legislative, executive and judicial authority to prevent monopoly or abuse of power is fundamental to democratic practice the contribution by Anne Mc Lennan on fiscal oversight and the South African Parliamentary Budget Office is quite apt. The oversight legislatures exercise over the executive through processes of approval (of budgets and plans) and review (of progress) is an inherent part of the democratic process. Legislative oversight
is hard as it involves balancing party politics with public interest. In South Africa, the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to “provide independent, objective and professional advice and analysis” provides insight into the potential and limits of fiscal oversight. This article documents the establishment and early operations of the PBO, and its findings indicate that the PBO plays an important role in building fiscal oversight capacity through the provision of policy advice and briefings. However, even with this additional support, members struggle to rise above party political issues and executive dominance to fully exercise fiscal oversight powers.

Kedibone Phago provides a good analysis of the national government intervention in provincial administration and governance, focusing on the case of Limpopo Province. While South Africa has strong elements of a federal state in respect of its provincial sphere, its constitutional provision indicates that the system of government is unitary in nature. This arrangement is necessary to be taken into consideration whenever issues of cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations are debated. In a broader context, it is necessary for spheres of government to streamline their systems to realise their basic developmental mandates towards communities. This requires the different spheres of government to take responsibility for both achievements and underperformance in instituting interventions that are geared towards maintaining the provision of quality public services. This study undertook to investigate national government’s interventions in the Limpopo provincial administration. This intervention was made to five provincial departments whose primary functions had collapsed due to rampant maladministration and corruption cases. An explorative case-study approach was undertaken in which unstructured interviews and official documents were used. This approach was necessary to determine the nature of a relationship between the Limpopo provincial administration and the National Government pertaining to this intervention. Several key findings were identified pointing to some of the following: leadership undermining and trivialising audit reports that sought to highlight areas of concern as well as the collapse of accountability systems that are necessary for ensuring effective and efficient functioning of provincial administration. Following these egregious findings, it is concluded that the strengthening of governance structures remains an imperative. In this case, establishing credible bodies and resourced institutions or strengthening existing ones is pivotal to accountability and proper public governance.

Our Portuguese-language contribution is by J.A. Oliveira Rocha and Gonçalves Jonas Bernardo Zavale with a focus on decentralisation and local autonomy in sub-Saharan Africa (Descentralização e Autonomia local Na África Subsaariana). The article analyses the post-independence evolution of states in sub-Saharan Africa with the intention of contributing to the governance and democracy debate in Africa. As many states experienced financial difficulties, they received financial aid, which often suggested decentralisation and greater levels of local autonomy. The authors do a comparative analysis of ten countries where the approach was applied, with a specific focus on Mozambique, and argue that similar measures did not always produce similar results in Africa. In the course of the article they also deliberate the “failure” of states as well as the wide-ranging reasons given by various authors, including references to the dependency theory, the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, weak public policies and institutions, as well as local divisions. The role of international investors is discussed in response to political, economic and administrative crises in the region, and the emphasis that they placed on decentralisation. In the end, it is simply evident that in terms of the role and success of decentralisation and local authorities in Mozambique, similar measures do not always generate similar results.

Prof Howard Richard’s thought-provoking book review article assesses Kate Philip’s Markets on the Margins: Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development (2018). This book provides a participant observer account of South Africa’s unsuccessful efforts to end mass unemployment and mass poverty. In 1987, workers in South Africa’s National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) staged a historic national strike, after which 40 000 workers from across southern Africa were dismissed from their jobs. To assist them, NUM set up a job-creation unit, starting with worker co-ops before shifting to a wider enterprise support programme. In this book, Kate Philip, who ran the
programme for over a decade, charts the lessons of successive phases of enterprise development in the marginal economic contexts in which the programme operated. The initial project-level focus of the co-op programme was unable to go to scale; the strategy shifted to the establishment of Development Centres, providing a wide range of business services to local entrepreneurs. Yet the strategy of local diversification through “local production for local consumption” soon faced the reality that many local needs were already catered for by mass production in South Africa’s core economy, leaving little market space within which small enterprises could compete. Instead, attention turned to the local competitive advantages that might provide access to wider, external markets. Case studies look at the craft sector and the commercialisation of products from the indigenous marula – with the marula programme building a value chain from the bottom up, breaking into national and global markets and contributing to the livelihoods of over 4,000 women in 42 rural villages. Markets on the Margins concludes with reflections on the role of markets in such marginal contexts. Is there scope to make markets work better for the poor – or is the process always, inexorably, one of making the poor work for markets? And if markets are social constructs, how might they be constructed to achieve different distributional outcomes?
ÉDITORIAL

L’AFRIQUE DOIT FAIRE ENTENDRE SA VOIX : CRÉER UNE REVUE POUR LE RÉSEAU DES INSTITUTS AFRICAINS DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE LA GESTION (AM DIN)

Thean Potgieter
Rédacteur

La nécessité d’une initiative visant à créer une revue unique pour l’Afrique a été exprimée au fil des années lors de plusieurs réunions auxquelles des représentants du Réseau des instituts africains de développement de la gestion [African Management Development Institutes’Network] (AMDIN), de l’Union africaine et du Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) ont participé. L’impression qui se dégageait était que les représentants des Écoles d’administration et des Instituts de développement de la gestion (MDI), les universitaires et les praticiens devraient mieux faire entendre leur voix dans un forum panafricain pour contribuer à la recherche politique et à la création et diffusion de connaissances sur les questions de développement et de gouvernance sur le continent.


L’AJPSDG est une revue scientifique à comité de lecture qui étudie un large éventail de sujets et de questions liés à la recherche en matière de politiques et leur application dans le cadre du leadership, de la gestion et du développement du secteur public en Afrique. L’Afrique a une culture et une histoire linguistiques riches et diversifiées. Toutefois, pour l’édition initiale de la Revue, les langues de travail sélectionnées sont l’anglais, le français ou le portugais. Bien que les articles complets soient publiés dans la langue dans laquelle ils ont été soumis, un résumé de chaque article sera également publié dans les deux autres langues. La plupart des propositions d’articles reçues étaient en anglais et un seul article en portugais a été reçu. Malheureusement, aucun article en langue française n’a été reçu, mais les rédacteurs poursuivent...
leurs efforts pour attirer une diversité plus large de propositions d’articles.

L’AJPSDG cherche à publier des articles de recherche fondée sur une discipline en particulier et interdisciplinaire, des articles de discussion, des documents de politiques, des entretiens avec de hautes personnalités et des critiques de livres sur les principales questions liées au développement du secteur public et à la gouvernance en Afrique. L’accent est mis sur des approches et des expériences théoriques et pratiques, y compris la recherche sur l’élaboration, l’application et l’analyse de politiques, de législations et de cadres réglementaires; les valeurs et principes; la gouvernance, la recherche, le suivi et l’évaluation; le leadership et la gestion; le renforcement des capacités, l’enseignement et l’apprentissage; les études de développement; les questions socio-économiques; la coopération régionale; la sécurité humaine et environnementale; la société civile et ses fonctions; la prestation de services; et le développement organisationnel du secteur public. Les éléments susmentionnés constituent le contenu principal, mais pas exclusif de la Revue. Les étudiants, les spécialistes, les praticiens, les consultants, les politiciens, les décideurs politiques, les membres de législatures et les personnes intéressées par les affaires africaines constituent le lectorat cible de la Revue.

La première édition de la Revue respecte les principes qui ont présidé à sa création en offrant des points de vue divers et transcontinentaux sur diverses questions de développement et de gouvernance auxquelles l’Afrique est confrontée et qu’elle doit gérer. Celles-ci sont fournies du point de vue de différentes disciplines et pays. Les contributions d’articles concernent les sphères gouvernementales nationales, provinciales et locales, le développement socioéconomique, l’importance de services publics et d’administration qui sont orientés et menés par les personnes, ainsi que les questions de prestation de services très pertinentes en Afrique, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le VIH/SIDA et les infrastructures routières.

L’article de Richard Levin se concentre sur l’importante question de l’édification d’une culture de services publics et d’administration orientés et menés par les personnes pour permettre l’autonomisation et le développement des jeunes. L’article provient d’un document qu’il a présenté lors des célébrations de la Journée de la fonction publique africaine de l’Union africaine au Rwanda, en juin 2017. Il indique que les discours mondiaux sur la (nouvelle) administration publique, la bonne gouvernance ainsi que la capture de l’État par les entreprises ont influencé et façonné des approches de gouvernance et de développement orientés et menés par les personnes. Une nouvelle relation entre le service public et la société en général, caractérisée par un contrat social qui place les intérêts des gens au premier plan et au centre de l’application des politiques, est nécessaire. Une orientation globale du développement basée sur les besoins des gens, leur participation à la formulation et à l’application des politiques est essentielle pour établir un partenariat entre l’État et la société afin de stimuler la transformation de l’Afrique. La jeunesse africaine représente un groupe démographique croissant par rapport à ceux des autres continents et ses aspirations doivent être satisfaites dans le contexte de la capture de l’État continue par les forces mondiales du capital monopolistique à travers des sociétés multinationales qui continuent à priver le continent de milliards de dollars américains à travers des activités illégales et des « fausses factures ». L’autonomisation des jeunes exige de la prévoyance et de l’innovation, et la mise à profit de la technologie pour le développement des capacités et des interventions durables menées par les communautés et leurs jeunes. De nouvelle manière de penser, agir différemment et assurer des activités à forte intensité de main-d’œuvre régulières et prévisibles constituent des défis que nous devons surmonter sur le continent. L’engagement de l’Union africaine à l’édification d’États développementistes compétents axés sur les personnes dans le cadre de l’Agenda 2063, la Charte africaine des valeurs et des principes de la fonction publique et de l’administration, ainsi que la Charte africaine de la jeunesse, offrent des cadres permettant d’atteindre ces objectifs.

L’article de Patrick Tandoh-Offin et Gbensuglo A. Bukari se concentre sur le débat sur la gouvernance et le développement socioéconomique en Afrique subsaharienne, avec une référence spécifique au Ghana. Les auteurs étudient les discours sur la dichotomie entre les efforts de gouvernance démocratique et le développement socioéconomique au Ghana et examinent la relation complexe entre la gouvernance et le développement socioéconomique.
au cours de la quatrième démocratie constitutionnelle républicaine du Ghana (depuis 1992). Ils soutiennent qu’une bonne gouvernance doit associer un système politique à son environnement en tant que cadre de développement dans lequel le développement socioéconómique peut être réalisé. Dans la mesure où la gouvernance a été acceptée comme base d’une distribution équitable et plus inclusive des programmes et projets de développement, son efficacité en tant que panacée automatique pour le développement a généralement été une source de désaccords majeurs. L’examen des processus de développement démocratique et socioéconómique du Ghana souligne les liens entre la bonne gouvernance et le développement socioéconómique, et les observations finales soulignent par conséquent que la bonne gouvernance a un rôle à jouer pour soutenir le développement démocratique et favoriser le développement socioéconómique des nouvelles démocraties comme le Ghana.

Roberts Kabeba Muriisa et Asasira Simon Rwabyoma apportent une contribution très pertinente sur l’importance de la synergie dans la prestation de services sociaux, et dans ce cas, l’accent est mis sur l’intégration et la complémentarité dans la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA en Ouganda. Depuis sa découverte au début des années 1980, le VIH/sida a dépassé les autres maladies en termes de propagation et d’impact. Avec une prévalence nationale de 6% en 2016, contre plus de 7% en 2011, le pays a réalisé des progrès significatifs dans l’atténuation de la propagation du VIH/sida et des décès connexes. Il y a une baisse continue des décès liés au VIH/SIDA, moins de nouvelles infections dans tous les groupes d’âge et plus d’un million de personnes sont sous traitement. En 2012, Right to Care, une organisation à but non lucratif, a implanté la première pharmacie assistée par robot dans un établissement public sud-africain de Thembela Lethu, un centre de traitement et de soins du VIH à grande capacité à l'hôpital Helen Joseph de Johannesburg. À l’époque, la clinique Thembela Lethu était la plus grande clinique VIH du pays, avec plus de 17 000 patients pris en charge. Bien que l’automatisation de pharmacie ait permis de réduire considérablement les temps d’attente et d’améliorer la qualité des soins aux patients, d’autres avantages liés à l’amélioration de la prestation de services pharmaceutiques se sont concrétisés en ce qui concerne la gestion des stocks, l’efficacité opérationnelle, les rapports de gestion et l’utilisation des ressources humaines pharmaceutiques. Malgré ses succès, ce premier projet pilote d’automatisation de pharmacie a également révélé les limitations de la technologie d’automatisation actuelle de répondre aux besoins de l’environnement du secteur public en Afrique du Sud et a souligné la nécessité d’innovations supplémentaires pour répondre à ces exigences uniques. En réponse à ce besoin, Right e-Pharmacy, avec ses partenaires locaux et internationaux, a piloté des unités de distribution de médicaments pour fournir des médicaments chroniques aux patients du secteur public en Afrique du Sud. Ce pilote a exploré la stratégie de décantation consistant à permettre aux patients, pour le renouvellement des médicaments pour des maladies chroniques, de les obtenir d’un...
autre site facilement accessible sans compromettre la qualité du service rendu.

Le lien entre l'infrastructure routière et le développement local est certainement une question importante et doit être prise en compte lorsque des programmes de développement des infrastructures sont entrepris en Afrique. Patrick Mbataru a analysé l'influence de la réalisation d'infrastructures routières sur le développement local, avec une référence spécifique à l'autoroute Thika au Kenya. Le développement des infrastructures est considéré comme une condition sine qua non du développement économique, mais ce lien est de plus en plus perçu comme trompeur au pire, ou, au mieux, mal compris. Dans cet article, l'auteur examine divers arguments qui tentent de contester que le développement des infrastructures a nécessairement un impact sur le développement économique où de tels projets sont déployés. Bien que l'objectif ne soit pas d'essayer de prouver l'argumentation sur le lien trompeur entre le stock d'infrastructures et le développement économique, il apporte un soutien à la documentation similaire en analysant l'impact d'un projet routier majeur au Kenya dix ans après sa mise en service. Cela confirme l'idée que les entreprises de services bénéficient le plus de cette expansion des infrastructures par rapport aux investissements manufacturiers.

Étant donné que la séparation de l'autorité législative, exécutive et judiciaire pour empêcher le monopole ou l'abus de pouvoir est fondamentale pour la pratique démocratique, la contribution d'Anne Mc Lennan sur la surveillance fiscale et le Bureau parlementaire du budget sud-africain est tout à fait appropriée. Les organes législatifs de surveillance exercent un contrôle sur l'exécutif par le biais de processus d'approbation (de budgets et de plans) et l'examen (des progrès accomplis) fait partie intégrante du processus démocratique. La surveillance législative est difficile, car elle implique la mise en balance de la politique partisane avec l'intérêt public. En Afrique du Sud, la création d'un Bureau parlementaire du budget (PBO) pour « fournir des conseils et des analyses indépendants, objectifs et professionnels » donne un aperçu du potentiel et des limites de la surveillance fiscale. Cet article documente l'établissement et les premières opérations du PBO, et ses conclusions indiquent que le DPB joue un rôle important dans le renforcement des capacités de surveillance fiscale en fournissant des conseils et des exposés en matière de politique. Cependant, même avec ce soutien supplémentaire, les membres ont du mal à surmonter les problèmes de politique de partis et de domination de l'exécutif pour exercer pleinement leurs pouvoirs de surveillance fiscale.

Kedibone Phago fournit une bonne analyse de l'intervention du gouvernement national dans l'administration et la gouvernance provinciales, en mettant l'accent sur le cas de la province du Limpopo. Bien que l'Afrique du Sud possède des éléments forts d'un État fédéral en ce qui concerne sa sphère provinciale, sa disposition constitutionnelle indique que le système de gouvernement est de nature unitaire. Cet arrangement doit être pris en compte lorsque des questions de gouvernance coopérative et de relations intergouvernementales sont débattues. Dans un contexte plus large, il est nécessaire que les sphères de gouvernement rationalisent leurs systèmes pour réaliser leurs mandats de développement de base vis-à-vis des communautés. Cela nécessite que les différentes sphères du gouvernement amènent la responsabilité des réalisations et de la sous-performance dans la mise en place d'interventions visant à maintenir la prestation de services publics de qualité. Cette étude visait à enquêter sur les interventions du gouvernement national dans l'administration provinciale du Limpopo. Cette intervention a été entreprise dans cinq départements provinciaux dont les principales fonctions s'étaient effondrées en raison des cas de mauvaise administration répandue et de corruption. Une approche exploratoire d'étude de cas a été suivie dans le cadre de laquelle des entretiens non structurés et des documents officiels ont été utilisés. Cette approche était nécessaire pour déterminer la nature de la relation entre l'administration provinciale du Limpopo et le gouvernement national, en ce qui concerne cette intervention. Plusieurs conclusions clés ont été identifiées, parmi lesquelles : un leadership minant et banalisant les rapports d'audit qui cherchaient à mettre en évidence les sujets de préoccupation ainsi que l'effondrement des systèmes de responsabilisation nécessaires pour assurer le fonctionnement efficace et efficace de l'administration provinciale. Suite à ces conclusions
flagrantes, il est conclu que le renforcement des structures de gouvernance demeure impératif. Dans ce cas, la création d'organismes crédibles et d'instituts dotés de ressources ou le renforcement des instituts existants sont essentiels à la responsabilisation et à la bonne gouvernance publique.


L'article de critique de livre du professeur Howard Richard, qui incite à la réflexion, évalue le livre de Kate Philip Markets on the Margins : Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development (2018) [Marchés sur les marges : les travailleurs des mines, la création d'emplois et le développement des entreprises]. Ce livre fournit un compte rendu d'observateur participant des efforts déployés par l'Afrique du Sud pour mettre fin au chômage de masse et à la pauvreté de masse. En 1987, les travailleurs de l'Union nationale des travailleurs des mines d'Afrique du Sud (NUM) ont organisé une grève nationale historique, à la suite de laquelle 40 000 travailleurs d'Afrique australe ont été licenciés. Pour les aider, le NUM a mis en place une unité de création d'emplois, en commençant par les coopératives de travail avant de passer à un programme d'assistance aux entreprises plus large. Dans ce livre, Kate Philip, qui a dirigé le programme pendant plus de dix ans, définit les leçons tirées des phases successives du développement des entreprises dans les contextes économiques marginaux dans lesquels le programme était exécuté. L'objectif au niveau du projet initial du programme coopératif n'a pas pu s'étendre à grande échelle ; la stratégie a été modifiée pour cibler la création de centres de développement, fournissant un large éventail de services aux entrepreneurs locaux. Pourtant, la stratégie de diversification locale par la « production locale pour la consommation locale » a dû très vite faire face à la réalité que de nombreux besoins locaux sont déjà satisfaits par la production de masse dans l'économie centrale sud-africaine, laissant peu d'espace de marché aux petites entreprises. Alors, l'attention a porté sur les avantages concurrentiels locaux susceptibles d'offrir un accès à des marchés extérieurs plus vastes. Les études de cas portent sur le secteur de l'artisanat et la commercialisation de produits issus du marula indigène – avec le programme de marula mettant en place une chaîne de valeur en partant de la base, pénétrant les marchés nationaux et mondiaux et contribuant à la subsistance de plus de 4 000 femmes dans 42 villages ruraux. Markets on the Margins se termine par une réflexion sur le rôle des marchés dans ces contextes marginaux. Existe-t-il des possibilités de faire fonctionner les marchés au bénéfice des pauvres - ou est-ce qu'il s'agit d'un processus qui obligera toujours et inexorablement les pauvres à travailler pour les marchés ? Et si les marchés sont des constructions sociales, comment pourraient-ils être construits pour obtenir des résultats distributifs différents?
Ao longo de vários anos, a necessidade de uma iniciativa para criar uma revista única para a África foi articulada em várias reuniões em que participaram representantes da Rede Africana de Institutos de Desenvolvimento de Gestão (AMBIN), da União Africana (UA) e do Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD). Ficamos com a impressão de que os representantes das escolas de organismos governamentais e de desenvolvimento de gestão (MDI), académicos e profissionais deveriam ter uma voz mais eficaz num fórum pan-africano para contribuir para a investigação de políticas e a criação e divulgação de conhecimentos sobre questões de desenvolvimento e governação enfrentadas no continente.

Embora os MDIs do setor público e as escolas de governo partilhem mandatos em grande parte semelhantes em todo o continente, a sua capacidade institucional e o seu âmbito de trabalho variam de país para país. Como ainda não foram envidados esforços de coordenação para recolher, rever e documentar a investigação sobre questões de desenvolvimento, de gestão, de governação e de política do setor público nestas instituições, a ideia de uma revista AMDIN para registar a investigação e impulsionar o desenvolvimento de capacidades de investigação entre as instituições continentais tornou-se relevante. Para tal, as partes interessadas propuseram a criação de um Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) [Revista Africana de Desenvolvimento do Setor Público e Governação] como uma iniciativa orientada pela AMDIN para criar um fórum que incentivar um discurso de políticas públicas através de investigação de ponta e fornecerá informações sobre políticas e abordagens adequadas para melhorar a prestação de serviços públicos.

A Escola de Administração Pública do Quênia, em Nairobi, geriu a iniciativa e tornou-se o secretariado interino. Foi realizada uma reunião de início em Nairobi, em 2016, com participação de representantes de instituições da África Oriental, Ocidental, Sul e Central. Durante esta reunião foram acordadas as orientações preliminares para uma nova revista, que em seguida foram desenvolvidas, e em junho de 2017 estas orientações foram formalmente aceites pela AMDIN. Foi criado um conselho editorial e iniciou-se o processo de solicitação de apoio de todo o continente.

A AJPSDG é uma revista académica revisada por pares que investiga um amplo espectro de matérias e questões relacionadas com a investigação e implementação de políticas sobre a liderança, gestão e desenvolvimento do setor público em África. A África tem uma cultura e história linguística rica e diversificada. No entanto, para efeitos da edição inicial da Revista, as línguas de trabalho selecionadas são o inglês, o francês ou o português. Embora os documentos completos sejam publicados na língua em que foram apresentados, um resumo do documento também será publicado nas outras duas línguas. A maioria das contribuições recebidas foi em inglês e foi apenas recebido um artigo em português. Infelizmente, não foram recebidas quaisquer contribuições na língua francesa, mas os editores continuam a envidar todos os esforços para suscitar submissões mais amplas.
A AJPSDG procura publicar artigos de investigação disciplinares e interdisciplinares, documentos de reflexão, documentos políticos, entrevistas com personalidades eminentes e críticas de livros sobre as principais questões relacionadas com o desenvolvimento e governação do setor público em África. A tônica incide em abordagens e experiências teóricas e práticas, incluindo a investigação sobre o desenvolvimento, implementação e análise de políticas, legislação e quadros regulamentares; valores e princípios; governação; investigação, acompanhamento e avaliação; liderança e gestão; reforço das capacidades, ensino e aprendizagem; investigação no domínio do desenvolvimento; questões socioeconómicas; cooperação regional; segurança humana e ambiental; sociedade civil e as suas funções; prestação de serviços; e desenvolvimento organizacional do setor público. O que precede constitui o conteúdo substantivo, mas não necessariamente o exclusivo, da Revista. O público-alvo da Revista são estudantes, especialistas, profissionais, especialistas, consultores, políticos, decisores políticos, parlamentares e os interessados em assuntos africanos.

A primeira edição da Revista corresponde à ideia dos fundadores de ter uma visão variada e transcontinental das diversas questões relacionadas com o desenvolvimento e a governação que a África enfrenta e que tem de gerir. Estes são fornecidos a partir do ponto de vista de diferentes disciplinas e países. As contribuições dos artigos são sobre as esferas do governo nacional, provincial e local, sobre o desenvolvimento socioeconómico, a importância do serviço público e a administração centrada nas pessoas e impulsionado pelas pessoas, bem como questões extremamente relevantes de prestação de serviços em África, em particular no que diz respeito ao VIH/SIDA e infraestrutura rodoviária.

O artigo de Richard Levin centra-se na questão importante da construção de uma cultura de serviço público e administração centrada nas pessoas em África para a capacitação e desenvolvimento da juventude. O artigo emanou de um documento apresentado nas Celebrações do Dia do Serviço Público da União Africana em Ruanda durante junho de 2017. Ele indica que os discursos globais sobre (a nova) administração pública, boa governação, bem como a captura corporativa do Estado influenciaram e moldaram as abordagens centradas nas pessoas e orientadas para às pessoas em termos da governação e do desenvolvimento. É necessária uma nova relação entre o serviço público e a sociedade em geral, caracterizada por um contrato social que coloca em primeiro lugar as necessidades das pessoas e no centro da execução das políticas. Uma orientação global para o desenvolvimento baseada nas necessidades das pessoas, a sua participação na formulação e implementação de políticas são fundamentais para a construção de parcerias entre o Estado e a sociedade para impulsionar a transformação da África. A juventude da África é uma demografia crescente em contraste com outros continentes e as suas aspirações devem ser satisfeitas no contexto da captura corporativa contínua do Estado pelas forças globais do capital monopolista através de empresas multinacionais, que continuam a drenar milhões de dólares americanos do continente através de atividades ilegais e "adulteração de faturas comerciais". A capacitação dos jovens exige a previsão e a inovação e a alavancagem da tecnologia para o desenvolvimento de capacidades e intervenções sustentáveis impulsionadas pelas comunidades e pela sua juventude. Novas maneiras de pensar, de fazer as coisas de forma diferente e garantir um trabalho regular e previsível da mão-de-obra intensiva é um desafio que temos de superar no continente. O compromisso da União Africana de construir Estados de desenvolvimento capazes e desenvolvimento centrado nas pessoas através da Agenda 2063, a Carta Africana dos Valores e Princípios do Serviço Público e da Administração, juntamente com a Carta Africana da Juventude, fornecem quadros através dos quais estes objetivos podem ser alcançados.

O debate sobre governação e desenvolvimento socioeconómico na África Subsariana, com uma referência específica ao Gana, é o foco do artigo de Patrick Tandoh-Offin e Gbensuglo A. Bukari. Os autores analisam os discursos sobre a dicotomia entre os esforços de governação democrática e o desenvolvimento socioeconómico no Gana e examinam relação complexa entre a governança e o desenvolvimento socioeconómico durante a Quarta Democracia Constitucional Republicana do Gana (desde 1992). Argumentam que a boa governação deve associar um sistema político ao seu ambiente.
como um quadro de desenvolvimento no âmbito do qual o desenvolvimento socioeconómico pode ser realizado. Na medida em que a governação foi aceite como base para uma distribuição equitativa e mais inclusiva dos programas e projetos de desenvolvimento, a sua potência como panaceia automática para o desenvolvimento tem sido, em geral, fonte de grandes desacordos. A revisão dos processos de desenvolvimento democrático e socioeconómico do Gana sublinha as ligações entre a boa governação e o desenvolvimento socioeconómico, e as observações finais sublinham, portanto, que a boa governação tem um papel a desempenhar no apoio ao desenvolvimento democrático e na geração de desenvolvimento socioeconómico em democracias emergentes como Gana.

Roberts Kabeba Muriisa e Asasira Simon Rwabyoma dão um contributo muito relevante no que tange à importância da sinergia na prestação de serviços sociais, neste caso com relevância específica para a incorporação e complementaridade na luta contra o VIH/SIDA no Uganda. Desde a sua descoberta no início dos anos oitenta, o VIH/SIDA ultrapassou outras doenças em termos de propagação e impacto. Com uma prevalência nacional de 6% em 2016 em comparação com mais de 7% em 2011, o país fez progressos significativos na mitigação da propagação e impacto. Como primeira farmácia apoia roboticamente numa instalação do setor público do Gana, a Clínica Themba Lethu, uma instalação de tratamento e cuidados de VIH de alto volume, no Hospital Helen Joseph em Joanesburgo. Na altura, a Clínica Themba Lethu era a maior clínica de VIH do país, com mais de 17 000 pacientes em cuidados. Embora a automatização da farmácia tenha demonstrado reduções significativas nos tempos de espera e aumentado a qualidade dos cuidados aos doentes, outros benefícios da melhoria da prestação de serviços farmacêuticos foram realizados em termos de controlo de existências, eficiência operacional, relatórios de gestão e utilização de recursos humanos farmacêuticos. Apesar dos seus sucessos, este piloto inicial em automação de farmácias também indicou limitações da tecnologia de automação atual para atender às necessidades do ambiente do setor público na África do Sul e destacou a necessidade de mais inovação para atender a estes requisitos únicos. Em resposta a esta necessidade, a Right e-Pharmacy, juntamente com os seus parceiros locais e internacionais, piloto Unidades Dispensadoras De Medicamentos para fornecer medicação prescrita para situações clínicas crónica aos pacientes do setor público na África do Sul. Este piloto explorou a estratégia de decantação de permitir que os pacientes que tomam medicação crónica recolham a sua recarga mensal a partir de um local alternativo que é facilmente acessível sem comprometer a qualidade de serviço prestado.

Tendo em conta o número crescente de doentes crónicos no setor público, a África do Sul fez grandes progressos no aumento do acesso aos serviços de tratamento e cuidados para doenças de saúde pública prioritárias, incluindo o VIH. Como resultado, Kurt Firnhaber, Shabir Banoo, Mpato Mokobori e Belinda Strydom argumentam que é necessária uma abordagem inovadora às farmácias e, no seu artigo, indicam como o uso adequado da tecnologia pode ajudar a criar as farmácias do futuro e melhorar a prestação de serviços. A ampliação dos serviços para o número crescente de doentes crónicos em instalações do setor público tem colocado uma pressão significativa na capacidade do sistema de saúde ao fornecer serviços farmacêuticos ótimos a hospitais públicos e clínicas de cuidados de saúde primárias. Em 2012, o Right to Care, uma organização sem fins lucrativos, implementou a primeira farmácia apoia roboticamente numa instalação do setor público sul-africano na Clínica Themba Lethu, uma instalação de tratamento e cuidados de VIH de alto volume, no Hospital Helen Joseph em Joanesburgo. Na altura, a Clínica Themba Lethu era a maior clínica de VIH do país, com mais de 17 000 pacientes em cuidados. Embora a automatização da farmácia tenha demonstrado reduções significativas nos tempos de espera e aumentado a qualidade dos cuidados aos doentes, outros benefícios da melhoria da prestação de serviços farmacêuticos foram realizados em termos de controlo de existências, eficiência operacional, relatórios de gestão e utilização de recursos humanos farmacêuticos. Apesar dos seus sucessos, este piloto inicial em automação de farmácias também indicou limitações da tecnologia de automação atual para atender às necessidades do ambiente do setor público na África do Sul e destacou a necessidade de mais inovação para atender a estes requisitos únicos. Em resposta a esta necessidade, a Right e-Pharmacy, juntamente com os seus parceiros locais e internacionais, piloto Unidades Dispensadoras De Medicamentos para fornecer medicação prescrita para situações clínicas crónica aos pacientes do setor público na África do Sul. Este piloto explorou a estratégia de decantação de permitir que os pacientes que tomam medicação crónica recolham a sua recarga mensal a partir de um local alternativo que é facilmente acessível sem comprometer a qualidade de serviço prestado.

A ligação entre as infraestruturas rodoviárias e o desenvolvimento local é certamente uma questão importante e deve ser considerada quando os programas de desenvolvimento de infraestruturas são realizados em África. Patrick Mbataru analisou
The influence of the implementation of the road infrastructure on local development with specific reference to the Thika Expressway in Kenya. The development of infrastructures is considered a sine qua non condition for economic development, but this link is increasingly seen as spurious in the worst case or not clearly understood in the best case. In the article, the author investigates various arguments that seek to contest that the development of infrastructures necessarily has an impact on economic development when these projects are launched. Although the goal is not to pretend to prove the argument about the spurious stock of infrastructures in economic development, it adds similar literature, analyzing the impact of a large road project in Kenya ten years after its inception. Confirms the notion that service companies benefit more from this expansion of infrastructures in comparison with investment in the transforming industry.

Once the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority to prevent monopoly or abuse of power is fundamental for democratic practice, the contribution of Anne Mc Lennan for the supervision of the Orçamento Parlamentar Sul-Africano is quite adequate. The supervisory legislations act through processes of approval (of budgets and plans) and review (of progress) is an inherent part of the democratic process. The fiscalization legislative is difficult, a fact that implicates balancing the political party with public interest. In South Africa, the creation of a Cabinet of Orçamento Parlamentar (PBO) for “provide advice and independent analysis, objective and professional” provides a perception of the potential and limits of the supervision orçamental. This article documents the establishment and the beginning of the operations of the PBO, and its conclusions indicate that the PBO is playing an important role in supporting the capacity of supervision orçamental through the delivery of advice and briefings about policies. In the same way, the same aid, the members submit to clarify the questions of political partisanship and the executive dominion to exercise properly the powers of supervision fiscal.

Kedibone Phago offers a good analysis of the national government intervention in provincial administration and governance, with focus on the Limpopo province. While South Africa has strong elements of a federal state in its provincial sphere, its constitutional structure indicates that the system of government is unitary. This structure must be taken into account every time governance-cooperative and intergovernmental issues are discussed. From a broader perspective, it is necessary that the governmental spheres rationalize their systems to carry out their basic mandates of development for communities. For that, it is necessary that the different governmental spheres assume responsibility for both achievements and insufficient performance in implementing oriented interventions for the maintenance of quality public services. This study aimed to investigate the national government intervention in the provincial administration of Limpopo. This intervention was made in five provincial departments whose primary functions collapsed due to cases of bad management and unbridled corruption. An exploratory study approach was used by using unstructured interviews and official documents. This approach was necessary to determine the nature of a relation between the provincial administration of Limpopo and the National Government related to this intervention. Several important identifications point to some of these questions: the leadership compromises and trivializes auditing reports that attempt to highlight areas of concern, and the collapse of accountability systems that are necessary to ensure effective and efficient administration. As a result of these obvious conclusions, it is concluded that strengthening governance structures remains an imperative. In this case, the creation of credible and endowed institutions or reinforcement of existing institutions is fundamental for accountability and good public governance.

Our contribution in the Portuguese language is by J.A. Oliveira Rocha and Gonçalves Jonas Bernardo Zavale with focus on Decentralization and Autonomy local in Subsaharan Africa. The article analyzes the
evolução pós-independência dos Estados na África Subsariana com a intenção de contribuir para o debate sobre governação e democracia em África. Como muitos Estados enfrentaram dificuldades financeiras, receberam ajuda financeira, o que muitas vezes sugeriu descentralização e maiores níveis de autonomia local. Os autores fazem uma análise comparativa de dez países onde a abordagem foi aplicada, com foco específico em Moçambique, e argumentam que medidas semelhantes nem sempre produziram resultados semelhantes em África. No decorrer do artigo, também deliberam sobre o “fracasso” dos Estados, bem como as amplas razões dadas por vários autores, incluindo referências à teoria da dependência, o comportamento de políticos e burocratas, políticas e instituições públicas fracas, bem como divisões locais. O papel dos investidores internacionais é discutido em resposta a crises políticas, económicas e administrativas na região, e a ênfase que colocaram na descentralização. No final, é simplesmente evidente que, em termos do papel e do sucesso da descentralização e das autoridades locais em Moçambique, medidas semelhantes nem sempre geram resultados semelhantes.

O artigo de revisão do livro instigante do Prof. Howard Richard avalia o livro da Kate Philip, Markets on the Margins: Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development (2018). Este livro fornece um relato de observadores participantes dos esforços malsucedidos da África do Sul para acabar com o desemprego em massa e a pobreza em massa. Em 1987, os trabalhadores da União Nacional de Mineiros (NUM) da África do Sul organizaram uma greve nacional histórica, após a qual 40 000 trabalhadores de toda a África Austral foram despedidos dos seus postos de trabalho. Para os ajudar, a NUM criou uma unidade de criação de emprego, a começar pelas cooperativas de trabalhadores antes de passar para um programa de apoio às empresas mais vasto. Neste livro, a Kate Philip, que geriu o programa durante mais de uma década, traça as lições das sucessivas fases de desenvolvimento empresarial nos contextos económicos marginais em que o programa funcionava. O foco inicial a nível de projeto do programa de cooperação foi incapaz de ir para a escala; a estratégia mudou para a criação de Centros de Desenvolvimento, fornecendo uma ampla gama de serviços empresariais aos empresários locais. No entanto, a estratégia de diversificação local através da “produção local para consumo local” logo enfrentou a realidade de que muitas necessidades locais já eram atendidas pela produção em massa na economia central da África do Sul, deixando pouco espaço de mercado dentro do qual as pequenas empresas poderiam competir. Em vez disso, chamou-se a atenção para as vantagens competitivas locais que podem proporcionar acesso a mercados externos mais amplos. Os estudos de casos analisam o setor do artesanato e a comercialização de produtos provenientes da mácula indígena – com o programa de mácula a construir uma cadeia de valor de baixo para cima, invadindo mercados nacionais e globais e contribuindo para a subsistência de mais de 4 000 mulheres em 42 aldeias rurais. O Markets on the Margins acaba por concluir com reflexões sobre o papel dos mercados nestes contextos marginais. Há margem para fazer com que os mercados funcionem melhor para os pobres – ou o processo é sempre, inexoravelmente, um de fazer com que os pobres trabalhem para os mercados? E se os mercados são construções sociais, como é que podem ser construídos para alcançar diferentes resultados de distribuição?
AFRICAN MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTES’ NETWORK – ORIGIN AND ROLE IN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Mike Welman

The African continent consists of 54 countries. Though each country is unique in terms of its historical, socio-economic and political character, countries share many of the generic capacity development requirements in the spheres of public management and administration.

However, the structure and capacity to address the training and development needs of public servants and roll out the relevant learning programmes for improved service delivery are uneven across the continent.

Some countries lack strong institutions, or institutions are in the process of being further developed, while in other countries good schools of government or management development institutes (MDIs) with good learning programmes were established. One of the shortcomings, however, is that there is limited sharing of learning programmes – specifically if one considers that through sharing and collaboration on learning programmes capacity development can accelerate on the African continent. There can therefore be no doubt that a network of training and capacity-building institutions that addresses the training and development needs of governments as a community of practice is an important requirement and that such an institution can contribute much to sharing and understanding issues of governance and service delivery in Africa.

It was for this reason that, in the wake of the Windhoek declaration (2001) as well as the Stellenbosch declaration (2003) and its associated commitments towards capacity development, the African Management Development Institutes’ Network (AM DIN) was launched in South Africa in 2005 with the support of the African Union Commission and the Secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). At the fifth Pan African Conference of Ministers Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (during December, 2005), the support for a Continental Capacity Development Programme for Governance and Public Administration was discussed, and in the Declaration that emanated from this meeting the establishment of AMDIN was noted.

The importance of AMDIN within the African Union Specialized Technical Committee (AU-STC) has been reiterated by Dr Matlosa Khubele, the then Director Political Affairs during the AMDIN Council meeting on 5 November 2014. He indicated that the AU-STC valued AMDIN for the purpose for which it was established and for its important role in fostering regional integration. The AU-STC views AMDIN as its capacity-building arm, which is to provide technical assistance on effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery.

The overall purpose of AMDIN is to be a continental network of government training and management development institutes that creates a platform for African Management Development Institutes (MDIs), Schools of Government and Institutes for Public Administration, to articulate their collective voice and promote mutual partnership, peer support and collaboration in developing leadership and management capacity in response to the needs of the African people and their governments.

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Such public sector management development institutions or schools (whether they are part of government, part of the Higher Education landscape of the different African countries or even completely commercialised and privatised ventures) have always been intended as critical vehicles to contribute towards the development of public sector capacity building for improved service delivery. As a result in the AMDIN strategy and operational matrix (for 2009-2012) it was already emphasised that the potential role of institutions and schools in this sphere manifests in all three domains of capacity building, namely individual (training); organisational (Organisation Development, consulting, research, policy analysis) as well as norm setting (relating to the integrity of public service; public sector reform and transformation).

The benefits of a strong African network are mainly rooted in its potentials for resource leverage and knowledge exchange. Other comparable regional networks have demonstrated such potential. Whilst the specific benefits to individual MDIs and schools of government will be rooted in the specific activities and services of the ‘network’, the overall rationale for the establishment of an African network of institutions (which are currently neglected) are broadly captured in three areas:

- **Resource leverage and exchange**: The framework of a network provides opportunities for resource leverage through active partnerships and exchange of resources (knowledge, capabilities, finance, etc.). In particular, a network of MDIs provides a platform for sharing personnel, expertise and grasping opportunities through collective processes.

- **Knowledge, Exchange and Development**: MDIs and schools of government develop curricula, research and training materials that can be used by similar institutions in other countries. A supportive network allows for the wide exchange of materials and provides a base for the collective development of materials and programmes. As many of these institutions are involved in government policy support, this would also serve to strengthen the overall policy capabilities of governments across the African continent.

- **Institutional Development Support**: MDIs and schools of government confront similar institutional challenges and problems. Within the context of a broader network of institutions it therefore provides opportunities to exchanges ideas focusing on institutional development issues and it has the potential to serve as a basis for establishing a collective voice on specific continental structures and initiatives.

In the main, the concept of ‘network’ is driven by a realisation that the diverse experiences of these institutions as well as their existing challenges provide both a vehicle and immense opportunities for building the collective. It therefore forms the basis for cooperation and strengthening individual institutions.

The network needs to consider activities that enhance the image and value of AMDIN for the members and stakeholders to establish itself as a recognised network of expertise for capacity development on the African Continent. It is common practice for organisations to do some introspection in this regard by asking the questions; what am I doing well – and should do more? What am I not doing well – and needs to improve or do things differently? This is also required by AMDIN.

Some of the important work done by AMDIN in support of its overall purpose (and the organisation should continue doing) include the following:

- **AM DIN was tasked to lead a research project on the “State of the Public Service in Africa” (referred to as SOPSA). The study forms part of the efforts to improve the quality of governance and public administration on the continent and enabling African states to become more developmental, while it also sought to evaluate how African states are delivering public services. AMDIN was requested by the Conference of African Ministers of Public Service (CAMPS) at the 8th Conference in Brazzaville, Congo to undertake a study. The project inception meeting occurred in August 2013. In November 2013 at a workshop in Maputo, Mozambique (with 18 member states present) the SOPSA research tools and methodology were further refined to ensure that the research is feasible, practical and implementable. The final consolidated SOPSA report was produced late in 2016 and the results were availed to AU.”**
structures. The State of the Public Service in Africa (SOPSA) Research Project is a good example of how AMDIN can deliver in the sphere of research.

- The Training of Trainers Course for Africa is another example of where a customised training programme for capacity building in African countries was presented to 218 participants from 44 countries. The rollout of the course was supported by South Africa and was presented in French and English. It was well received by participants and the Evaluation Report on this capacity building course and Training of Trainers (dated April 2010) indicated that such efforts should continue.

- An important achievement for AMDIN is that it succeeded in creating a peer-reviewed scholarly journal for Africa. The Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) investigates a broad spectrum of matters and issues related to policy research and implementation in public sector leadership, management and development in Africa. Its intention is publishing discipline-based and inter-disciplinary research, with a focus on both theoretical and practical approaches and experiences relevant to development and governance in Africa.

- AMDIN also coordinated a training programme on the African Charter on values and principles for the public service. The training took place in Ghana (from 18 to 24 November 2013) focusing on training guidelines developed for HR Planning; Performance Management and Measurement; Leadership and Management; Economic Governance; and Information Technology in Government. This training on the African Charter indicated that there is an important need to popularise the Charter and its associated content further through seminars and conferences.

- A programme to popularise the Charter has been developed for English- and French-speaking public servants. The first piloting of the programme (for English speakers) took place in Kampala, Uganda, during November 2017. The pilot for French speakers took place shortly afterwards. Inputs received from the two pilots were incorporated in preparation for the second pilot of the programme, which took place in August 2018 in Monrovia, Liberia (for English speakers) and in Dakar, Senegal (for French speakers). Final facilitators and learner manuals were developed and this programme is now ready to be shared by all public service training institutions of AMDIN member states in order to have a uniform method of popularising the Charter.

As an African-wide network, some of the activities which AMDIN may consider focusing on more in the future is to commence with a process to identify and list all the relevant learning programmes/courses available at MDIs and schools of government in Africa; develop a tool to assess the learning focus areas and materials available; establish which of these institutions are willing to make learning material (in line with AU-STC priorities) available to others, and has the willingness and capacity to roll out their training in cooperation with other African countries. If one could determine which of these institutions is willing to subject their learning material to peer review, one could establish the five best training programmes available and these could be shared and rolled out across the various regions of Africa. To boost learning and development on the continent further, AMDIN can also support the development of norms and standards, and conduct assessments of learning programmes. This will promote the possibility of some learning programmes being recognised and utilised across the borders of different countries on the continent.

In cases where specific learning programmes are of relevance to a number of countries, such priority learning materials could be made available to AMDIN partners through the AMDIN website. An approach to share and cooperate in training could be valuable as the successful example of the service delivery improvement training that was shared and rolled out in East Africa shows. However, such an approach will also require much coordination amongst AMDIN countries and enablement support to the AMDIN Secretariat.

African governments face the challenge that government should transform service delivery mechanisms to meet the needs of citizens. In order
to meet these challenges, Africans need transformed public services which are representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all citizens. The Pan-African Ministers’ Conference has recognised that the continent’s citizens deserve public services that are people-centred and people-driven, and that are characterised by equity, quality, timely interventions and strong codes of ethics. AMDIN has a key role to play in transformation and improved service delivery by government and in instilling the knowledge, skills and values caring public servants require.

A final word on the role of AMDIN is the notion that the various schools and institutes should partner and collaborate (not compete) to action key initiatives that enhance the understanding of public services on the African continent and to initiate learning programmes for service delivery improvement. The value of AMDIN as a network lies in the collaboration, sharing and exchange of programmes, but with the organisation still in its infancy, these aspects leave much room for improvement while at the same time offering many opportunities.
Le continent africain est composé de 54 pays. Bien que chaque pays soit unique en termes de son caractère historique, socioéconomique et politique, les pays partagent un grand nombre des exigences génériques en matière de renforcement des capacités dans les domaines de la gestion et de l’administration publiques.

Cependant, les structures et la capacité visant à répondre aux besoins de formation et de perfectionnement des fonctionnaires et mettre en œuvre les programmes d’apprentissage pertinents pour améliorer la prestation de services sont inégales sur le continent.

Certains pays ne disposent pas d’instituts forts, ou ces instituts sont en cours de développement, tandis que dans d’autres pays, de bonnes écoles d’administration ou d’instituts de développement de la gestion dotés de bons programmes d’apprentissage ont été créés. L’une des défaillances, cependant, est le manque de partage des programmes d’apprentissage, en particulier si l’on considère que le renforcement des capacités sur le continent africain peut être accéléré par le partage de programmes d’apprentissage et la collaboration en la matière. Il ne fait donc aucun doute qu’un réseau d’instituts de formation et de renforcement des capacités répondant aux besoins de formation et de développement des gouvernements en tant que communauté de pratique est une exigence importante et qu’une telle institution peut apporter une grande contribution au partage et à la compréhension des questions de gouvernance et de prestation de services en Afrique.


L’importance d’AMIDIN au sein du Comité technique spécialisé de l’Union africaine (CTS-UA) a été réaffirmée par le Dr Matlosa Khubele, qui était alors directeur des affaires politiques, lors de la réunion du Conseil d’AMIDIN du 5 novembre 2014. Il a indiqué que le CTS-UA apprécie AMIDIN en termes de l’objectif pour lequel il a été créé et pour son rôle important dans la promotion de l’intégration régionale. Le CTS-UA considère AMIDIN comme son outil de renforcement des capacités pour fournir une assistance technique visant à améliorer l’efficacité et l’efficience de la prestation de services.

AMIDIN a pour objectif général d’être un réseau continental d’instituts gouvernementaux de formation et de développement de la gestion, afin de créer une plate-forme pour les Instituts de développement de la gestion (MDI), les écoles d’administration et les Instituts d’administration publique, leur permettant...
d’exprimer leur voix collective et de promouvoir des partenariats à bénéfices réciproques, le soutien des pairs et la collaboration pour développer les capacités de leadership et de gestion en réponse aux besoins des populations africaines et de leurs gouvernements.

Ces instituts ou écoles de développement de la gestion du secteur public (qu’ils fassent partie du gouvernement, de l’environnement de l’enseignement supérieur des différents pays africains ou même des entreprises entièrement commercialisées et privatisées) ont toujours eu pour rôle d’être un moteur critique permettant de contribuer au renforcement des capacités du secteur public pour améliorer la prestation de services. Par conséquent, dans la stratégie et la matrice opérationnelle d’AMDIN (pour 2009-2012), il avait déjà été souligné que le rôle potentiel des instituts et des écoles dans ce domaine se manifeste dans trois domaines du renforcement des capacités, à savoir l’individu (formation) ; l’organisationnel (développement organisationnel, conseil, recherche, analyse des politiques) ainsi que l’établissement de normes (relatives à l’intégrité du service public ; la réforme et la transformation du secteur public).

Les avantages d’un réseau africain fort résident principalement dans son potentiel d’optimisation des ressources et d’échange de connaissances. D’autres réseaux régionaux comparables ont démontré un tel potentiel. Alors que les avantages spécifiques pour les divers MDI et les écoles d’administration résident dans les activités et services spécifiques du « réseau », la justification générale de la création d’un réseau africain d’instituts (actuellement négligés) est largement regroupée sous ces trois domaines :

- **Optimisation et échange de ressources** : Le cadre d’un réseau offre des possibilités d’optimisation des ressources grâce à des partenariats actifs et à l’échange de ressources (connaissances, capacités, finances, etc.). En particulier, un réseau de MDI fournit une plate-forme pour partager le personnel et l’expertise et saisir les opportunités à travers des processus collectifs.

- **Connaissance, échange et développement** : Les MDI et les écoles d’administration élaborent des programmes d’études, des documents de recherche et de formation pouvant être utilisés par des instituts similaires dans d’autres pays. Un réseau de soutien permet un large échange de matériel et fournit une base pour le développement collectif de matériel et de programmes. Étant donné que beaucoup de ces instituts jouent un rôle de soutien dans les politiques gouvernementales, cela contribuerait également à renforcer les capacités en matière de politiques globales des gouvernements du continent africain.

- **Appui au développement institutionnel** : Les MDI et les écoles d’administration sont confrontés à des enjeux et à des problèmes institutionnels similaires. Dans le contexte d’un réseau plus large d’instituts, il offre donc des possibilités d’échanger des idées axées sur des questions de développement institutionnel et peut servir de base pour établir une voix collective sur des structures et des initiatives continentales spécifiques.

Dans l’ensemble, le concept de « réseau » résulte de la prise de conscience que les diverses expériences de ces instituts ainsi que leurs défis existants constituent à la fois un moteur et d’immenses opportunités pour la construction du collectif. Il constitue donc la base de la coopération et du renforcement des instituts individuels.

Le réseau doit prendre en compte les activités qui améliorent l’image et la valeur d’AMDIN pour que les membres et les parties prenantes puissent s’imposer comme réseau d’expertise reconnu pour le renforcement des capacités sur le continent africain. Il est pratique courante pour les organisations de faire une introspection à cet égard en se posant les questions suivantes. Qu’est-ce que nous réussissons bien - et devons continuer de faire ? Qu’est-ce que nous ne réussissons pas bien et devons améliorer ou faire différemment ? Ceci est également requis par AMDIN.

Parmi les travaux importants réalisés par AMDIN à l’appui de son objectif général (et que l’organisation devrait continuer à faire), figurent les suivants :

- **AM DIN a été chargé de mener un projet de recherche sur « l’État du service public en Afrique » (dénommé SOPSA). L’étude s’inscrit**
dans le cadre des efforts visant à améliorer la qualité de la gouvernance et de l’administration publique sur le continent et à permettre aux États africains de se développer davantage, tout en cherchant à évaluer la manière dont les États africains fournissent des services publics. AMDIN a été sollicité pour entreprendre une étude par la Conférence de l’UA des ministres de la Fonction publique (CAMPs) lors de la 8e Conférence à Brazzaville, au Congo. La réunion de lancement du projet a eu lieu en août 2013. En novembre 2013, lors d’un atelier à Maputo, au Mozambique (avec 18 États membres présents), les outils et la méthodologie de recherche de SOPSA ont été perfectionnés pour garantir une recherche réalisable, pratique et applicable. Le rapport final consolidé de SOPSA a été réalisé fin 2016 et les résultats ont été communiqués aux structures de l’UA. Le Projet de recherche sur l’état du service public en Afrique (SOPSA) est un bon exemple de la manière dont AMDIN peut produire des rendements dans le domaine de la recherche.

- Le Cours de formation des formateurs pour l’Afrique est un autre exemple de programme de formation personnalisé pour le renforcement des capacités dans les pays africains, présenté à 218 participants de 44 pays. Le déploiement du cours a été soutenu par l’Afrique du Sud et a été présenté en français et en anglais. Il a été bien accueilli par les participants et le Rapport d’évaluation de ce cours de renforcement des capacités et de la formation des formateurs (daté d’avril 2010) a indiqué que ces efforts devraient se poursuivre.

- Une réalisation importante pour AMDIN est qu’elle a réussi à créer une revue scientifique à comité de lecture pour l’Afrique. La Revue africaine du développement et de la gouvernance [Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance] (AJPSDG) étudie un large éventail de sujets et de questions liés à la recherche en matière de politiques et leur application dans le cadre du leadership, de la gestion et du développement du secteur public en Afrique. Son intention est de publier des recherches fondées sur une discipline et interdisciplinaires, axées sur des approches et des expériences théoriques et pratiques pertinentes pour le développement et la gouvernance en Afrique.

- AMDIN a également coordonné un programme de formation sur la Charte africaine des valeurs et des principes de la fonction publique. La formation a eu lieu au Ghana (du 18 au 24 novembre 2013) et a porté sur les directives de formation élaborées pour la planification des RH; la gestion et mesure du rendement; le leadership et la gestion; la gouvernance économique; et la technologie de l’information au gouvernement. Cette formation sur la Charte africaine a montré qu’il était nécessaire de vulgariser la Charte et son contenu par le biais de séminaires et de conférences.

- Un programme de vulgarisation de la Charte a été mis au point pour les fonctionnaires anglophones et francophones. Le premier pilotage du programme (destiné aux anglophones) a eu lieu à Kampala, en Ouganda, en novembre 2017. Le pilote pour les francophones a eu lieu peu après. Les contributions reçues des deux projets pilotes ont été prises en considération lors de la préparation du deuxième projet pilote du programme, qui a eu lieu en août 2018 à Monrovia, au Libéria (pour les anglophones) et à Dakar, au Sénégal (pour les francophones). Les animateurs définitifs ont été formés et les manuels des apprenants ont été développés et ce programme est maintenant prêt à être partagé par tous les instituts de formation de service public des États membres d’AMIDIN afin d’avoir une méthode uniforme de vulgarisation de la Charte.

En tant que réseau africain, certaines des activités sur lesquelles AMDIN pourrait se concentrer à l’avenir consistent à commencer par identifier et répertorier tous les programmes/cours d’apprentissage pertinents disponibles dans les MDI et les écoles d’administration en Afrique; développer un outil pour évaluer les domaines d’apprentissage prioritaires et le matériel disponible; déterminer quels instituts sont disposés à mettre du matériel didactique à disposition des autres (conformément aux priorités du CTS-UA) et ont la volonté et la capacité de déployer leur formation en coopération avec d’autres pays africains. Si l’on pouvait déterminer lesquels de
ces instituts sont disposés à soumettre leur matériel pédagogique à un examen par les pairs, on pourrait établir quels sont les cinq meilleurs programmes de formation disponibles et les partager et les diffuser dans les différentes régions d’Afrique. Pour promouvoir davantage l’apprentissage et le développement sur le continent, AMDIN peut également appuyer l’élaboration de normes et de standards et mener des évaluations des programmes d’apprentissage. Cela favorisa l’acceptation et l’utilisation de certains programmes d’apprentissage de façon transfrontalière sur le continent.

Dans les cas où des programmes d’apprentissage spécifiques intéressent un certain nombre de pays, ces matériels d’apprentissage prioritaires pourraient être mis à la disposition des partenaires d’AMIDIN via le site Web d’AMIDIN. Une approche de partage et de coopération dans le domaine de la formation pourrait s’avérer fort utile comme l’exemple réussi de la formation à l’amélioration de la prestation de services qui a été partagée et déployée en Afrique de l’Est le montre. Cependant, une telle approche nécessitera également une grande coordination entre les pays AMIDIN et un soutien en matière d’habilitation au Secrétariat d’AMIDIN.

Les gouvernements africains sont confrontés au défi de transformer les mécanismes de prestation de services afin de répondre aux besoins des citoyens. Pour relever ces défis, les Africains ont besoin de services publics transformés, qui sont représentatifs, cohérents, transparents, efficaces, efficaces, responsables et adaptés aux besoins de tous les citoyens. La Conférence panafricaine des ministres a reconnu que les citoyens du continent méritent des services publics orientés et menés par les personnes et caractérisés par l’équité, la qualité, l’opportunité et de forts codes de l’éthique. AMIDIN a un rôle clé à jouer dans la transformation et l’amélioration de la prestation de services par le gouvernement et dans l’acquisition des connaissances, des compétences et des valeurs dont les fonctionnaires attentionnés ont besoin.

Un dernier mot sur le rôle d’AMIDIN concerne la notion que les divers instituts et écoles devraient s’associer et collaborer (et non se concurrencer) pour mener des initiatives clés visant à améliorer la compréhension des services publics sur le continent africain et lancer des programmes d’apprentissage pour améliorer la prestation de services. La valeur d’AMIDIN en tant que réseau réside dans la collaboration, le partage et l’échange de programmes, mais étant donné que l’organisation est encore à ses débuts, ces aspects laissent une grande marge de manœuvres pour l’amélioration tout en offrant de nombreuses opportunités.
REDE DOS INSTITUTOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA GESTÃO AFRICANA – ORIGEM E PAPEL NO DESENVOLVIMENTO DE CAPACIDADES NO CONTINENTE AFRICANO

Mike Welman

O continente africano é constituído por 54 países. Embora cada país seja único em termos do seu caráter histórico, socioeconômico e político, os países partilham muitas das necessidades genéricas de desenvolvimento de capacidades nos domínios da gestão e administração públicas.

No entanto, a estrutura e a capacidade para responder às necessidades de formação e desenvolvimento dos funcionários públicos e implementar os programas de aprendizagem relevantes para melhorar a prestação de serviços são desiguais em todo o continente.

Alguns países carecem de instituições fortes, ou as instituições estão em vias de ser desenvolvidas, enquanto outros países foram criadas boas escolas de organismos governamentais ou de desenvolvimento de gestão (MDI) com bons programas de aprendizagem. Uma das deficiências, no entanto, é que existe uma partilha limitada de programas de aprendizagem – especificamente se considerarmos que, através da partilha e colaboração em programas de aprendizagem, o desenvolvimento de capacidades pode acelerar no continente africano. Por conseguinte, não há dúvida de que uma rede de instituições de formação e de reforço de capacidades que responda às necessidades de formação e desenvolvimento dos governos enquanto comunidade de práticas é um requisito importante e que essa instituição pode contribuir muito para a partilha e compreensão de questões de governação e prestação de serviços em África.


A importância da AMDIN no Comité Técnico Especializado da União Africana (AU-STC) foi reiterada pelo Dr. Matlosa Khubele, o então Diretor de Assuntos Políticos durante a reunião do Conselho da AMDIN a 5 de novembro de 2014. Indicou que a AU-STC valorizou a AMDIN para os fins para os quais foi estabelecida e para o seu importante papel na promoção da integração regional. A AU-STC vê a AMDIN como o seu braço de capacitação, que é fornecer assistência técnica sobre a eficácia e eficiência na prestação de serviços.

O objetivo geral da AMDIN é ser uma rede continental de institutos de formação e desenvolvimento de gestão governamentais que crie uma plataforma para os Institutos Africanos de Desenvolvimento de Gestão (MDI), Escolas de Governo e Institutos de Administração Pública, para articular a sua voz coletiva e promover a parceria mútua, o apoio dos pares e a colaboração no desenvolvimento da capacidade de liderança e gestão em resposta às necessidades do povo africano e dos seus governos.

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Essas instituições ou escolas de desenvolvimento de gestão do setor público (quer façam parte do governo, do cenário do Ensino Superior dos diferentes países africanos ou mesmo empreendimentos completamente comercializados e privatizados) foram sempre concebidas como veículos críticos para contribuir para o desenvolvimento do reforço das capacidades do setor público para melhorar a prestação de serviços. Como resultado, na estratégia e matriz operacional da AMDIN (para 2009-2012), já foi sublinhado que o papel potencial das instituições e escolas neste domínio se manifesta nos três domínios do reforço das capacidades, saber, individual (formação); organizacional (Desenvolvimento da Organização, consultoria, investigação, análise de políticas), bem como no estabelecimento de normas (relativas à integridade do serviço público; reforma e transformação do setor público).

Os benefícios de uma forte rede africana assentam principalmente nas suas potencialidades de alavancagem dos recursos e de intercâmbio de conhecimentos. Outras redes regionais comparáveis demonstraram esse potencial. Embora os benefícios específicos para os MDIs individuais e as escolas de governo estejam enraizados nas atividades e serviços específicos da "rede", a razão geral para a criação de uma rede africana de instituições (que são atualmente negligenciadas) são amplamente captadas em três áreas:

• **Alavancagem e troca de recursos:** O quadro de uma rede proporciona oportunidades de alavancagem dos recursos através de parcerias ativas e de intercâmbio de recursos (conhecimentos, capacidades, finanças, etc.). Em particular, uma rede de IDM fornece uma plataforma para partilhar pessoal, conhecimentos especializados e oportunidades através de processos coletivos.

• **Conhecimento, intercâmbio e desenvolvimento:** MDIs e escolas de governo desenvolvem currículos, pesquisa e materiais de formação que podem ser utilizados por instituições semelhantes em outros países. Uma rede de apoio permite o amplo intercâmbio de materiais e fornece uma base para o desenvolvimento coletivo de materiais e programas. Uma vez que muitas destas instituições estão envolvidas no apoio à política governamental, tal serviria também para reforçar as capacidades políticas globais dos governos em todo o continente africano.

• **Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Institucional:** MDIs e escolas de governo enfrentam desafios e problemas institucionais semelhantes. No contexto de uma rede mais ampla de instituições, proporciona, por conseguinte, oportunidades para o intercâmbio de ideias centradas em questões de desenvolvimento institucional e tem potencial para servir de base para estabelecer uma voz coletiva sobre estruturas e iniciativas continentais específicas.

No essencial, o conceito de "rede" é impulsionado por uma perceção de que as diversas experiências destas instituições, bem como os seus desafios existentes, proporcionam um veículo e imensas oportunidades para a construção do coletivo. Constitui, por conseguinte, a base para a cooperação e o reforço das instituições individuais.

A rede tem de considerar atividades que melhorem a imagem e o valor da AMDIN para os membros e partes interessadas se estabelecerem como uma rede reconhecida de conhecimentos especializados para o desenvolvimento de capacidades no continente africano. É prática comum as organizações fazerem alguma introspecção a este respeito, fazendo as perguntas; o que é que estou a fazer bem – e devo fazer mais? O que não estou a fazer bem – e preciso de melhorar ou fazer as coisas de forma diferente? Isto também é exigido pela AMDIN.

Alguns dos importantes trabalhos realizados pela AMDIN em apoio do seu objetivo geral (e a organização deve continuar a fazer) incluem o seguinte:

• A AMDIN foi incumbida de liderar um projetou de investigação sobre o “Estado do Serviço Público em África” (referido como SOPSA). O estudo faz parte dos esforços para melhorar a qualidade da governação e da administração pública no continente e permitir que os Estados africanos se tornem mais desenvolvidos, enquanto também procurou avaliar como os Estados africanos estão a prestar serviços públicos. A AMDIN foi convidada pela Conferência dos Ministros Africanos do Serviço Público (CAMPS) na
8ª Conferência em Brazzaville, Congo a realizar um estudo. A reunião de início do projecto ocorreu em Agosto de 2013. Em novembro de 2013, num seminário em Maputo, Moçambique (com 18 Estados-Membros presentes), as ferramentas e a metodologia de investigação SOPSA foram aperfeiçoadas para garantir que a investigação é viável, prática e exequível. O relatório final consolidado SOPSA foi produzido no final de 2016 e os resultados foram disponibilizados às estruturas da UA. O Projeto de Investigação do Estado do Serviço Público em África (SOPSA) é um bom exemplo de como a AMDIN pode produzir resultados no domínio da investigação.

• O Curso de Formação de Formadores para África é outro exemplo de onde foi apresentado um programa de formação personalizado para o reforço das capacidades nos países africanos a 218 participantes de 44 países. A implantação do curso foi apoiada pela África do Sul e foi apresentada em francês e inglês. Foi bem recebido pelos participantes e o Relatório de Avaliação sobre este curso de capacitação e Formação de Formadores (datado de Abril de 2010) indicou que tais esforços devem continuar.

• Uma conquista importante para a AMDIN é que ela conseguiu criar uma revista académica revisada por pares para África. A Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) é uma revista académica revisada por pares que investiga um amplo espetro de matérias e questões relacionadas com a investigação e implementação de políticas sobre a liderança, gestão e desenvolvimento do setor público em África. O seu propósito é o de publicar a investigação disciplinar e interdisciplinar, com foco em abordagens teóricas e práticas e experiências relevantes para o desenvolvimento e governação em África.

• A AMDIN também coordenou um programa de formação sobre a Carta Africana sobre valores e princípios para o serviço público. A formação teve lugar no Gana (de 18 a 24 de novembro de 2013), com foco em orientações de formação desenvolvidas para o planeamento de RH; Gestão e Medicação de Desempenho; Liderança e Gestão; Governança Económica; e Tecnologia da Informação no Governo. Esta formação sobre a Carta Africana indicou que há uma necessidade importante de popularizar a Carta e o seu conteúdo associado através de seminários e conferências.

• Foi desenvolvido um programa de popularização da Carta para os funcionários públicos de língua inglesa e francesa. A primeira pilotagem do programa (para falantes de inglês) teve lugar em Kampala, Uganda, durante novembro de 2017. O piloto dos oradores franceses realizou-se pouco depois. As contribuições recebidas dos dois pilotos foram incorporadas na preparação do segundo piloto do programa, que teve lugar em agosto de 2018, em Monróvia, Libéria (para falantes de inglês) e em Dacar, Senegal (para falantes de francês). Foram desenvolvidos manuais finais de facilitadores e de alunos, e este programa está agora pronto para ser partilhado por todas as instituições de formação de serviço público dos Estados membros da AMDIN, a fim de ter um método uniforme de popularização da Carta.

Como uma rede à escala africana, algumas das atividades que a AMDIN pode considerar centrar-se mais no futuro é começar com um processo para identificar e listar todos os programas/cursos de aprendizagem relevantes disponíveis nos MDIs e escolas de governo em África; desenvolver uma ferramenta para avaliar as áreas de foco de aprendizagem e os materiais disponíveis; estabelecer quais destas instituições estão dispostas a disponibilizar material de aprendizagem (em conformidade com as prioridades da UA-STC) a outros, e tem a disposição e a capacidade de implementar a sua formação em cooperação com outros países africanos. Se se pudesse determinar qual destas instituições está disposta a submeter o seu material de aprendizagem à avaliação interpares, poderia estabelecer-se os cinco melhores programas de formação disponíveis e estes poderiam ser partilhados e implementados em várias regiões de África. Para impulsionar ainda mais a aprendizagem e o desenvolvimento no continente, a AMDIN também pode apoiar o desenvolvimento de normas e padrões e conduzir avaliações de programas de aprendizagem. Isto promoverá a possibilidade
de alguns programas de aprendizagem serem reconhecidos e utilizados para além das fronteiras de diferentes países do continente.

Nos casos em que os programas de aprendizagem específicos sejam relevantes para vários países, esses materiais de aprendizagem prioritários poderão ser disponibilizados aos parceiros da AMDIN através do sítio web da AMDIN. Uma abordagem para partilhar e cooperar na formação poderia ser valiosa como o exemplo bem sucedido mostra da formação de melhoria da prestação de serviços que foi partilhada e implementada na África Oriental. No entanto, tal abordagem exigirá também uma grande coordenação entre os países da AMDIN e um apoio ao Secretariado da AMDIN.

Os governos africanos enfrentam o desafio de que o governo deve transformar os mecanismos de prestação de serviços para atender às necessidades dos cidadãos. Para enfrentar estes desafios, os africanos precisam de serviços públicos transformados que sejam representativos, coerentes, transparentes, eficientes, eficazes, responsáveis e que respondam às necessidades de todos os cidadãos. A Conferência Pan-Africana de Ministros reconheceu que os cidadãos do continente merecem serviços públicos centrados nas pessoas e orientados para as pessoas, caracterizados por equidade, qualidade, intervenções atempadas e códigos éticos fortes. A AMDIN tem um papel fundamental a desempenhar na transformação e na melhoria da prestação de serviços por parte do governo e na instilação dos conhecimentos, competências e valores que os funcionários públicos necessitam.

Uma palavra final sobre o papel da AMDIN é a noção de que as várias escolas e institutos devem estabelecer parcerias e colaborar (não competir) com iniciativas-chave de ação que melhorem a compreensão dos serviços públicos no continente africano e iniciem programas de aprendizagem para a melhoria da prestação de serviços. O valor da AMDIN enquanto rede reside na colaboração, partilha e intercâmbio de programas, mas com a organização ainda na sua infância, estes aspetos deixam muito espaço para melhorias, ao mesmo tempo que oferecem muitas oportunidades.
Introduction

People-centred and people-driven approaches to governance and development have been shaped by reactions to corporate capture of the state as well as the discourses of good governance and new public management and the influence they have had on public administration globally. They demand a new relationship between the public service and broader society characterized by a social contract that puts the interests of people first and at the centre of policy implementation. Understanding people's needs, participation in policy formulation and implementation, and an overall development orientation are critical in building the partnerships between state and society to drive Africa's transformation. The youth of Africa is a growing demographic in contrast with other continents and its aspirations must be met in a context of ongoing corporate capture of the state by global forces of monopoly capital through multinational companies, which continue to drain billions of US$ from the continent through illegal activities and “mis invoicing”. Empowering the youth requires foresight and innovation and the leveraging of technology for capacity development and sustainable interventions driven by communities and their youth. New thinking, doing things differently and securing regular and predictable labour-intensive work is a challenge which we need to overcome on the continent. The African Union’s commitment to building capable developmental states and people-centred development through Agenda 2063, the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, together with the African Youth Charter provide frameworks through which these objectives can be attained.

AU Agenda 63 and a People-centred State

The African Union Commission’s Agenda 63 calls for an Africa whose development is people-driven, believing in the capabilities of African people, especially its women and youth (African Union Commission 2014). In this vision, citizens from across the continent will be active in defining and executing development interventions. The approach is inclusive, committing to involving all citizens in decision-making in all aspects of development, including social, economic, political and environmental development. Agenda 2063 also emphasizes that no one shall be excluded on the basis of gender, political affiliation, religion, ethnic affiliation, locality or age. Agenda 2063 further seeks to end all dimensions of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people whose issues must be mainstreamed in all development agendas. In addition, the vision seeks to eliminate youth unemployment and guarantee Africa’s youth full access to education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic opportunities, along with resources. It also asserts that young African men and women must be empowered to become the path breakers of the African knowledge society and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. In so stating, Agenda 2063 declares that the driving force behind the continent’s political, social, cultural and economic transformation will be the creativity, energy and innovation of Africa’s youth.

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The African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration

African Heads of State adopted the *African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration* in January 2011, for ratification by member states to promote efficient, effective and professional public service and administration (African Union 2011). The charter harmonizes, at a conceptual level, notions of civil service and public service. It also utilizes a broader concept of public service than just some parts/spheres/levels of government that manage the implementation of its policies. In this way, it enables the continent to develop a public service and administration approach that resonates among all member states and seeks to build a professional and effective public service. This is reflected in the key values and principles underpinning the charter, which include access, quality service, efficiency, modernization, ethical behaviour, equality, freedom of expression and professionalism.

In a nutshell, the Charter has four central themes:

- The *first* highlights the link between an effective public service and the promotion of human rights and development;
- The *second* promotes a higher standard and quality of service delivery and emphasizes the role citizens can play;
- The *third* theme focuses on the promotion of ethical practice and behaviour and the fight against corruption; and
- The *fourth* theme emphasizes the importance of sound management of human resources, outlining the rights of public servants as well as their roles and responsibilities in improving service delivery.

In relation to people-centred service delivery, the Charter specifically states that:

- Public Service and Administration shall establish appropriate mechanisms to periodically monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of public service delivery;
- Public Service and Administration shall set and respect time-frames for public service delivery;
- Public Service and Administration shall ensure its services are adapted to the evolving needs of users; and
- Public Service and Administration shall take the necessary steps to create and maintain trust among public service agents and users (African Union 2011).

These values and principles, if implemented with serious intent, create the conditions under which people’s needs must be met, public service and administration will be development-oriented and policy formulation and implementation will be evaluated in ways which include the users of public services.

People-centred Development

Good governance and participatory, people-centred development are intimately linked. The evolution of people-centred or citizen-centred approaches to the state and development arise out of a critique that saw corporate capture of the state undermine the public interest leading to the domination of the state by sectional interests (Baker 2016; and Korten 2000). Key to ridding the state of patronage and neo-patrimonial imperatives are the development of people-centred policy, which must be informed by evidence. This acknowledges that the methods of gathering evidence generally exclude a focus on participatory research and evaluation techniques. This is unfortunate, because in order to change people’s lives and achieve the developmental outcomes envisaged in Agenda 2063, we need to strengthen the evidence basis of policy implementation and give people voice. This is a global challenge, and can be seen, for example, in the work of Gilens and Page in the United States, which asked the basic question of ‘whose voice counts’ when it comes to evidence in policymaking. The study examined public-opinion polls on 1,779 policy issues between 1981 and 2002, and concluded that:
economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interests have little or no independent influence (Gilens and Page 2014).

Ernest House has argued how George Bush’s politics influenced a methodological fundamentalism in evaluation focused on “evidence” rooted in quantitative pseudo-scientific randomized trials, through which “government officials often yearn for certitude in evaluation findings as a way of bolstering their authority” (House 2003).

A state-centred as opposed to a people-centred understanding of development is bound to focus on particular programmes and interventions that are invariably in the interests of the state rather than in the public interest. The concept and practice of development has been problematized and criticized in “post-development” literature, which argues that “development” in post-Second World War Truman doctrine practice presents the Western world as idealized and hegemonic. It is also state-centred, where the state takes on the role of delivering limited resources to a disempowered citizenry in top-down fashion.

The critique demands a fresh approach to state-people relations and state interventions to support social transformation and development. It recognizes that, globally, hundreds of millions are marginalized, experiencing poverty, social inequality, unemployment and environmental degradation. People-centred development must give voice to the people through participatory techniques and bring new evidence while problematizing the entire development enterprise and the social relations that underpin the reproduction of social inequality. Solving the conundrum in post-colonial Africa includes identifying livelihood strategies and pathways of capital accumulation that go beyond forms of comprador parasitic accumulation from above, and that are characterized by people-driven accumulation from below. Through its commitment to collective action by citizens, people-centred development can provide an alternative “cultural and economic paradigm” of development to the Western model of civilization (Escobar 2012).

Indeed, the concept of ‘development’ has been contested over the last two decades. Scholars and activists have argued that development plays a central role in “strategies of cultural and social domination” (Escobar 2012). Wolfgang Sachs has argued that: “development is much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; it is a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts societies, and a fantasy which unleashes passions” (Sachs 2010). “Underdeveloped” countries must aspire to this passionate illusion. As indicated, the Truman Doctrine inspired this fantasy and in the decades that followed, the state, through massive investment in infrastructure and social welfare, became the epicentre of the development dream.

The era of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw the evolution of a new and more brutal fantasy, where the market was seen as a more efficient allocator of resources. The only problem was that the basic principle that “it takes money to play” was never honestly acknowledged by the enthusiastic advocates of the virtues of free market economics. Against this background, the ‘Washington Consensus’ and its free market policy reforms ushered in the era of neo-liberalism. This witnessed global capitalism through the Bretton Woods institutions embark on a programme of mass restructuring of macro-economic relations across the developing world.

Several mantras and conditionalities were imposed on ‘the wretched of the earth’, including shrinking the state, disempowering workers, ending large projects, supporting small farmers and ending state subsidies. Little effort was devoted to establish what the world’s poor themselves thought would end their plight, until the forces of Western hegemony discovered “good governance” and participatory and people-centred development. With this discovery, donor funds were shifted from governments to civil society, as long as Western-sanctioned experts were part of “people-centred” solutions.

And then the bubble burst. The global financial crisis of 2007 and the great recession that followed led to a renewed legitimization of state intervention in the economy, albeit in partnership with the private sector. This was illustrated poignantly by the Obama administration’s harnessing of cheap natural gas as a critical resource to turn the US economy around.
What the global recession did demonstrate abundantly, however, was that good governance does not lead to or guarantee development. Neither does it bring about the objective conditions to overcome poverty, social inequality or create jobs. Furthermore, it became clear that these “development challenges” confront all governments in both the developed North and the global South. The events also signify an increasing awareness of the limits of state power, and the need to understand the role of the state in society as a lead facilitator of social mobilization for transformational development.

The Great Recession, which began in 2007, also confirmed the emergence of a new global geopolitical-economic order characterized by the dynamic rise of China and India. Growth in China in particular, since the late nineteen seventies, has shifted the global balance of forces along with the collapse of existing socialism in Eastern Europe, the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The cumulative effects of these developments and the onset of the Great Recession have seen an end of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the ideological and institutional basis of neo-liberalism. In the African context the last two decades of the 20th century saw the final demise of colonial rule in southern Africa, a resurgence of democracy and a second wave of post-colonial state restructuring and organization. This was buttressed by the emergence of the African Renaissance and concerted efforts to build continental and regional integration with the emergence of a more active African Union on the foundations of the Organization of African Union. The onset of the digital and the new information age in the new millennium have in the context of the shifts in the global geopolitical balance of power, been a central plank of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (Schwab 2016). New technologies, including artificial intelligence, robotics, the internet of things, nanotechnology and self-driven vehicles, many of which are in infant stages, are transforming the world of work at an alarming rate. The impact on the state, government and institutions is yet to be understood, but over-linear thinking and focus on immediate concerns means that we are not exercising foresight and innovative thought in developing a strategy to cope with these changes (Schwab 2016).

The impact of these dramatic transformations in the relations between economy, politics and society compels us to ensure that the fourth industrial revolution is managed in a manner that puts people first and is people-centred in its outcomes. This has huge implications for the African continent and how to leverage regional and continental integration to optimize the outcomes. The overarching impact of the transformations and issues identified in the foregoing analysis is that the new millennium has been characterized by growing social inequality globally. The United States has also experienced growing social inequality over the past two decades, and this has been analysed by Joseph Stiglitz in his book *The Price of Inequality* (Stiglitz 2012).

Social inequality is increasingly recognized as a central challenge for all governments in both the developed North and the global South. A key driver of inequality is the nature of the state, which is rent-seeking, especially in post-colonial situations but in even more opaque, entrenched and sinister ways in mature capitalist economies. Corporate capture of the state has had a huge impact on Africa, with billions of dollars being siphoned off by corporations, in many instances illegally, in order to finance and underwrite growth and development in the developed world. This has been characteristic of the historical evolution of the capitalist state and has been a central feature of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonial political-economic relations. Capitalist relations of production and aspirant consumerism give inequality a violent and aggressive nature in certain contexts, especially in countries in transition. Deepening social inequality is not inevitable and is a product of human agency, even though moneyed interests compound their wealth by stifling true, dynamic capitalism, trampling on the rule of law, and undermining democracy. Designing a different course requires strategy, courage and determination.

**People-centred Development – Countering Corporate State Capture**

Rent-seeking by the ruling classes and corporate state capture are different sides of the same coin and are characteristics of political economy across the globe. During the post-Second World War reconstruction period state intervention was critical in providing
a safety net and constructing a social democratic project with policies that impacted on the dynamics of wealth creation and distribution. The welfare state offered free social services and robust scrutiny of these in different parts of the globe during the period prior to the neoliberal backlash. This was accompanied by government attempts to ensure the competitiveness of markets through competition legislation, which frequently curbed the predatory instincts of the capitalism and provided favourable outcomes for the poor and marginalized. The colonial and post-colonial period, which corresponded with this period in global history however, was characterized by the corporate capture of the state and elite-driven partnerships and interventions leading to a massive drain of wealth from Africa, Asia and Latin America to Europe and North America.

A recent report published by African and British social justice organizations presents data that shows that in 2015, African nations received a total of $162 billion in aid, loans and remittances, while $203 billion was taken from these nations through resource extraction, debt payments and illegal logging, fishing and the trade in wildlife and plants. If this data is accurate, it means that African countries were collectively the net creditors of the rest of the world at an amount of $41.3 billion in 2015 (Honest Accounts 2017:2). The report also shows how: “African governments received $32.8 billion in loans in 2015 but paid $18 billion in debt interest and principal payments, with the overall level of debt rising rapidly” (Honest Accounts 2017:2). The overall thrust of the research is that Africa needs the rest of the world to stop looting its wealth and resources and that little has changed since the Guyanese scholar Walter Rodney wrote his classic analysis in 1972 entitled How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dangl 2017).

The AU Agenda’s aspiration of the establishment of People-Centred, Capable Developmental States, if realized in practice, will indeed undermine the looting of Africa’s wealth and resources. Developmental state institutions are driven by concepts and practices of autonomy and embeddedness (Evans 2011). Autonomy refers to the importance of developmental state institutions being capable of formulating and consistently implementing public interest goals as opposed to public employees pursuing their individual or sectional interests. Embeddedness is the ability of the state and its institutions, policies and practices being formulated and implemented through engagement with the myriads of networks that bind state and society together; to interact with non-state actors and to elicit their participation in the achievement of its development goals. Embeddedness is critical for the successful achievement of people-centred partnerships with the youth and their organizations.

Developmental states focus primarily on effectiveness, outcomes and impact, rather than on efficiency. This is because while efficiency and attendant processes are important, they are not ends in themselves. Developmental states are not ideologically committed to any specific policy instrument but adopt policies that enable achievement of developmental goals. This is why, for example, China and Korea along with Botswana, Mauritius and Ethiopia have been identified as Developmental states.

A key feature of several successful Developmental states is that they have been adept in technical innovation, flexibility and avoiding complex procedures and laws because of the disabling effects on citizens, public servants and the state and because they open up spaces for corruption. Regulation may be uneven within a single jurisdiction. China for instance opted to ease the regulatory environment shaping foreign investment, while tightening regulation at economic sectoral level in strategic industries and exercising incidental control in less strategic industries (Hsueh 2011). Nevertheless, developmental states are renowned for encouraging innovation in the public and private sectors. A key driver of innovation is that the complex interrelationships of the economy, politics and society in the modern world require simple, flexible procedures that can be adapted to deal with specific contexts through innovation and discretion!

Aspirations towards the achievement of capable developmental states draw on Amartya Sen’s capability approach to development with modern reconstructions of traditional economic models of growth. Amartya Sen argues that “well-being” involves both increasing contentment as well as the capacity of human beings to achieve what they want to (Sen
1999). Thinking in terms of "capabilities" rather than just "well-being" draws our attention to the fact that human capabilities are both ends in themselves and the key means to intermediate goals, such as economic growth and the construction of democratic institutions that help us to "lead the kind of lives we value" (Evans 2011: 4).

The public service has a key role to play in building human capabilities. In the twenty-first century, job growth has moved to the service sector. Services focus more intensely on people and their skills, instead of machines and their owners. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is accelerating this trend. The challenge brings with it infinite possibilities for innovation including through expanding access to education through open online learning using mobile technologies. The service sector including public services is the site of capability expansion, but jobs involved in developing general human capabilities (e.g. education and health) are badly under-remunerated (Evans 2011: 6). The expansion of human capabilities is the key means and central goal of development; rewarding capability-expanding services and increasing their supply must be a developmental priority.

Capability-expanding services like health and education must be adequately supplied and well rewarded. These are critical services, which can be deployed to combat gender inequality and empower women and youth in ways that will enable states committed to a developmental agenda to pursue equity goals. Access to health and education services is also critical in the pursuit of socio-economic equality.

The increasing significance of development interventions that include women and youth giving voice to the marginalized through participatory development is central to the aspirations of the AU's Agenda 2063 vision. People-centred developmental approaches that seek to engage and empower participants at each stage of the implementation cycle are part of good governance, ethical, put people first and provide an opportunity to find democratic solutions to development challenges. Inspired by the successes of popular participation across the globe in community health, early childhood development, agriculture, sanitation, asset management and budgeting, there is a growing belief that effective execution is contingent on the capacity of the people to participate in and drive development implementation as well as its evaluation.

Based on the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting experience, Erik Olin Wright's general design principles for "empowered participatory governance" (Wright 2010) are useful:

- Bottom up empowered participation through face to face community meetings;
- Pragmatic orientation involving concrete problem solving exercises;
- Deliberative engagement focusing on decision-making processes that facilitate the most appropriate decisions being taken;
- Devolution and decentralisation to ensure that decisions are made at the locus of the problem;
- Recombinant decentralisation that connects local solutions to broader national agendas and supportive muscular central state power; and
- Organising countervailing powers by popular mobilisation that reduce the power advantages of the traditional elites.

These design principles can be seen as elements of the kinds of inclusive processes that aspirant developmental states and people should engage in, and should not be seen as a template of essential sequential steps. When applied in conjunction with people-centred development evaluation tools such as participatory timeline construction, social change mapping and impact mapping to self-identified community groupings, they provide an alternative approach to top-down traditional public administration approaches, which generally implement policies that suit the bureaucracy's own working rules, systems and interests. Changing how government works also involves to creating opportunities for people to partner with government through community organizations, religious institutions, trade unions and businesses. This calls for new styles of leadership within the state and civil society, which in the words of Nelson Mandela require...
leaders to “lead from the back and let others believe they are in front.” As Esteva and other argue, “Real social change does not happen as a series of cataclysmic moments associated by great leaders but through daily transformation conceived and implemented by ordinary people” (Esteva, Babones & Babcicky 2013).

Building the human capabilities to achieve this requires multifaceted interventions within and between the state and civil society. Public services as vehicles for broader social transformation require public servants to understand complexity along with the values underpinning people-centred and people-driven development. This involves how to understand people’s needs and how to apply laws and regulations to ensure that these needs are fulfilled. States often seek a narrow policy solution to societal problems due to the inward-looking character of governments and bureaucracies, which have their own convenience and interests at heart, or from fiscal constraints, which limit the desirable solutions.

Governments must learn how to address the complex challenges associated with contemporary life, and how to negotiate and facilitate rather than impose solutions. People-centred government services require embeddedness or “state-society synergy”. State agencies must create platforms and networks of civic engagement to promote innovation, which lead to positive and sustainable developmental outcomes.

State-society relations must facilitate the emergence of an encompassing vision for the future around which popular support can be mobilized. State-society relations must support and build community capabilities to develop strategies to create material conditions for sustainable livelihoods, productive, useful work and entrepreneurship. The alternative to harnessing the legitimate anger of the marginalized into positive energy for change is a cynical national bourgeoisie dancing in the footprint of the forces of corporate monopoly capital and the political regimes it props up.

**Working with the Youth for People-Centred Development in Africa**

The importance of the foregoing approaches has long been recognized on the African continent and is reflected *inter alia* in work done by the African Union Commission with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2006). The work sought to develop a framework to enable youth development, empowerment and leadership. Key indicators and benchmarks were identified, including: participation, innovation, strategic capacity building, knowledge and rights-based programming and scaleability (UNFPA 2006). Over and above aspiring to guarantee access to the youth to participate in parliament and other decision-making bodies, the Charter calls for facilitating “the creation or strengthening of platforms for youth participation in decision-making at local, national, regional and continental levels of governance” (African Union 2006: 17). The Charter calls on all member states to develop a youth policy and applicable legislation to establish a regulatory framework that will guarantee inclusive youth institutions and programmes. These would incorporate multiple learning platforms, including distance education and lifelong learning.

The number of youth is growing rapidly on the continent. In 2015 it stood at 226 million measured as youth aged between 15 and 24, accounting for 19 percent of the global youth population. This was projected to grow by 42 percent by 2030, more than doubling from present levels by 2055. By 2060 the number is projected to stand at 500 million, just under 600 million in Asia, whose youth population is projected to decline from 2020. In terms of these projections, the African continent is the only one whose youth is projected to grow, while outside Asia the trend line is almost straight (United Nations 2015).

Against this background, unemployment trends of African youth are of great concern. The picture is described in a recent report by the International Labour Organization:

- “Northern Africa: Almost one in every four working youth in the region is estimated to be living in extreme or moderate poverty in 2016. This represents a considerable improvement over the 1991 figure when almost half of all employed youth were living in poverty. However, since 2012 there have been virtually no signs of a reduction in this rate, although the gap between youth and adult working poverty rates remains relatively slight” (International Labour Organisation 2016).
“Sub-Saharan Africa: The region continues to report the highest youth working poverty rates globally, at almost 70 percent in 2016. Although this rate has declined by some ten percentage points since 1991, it is important to bear in mind that the number of poor working youth has increased by as much as 80 percent since that date. This is coupled with the fact that young workers in the region have one of the highest probabilities of living in poverty in comparison to adults” (International Labour Organisation 2016).

Lack of access to decent work, poverty, armed conflict and military conflict are cited as the major reasons for widespread migration and a high willingness to move permanently to another country, which stands at 38 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and three percent in North Africa (International Labour Organisation 2016).

The African brain drain is a challenge that we need to confront through inclusive growth and development as well and expanding the opportunities for capacity development to create the skills to help facilitate this. Innovation and leveraging technology may be the key to broadening access.

Innovation and Capacity Development for Youth Inclusion and People-centred Development

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela once said: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” This ideal spells out the inseparable, mutually inclusive relationship that should exist between education, innovation and transformation. Our key priority should be about how we can scale up innovation, and how to disseminate and share learning on actual innovation success stories.

Africa Agenda 2063 recognizes this, stating that: “Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. The creativity, energy and innovation of Africa’s youth shall be the driving force behind the continent’s political, social, cultural and economic transformation” (African Union Commission 2015). Achieving this in practice requires the development of strategies across the continent to facilitate lifelong learning, continuous professional development and knowledge production.

This could be achieved through harnessing open online and blended eLearning approaches, where the youth could be the drivers of opening access to education and training as accredited trainers and lead facilitators of development. Together with innovative entrepreneurship, these are central to building the capabilities of the youth and society as a whole.

The emphasis on the importance of education, learning and innovation – how we can harness the value of technology as an enabler, to open up the doors of learning and to entrench the culture of innovating in the public sector – is a challenge and an opportunity. We need to scale up innovation as part of the very fabric of lifelong learning to build the capabilities of the youth for their participation in people-centred development interventions. Access to technology, even a mobile device, is fundamental to meeting this African challenge.

At the same time, when innovating in the field of education, training and learning, we should be cautious about understanding innovation as a purely technological matter while ignoring the need for a new innovative pedagogy, which places learners and their needs at the centre. Learning has always taken place through various modes and pedagogical techniques, including distance education via the post, technological mediation, face-to-face, using books, black boards, computers and tablets. Teaching has generally been about talking down to people with the objective of imparting knowledge and influencing behavioural change, as “change drives new ways of living, working and learning. However, the industrial model of education remains the prevalent model of education today… New technologies should not be used to do the same old stuff” (Moravec 2013:32).

In the endeavour to cultivate public sector innovation, a principal goal should be to build a capable development state that can innovatively explore better ways of serving the people through mobilizing and incentivizing the youth. This should mainly begin with the ability to generate new ideas, which would require radically disrupting the hierarchical structures that stifle innovation to open up dialogue and create spaces for collaboration.
Open dialogue and collaboration are key elements that define an ideal space to encourage thought leadership and new forms of knowledge to instil change and meaningful people-centred development. Most importantly, we should also concentrate on capacity development and human capability empowerment for the development and refinement of solutions required in tackling existing service challenges after they have been clarified. This kind of foresight in innovative service delivery will be meaningless if not accompanied by the capacity to execute or implement. Thus, the capacity to effectively manage projects from conceptualization to implementation becomes even more crucial.

Flooding the youth with ready-made, hypothetical solutions to problems and challenges can have dire and adverse consequences. It denies them the opportunity to develop as capable innovators who can create their own solutions. Instead of always instructing youth on solutions, an approach that uses innovative experiential learning to develop capacity for innovation must be adopted.

Open learning solutions can significantly increase the scale of and access to learning. For instance, if learning is fully technology-mediated from registration to certification, it becomes real-time and bite-sized to promote flexibility and accessibility while allowing learners to set their own pace and decide where and when to learn. Assuming that a problem to solve is knowledge and understanding of local economic development opportunities, challenges, people’s needs and possible solutions, then open online programmes can play a role addressing these matters. They can teach *inter alia* applied economic and business principles, social enterprise establishment, cooperative forms of production and marketing in the context of government programmes and resources on offer. Blended learning solutions can also be used where learners can familiarize themselves with content in an online learning environment. This can be supplemented with in-class time. When repurposed, this mode of interactive, face-to-face mode is strategically more focused. Additionally, by being more interactive, this approach allows learners to ask questions, learn through application of knowledge and discuss solutions to real-life challenges. It also enhances the prospects of the development of online communities of practice during the post-face-to-face period.

**Empowering the Youth for Sustainable People-centred Development**

Short-term interventions, which offer temporary relief such as fixed-term employment opportunities, are unlikely to be the solution to people-centred development, which empowers the youth. The neo-colonial context of scarcity of capital and resources, predatory monopoly capital, the draining and looting of African wealth and resources, combined with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” requires sustainable, innovative programmes to disrupt these deep historical structural challenges.

The expansion of terrestrial fibre-optic cables provides a massive opportunity for continental-wide digital integration (Juma 2016). If harnessed with intent this can provide new infrastructure to spark inter-regional and continental trade in contrast with the divisive effect of the colonial railway system, its inability to foster interoperability and its primary function of moving commodities to other continents and deepening dependency on world commodity pricing as a spur to growth and development. Developing policies that give access to digital infrastructure is critical for youth development in terms of capacity development, sustainable people-centred development and building social enterprise and entrepreneurship. Leon Stiegler, the GM of Ringer Africa, which runs businesses across the continent, argues that digital is a “natural extension” of many young people in Africa, who “understand how to communicate effectively to large audiences through mobile and are always ready to explore more. This gives them an edge versus others in this large and growing space. If they are shown how to use this natural affinity to digital to build a career they become powerful players in the economy” (Jackson 2017).

Africa’s move towards aggregating and crowdsourcing content has led to the development of platforms that should be seen as opportunities for building citizen-centred development. Kenya’s Ushahidi platform was used to monitor elections in Uganda and Zambia and spawned the Huduma platform, inspired by MySociety projects and has created a site where people can seek accountability and redress for service delivery.
challenges (Wakefield 2011). Huduma Services Kenya is a programme by the Government of Kenya to provide integrated service centres where citizens can access multiple services in one place. South Africa’s Thusong services centres are a similar initiative.

African countries are at different stages in the development of youth development policies and interventions, but a number of patterns are emerging. Given the high rates of youth unemployment across the continent, improving the investment climate is critical, as are infrastructure build programmes where government can create job opportunities to provide temporary relief. Innovation can provide opportunities in some sectors, with agriculture often primed for the potential to attract youth back into the sector and all its value chains. Building strong institutions across the sectors of society including government is also key in partnering the youth in various development initiatives by ensuring that state institutions and those driving youth development initiatives are well governed and capable of implementing people-centred sustainable development programmes and projects.

There are positive lessons from diverse initiatives across the continent, which need to be mainstreamed and become the site for networks of communities of practice to be replicated under different socio-cultural, political and economic conditions. National poverty reduction strategy papers (PSRPs) have been integrated into national development agendas in Malawi, Mauritania and Mozambique and have assisted with understanding the relationship between high numbers of unemployed graduates and the skills deficit that makes them unemployable due to “inappropriate curricula” (UNFPA 2006: 23). In Mauritania, this led to initiatives that included a vocational training programme for over 5,000 youth and women as well as a programme to place individuals in workforce partnerships with business, communities and NGOs. In Mozambique the PSRP saw a focus on health care needs of youth through school-based services also focusing on their reproductive needs (UNFPA 2006: 24).

Entrepreneurship programmes for youth are another feature of youth development policy in numerous countries, but they are often constrained by lack of access to credit by youth who are regarded by the banks as a major risk. The Commonwealth Youth Programme is an exception, where through the Youth Enterprise Development Programme and the Commonwealth Youth Credit Initiative it has sought to implement an effective credit delivery system, achieve sustainability and increase the business success and credit worthiness of the youth enabling them to graduate from micro-credit to formal sector banking clients (Ibid).

The Commonwealth Plan of Action has governed the CYP and its ministerial network for Youth Empowerment (PAYE) 2007–2015 and provides an example of an agenda for action in youth affairs. The PAYE also seeks to stimulate and guide action by other development partners, including multilateral agencies, NGOs, and youth organizations. The PAYE guides the Youth Enterprise and Sustainable Livelihoods programme, which aims to strengthen the credit initiative by building sustainable social enterprises and businesses (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011).

While the lessons, opportunities and tools emanating from initiatives like those of the Commonwealth are important, these need to be scaled and supported by government. Government employment schemes must be targeted at meeting the long-term objectives of people-centredness and sustainability. The Community Works Programme in South Africa is instructive in this regard. Its innovation lies in the attempts the programme makes to move beyond creating job opportunities to sustainable community-shaped and -driven sustainability. This is in contrast to the Expanded Public Works Programme, which provides work opportunities without sustaining them.

The Community Work Programme (CWP) can be distinguished from other Public Employment Programmes (PEPs) around the globe, because it provides two days of work every week indefinitely to large numbers of people (usually a minimum of 1,000 at a site), securing predictably and regular work for the unemployed and underemployed. The CWP also is mandated to use public employment as a catalyst for community development, which is shaped by what the local community deems to be useful work contributing to a popularly defined public good.
In addition, labour intensity (ratio of wages to all other costs) is set at a minimum of 65 percent and the programme implemented through partnerships between government, not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) and communities (Andersson and Alexanderi 2018). While the five-year-old target of one million work opportunities through this programme is yet to be attained, this type of programme and others similar to this across the continent are the ones that need to be supported in order to chip away at the edifice of various attempts at corporate state capture.

Conclusion

In his frequently cited Political Order and Political Decay, which predicted the “end of history”, Francis Fukuyama wrote that the “development of modern states … required specific strategies for shifting political organization away from family- and friends-based organizations to impersonal ones” (Fukuyama 2014). Fukuyama did not foresee a reversal in the characterization of modern states, but the ascent of Donald Trump to the presidency of the US threatens a reversal of the impersonal institutional character of the American state. It has been argued that corporate state capture has many facets: “It is often related to illicit financial flows characterizing particular industrial sectors with profound economic and political power asymmetries” (Hansen 2017). Of the $203 billion that flowed out of Africa between 2010 and 2012, $68 billion was illicit financial flows, amounting to approximately 6.1 percent of the continent’s total GDP. Of this, $48.2 billion was stolen through trade misinvoicing by multinational companies (Honest Accounts 2017).

Corporate state capture, which has been a characteristic of imperialism, colonialism and post-colonial state formation and transformation in Africa, Asia and Latin America, has generated an alternative discourse of people-centred development. These conceptions are integral to Africa’s Agenda 2063 Vision and they are articulated in a context of building capable developmental states across the continent. This paper has argued that such states require strong institutions, free from undue political influence run by professional public servants committed to the public good. The role of the state is to lead in the facilitation of engagement across all sectors of society to build a national development consensus and compact through people-centred participatory processes. The AU Agenda 2063 requires “capable developmental statism” in which the state shapes market forces in ways that promote greater equality and tackle the complex problems confronting society.

Capable developmental states must assume a leadership role in building visions of shared destinies that aim to narrow socio-economic inequality and recognize that while politics and economics are not the same, they are inseparable. Under these conditions youth empowerment and development becomes an essential component of state strategy to promote sustainable programmes and interventions to transform the livelihoods of the poor and marginalized, who comprise a significant proportion of Africa’s population.²

Bibliography


² According to The World Bank (World Bank 2018) in 2013, 400.8 million people, or 42.3 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, lived on $1.90 a day or less, a principal factor in causing widespread hunger. This number compares to 233 million estimated undernourished people.


TOWARDS CONSOLIDATING SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROGRESS IN GHANA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Patrick Tandoh-Offin1 and Gbensuglo A. Bukari2

Introduction

There is no doubt that the ability of sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries to confront their developmental challenges depends on the quality of governance and political leadership. Generally, development experts agree that a positive relationship exists between good governance and socio-economic development (Hickey and Mohan 2005). Thinking about the politics of governance therefore means thinking about how to steer the economy and society and how to reach the national goals of development. More specifically, the sustainability of democratic governance across the continent depends to a large extent on how well the various governments deliver sustainable development dividends (Hope 2002). It is in the light of these aspects that we examined how the quality of democratic governance and political leadership influences the socio-economic development of SSA countries, focusing specifically on the case of Ghana.

The term governance enlarges and better illustrates what governments should be focusing on. At the end of the Cold War, the use of the term was revitalised as donor agencies, notably the World Bank Group and Western countries, urged countries of the former Soviet Union and other parts of the developing world to undertake political, economic and administrative reforms and to practice good governance (Pierre 2000). The debate that has arisen is whether or not government can solely determine development, and whether doing so is an effective way to perform tasks. Deciding on the most appropriate roles for government, and which other viable alternatives exist, remains an issue of continuing debate (Hope 2002). This is particularly so in today’s more liberal societies, where government is often compelled to depart from the traditional model of democratic government in which the state was the ultimate locus of political power and control (Boafo-Arthur 2006). More prevalent now are governments that set priorities and objectives, and enforce compliance, progressively relinquishing execution to the private sector and other non-state stakeholders. Even though governance relates to the changing relationships between state and society and a growing reliance on less coercive policy instruments, the state is still the centre of considerable political power and control (Levi-Faur 2011).

Regardless of how it is organised, sound democratic governance requires an informed citizenry, a proactive and empowered media, popular participation in policy making, and a responsive state whose processes are open, transparent and broadly inclusive. Improving relationships between citizens and the government is therefore both an outcome of good governance, and at the same time a basic requirement for effective leadership. This underscores the importance of citizens’ action and participation for good governance (Boafo-Arthur 2006).

Good governance became a subject of intense international debate in the 1990s, with the debate predominantly centring on the shift from top-down to bottom-up participatory governance. Proponents of the latter claimed that additional political participation improves the quality of politics and impacts positively on the socio-economic development of SSA countries. As the twenty-first century dawned, good governance was most commonly used by donor agencies, social scientists, philanthropists and civil society. It was

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applied to a wide range of issues, relationships and institutions (public and private). Increasingly, ‘good governance’ and ‘democratic governance’ came to be used interchangeably. Undisputedly, democratic governance in its broadest sense embodies good governance. Democratic governance emerged as a key concept in contemporary political debate and development theory (Urbaniti and Warren 2008). This paper is therefore a contribution to the ongoing debate on how governance and the political system affect development sustainability in Ghana.

**Origin and Concepts of Governance**

The desire to hasten development in SSA since the 1990s drew significant attention to the nexus between quality of governance and economic development. Governance as a concept was first introduced in a World Bank document on crisis and sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa as a reform objective (Boafo-Arthur 2003). However, sustained concern about the concept of governance came onto the World Bank agenda after the publication of the 1991 *World Bank Development Report*, which acknowledges the importance of the state as an institution in the process of governance (World Bank 1991). But meaningful development depends largely on political leadership that must strengthen civic voices, demonstrate responsive governance systems and promote the interests of all citizens (World Bank 1991). There is also some confusion in the governance literature as to whether governance is a phenomenon or a theory, or whether governance is an analytical framework for socio-economic development (Rhodes 1996). The conceptualisation of the term governance does not, however, seem to have been consistent and it has generated various definitions and meanings in the literature. According to Work (2003), governance can be broadly defined as “a system of values, policies and institutions by which a society organises collective decision-making and actions related to political, economic and socio-cultural and environmental affairs through the interaction of the state, civil society and the private sector” (Work 2003: 5; cited in Heywood 2007). It is argued further that governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment that fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound economic policies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 1997 policy paper, defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences”. The number of country-level programmes on governance supported by the United Nations system has expanded considerably. While the World Bank has focused on stabilisation and state reforms, which stressed civil service retrenchment and privatisations for a long period, the early 1990s saw a change of focus. The Bank came to realise that most of the crises in developing countries have to do with governance. Hence, the contemporary adjustment package emphasises governance issues such as transparency, accountability, participation and judicial reform. In this context, the Bank has introduced a new way of looking at development in terms of good governance.

According to Jon Pierre (2000), governance refers to sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives. Such actors may include political actors and institutions, interest groups, civil society, non-governmental and transnational organisations. This definition illustrates that while the government of a traditional state has to cope with both internal and external challenges from the above-listed actors, some of the functions that previously were the preserve of governments may be taken over by some of the same parties. Moreover, the definition gives credence to the assertion made earlier that governance is broader than mere government.

Canada's Institute of Governance (2002) offers another general definition, asserting that governance is the process whereby societies or organisations make important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render account. There is also no doubt that Africa's development problems have stemmed not only from a lack of good governance, but also from poor political leadership. The authors of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) document stated that “we recognized that failures of political and economic leadership in many Africans countries impede the effective mobilization and utilization of scarce resources into productive areas of
activity in order to attract and facilitate domestic and foreign investment” (OAU 2001: 8). There is no doubt, therefore, that Africans’ ability to confront their developmental problems will be determined by the nature of democratic governance and political leadership prevalent on the continent. Similarly, the future of the fledgling democratic governance across the continent will depend, to a large extent, on good governance and political leadership. Governance is also seen as a dynamic and context-dependent concept, which consists of complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise legal rights and obligations (Work 2003). According to Rhodes (1996), governance is a broader term than government. Although it still has no settled or agreed definition, it refers in its widest sense to the various ways through which social life is coordinated. Government can therefore be seen as one of the institutions involved in governance. It is possible to have governance without government. The wider use of term reflects a blurring of the state or society distinction resulting from changes such as the development of the new forms of public management, the growth of public–private partnerships, the increasing importance of policy networks and the greater impact of both super-national and sub-national organisations. While some associate governance with a shift away from command-and-control mechanisms to a more realistic emphasis on consolidation and bargaining, others argue that it implies a preference for less government and the free market.

The popularity of governance tends to cause confusion about what the concept actually means. Governance, therefore, as an analytical perspective is still emerging, but there seems to be contending views on what is the most rewarding approach to governance as a concept. According to Jon Pierre and Guy Peters (2000), the approach to understanding governance is a "state-centric approach". In their view, although governance relates to changing relationships between state and society and a growing reliance on less coercive policy instruments, the state is still the centre of consideration. This means that the emerging forms of governance have departed from a model of democratic government where the state was the undisputed locus of political power and control. Governance in this sense is seen as the articulation and pursuit of collective interests in the post-strong state era. This is in line with the notion of the role of the state as that of steering society and the economy. It can therefore be said that governing the state and society is still a highly politically charged process and that the state remains the only creature in the society that can play both a political and democratic role interchangeably. Markets may play an efficient role in allocating resources, but they cannot play the same role as political actors or arenas.

Also, according to Stoker (2006), governance can be viewed according to the following five propositions:

- Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government;
- Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues;
- Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action;
- Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors; and
- Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority.

In its broadest sense, governance is the exercise of power in the management of public affairs. Core to the substance of governance is the relationship between state and citizen. Governance is not limited, however, to government. Governance characterises the rules and institutions that manage public affairs in matters of the state, but also private business, civil society, and the relations among them. Governance has become a prominent concern in development programmes. This is due to a growing recognition that politics and political systems shape the direction and opportunities for development: poverty and insecurity are not simply a matter of inadequate resources or natural disasters but can result from unequal distributions of power, abuses of power and the systematic violation of people’s rights.
Theoretical Framework for Analysing Governance

Government refers to formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive power (Stoker 2006). It is thus the formal and institutional process that operates at the level of the nation state to maintain public order and facilitate collective action. But governance leads to outcomes that parallel those of the traditional institutions of government. It is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action, and the outcomes of governance are therefore not different from those of government; it is, rather, a matter of a difference in process. A governance analytical framework helps in the understanding of governance as a concept. Governance analysis can also help us understand different people’s and groups’ conceptions of what constitutes good governance, and how this compares with the current context. It will help us broaden our understandings of governance and the specific measures or mechanisms of ‘good governance’. Governance is thus a dynamic and context-dependent concept.

Framework for Analysing Governance

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Source: Hyden and Court (2002)

There is an ongoing interaction between political factors and economic factors in the context of democratic consolidation and socio-economic development. In political democracy, the major index of socio-economic development depends largely on the extent to which political power is decentralised to the local levels within the national polity (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). This therefore means that the challenge of entrenching sub-Saharan Africa’s fledgling democracies lies in how to ensure a synergy between the efforts at deepening democratic governance, while at the same time ensuring sustainable economic development. Indeed, many of Africa’s developmental problems cannot be fully explained without an in-depth understanding of the prevailing dichotomy between governance and socio-economic development. While there is no disputing the fact that governance is not an automatic panacea for development, it is equally true that the concept forms the basis for an equitable and more inclusive framework for equitable distribution of development programmes and projects. The generally accepted position is that poor economic performance undermines attitudes and behaviours that are essential for democratic consolidation.

Africans support democracy because they expect it to reverse decades of corruption, mismanagement and economic hardship (Makau-Mutua 2000). Salim Ahmed Salim (1999) contends that governance and respect for human rights cannot thrive on empty stomachs. In particular, democracy must deliver on bread-and-butter issues, otherwise democratic transitions will be reversed and the continent will slide back into a situation where the policies of poverty gives rise to the politics of poverty on the continent. This position provides a basis for the view by President Baliki Muluzi of Malawi that people do not eat democracy, but food (cited in Mkandawire 1999:132).

Liberal democratic theorists, particularly those who operate within the framework of Gross National Statistical Studies, often argue that economic development or affluence is a condition for sustaining democracy (Lipset 1980). But there is always tension between democracy and economic development. Democracy can impact positively on poverty
reduction, but democracy per se cannot reduce poverty. According to Makau Mutua (2000), the most serious threat to democracy and civil society reform remains the impoverished economies of African states. Democracy will not take root in Africa if the majority of its population continue to live in abject poverty. In other words, mass economic deprivation and aggravated inequalities in wealth distribution cannot work under democratic governance.

Thus, from the above view, international experience suggests that there seems to be a strong association between the politics of governance and economic development. Economic development requires the mobilisation of countries’ physical, human and financial resources and their appropriate deployment into productive activities in economies. Further, since the main goal of economic development is to raise people’s standard of living, what is produced by deploying a country’s resources should be equitably distributed. The mere creation of material wealth and resultant material welfare are not the only goals of economic development. The prime objective of economic development is not merely the elimination of material poverty but more importantly the eradication of illiteracy, disease, environmental degradation, and through them improving the quality of life and establishing peace and tranquillity in the society. In other words, political leadership plays an important role in good governance and in turn plays an important role in pushing up the pace of economic development.

Realising the importance of governance in achieving economic growth in developing countries, World Bank experts have studied the association between governance and growth in such countries. These studies identified voice and accountability, political stability, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and ‘control of corruption’ as the main indicators of good governance. The study also found a strong correlation between quality of governance and level of growth in a majority of the countries studied. Political leadership does influence to a large extent these indicators of governance (Pierre 1996).

The most important mechanism through which political leadership contributes to economic development is by choosing appropriate policies and programmes, implementing them effectively and creating, reviving or adopting the required institutions for hastening the pace of development. In his article “Africa in Search of Democracy”, Dr K. A. Busia stated that “the best kind of democracy is the one which enables as many people as possible to share in making of decisions and in the actual functions of government” (Boafo-Arthur 2006). This kind of admonition should be followed in the drive to democratic governance and socio-economic development. But Ghana and sub-Saharan African countries in general do not have the social and economic bases for liberal democracy and governance, and maintaining this system is demanding enough. The only alternative therefore is to devise a political system that takes the socio-economic conditions of Ghana as the basic premise (Boafo-Arthur 2006).

A country’s wealth is of great importance to democratic consolidation. Sustained economic growth at stable and moderate levels of inflation is key to sustaining democratic regimes over time. Thus, once a democratic regime is established, then the chances of democratic consolidation are likely to be greater, because wealth and economic growth can decisively ease the embedding of democratic institutions. This means that economic expansion helps reduce societal conflicts resulting from inequality or other cleavages and serves to diminish any tendency to political alienation, polarisation and destabilising social violence. Then democratic consolidation is plausible. But economic decline poses a severe threat to democratic sustainability. In their comprehensive survey (1996), Prezeworski and his co-authors indicate that the chances of democratic survival and ultimately consolidation increase when a government manages to develop a country’s economy in a sustained fashion and consistently manages to reduce socio-economic inequalities through effective welfare policies.

The association between socio-economic development and democratic governance can be located in at least three distinct periods (Lancaster 1993). The first was during the 1960s and 1970s – the height of the Cold War. This period coincided with Africa’s liberation and decolonisation struggle. During
this period, development aid was expected to result in growth and the adoption of democracy and provide support for the global anti-communism project. The second period was during the early 1980s, when issues pertaining to the expansion of democratic values began to emerge. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) became hesitant about promoting democracy and good governance in Africa and the possibility of working productively with Africa governments in any way at all, and it was sceptical about political aid and doubted that democracy and governance were feasible or even appropriate goals on the continent.

The final period was the end of the Cold War, when multinational agencies such as the World Bank adopted a new conception of democracy and good governance in a bid to foster the relationship between economic growth and democracy (Lancaster 1993). Democratisation and good governance have therefore become effective political instruments in the hands of donor agencies. However, over time, Western support for democratisation became increasingly rhetorical rather than substantial. This is because re-emerging strategic concerns about regional order and security and the deepening of market-based reforms began to take precedence over democracy and democratic consolidation.

The restoration of democracy and governance in sub-Saharan Africa, like many other developing areas of the world, came amid pressure from international financial and aid agencies and the governments of the Western nations seeking to promote democracy across the world as well as demands by local democratic forces for democracy and economic reforms. This development coincided with what Huntington (1991) describes as “the third wave” of democratisation, which engulfed the whole world in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Thus, by embarking on a democratisation process, sub-Saharan Africa, and Ghana in particular, seemed to be endorsing what Gitonga termed a progressive sanctification of the democratic idea (Gitonga 1988).

Many reasons are advanced for the seemingly triumphal march of liberal democracy and governance since the 1990s. According to Fukuyama (1992), with the demise of rival ideologies – hereditary monarchy and, most recently, socialism and communism – and the subsequent spontaneous demands for democracy and governance in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, human society seems to be moving in one direction. For Fukuyama, liberal democratic governance may constitute the end point of mankind’s ideological evolutions and the final form of human government and therefore the end of history. There is merit in Fukuyama’s perspective in the sense that it provides a grand historical evolutionary framework for examining the development and trajectories as the reasons for the relative successes and failures of different political ideologies in the African context.

However, a more proximate cause of political democratisation can be argued to be the failure of structural adjustment programmes to produce definite successes in Africa. Indeed, by the 1990s, after a decade of structural adjustment programme aimed to meaningfully transform sub-Saharan African economies, the World Bank offered a new political interpretation of the African crisis. It argued that underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance (World Bank 1989). In response, therefore, Western donors insisted that economic reforms should go hand-in-hand with democracy and governance. Thus as a condition for further aid, sub-Saharan African states were encouraged to liberalise the political arena and socio-economic structuring. This political conditionality is premised on the belief that democratic governance and economic reform will reinforce each other and provide a stable process of socio-economic development (Dzorgo 2001).

Also, as stated above, governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs. Such a system should include the mechanisms, the processes and the institutions that should serve as the conduit for people to express their preferences, mediate differences, and exercise their rights, while taking responsibility for their obligations as citizens. There is a relationship between economic poverty and human dimensions characterised by powerlessness, voicelessness, vulnerability, exposure to risk and fear, humiliation and social exclusion (UNDP 2002). There is also a psychological aspect of poverty that manifests as a search for identity and desire for security for self
and family (World Bank 2000a: 64). This position of the World Bank confirms the correlation between democracy and poverty. While there is no disputing the fact that good governance is not an automatic panacea for development, it is equally true that it is the basis for the equitable distribution of development programmes and projects.

The phenomenal changes in the international system that induced the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War also swept dictatorial regimes off the political landscape. To a very large extent, Ghana was a beneficiary of the globalisation in this political sense. With the collapse of communism and the clamour for political openness and economic structuring in sub-Saharan Africa, and the developing world in general, the democratic mode of governance and economic development that had been jettisoned for several years by the military was resurrected (Boafo-Arthur 2006). It has also been argued that democracy and governance could impact positively on poverty reduction, but others are of the opinion that governance per se cannot bring about socio-economic development, because the poverty of democratic practices can in some instances aggravate the levels of the poverty in a polity.

Democracy and good governance as norms that are fundamental to the success of poverty reduction have been explored in many circles and at different levels. For many developing countries, the only way to achieve a reduction in the levels of poverty experienced by the vast majority of their population is to create the enabling environments through democratic governance as means of yielding the fruits of good governance as the bridging element between democracy and development. While there is no disputing the fact that democracy is not a panacea for poverty reduction and socio-economic development, it is equally true that it is the basis for an equitable and inclusive framework and for the equitable distribution of programmes and projects (Boafo-Arthur 2006).

In sum, the ongoing debate in the literature is ample evidence that there is a link between democracy, good governance and socio-economic development. Thus democratic governance with the element of participation in the electoral process and development has the unique potential of empowering ordinary people who may fall into the poverty bracket variously defined. Ghanaian democracy is gradually contributing to socio-economic development, the imperceptions of the mechanisms, processes and structure notwithstanding. This is encouraging, because people can then hold government accountable for its actions and inactions to ensure social and geographical equity and management of resources, and eventually streamline the crooked path towards the building of a society where accountability of political leadership or power bearers, press freedom, respect for human rights, independence of judiciary and the empowerment of the vulnerable and excluded become the hallmarks of committed and broadly owned strategy for socio-economic development.

The underlying debate is that democratic governance and political leadership is a development imperative for all development countries because effective and robust systems of governance and political leadership are the most conducive to achieving sustainable socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Any good governance system should aim at achieving the three “Es”, namely “empowering citizens, enabling governments to be responsible and enforcing compliance with transparency and rule of law” (World Bank 2000b). The literature confirmed a correlation between good governance and socio-economic development. This is because the present democratic dispensation of Ghana’s Fourth Republic is one which has been characterised by heightened socio-economic and political transformation since the return to democratic governance in 1993. In other words, the return to democracy in 1993 was viewed by Ghanaians as a process that would provide the opportunity for good governance or people-centred leadership, poverty reduction, bringing about self-determination through free and fair elections, addressing the challenge of political participation and checking marginalisation by curtailing the elite–mass divide in the country.

Political participation in Ghana since 1992 has occurred within the framework of multi-party constitutional democracy. It is therefore important to determine the linkages between governance and socio-economic development. For more than two
decades now, Ghana under the Fourth Republican Constitutional Democracy has enjoyed peaceful and progressive democratic governance. In spite of the challenges and nerve-racking moments of minor violence, confusion and tensions, the journey has been manageable and profitable in terms of development, prestige, growth and trust among the citizenry and international community. Clearly, Ghana has made tremendous progress in the democratic journey, but democracy and governance is a process, and a lot needs to be done. There is therefore the need for regular assessment of how the country has sustained its commitment to the norms and practice of democratic governance towards sustainable economic development and democratic consolidation.

The politics of governance and political leadership is about the vision of the state and how to achieve development and thereby improve and increase the quality of life of the citizens. This can be done through the socio-economic objectives of Directive Principles of the State Policy (DPSP) enshrined in Ghana’s 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution towards the establishment of just and free society, which includes the following: Article 34, clause 1 in Chapter Six states that “the Directive Principle of the State Policy contained in this chapter shall guide all citizens, parliament, the president, the Judiciary, the council of state, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions for the establishment of a just and free society.” Clause 2 of article 34 also mandated the president to act as follows: “the president shall report to the parliament at least once a year all the steps taken to ensure the realization of the policy objectives contained in this chapter and in particular the realization of basic human rights, a healthy economy, the right to work, the right to good health care and the right to education” (Republic of Ghana 1992: 35).

Consequently, since Constitutional Democracy and Governance in 1993, successive governments have put in place socio-economic development polices such as the Ghana Vision 2020, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy and Ghana’s Shared Growth and Development Agenda, which are all influenced by DPSP. The is required under the directive principle of state policy to take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed in such a manner as would maximise the rate of socio-economic development and to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of the every person in Ghana and to provide adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment and public assistance to the needy.

As stated above, the generally accepted position is that poor economic performance undermines attitudes and behaviours that are essential for democratic consolidation. In other words, mass economic deprivation and aggravated inequalities in wealth distribution in the country can undermine democratic consolidation. While there is no disputing the fact that democracy does not automatically lead to socio-economic development, but it is equally true that it is the basis for equitable distribution of development since 1992 through elected representatives.

The literature reviewed above suggested that political factors intimately interact with economic factors in the context of democratic consolidation. This classical starting point for the link between economic growth and democracy was the early work of Lipset with the famous dictum “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. However, he did not propose that democracy is the inevitable result of a certain level of socio-economic development (Lipset 1980). This view was also confirmed by Kiloh in 1997, who asserted that “there is relationship between socio-economic modernization and the development of liberal democracy” (cited in Boafo-Arthur, 2006: 73-80). As to whether the economic situation affects the acceptance of democracy by Ghanaians, it is said that economic condition determines political behaviour in the democratic system. This again confirmed the minimalist conception of democracy as ‘electoralism’ (Schumpeter 1947; Dahl 1989; Huntington 1991; O’Donnell 1996; Diamond 1996, 1997).

Development according to the United Nations means “the process of enlarging people’s choices to live long and healthy lives, to have access to knowledge and to have access to income and assets; and finally to enjoy a decent standard of living” (World Bank 1990). Reflections on the elements of governance in the
country can tell a great deal about the people and their options, their access to knowledge and opportunities. Each of these elements and good governance itself can be understood to be both a means and a goal of development. Assessing governance and its elements would help to determine whether development efforts are succeeding or not in securing choices for the people the government represents. As regards governance as a development framework, it is said that “good governance and sustainable development are indivisible” (World Bank 1990).

At the international conference on “Governance and Sustainable Growth and Equity”, Kofi Annan said

That is the lesson of all our effort and experiences from Africa to Asia to Latin America. Without good governance – without the rule of law, predictable administration, legitimate power and responsive regulation – no amount of funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity … Good governance will give every citizen, young or old, man or woman, a real and lasting stake in the future of his or her societies – politically, economically and socially. With that stake in their mind and hearts, there are no limits to what people of your countries can achieve (Annan 1997; cited in Heywood 2007: 372).

Implications of Good Governance for Socio-Economic Development

The concept of democratic consolidation defies clear-cut definition. Indeed, Schedler (1998) indicated there are many different views and definitions of democratic consolidation and that the concept has expanded beyond all recognition. He specified that consolidating democracy includes such divergent items as: popular legitimation, the diffusion actors, fusion of democratic values, the neutralisation of anti-system, civilian supremacy over the military, elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organisation of functional interest, the stabilisation of electoral rules, the reutilisation of politics, the decentralisation of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reforms, the alleviation of poverty and economic stabilisation (Schedler 1998). However, as indicated below, there seems to be some consensus on two features of democratic governance and its consolidation.

The first is the widespread acceptance of the general principles of democratic competition (i.e. electoral processes). In 1986 Gunther and his co-authors stated that a democratic regime is consolidated when all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation and adhere to the democratic rules of the game (cited in Schedler 1998). Burton and others conversely stated in 1995 that democratic consolidation denotes the condition of a political system in which all major political actors and social groups expect that government leaders will be chosen through competitive elections and regard representative institutions and procedures as their main channel for pressing claims on the state for socio-economic development (cited in Schedler 1998). Since returning to constitutional democracy since 1992, Ghana had had six successive democratic presidential and parliamentary elections accepted by all contested parties.

The second is the mass acceptance of democracy – in particular, the degree to which the population is satisfied with democracy. Since the adoption of Constitutional Democracy in Ghana six successive democratic elections have been conducted. Many therefore believed that satisfaction with the democratic experience promotes a greater commitment to democracy and, hence, signifies an important trend towards democratic consolidation and sustainable development in the near future. Indeed, as Gunther and his co-authors acknowledged in 1986, widespread support for and satisfaction with democracy may be an important and necessary condition (Schedler 1998).

In the words of Diamond (1993), consolidation is the “process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioural and institutional changes (i.e. political and administrative) that normalize democratic politics and narrows its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen’s access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training and other functions that civil society performs. But most of all, and most urgently, it requires political institutionalization.”
However, by itself, widespread support for democracy undervalues or ignores the importance of the absence of fundamental disputes among politically significant groups over the acceptability of the basic framework for political contestation, and what this implies for democratic stability, predictability and ultimately sustainability (Prezeworki et al., 1996). Therefore it is not a sufficient condition for the onset of democratic consolidation. This notwithstanding, although widespread support of democracy may not by itself be a sufficient condition for democratic consolidation and socio-economic development, certainly it is recognised as a contributory factor. The phenomenon of people’s involvement in the democratic politics and political consciousness is a typical case of politics of governance as a reform objective in Ghana. This, no doubt, augurs well for the future of democratic consolidation and socio-economic development in the country.

**Policy Recommendations and Conclusions**

Ghana, as a sub-Saharan African country, is on a steady course towards democratic consolidation and sustainable economic development. Although politics and governance have seemingly improved, the efforts to strengthen democracy are not yet complete. Democratic institutions need to be relevant, vibrant and efficient, while vigilant nurturing of governance institutions in the national and local spheres is needed to prevent a reversal of processes. It is argued that the move to democracy and its consolidation will change depending on different circumstances, but whatever the specific circumstances may be, a polity remains democratic if there are institutionalised mechanisms through which the masses can get power over the political elite in an organised fashion (Bukari 2015:69; Hawthorn 1996; Moore 1966).

It can therefore be argued that Ghana’s democratic governance is on course, because both the elite and the masses agreed that democracy is the best form of government for this country. To a large extent, the forms of control, especially elections and free media, exist even though there is more to be done to strengthen the institutions that make such controls possible. The growth of democratic culture must be linked to guaranteed socio-economic development and equity for people. Also, for Ghana’s democracy to smoothly sail into maturity, there is the need to redouble efforts at engineering development efforts as the foundation for sustainable democracy and socio-economic development in the country.

To lead to the development of mutually reinforcing institutions and sustainable practices, the reformed institutional structures must be rooted in Ghana’s political and economic context and must draw on the critical factors that led up to the crisis. This means that more attention must be given to understanding Ghana’s national circumstances. Despite the enthusiasm for governance reform, there are several sobering issues that should be kept in mind, as they have implications for policy. There are limitations in both in scale and timing and there is not always a clear analytical link between specific institutional arrangements and economic performance, as some institutions are both ends and instruments. The following is therefore worth noting: it is also very important to sequence the reforms strategically and appropriately, as many institutions and processes are interdependent and reforms must be undertaken simultaneously if they are to bear results. There is a need to set manageable priorities so as to avoid the danger of overloading the reform agenda.

Another useful strategy is to lower expectations of the immediate gains that can be achieved through governance reform and avoid linking reforms with conditionalities. The revised institutional framework to support good governance can be created and sustained only on the basis of social consensus. To move out of this deep crisis towards lasting regeneration, growth and social cohesion, the institutional framework must be developed through deliberation and the participation of broad sections of the Ghanaian political and economic community. This is an arena in which public-sector and private-sector co-operation and consultation is required. Such deliberations are the product of a democratic system grounded in the rule of law. This is a prerequisite for the transformation of Ghana and cannot be regarded as a by-product of development. Given their differences, it is important that planners and policy-makers have a clear notion of what type of democratic state and what model of market economy Ghana is seeking to create.
At present, Ghana is fighting on many fronts. Her struggles include coping with enormous public-sector debts and salvaging a banking sector that is burdened by defaulting creditors and a weak currency. The government needs to develop credible policies to secure investor confidence and to undertake the redistribution of assets within a framework that is transparent and fair. Much attention should also be directed at creating employment and the delivery of basic services at affordable prices, so as to secure the confidence of the public that these issues are being treated as a priority.

There must be the application of the rule of law, without any discrimination, to prevent exploitation and the unfair treatment of employees, the equal and fair treatment of all economic subjects to give the same opportunities of success to all and the creation of a transparent process in awarding economic rights through licensing. The state should not intervene to create market distortions, but rather recognise that it has a role to play in providing safety nets and support to vulnerable groups. The state also needs to give special attention to vulnerable groups, especially those in the informal sector, through affirmative action programmes that eventually create a level playing field to guarantee free movement for all production factors, goods and services in Ghana.

Bibliography


Introduction

Uganda is among the countries that have managed to control the spread of HIV/AIDS despite of the high number of people living with HIV. Uganda is observed to be on the right track towards achieving the 90, 90, 90 Strategy by 2020 (Agaba 2018). The 90, 90, 90 Strategy is an ambitious treatment target that was launched by UNAIDS and other partners. It is aimed at diagnosing 90% of all people living with HIV, provide antiretroviral therapy (ART) for 90% of those diagnosed, and achieve viral suppression for 90% of those treated by 2020. Uganda has registered success in a number of areas, including: reductions in new infections by more than half in five years from 135,000 in 2010 to approximately 60,000 by 2016, in men and women; in children from 26,000 in 2010 to 4000 in 2016, enrolling more than 1 million people on care and support and about 980,954 on antiretroviral therapy (Ministry of Health Uganda 2016; World Health Organisation (WHO) 2018). The reasons why Uganda, a country perceived to be poor, has been more successful in fighting HIV/AIDS than countries such as South Africa and Botswana, considered economically prosperous, remain a matter of discussion. Countries have responded to HIV/AIDS mitigation by providing information and upscaling treatment and prevention. However, these have failed to address the social, economic and power relations which are responsible for individual risks of infection and ability to protect themselves (Kharsany and Karim 2016). The prevalence of HIV among women in most African countries, including Uganda, is higher than that of men due to power relations. Women are unable for example to negotiate consistent use of condoms due to power relations between men and women.

Uganda's success is also registered in being able to create harmonious relations between various actors engaged in the fight against HIV/AIDS, a relationship that has been fundamental to Uganda's success in implementing HIV/AIDS policy programmes. Political, social or structural factors play a role in differences between countries about how policy is put into practice (McRobie et al. 2017) and ultimately the successes that may be registered in HIV prevention. In this paper, we follow a framework of synergy which looks at the relationship between society and state in fighting HIV/AIDS. We perceive that Uganda's success story can be explained by the general framework of synergy. The study uses secondary data on HIV/AIDS prevention in Uganda.

Synergy as a Framework for Service Provision

Evans (1996 and 1996a) conceptualises synergy as mutually reinforcing relationships between government and groups of engaged citizens. According to Evans (1996a), synergy may take the form of either complementarity or embeddedness. Under complementarity, the activities of civil society complement the activities of government. There is clear division of labour between the two realms. Each may act with relative autonomy in pursuing goals where there is mutual understanding. In Uganda, civil society organisations have for a long time worked independently yet with the knowledge of government about what they are doing in the service sector, especially in health and education. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pioneered the service and health support systems for HIV/AIDS patients. Embeddedness requires complex institutional settings to allow sustained relationships
Countries such as Rwanda have developed HIV and AIDS programmes that have enabled them to achieve near-universal access to HIV prevention, care, and treatment. This is because it built a decentralised health sector system, as well as its public policies that permit complementary services from NGOs and government healthcare facilities (Riedel et al. 2018). Under embeddedness, the government provides not only inputs and a favourable environment that facilitates the development of private sector, but also co-opts members of civil society into government teams involved in the delivery of goods and services.

The involvement of the state is a strong environmental factor that facilitates the functioning of the public sector, private sector and civil society in service provision in general. Evans (1996a: 1120) argues that effective states create environments which strengthen and increase the efficiency of local institutions and organisations. Similarly, Muriisa (2009) argues that government can coordinate the relationships between the various actors involved in service provision such as those involved in HIV/AIDS-related activities. Both state and non-state actors must work in close partnership for efficient service delivery. Synergy exhibited by the state and civil society in fighting HIV/AIDS was particularly important for making HIV/AIDS visible and making communication and open discussion about HIV/AIDS possible in Uganda (Low-Beer & Stoneburner 2004a; 2004b; Muriisa 2009). How did it work? In the following account, we try to answer this question.

Initial Response to HIV/AIDS: The Role of Government in Uganda

At the heart of Uganda's HIV/AIDS response success story has always been a strong government commitment. At a time when many African governments such as Kenya and Zimbabwe were denying the existence of HIV/AIDS (Fredland 1998; Kayazze 2002), Uganda responded by taking an open stance to the epidemic and was among the first African countries to establish a national AIDS Control Programme (ACP) and the National Committee for the Prevention of AIDS (NCPA). In 2007, the STD/AIDS Control Programme developed a four-year Strategic Plan (2007-2010) with the primary goal of preventing further transmission of STIs and HIV infection and providing support for the mitigation of the impact of HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS was placed high on the agenda of the government development programmes, and HIV prevention was integrated in poverty eradication programmes early enough, compared to other African countries (Allen & Heald 2004; Oketcho, Kazibwe, & Were 2001; Okware, Opio, Musinguzi, & Waibale 2001). Uganda is the first country in the world to start a presidential initiative to end HIV/AIDS by 2030 (WHO 2018).

According to O'Manique (2004), the response by the government of Uganda in combating the AIDS pandemic, rather than denying its existence, remains unparalleled and unmatched on the African continent. According to the country UNAIDS Representative and the Executive Director of UNAIDS, Uganda has made tremendous progress in the fight against the scourge in a way that had made it a model country for effective response to any epidemic (Agaba 2018; WHO 2018). For Barnett and Whiteside (2002: 116), Uganda's openness about HIV/AIDS on the part of the president of the country enabled the country to succeed in the battle against HIV/AIDS.

With a president committed to responding to the HIV/AIDS challenge, Uganda created an environment that enabled and encouraged the HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation activities by various individuals and groups – including HIV/AIDS NGOs, faith-based organisations, and private individuals such as herbalists. In addition, the government established agencies like the Uganda AIDS Commission and the National HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum and various committees such as the District AIDS Coordination Committees (DACCs) that would encourage interaction between different actors involved in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and between different actors and government agencies and departments.

Political Leadership

The importance of senior political leaders in promoting and sustaining the fight against HIV/AIDS cannot be ignored (Parkhurst and Lush 2004). The commitment of senior political leadership is crucial for the provision of resources necessary for fighting HIV/AIDS (World Bank 2000). To affirm their commitment, political leaders of the world at the 69th UN assembly signed a resolution...
to end HIV by 2030 (Uganda AIDS Commission 2015). In Uganda, the fight was championed by the president when other African leaders were denying the existence of HIV/AIDS (Muriisa 2009, 2004). The president of Uganda launched “The Presidential Fast-track Initiative on ending HIV&AIDS in Uganda by 2030”, which is the first such initiative in Africa and the entire world (WHO 2018). The initiative proposed five points, including: men’s involvement in fighting HIV/AIDS to prevent new infections, acceleration of implementation of Test and Treat and attainment of 90-90-90 targets; consolidate progress on eliminating mother-to-child transmission of HIV; ensure financial sustainability for the HIV response; and ensuring institutional effectiveness for a well-coordinated multi-sectoral response for consideration for ending HIV/AIDS in Uganda (WHO 2018). It is this political commitment of the highest office that enabled Uganda’s continuous fight against HIV/AIDS and partly explains the successes registered in HIV/AIDS mitigation.

The Role of Local Governments in Uganda

Uganda has a decentralised administrative structure in which districts are given autonomy in designing their own programmes. In combating HIV/AIDS, the decentralisation policy promotes coordinated partnerships between religious, political and educational institutions and NGOs, in planning and implementing programmes through a central coordinating body at the district level. Initially, the District AIDS Coordination Committee-DACC (UNDP 2002) and later the District AIDS Committee have over time assumed critical roles in responding to HIV/AIDS problem. The formation of these bodies facilitated the formation of a formal structure of communication through which politicians could interact with other actors and monitor programmes in their respective districts.

In Uganda, the decentralised framework allows the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) to link up with the politicians at local governments. Lam (1996) provides evidence that the involvement of officials who are part of society in the programme management process increases trust between government and citizens, and such trust leads to improved delivery and management of services and also results in positive reception for messages about HIV/AIDS in communities.

Community Response

The government in Uganda intrinsically has an enabling environment for association and participation (Oketcho et al. 2001:14). The participation and engagement of people working in various fields and at all levels is encouraged by the decentralised health reforms involving the creation of AIDS Coordination Committees (ACC) at various levels in the district. Beginning in 1992, the Uganda Aids Commission (UAC) established District AIDS Coordination Committees (DACCs) in all districts of Uganda. Within each district, three levels of committees were established: the Sub-county Coordination Committees (SACCS), Parish AIDS Coordination Committees (PACCS) and Village AIDS Control Committees (VACCS). The creation of such bodies was meant to facilitate the coordination of HIV/AIDS activities in the districts, but this structure was not fully implemented due to a lack of technical leadership and funding (UAC & NHACP 2002).

Without the above structure in place, the UAC allowed the Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs, also the Administrative Head of the District) to form District AIDS Committees (DACs) in their districts in 2001. The DACs were chaired by District HIV/AIDS Focal Persons appointed by the district CAOs to coordinate HIV/AIDS activities such as training, mobilisation and coordination of different stake holders and the implementation of new programmes such as the recently launched presidential initiative to end HIV/AIDS in Uganda by 2030.

Government Procurement of HIV/AIDS Medicine

The introduction of the Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) services in 1996 (Lucchini et al. 2003), brought hope to people affected by HIV/AIDS. However, the high cost of these services and monitoring tests, and lack of qualified personnel, meant that people living in developing countries did not have access to these services, especially the ARVs. In Uganda in 1998, the cost of treatment was US$1,000 per month or US$12,000 annually for brand drugs (Martinez-Jones & Anyama 2002). Considering that about 80% of Ugandans lived on less than US$1
a day (O’Manique 2004). HIV/AIDS treatment was a faraway dream.

Recognising this disparity of access, the United Nations (UN) organisations set out to negotiate a way of making these drugs accessible to people in developing countries. Thus making these drugs cheaper was the starting point. As a result, the UN organisations, governments and non-governmental organisations began negotiating with the major pharmaceutical companies producing ARV drugs for a reduction in their prices. The pharmaceutical companies negotiated with governments on a country-by-country and drug-by-drug basis. According to the Ministry of Health Annual Health Sector Performance Report for the Financial Year 2000/2001, continuous negotiation by government reduced the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs by 80-90% (MoH 2001:14). This is confirmed by the findings that between 1996 and 2001, the price of ARV drugs decreased to between 5% and 20% of their price in developed countries (Lucchini et al. 2003).

As early as 1996, Uganda, unlike many other Sub-Saharan African countries, had started the importation of antiretroviral drugs. These drugs were imported and distributed to those who could afford them, through private and government hospitals under the supervision of qualified health personnel. The government commitment to making ARV drugs available to its citizens caught the attention of international AIDS bodies such as UNAIDS. Between 1998 and 2000, therefore, Uganda was one of the countries sponsored in a pilot project under the UNAIDS Drug Access Initiative (DAI) programme (Martinez-Jones and Anyama 2002) to access antiretroviral drugs for all. In order to increase access to the drugs, the government established an advisory board to oversee the implementation of the programme. In addition, a non-profit autonomous organisation, Medical Access Uganda Ltd, was established to import the ARVs and distribute them to pharmacies at subsidised prices. Lucchini and his co-authors (2003) note that in other countries such as Kenya and South Africa, there was no clear commitment of government to facilitate the delivery of ARV drugs, except for preventive use like in the case of prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

Apart from the DAI project, Uganda is one of the countries that has been active in developing a hybrid mechanism of drug procurement that combines the Accelerated Access Initiative (AAI) international framework with competitive tendering procedures vis-à-vis the generic producers (Lucchini et al. 2003: 190). In 2002, the UN signed an agreement with five pharmaceutical companies (Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck and Hoffman-la Roche) to provide ARVs to developing countries through the AAI. The aim of the programme was to rapidly increase access to ARVs in developing countries. To supplement this, UNAIDS offered technical training to various centres in Uganda in dispensing the ARV drugs. The biggest centre dispensing these drugs is the Joint Clinical Research Centre (JCRC), a non-profit organisation established by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health and Makerere University to carry out research in HIV/AIDS (Martinez-Jones and Anyama 2002).

Although Medical Access Uganda Ltd was given the exclusive rights to import ARV drugs in Uganda, this monopoly did not apply to the hybrid mechanism. By 2002, JCRC was dispensing generic drugs to patients in regional referral hospitals such as Mbarara regional referral hospital. Similarly, Médecins sans Frontières (SMF) was importing generic ARVs directly from pharmaceutical companies and is initiating a HAART project in Arua District of Northern Uganda. As a result of taking away the monopoly rights of provision of ARVs from Medical Access Uganda Ltd, and allowing other companies to provide these drugs, their prices declined significantly. Between September 2000 and February 2001, there was a sharp decline in the price of the eight major types of ARV drugs on the Ugandan market. There has been continuous drop in prices of drugs and the costs of HIV/AIDS treatment in general. By 2013, the Ministry of Health reported that the annual cost of first-line antiretroviral drugs was US$118–137 (McCreesh et al. 2017), more than a 1000% reduction in price compared with the 1998 price.

The reduced prices made it possible for an increasing number of patients to access ARV drugs. Prior to the DAI programme, which ended in 2001, fewer than 400 patients had had access to ARV drugs. However, by the time the programme closed down, about
1,700 patients had received treatment in seven centres (Cains et al. 2003:32). By 2016, 940,000 (67%) people living with HIV/AIDS were on treatment (UNAIDS 2017:43). How did this happen?

In 2003, the government negotiated with various organisations regarding the provision of ARVs in various districts and centres. In 2004, Uganda implemented the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which was President Bush's five-year plan to address the problem of AIDS in developing countries. The programme in Uganda focused on making ARV drugs available to patients free of charge in selected hospitals. About 2,700 HIV/AIDS patients received the drugs at 11 referral hospitals and 11 district hospitals throughout the country. This was a joint programme initiated by JCRC, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and is still being run by the MOH.

Apart from negotiations to access ARVS, the government has been involved in the procurement of condoms to be distributed through health units and NGOs. The Ministry of Health procured about 150 million condoms between 1997 and 2000 (Garbus & Marseille 2003: 90). In 2002, over 50 million condoms were distributed and the government projected that about 80 million would be distributed in 2003. In 2015 about 240 million condoms were procured. Condom use and behaviour change are among the reasons why HIV/AIDS intervention has been successful in Uganda (Low-Beer and Stoneburner 2004a to c). Condom use in 2016 stood at 60% and 45.5% for males and females respectively (UNAIDS 2017). It should be noted, however, that government recognition of the NGOs and other actors involved in condom distribution – “a multi-sectoral approach to condom education and distribution” (Ministry of Health Uganda 2016) – made this exercise successful.

It should be emphasised that the government relies on the health units (government hospitals and other government health establishments) for the implementation of various health programmes. However, these units are understaffed, lack essential drugs and very few people visit them because they lack the funds to enable them to access healthcare services (Garbus & Marseille 2003; O'Manique 2004; and TASO 2002). The lack of resources and facilities requires involving other actors in the delivery of services. In the following section, we discuss aspects of the role of NGOs in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The discussion focuses on the services of NGOs as autonomous service providers well recognised by government for their service.

The Role of Civil Society in Fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda

In Uganda, there has been a peaceful co-existence of civil society and the government in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Civil society organisations work with people at the grassroots. The exclusion of such organisations from policy debates and/or the relief arena contributes to the failure of the government to transmit messages about HIV/AIDS to the people. Civil society involvement is a precondition for successfully combating an epidemic such as HIV/AIDS, which affects all social and economic forums. Civil society organisations have been instrumental in making society realise and accept the HIV/AIDS reality and cooperate in fighting HIV/AIDS. On the cooperation of society, Steven Friedman wrote:

It is simply impossible for any government to fight Aids on its own: society must co-operate not only by changing attitudes and behaviours, but also in its willingness to support and help those who live with the virus or are orphaned by it. The key goal of political leadership in the three countries (Uganda, Thailand and Cuba) was to rally society around the battle against AIDS. The government needed to take the lead, but its task was to get everyone who could contribute to a solution to work together to achieve it. (Friedman 2000)

In Uganda, NGOs have been instrumental and pioneered the fight against HIV/AIDS. The relationship between NGOs and government has been harmonious. Policy proposals have always developed through a cooperative process, with no major opposition from either the government or civil society. For example, HIV/AIDS NGOs in Uganda were viewed as channels through which counselling and care, and HIV/AIDS messages on behavioural change, could reach the communities. The government of Uganda provided a stable environment in which
NGOs could evolve and coexist with the government in the fight against HIV/AIDS (Putzel 2004:27). This kind of cooperation made it possible to send the right messages to communities and people at the grassroots in Uganda.

NGOs and Fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda: Complementarity in practice

The development of HIV/AIDS NGOs in Uganda followed a pattern that has a global outlook. HIV/AIDS organisations emerged as a distinct group as a result of a grassroots need. People infected with HIV and AIDS or affected by the diseases felt a pressing need to respond to the exclusionary practices society had adopted. This was also as a result of limited government support to fund HIV/AIDS activities. Uganda funds only about 5% of the HIV/AIDS programmes, with the rest coming from the donor community. According to O’Manique (2004:139), in 1992 “the public sector [in Uganda] contributed approximately $2 per capita per annum to health, the lowest in the region”. HIV/AIDS appeared in Uganda at the time when Uganda was implementing the neoliberal policies of restructuring of the public sector with increasing privatisation of services, leaving many patients with no services at all, thereby making them fend for themselves. This came in the way of solidarity organisations through which care and support for one another could be accessed. It is out of these initiatives that the first ever HIV/AIDS NGO – The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) was formed (Muriisa 2009).

TASO which started in a sitting room of one HIV/AIDS-infected person in collaboration with 15 other members. It is now a nationwide organisation, operating 11 service centres and mini-TASOs operating in partnership with missions and government hospitals (TASO 2018). TASO operates 22 outreach clinic sites in public health facilities, where clients receive a comprehensive package of care and support services. Through the outreach programme, TASO operates mobile health clinics, where clients receive medical services such as counselling, nutrition advice, and care and support.

The community outreach approach has increased the number of clients who have access to TASO services. Since its inception TASO reports that it has served 300,000 individuals and about 1,000,000 households, and supported about 300,000 orphans and vulnerable children with different services, including nutritional support, therapeutic support, and provision of scholastic materials and paying of school fees (TASO 2018). TASO is providing ARVs to over 50,000 clients across the 11 service centres in the country. On average, 75% of clients receive their ARVs through Community Drug Distribution Points (CDDPs). TASO makes sure that there is drug adherence through community and homecare visits. In addition, TASO ensures that there is limited duplication of services by closely linking with other service providers (TASO 2018).

Other than providing services to people infected with HIV/AIDS and their relatives, TASO paved the way for, or even facilitated, the founding of other service organisations: for example, Uganda National Association of AIDS organisations – UNASO (an umbrella organisation for organisations engaged in HIV/AIDS activities) – AIDS Information Centre (AIC), Positive Men’s Union (POMU), and National Community for Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Uganda (NACWOLA). Through its community-based programme, TASO mobilises communities to create an environment conducive to HIV prevention and care and support for people living with HIV. Through homecare visits, TASO provides chemotherapy and aromatherapy to bedridden AIDS patients. TASO mobilised and trained over 6,000 volunteers for offering minimum community education on HIV prevention, care and support services (The AIDS Support Organisation – TASO 2018). In addition, the rapid HIV test, whose results are immediately available, enables TASO to “test and treat” clients immediately (WHO 2015). The counselling that precedes HIV testing and the post-test counselling put the client in position of acceptance of positive HIV status.

Multi-sectoral Approach-embeddedness and Complementarity

A multi-sectoral approach is one that goes beyond prevention to focus on all aspects of the epidemic, including treatment, policies and programmes to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS and developing policies that will change the societal factors that
influence long-term susceptibility and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS (Barnett & Whiteside 2002). The multi-sectoral approach combats AIDS on a number of fronts, involving various government ministries, and civil society organisations, such as local and international NGOs, the business sector and individuals. This remains a central government approach, and may explain Uganda’s success in fighting HIV/AIDS.

As early as 1986, the Ugandan government set up the Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Control Programme (ACP) to fight HIV/AIDS through information dissemination, blood transfusions and epidemiological surveillance. The ACP was established under the Ministry of Health. By 1991 the HIV/AIDS programme was fully incorporated into six public ministries: Defence, Education, Information, Labour and Social Affairs, Local Government and Health (UNDP 2002). The rationalisation of the HIV/AIDS programme in the public sector began in 1993 with the appointment of programme managers in various ministries, such as Education and Sports, Defence, Information, Labour and Social Affairs, Local Government, Gender and Community Development, Agriculture, Justice, Finance and Economic Planning, Internal Affairs (Police and Prisons) and Health (UNDP 2002). This approach was a forerunner, since, as mentioned earlier, other African countries were still denying the existence of the disease on the continent.

In 1992, the Uganda Aids Commission (UAC) was established under the Office of the President by the Parliamentary Statute No. 2 of 1992 to coordinate HIV/AIDS activities and to harmonise different stakeholders’ initiatives in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The commission was appointed on a five-year tenure, which could be renewed or suspended, and its role was to coordinate the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS. Owing to its work, the Uganda Aids Commission has remained the main central coordinating body in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Uganda. By 2015, the commission had coordinated the HIV/AIDS fight and HIV/AIDS and had succeeded in reducing new infections among adults and children (Ministry of Health Uganda 2016). Of particular importance for this paper is the composition of representatives to the commission, who are drawn from religious organisations, different government ministries, other civil society organisations and the medical profession (UNDP 2002). This involvement of various categories of people increased the exchange of knowledge about HIV/AIDS, as well as participation and popular acceptance of government programmes. The UAC was intended to ensure harmonisation of intervention, to foster collaboration, to establish effective linkages between various agencies, and to facilitate the sharing of experiences (Oketcho et al. 2001:15).

In order to coordinate activities and effective programme implementation, the UAC developed a National Strategic Framework (NSF), the purpose of which is to relate the fight of HIV/AIDS to national development goals, and to facilitate and integrate the participation of all stakeholders in the planning and management of HIV/AIDS activities and bringing together all stakeholders under one umbrella and to guide them how to act with respect to priority setting (Oketcho et al. 2001). The UAC developed a National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan, 2007–2011, whose aim was to provide for universal access services (UAC 2007). The 2011–2015 strategic plan pledged a population free of HIV and its effects. Both plans emphasised the continuity of the multi-sectoral approach as a mode of fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda.

Within the multi-sectoral framework, HIV/AIDS activities were decentralised and embedded in the different ministries responsible for designing programmes for implementation. The 2018 guidelines for mainstreaming HIV and AIDS provide guidance on how all government ministries and agencies will mainstream HIV and AIDS into their programmes as a strategy for ending AIDS by 2030 (Uganda AIDS Commission 2018).

**State-NGO Relations**

Existing literature about the NGO-state relationship indicates that governments in many developing countries fear that the existence of NGOs may erode state political power and threaten national security (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Others such as Jamil (1998:10) suggest four distinct ways in which NGOs relate to government. Of particular interest to this paper is cooperation where NGOs relate to government through consultation and
collaboration. Consultation implies that the both NGOs and government advise each other on development issues, and collaboration implies partnership. This kind of relationship may be likened to the embeddedness and complementarity already discussed.

With respect to service organisations such as TASO, the government of Uganda, as already pointed out, set up partnerships and recognised their importance in development, and has therefore opted to allow their contributions in the mobilisation and delivery of services. In this model, complementarity and embeddedness may be observed. This is the government providing a favourable environment for the formation of HIV/AIDS NGOs and NGOs operating independent of government. Here, the role of NGOs such as TASO in fighting HIV/AIDS is well recognised. In other respects, government works directly with NGOs. For instance, NGOs work hand in hand with government on the same programme using existing government structures. It should be mentioned, however, that with regard to other forms of NGOs, especially those engaged in advocacy and human rights, conflict and confrontation characterise the form of relationship. However, as the main concern is with service organisations, issues regarding NGO advocacy will not be focused on. In this section, we explore how the NGOs relate to the government with respect to the HIV/AIDS problem.

The government of Uganda recognises the importance of partnership with NGOs in order to fight HIV/AIDS. There is widespread recognition that no single actor (individual, organisation or state) can successfully solve the HIV/AIDS problem without involving others (MoH, 2003; and TASO 2002). Recognising the potential of the state, NGOs have focused on developing synergistic relations rather than working in isolation. TASO (2002:5), for example, notes that political goodwill and support are vital for the success of HIV/AIDS service delivery. Muriisa (2009) found that the government of Uganda provides a favourable environment for the functioning of HIV/AIDS organisations. There is widespread recognition on the part of the HIV/AIDS organisations that they need interdependent relationships with the government. The nature of the state-NGO relationship is symbiotic and is enacted in a reciprocal way. In this respect, the NGOs have created linkages with the state at both administrative and operational levels.

At the administrative level, government and NGOs plan some of the HIV/AIDS activities together. For example, celebration of International AIDS Day activities are jointly planned and participated in by government and HIV/AIDS CSOs. We have already argued that NGOs plan together with government by involving representatives in various committees for programme implementation. The involvement of the people’s representatives on government committees not only increases the legitimacy of the programmes, but also promotes a trusting relationship between government and citizens.

At the operational level, organisations sign memoranda with government authorities committing themselves to provide various services and use the available health facilities. Thus, TASO operates in health facilities owned by the government. As already indicated, many of TASO’s outreach activities are done in government health facilities, which are also used as mobile clinics (Muriisa 2009). Health workers in government facilities also help in mobilising people to access health services offered by TASO. At the local level, TASO seeks the assistance of local leaders to mobilise the population for their drama presentations. In the following figure the above relationship is illustrated.
The Relationship between Government and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) in Fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda

Religious and faith-based organisations are one category of civil society organisations involved in the multi-sectoral strategy that plays an important role in mobilising communities for behaviour change. The focus of this section is on how the government recognised and facilitated the involvement of religion and religious leadership in fighting HIV/AIDS.

Uganda is a religious country and predominantly Christian. According to the 2014 national Census, Christians of all denominations made up 85.1 percent of Uganda’s population, which comprise Catholics (39.3%), Anglicans (32%), Pentecostals (11.6%), Seventh Day Adventists, (1.7%), Baptists (0.3%), Orthodox (0.1%) and other Christians (1.4%) (UBOS 2016). The rest of the population are Muslims (13.7%), traditionalists and non-religious (0.1% and 0.2% respectively).

Faith-based organisations have been important for delivering HIV/AIDS messages and healthcare delivery in Uganda. The involvement of religious groups in the fight against HIV/AIDS strengthened the trust people had in government and its agencies. The legitimacy of discussing HIV/AIDS, which had been considered a sin-related disease, became successful with the involvement of religious groups. The involvement of top church leaders in the Uganda Aids Commission broke the myth about HIV/AIDS being considered as a disease affecting immoral people and transmitted through immoral behaviour.

The introduction of HIV/AIDS discussions into the religious gatherings and functions served, in the first instance, to legitimise and acknowledge the presence of the disease among the congregation and encourage acceptance of the problem. The inclusion of religious leaders as part of the team fighting HIV/AIDS was one way of overcoming the cultural and religious tendencies to view people with HIV/AIDS as immoral social deviants. This was part of the move to make a collective attack against HIV/AIDS.
In addition, since HIV/AIDS had been identified as a sexually transmitted disease, behavioural change was necessary to combat its spread. Open discussions about sex involved touching issues related to people’s personal life, and religious beliefs. Involving religious institutions not only legitimised such discussions, but also limited opposition from religious leaders (Putzel 2004). Most public officials had hesitated to address issues related to sex and sexuality because of opposition from religious leaders and interest groups who regarded such issues as matters of individual behaviour and not for public discussion (Putzel 2003). It is important to note, however, that the Anglican Church did not openly support or criticise the use of condoms in HIV/AIDS prevention. Thus, the key messages embodied in the AIDS campaign slogan – Abstain, Be Faithful and use a Condom (ABC) – have been modified by the church: for example, “love carefully” has been replaced by “love faithfully”. Such a substitution implies the recognition of the presence of HIV/AIDS amongst their congregation, which facilitates the discussion of HIV/AIDS and sex-related matters in the church.

**Religious Fundamentalism and the AB Approach to Fighting HIV/AIDS**

Fundamentalist movements have grown up in both the Anglican and the Catholic churches that are vehemently opposed to the use of the condoms in fighting HIV/AIDS. The fundamentalists focus on abstinence until marriage (AB) as the only acceptable approach. This approach has evolved particularly in the Charismatic and Pentecostal sects, and has government support. The programme targets the youth, who are brought together for prayer meetings. With the recent involvement of the first lady, the wife of the president (Mrs Janet Museveni), who called upon the youth to maintain their virginity until marriage, the AB strategy is still a catch word for the religious fundamentalists (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2005).

It is not unusual to hear that religious groups are preaching about the dangers of failure to abstain from sex. The two moral principles (abstinence from sex until marriage and fidelity) constitute pillars of Christian morality. Nevertheless, the approach of religious fundamentalists to fighting HIV/AIDS needs a closer look and a critique.

In its religious teachings condemning sin, the fundamentalists criminalise all other programmes which have proved successful in Uganda and other parts of the world such as Thailand. For example, it condemns condom use, implying that this promotes immorality, exposes individuals to high risk of infection and therefore should be avoided. Thus, the programme fails to address both cultural and social issues that have led to the increased spread of HIV/AIDS. In addition, the approach individualises the problem of HIV/AIDS, and this may heighten blame and stigmatisation. It portrays HIV/AIDS as a self-inflicted punishment, and the acquisition of HIV/AIDS as a matter of personal choice. This approach is not visible only in Uganda, but is what dominated the United States of America’s fight against AIDS in the 2000s. Hellen Epstein’s work points out that Christians were opposed to the continued funding of HIV and AIDS programmes because they considered HIV to be self-inflicted by homosexuals and also believed that HIV was “God’s judgement on promiscuity” (Epstein 2007, 186). As such, 1 billion of about 15 billion US dollars planned for HIV/AIDS activities was earmarked for HIV prevention programmes that encouraged sexual abstinence, and those that received funding were modelled on programmes that strictly promoted abstinence only until marriage (Epstein 2007). In Uganda, the approach dominated much of the fight against AIDS in the 2000s as well. Messages such as abstain and be faithful were emphasised and these have deeper implications, since those who acquire HIV are blamed for their failure to abstain and to be faithful. Ultimately, such an approach meant that those with HIV/AIDS would most likely be isolated and stigmatised, and lose their social identity. This remains a challenge to the efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. Indeed, Epstein (2007) points out that the evaluation of programmes that were founded on the abstain-only-until-marriage approach were found to have failed and were bound to fail if applied in Africa. The success of Uganda’s programme was thus not based on abstinence only, but on a combination of other programmes, including the use of condoms (Epstein 2007) and the social approach of openness and the social support system that has long existed in the country (Muriisa 2009).
The use of condoms has been effective and, in combination with other approaches, condom use has contributed to the decline of HIV/AIDS prevalence. Deemphasising the use of the condom, as was the case with the abstain-only-until-marriage programme, is therefore likely to lead to more HIV/AIDS infections. The programme does not address the socio-economic factors that promote sexual vigilance. Poverty, gender and cultural practices, such as widow inheritance, which facilitate the spread of HIV, are ignored. Without addressing these problem areas, it is unlikely that women can negotiate relationships based on abstinence and faithfulness (Wilson 2004: 848). The narrow focus of religious fundamentalists, who vehemently opposes condom use (C), leads to the creation of stigmatised individuals. The Ugandan success story in fighting HIV/AIDS may be reversed by this life philosophy (Sekabira 2005). Already, the HIV situation in Uganda since 2005 has changed, and there has been a significant increase in the prevalence rates – up to 7.6% for females and 4.7% among males (Uganda 2017).

It is important to note that much as religious fundamentalism posed a challenge to the fight against HIV, this position has since shifted, as more open discussions about HIV/AIDS are now visible, although still inclined towards abstinence. There is less condemnation and more welcoming of people living with HIV and AIDS into the congregation. Moreover, there is increased recognition of what the churches and other religious groups are doing in the fight against HIV and AIDS, and they are part of the multi-sectoral approach promoted by Uganda. Instead, the increasing spread of the HIV virus is attributed to the abandonment of ABC (abstinence, be faithful and condom use) strategy. Other explanations for the increase may be the stability of lives and reduction in deaths due to increased access to ART and increased hope of life with the introduction of ART, being less fearful of the deadly HIV virus and AIDS, thus making young men and women change their sexual behaviour (Ninsiima 2012).

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to discuss synergy as a model of service delivery in fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda. The underlying argument is that synergy provides a framework which explains the way Uganda has allowed independence and mutuality in fighting HIV/AIDS. Uganda provides not only an environment where HIV/AIDS is fought but also provides direct support to individuals and organisations fighting HIV/AIDS. The role of the government in providing political leadership, mobilising funding and establishing an enabling environment not only for the operation of NGOs but also for the participation of other actors, including individuals, in the fight against HIV/AIDS, was identified as important an contribution to the success registered in Uganda with regard to fighting HIV/AIDS. The discussion also revealed that the government has been instrumental in forming partnerships between itself and NGOs through the establishment of formal institutions of collaboration. These institutions enable NGOs such as TASO not only to engage with other actors, but also to work closely with government.

The discussions in this paper have shown that there are strong synergistic relationships between government and HIV/AIDS NGOs in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Embeddedness is observed at the organisational level, where inter-organisational communication and collaboration have been strengthened. Complementarity is observed in the form of coproduction as well as individual/independent HIV/AIDS programmes. The paper concludes that without synergy, the success of the fight against HIV/AIDS in Uganda could not be registered.

Bibliography


Introduction and Background

At the end of 2013, South Africa had more than 2.6 million people on antiretroviral (ARV) medicines – more than any other country in the world (United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) 2014), and with the potential for an additional 100,000 new patients being enrolled each month (Avert 2016). Five years ago, there were under 500 clinics providing HIV services and today over 3500 clinics provide these services. However, delivering accessible pharmaceutical services in the public sector remains a significant challenge, and patients on chronic medicines face a range of barriers in being able to efficiently access these services. These barriers can include geographical and financial accessibility as well as availability (Peters et al. 2008)

The current shortage of pharmacy personnel, particularly in the public sector, has created significant challenges for the delivery of pharmaceutical services that are accessible and convenient for patients. This has resulted in lengthy waiting times at facilities with a consequent loss of work for patients, medication monitoring and counselling often not given sufficient attention due to high patient volumes and busy staff, and a limited ability to follow up on patients who default on their medication collection visits (Rothmann and Malan 2011). The lack of sufficient numbers of pharmacy personnel is the key limitation to scaling systems, infrastructure and services to meet this additional demand, which, based on the current delivery of new qualified personnel by the training industry, is not possible to resolve unless a step change in the service delivery model is achieved. The latter mentioned remains a critical requirement to effectively address the current challenges in the health system and, in particular, the HIV epidemic. Additionally, supply chain instabilities, stemming from the lack of appropriate IT systems to support medicine supply management activities at facilities, often results in shortages and stock-outs of key medicines, including ARVs and tuberculosis (TB) medications, with potentially dire consequences for patients. Strategies are therefore needed that ensure the best possible utilization of existing pharmacy personnel and that provide minimum disruptions for patients resulting from erratic medicine supplies, long waiting times and delays, especially at busy, high-volume facilities.

This need to ensure uninterrupted access to chronic medications for a growing number of patients is expected to aggravate the already burdened capacity of healthcare facilities in the public sector to deliver efficient, timely and cost-effective services and highlights the need for innovative approaches to medicine distribution and access systems, especially for patients on stable chronic medication. Moreover, providing access to chronic medication would need to ensure minimum disruptions for patients resulting from erratic medicine supplies, long waiting times and delays at facilities, particularly for patients who are economically active. Moreover, with the Minister of Health’s recent efforts to expand services to chronic patients through a strategy that also enables patients to access their medicines outside of public sector health facilities, there is an urgent need for these innovative solutions to be developed and brought to scale (National Department of Health, South Africa 2016).
The significant increase in the number of patients on chronic medications currently has also had a major impact on supply chain systems for medicines in the public sector, with ongoing shortages of key medicines regularly being reported in the various provinces (Bateman 2013). In accordance with estimations by the United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) South Africa has over six million people infected with HIV and there are approximately 370,000 new infections each year. As the evidence base for test-and-treat initiatives increases, the current national caseload is expected to increase dramatically (UNAIDS 2014).

In addressing these challenges Right to Care has, in collaboration with the Department of Health, demonstrated that the use of in-pharmacy robotic automation technology in the public sector could enhance the delivery of efficient medication services for patients whilst ensuring that the integrity of the medicine supply chain, patient convenience and patient safety are maintained. This work has also shown that the use of pharmacy automation eases overcrowding at high-volume facilities, reduces waiting times and delays for patients in collecting medicines and impacts positively on patient routines through minimising time off from work for employed patients. It was further demonstrated that automated dispensing systems, which facilitate access to medicines in a controlled, secure environment, may provide the opportunity to manage public sector patients, in a cost-effective and sustainable manner, outside of public sector facilities, at sites that are practical, convenient and accessible.

This support to government has the overall aim of assisting public health, in line with the strategy of the Department of Health and requirement of the Minister to improve service delivery to the growing number of patients receiving chronic medicines, provide services for chronic patients outside of healthcare facilities, where feasible, and create effective systems to ensure the integrity of the supply chain for medicines.

This approach by Right to Care, which was recently highlighted in the New York Times (2014), also proposes the use of community-based, automated medicine dispensing units at which patients can obtain their chronic medicine refills and receive counselling support through the services of a “virtual” pharmacist. This technology is called Pharmacy Dispensing Units (PDUs) and provides the convenience of accessibility, flexibility of extended operating hours, direct dispensing and the ability to deliver pharmaceutical care either on-site or through audio-vision linking. Currently this technology is only approved for use in the public sector as set out by the South African Pharmacy Council’s Minimum Standards for Remote Automated Dispensing Units / PDUs. The project, currently being piloted in Gauteng, integrates chronic medicine refills, medication monitoring and support, and accurate record documentation to ensure a high-quality continuum of care, excellent customer service through minimizing waiting times and providing the convenience of “after-hours” medication access.

Given the shortage of qualified pharmaceutical personnel in the public sector (International Pharmaceutical Federation 2012), and the move towards task-shifting where nurses manage the dispensing of medicines at primary healthcare level, many patients do not receive professional medication counselling by a pharmacist. Additionally, long waiting times, typically seen in healthcare facilities, contribute to patients defaulting on their medication collection visits with a consequent adverse impact on medication adherence, risk of drug resistance and worsening of the patient’s condition. With a significant increase in the number of patients with other chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension, in addition to HIV, the impact of this shortage of pharmacy personnel is further exacerbated and poses an ongoing challenge to the delivery of medicines on a regular basis for patients needing long-term and even life-long treatment.

While there has been much focus on the challenges in the healthcare system, the impact that these challenges have on patients’ wellbeing and livelihood is often not considered. Healthy chronic patients often sit in waiting areas with other acutely ill patients, in areas with suboptimal ventilation and infection control, leading to an increase risk of illness through exposure to respiratory pathogens. In addition, patients experience loss of work and wages due to the lengthy time spent at health facilities. A study conducted by the Health Economics and Epidemiology Research Office (HE²RO) in 2010 found
that the average patient spends R150 per day to visit a clinic (Magagula et al. 2010).

In-Pharmacy Automation Project

As described above, the use of pharmacy robotic automation technology has the potential to optimize the utilization of existing pharmacy personnel and enhance the delivery of efficient medication services. Automated dispensing systems provide an innovative approach to medicine distribution and facilitate access to medicines in a controlled, secure environment and provide the opportunity to manage patients, in a cost-effective and sustainable manner (American Society of Health-System Pharmacists 1998; Fitzpatrick et al. 2005). Automated medicine dispensing systems allow medications to be stored and dispensed in a safe and controlled manner near the point of care, while controlling and tracking drug distribution (Shirley, 1999). These systems, originally designed to replace traditional medication cabinets in wards and clinical units, were first introduced in hospitals in the US in the 1980s and have facilitated the transition to alternative delivery models and more decentralized medication distribution systems (Mobach 2006). Today, these systems are widely used in public and private hospitals in the US and in Europe as a tool to support the delivery of pharmacy services and have become more prevalent in the outpatient setting, providing convenient, accessible services for patients.

Introducing automation to support routine services in public sector pharmacies has the potential to improve operational efficiencies, reduce facility waiting times for patients and enhance pharmaceutical care outcomes. Pharmaceutical information management and stock control is also enhanced, thereby improving compliance requirements. Pharmacy automation also offers the opportunity to optimize the use of human resources through reducing the need for pharmacy personnel to perform routine tasks such as prescription preparation and the picking of drugs, which are frequently error-prone in busy pharmacies, thus allowing more time for patient engagement and improving patient safety and the quality of pharmaceutical care (Guerrero et al. 1996). Furthermore, the capacity to link automated dispensing services with cloud technology and pharmacy call-centre operations has the potential to facilitate after-hours access and direct patient operation of the system (Paoletti et al. 2007).

This initiative of Right to Care first began through a pilot project started in 2011, with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to evaluate in-pharmacy robotic automation at the Helen Joseph Hospital Themba Lethu Clinic in South Africa. Approval for the implementation and evaluation of the project was obtained from both the Gauteng Department of Health and Helen Joseph Hospital.

Project Implementation Site

The Themba Lethu Clinic is a high-volume HIV treatment, care and management facility, supported by Right to Care, and is easily one of the largest and busiest facilities in the country with over 33 000 patients initiated on antiretroviral therapy (ART) since the inception of the programme in 2003. While the clinic has a formal framework to decentralize the continued management of stable HIV patients to satellite sites, this downstream capacity is rapidly being saturated. The clinic continues to initiate new patients and also manages large volumes of stable patients on treatment, in line with the government’s scale-up efforts. There are currently over 17 000 patients retained in care at the site.

Themba Lethu Clinic has a dedicated pharmacy which typically dispensed ARV medications to an average of 700 patients daily at the time. Prior to the implementation of this project, pharmacy waiting times for patients ranged between 3 and 4.5 hours. Additionally, patients requiring management for other co-morbidities were required to receive these additional medications through the hospital’s main pharmacy, requiring another queue and further increasing waiting times. Although doctors utilize a clinical management IT system (TherapyEdge®), a paper-based system of records was still being used in the clinic which also required patients to wait in queues to collect files during visits. The lack of suitable IT systems in the pharmacy for dispensing as well as ineffective inventory control and routine management reporting, placed significant constraints on the capacity of pharmacy staff to deliver optimum services for patients. Given this workload within
the pharmacy, supply chain and information management activities, as required by law, as well as essential pharmaceutical care interventions such as patient counselling, medication adherence and adverse drug reaction monitoring, were frequently not given sufficient attention.

This project was therefore aimed at improving service delivery for patients at the clinic through the implementation of an automated dispensing system within the pharmacy, supported by an integrated IT environment throughout the clinic. Themba Lethu Clinic remains a key programme in the province which has rapidly evolved to a centre of excellence for the provision of treatment and care services for patients with HIV through its service delivery model and highly trained staff. The clinic is also a referral site for the management of patients with clinical complications; conducts clinical and operational research; and supports training, mentoring and capacity-building of medical and pharmacy students and health workers from other sites in the province. The project was therefore intended to support this role and has the underlying goals of optimizing the delivery of pharmaceutical services as well as scaling up the provision of ARVs and related medicines for patients.

Project Objectives

The key objective of the Themba Lethu pharmacy automation pilot project was to demonstrate the following impact on the delivery of pharmaceutical services:

- Improve operational efficiencies within the pharmacy.
- Reduce waiting times for patients at the pharmacy.
- Increase patient compliance and satisfaction.
- Improve patient counselling through more effective use of pharmaceutical staff.
- Improve inventory management and control of medicines at the facility level.

The additional objectives associated with the project included efforts to eliminate medication dispensing errors for patients; increase patient throughput (regarding volumes and queue speed within the facility); improve management reporting and compliance with pharmaceutical audit requirements; improve related pharmaceutical care interventions for patients (e.g. adherence and safety monitoring); and to enable a paperless operational environment within the pharmacy and clinic.

The Selected Innovation

Innovation speaks to the introduction of new technology together with new processes to address novel or known challenges (Omachonu and Einspruch 2010). Within the healthcare space innovation aims to help healthcare workers to offer an improved service to patients by optimizing processes and equipment used (Thakur et al. 2012). As the landscape of healthcare changes in South Africa, it is critical to face new challenges using innovation as a strategy.

The challenges facing pharmaceutical services were taken up by Right to Care. This was done through a project aimed at introducing, expanding and adapting the latest automation technologies available for use in the South African public sector environment. The project comprised the implementation of an automated dispensing service, integrated with a pharmacy management information system (PMIS), to enable dispensing of prescriptions, control of inventory and facilitate management reporting. The project also involved integration of the PMIS with the clinical management system, already being used by doctors in the clinic, to allow the electronic transfer of patient and prescription data (e-scripting) and laboratory results directly to the pharmacy. This integrated electronic system also enabled other operational activities within the clinic such as the booking of patient visits.

The automation unit is made up of a storage and dispensing system and a loading system for medicines. The system automates the loading, storage and dispensing of medicines and has a storage capacity for approximately 15,000 items. Automated loading is facilitated through a conveyor belt-driven unit in order to accommodate larger quantities of medicines for quick and accurate loading as well as enable
automated night-time loading when the pharmacy is closed. The system utilizes two-dimensional barcode scanning technology to ensure the accurate loading and picking of medicines, thereby eliminating errors. The system ensures a closed, secure environment for stored medicines and enables an optimum level of stock control for medicines issued from the bulk store into the dispensing area. Stored medicines are continually tracked in relation to batch numbers and expiry dates and dispensed accordingly. The system also employs First-In-First-Out (FIFO) principles that further enhance control over medicine stock, eliminating the risk of expiry and providing accurate predictions of future stock requirements for patients. A high level of security is also ensured through a system of user-authorized access to functions and procedures which prevents the theft of medicines.

The robotic dispensing system was integrated with a pharmacy information management system which has all the functionality required, including modules for stock management, dispensing and reporting, and was tailored to meet the requirements for pharmacy systems in the public sector. Once integrated, the system was able to meet all pharmacy-related data management and reporting requirements in line with South African public sector policies and procedures.

The patient experiences the integrated system throughout the entire clinical service. Patients have unique identification numbers linked to their clinical records which are stored on the clinical management system, including patient bookings and follow-up information. The clinical management system has been integrated with the National Health Laboratory Service through a linked barcoded system, enabling laboratory results to be electronically uploaded directly into patient records. When the patient attends their medical visit, the clinician is able to assess and see the full patient medical history and receive alerts for possible drug interactions or abnormal laboratory results. This allows the clinician to see the full information required to improve clinical management and medication prescribing. A prescription generated by the clinician is electronically delivered to the pharmacy through a network connection enabled by cloud technology. Cloud technology enables storage of patient and script information on a central location from where the various systems are linked and can access this information in a secure manner. The patient then advances to the pharmacy with a paper printed script from the system where a barcoding system enables identification of the patient. At the pharmacy, the pharmacist is able to assess and verify the prescription more effectively through being able to access the patient history and relevant laboratory results through the cloud system. This integration of information enables the best clinical care for the patient. When the pharmacist approves the dispensing of the prescription, labels are printed and the robotic arm automatically retrieves the correct medicines and delivers them through a chute to the pharmacist dispensing hatch. During the period taken for the medicines to be picked and dispensed by the robotic system, pharmacy staff have ample opportunity to engage and counsel the patient, allowing for a consistent intervention opportunity with every patient.

During the changeover to the automation system, a two-week period was required to complete the necessary renovations to the pharmacy, install the robotic system, complete the cloud-based data integration, and fully stock the automation system. With the electronic patient management system in place, lower numbers of patients were also booked during this transition period. A temporary manual pharmacy was established elsewhere in the clinic to enable the continuation of pharmaceutical services. On the first day of using this automation system, over 500 patients were serviced. Prior training and a change management strategy were also implemented to ensure staff were well equipped to use the new automation system and mentors were in place to oversee the first two weeks of implementation.
The Impact of the Implementation

As part of this evaluation, several output variables in the pharmacy were measured prior to (baseline) and following the implementation of the pharmacy automation and system integration project. During the first six months of implementation, this pilot project demonstrated massive reduction in patient waiting times, improved operational efficiencies leading to significant increases in service delivery, improved effectiveness of limited pharmacy personnel, and optimized supply chain management. From the data obtained during 2012-2013 from patient waiting time registers, it is evident that the automation solution has seen patient waiting times in the pharmacy drop from an average of three-and-a-half hours to 28 minutes (Right to Care 2013b). Another important advantage was evident in the data obtained from staff time sheet logs during 2012-2013, as it indicated that as a result of the automation pharmacy working hours were reduced from an average of eleven-and-a-half hours to eight-and-a-half hours (Right to Care 2013c). Prescription picking errors have also been completely eliminated in the pharmacy as a result of the barcode scanning technology used to ensure the accurate loading and picking of medicines. In addition, the data obtained from staff interviews (conducted during 2012 and 2013) on how staff experience the automated pharmacy services indicated that staff motivation was significantly enhanced as a result of the improvement in working conditions in the pharmacy (Right to Care and Themba Lethu Clinic Pharmacy 2013).

There has been a significant impact on patient waiting times, which has allowed patients to suitably change their routines in obtaining pharmacy services. Previously, patients began queuing inside hospital passage ways from around four-o’clock each morning waiting for the clinic to open at seven-thirty in the morning. Normally between 200 and 250 patients were already in the queue by the time the clinic opened. For these patients, this typically added an additional three hours to the three-and-a-half hours of pharmacy waiting times described previously. Records from staff log books also indicated that, given the large patient volumes and despite the longer pharmacy operational hours, patients were sometimes turned away and required to return the next day to collect their medications. With patients now waiting on average, less than 18 minutes in the pharmacy, their routines for obtaining services at the clinic have changed and early morning queues have been significantly reduced.

The impact on staff in the pharmacy has also been significant. Previously, staff were required to work overtime regularly, which not only had a financial impact on the hospital budget but also contributed to over-worked and demotivated staff. The impact of long working hours, unrelenting queues and patient dissatisfaction has caused a high turn-over of pharmacy management staff (Right to Care 2013a). However, data obtained from pharmacy staff registers during 2012-2013 painted a much better picture: after the first six months of operation of the automation system, only sixty percent of the original staff was required for routine dispensing functions in the pharmacy, allowing other staff to undertake other important pharmaceutical care functions such as ward rounds, patient adherence monitoring and interventions, safety and adverse drug reaction monitoring and reporting, as well as enhanced interventions for patients on second-line therapy and those with more complex treatment and management needs (Right to Care 2013d).

Lessons Learned during the Project

A number of lessons have been learned both from the implementation of this pilot project and from the subsequent three years of operation of the integrated automation system. The robotic automated dispensing and integrated data systems comprising the electronic patient management and unique patient identifier system, National Health Laboratory Service laboratory data, electronic pharmacy system and automation have demonstrated significant value for patients, staff and the operational environment within the clinic. With the seamless movement of data, errors previously encountered through manual data capturing have been eliminated.

The use of barcoding technology to identify patient records, laboratory results, and prescribed medicines have also created an error-free approach to providing services by both clinics and pharmacists. The barcoding system used for robotic loading and picking of medicines has eliminated time wasted...
by staff manually undertaking this function and eliminated picking errors, particularly for medicines with similar package design and branding. The use of a single identifier for patients also significantly reduced the problem of multiple patient files and the resulting wastage of time spent searching for lost files.

The use of defined standard operating procedures, processes and protocols for the new approach required for running an automated pharmacy environment was critical. New job descriptions were required to be developed as well as a training and mentoring programme implemented to ensure the correct approaches were used for stock control, machine loading, night-time activation of robotics, maintenance and dispensing, and other routine pharmacy operations. Further standard operating procedures were required for technical staff to support back-up internet connectivity, un-interrupted electrical supply, immediate desktop support for computers and seamless upgrades of software.

**Limitations of the Innovation**

Despite its successes, this pilot project also indicated several limitations of the current automation technology, which is developed in Europe, to meet the needs of the public sector environment in South Africa and highlighted the need for further innovation to meet these unique requirements. The available technology has been originally designed for a pharmaceutical environment where all medicines are dispensed in their original containers without the need for changing quantities dispensed or repackaging. All European manufacturers have a similar approach that only meets the needs of their environment. In the public health sector in South Africa, roughly thirty percent of medicines on tender are supplied in patient-ready packs (plastic/foil packets) and an additional ten percent are supplied in oddly-shaped containers, which prevents their handling by the current robotic technology. As a result, only around sixty percent of the medicine items in the public health sector can be used in these automation systems, with the rest having to be manually repacked in appropriate cartons/containers prior to loading. However, through this learning, Right to Care has now developed and tested a further innovative improvement to this technology which allows for the handling of hundred percent of South African packages. Without this approach, the additional step of repackaging of medicine creates an un-sustainable future for automation in the public health sector in South Africa.

**The Next Innovation: A Pilot for Out-of-Pharmacy Automation for Access to Chronic Medicines**

Right to Care has taken the lessons learned and experience gained in the previous automation project and has begun the next level of innovation, through a subsidiary organization, Right ePharmacy. This is in response to specific challenges around chronic medicines currently managed through primary health care. With chronic patients only requiring routine clinic visits every six months and repeat prescriptions for medicines needing collection on a monthly basis, there is an important opportunity for automation systems to meet this need. While various approaches have been piloted for the dispensing and collection of repeat medicines for public health patients, few have increased accessibility to medicines and improved convenience for patients. There is also a growing number of patients requiring chronic medications, and this is expected to increase further in line with new treatment guidelines requiring earlier treatment of all HIV positive patients. The National Test and Treat strategy has a key goal of ensuring that all people who test positive for HIV receive the option to start ART regardless of CD4 count.

Right ePharmacy is now taking automated dispensing technology to the next level and piloting Pharmacy Dispensing Units (PDUs) for the dispensing of chronic medicines to patients. This pilot has recently been initiated in the City of Johannesburg, Gauteng at four sites: Alexandra Plaza, Ndofaya Mall, Bara Mall and Bambanani Mall. Each of these sites has for PDU units servicing patients from the community clinics in that area. A cloud-based pharmacy information management system enables patients to collect their medicines from these convenient locations. This approach, which is aligned to the National Health Insurance (NHI) plan, will create a network of linked facilities to improve supply chain management. The development of a data cloud to enable remote dispensing is seen as critical to the improvement and
transformation of healthcare solutions and integral to the e-Health Strategy of South Africa 2012-2017 (Health-eNews 2012). In this plan telemedicine and virtual health care are seen as an approach to leveraging technology to improved health outcomes.

The PDU is a South African innovation, designed by Right ePharmacy, to meet the needs of the public health environment. The PDU serves as both a central dispensing service and a pick-up point for medicines, and is supported by a call centre for direct pharmacist audio/visual interaction. The PDUs, which are similar to ATMs, provide an Out-of-Pharmacy approach where all stable patients receiving chronic medications are able to receive their medicines at extended operating hours, seven days per week, located at convenient locations close to their homes and work places, such as shopping centres. The approach utilizes PDU technology which Right ePharmacy has recently developed in South Africa. This is the first such system in the world that combines remote dispensing of medicines with tele-pharmacy operations through the integration and management of cloud-based data.

Patients will receive an automated SMS five days prior to their scheduled pick up date, reminding them to collect their medicines. Following registration as a chronic patient on the system, patients are able to identify themselves at the PDU through their ID book or patient health ID card and pin code and can receive their medicines in less than five minutes.

Patients who do not collect their medicines within 48 hours of the scheduled pick-up date will receive a call from the call centre. Patients will also have access to the call centre for any medicine-related queries. The SMS reminders and call centre accessibility further increases patient compliance. The use of PDUs significantly reduces patient waiting times.

Each PDU site has the capacity to service up to 14,000 patients per month from surrounding clinics at a convenient location such as a shopping centre. Users of these PDUs are stable chronic patients from various facilities within the relevant sub-districts which are Alexandra Plaza (Region E), Bara and Ndofaya Malls (Region D), and Bambanani Mall (Region A). Demand creation and outreach initiatives were used in conjunction with facility staff to assist in the identification of stable patients and orienting them on the location and use of PDU pick-up points. As part of the ePharmacies an integrated supply chain management system was implemented to ensure that PDUs always have the required stock levels in anticipation of medication collections by patients and integrated with supply chain systems of the Department of Health.

Patients are able to receive their monthly scripts at any time according to their predetermined schedules, for example, on the way to or from work, over weekends while shopping or on the way home from places of worship. This expands the hours of health service provision to the patients. In addition, providing services to chronic patients outside of healthcare facilities through PDUs significantly frees up the staff resources in these facilities to focus further on acute patients and chronic patients needing more complex interventions.

**Advantages of the Pharmacy Dispensing Units Automated Pharmacy Solution**

Additional benefits of this technology and the use of PDUs include the following:

- Extended hours, seven days a week availability for patients to collect medicines outside of health facilities at PDU sites.
- Quick patient collection process (five minutes), reducing patient waiting times.
• Data held in cloud, which is connected to all automated pharmacies as well as PDU sites allowing staff to view specific patient data at any of the PDU sites.

• All pick-up points are managed by a pharmacist, with auxiliary pharmacy staff, to enable patients' access to direct pharmaceutical support, which they currently may not have at existing clinics.

• Integrated data system between In-Pharmacy and Out-of-Pharmacy automation.

• All patients receive integrated communication through SMS reminders and follow-up calls for missed visits.

• Stock management systems comply with the highest standards to eliminate stock losses through expiry and pilferage, and facilitate accurate forecasting.

The current PDU pilot project in Gauteng has the aim of evaluating the operability of the unit by the patient as well as the effectiveness of the cloud-based information management system. Results and lessons learned from this pilot will be used to plan further maturation of the technology and explore alternative applications. The primary objects of its evaluation is therefore firstly to evaluate patient acceptance and experiences with the PDU, including experience with video-linked assistance using unidentified online client surveys and secondly to evaluate summary usage statistics generated by the PDU. In the second case it concerns the number of prescriptions dispensed, accuracy of medication dispensed, time spent on each video link, peak time periods, down time (e.g. an error log indicating time out of order, under maintenance, restocking, etc.), and the average time per prescription dispensed.

Conclusion

The implementation of in-pharmacy automation to support pharmacy services at Themba Lethu Clinic is the first in the public sector in South Africa. This project has demonstrated the value of automation in implementing best practices for the delivery of pharmaceutical services in high-volume facilities. Whilst the project had an initial focus on the Themba Lethu Clinic pharmacy in order to develop the implementation model and associated best practices, lessons learned from this project enabled wider implementation of this technology to be considered both for the Helen Joseph Hospital main pharmacy as well as Steve Biko Academic Hospital.

With the expectation to manage an increased number of chronic patients in the public sector in the face of the current challenges in delivering quality healthcare to patients, new and innovative technologies are required. South Africa now has the largest HIV programme in the world and significant strain is being placed on the entire health system. While there is a goal of doubling the number of chronic patients in care, resources to support the expansion of facilities, management systems, staff and equipment are not in place as yet (Keeton 2010). Furthermore, as medicines represent the third-largest expenditure in health, innovation that protects this resource through effective supply chain management solutions is urgently needed.

As we consider the opportunities for automation, we must take into account the impact on the patients’ routines and livelihoods. Many of the chronic patients in South Africa represent the working poor who cannot afford to spend a day each month attending to life-long treatable diseases. These patients can have a positive impact on the economy through improving service delivery and enabling access to chronic medications in a convenient and practical manner outside of public sector health facilities.

Pharmacy automation has already proven that it is a viable solution for scaling up a sustainable approach to providing higher quality service to patients. Through novel pharmacy automation solutions such as the PDUs, there are opportunities to bring the expertise and support of health care professionals to rural and underserved areas through the use of telemedicine and tele-pharmacy approaches. South Africa has the unique opportunity to bring innovative solutions to high-burden diseases and lead the way in technology for public health solutions.

Pharmacy automation however is not a silver bullet for health care. It is a solution that requires strong support systems, highly skilled and trained staff and effective technology solutions designed for the South African environment.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THIKA SUPERHIGHWAY IN KENYA

Patrick Mbataru

Introduction

During the last two decades, Kenya as well as the East Africa region has experienced substantial infrastructural expansion. Vision 2030, Kenya’s social and economic development blueprint, includes an agenda for a range of 51 infrastructure projects, which included a 10,000 kilometre (km) road expansion programme (KRB 2015). Infrastructural development is defined as a silver bullet that would cure all social problems and lead the country to achieve middle-income status. The country has expanded its network of paved roads from 7,000 km in 2001 to about 12,000 km (CIA 2014) in 2013. Thousands of kilometres have also been upgraded to all-weather roads. However, this represents only eight percent of the 160,000 km of the clarified roads that need upgrading.

The pillars of this grand infrastructural development are several ‘flagship projects’ that symbolize the march toward the middle-income status. These are, without order of priority: the 50 km Nairobi-Thika road improvement project, i.e. turning the dual four-lane highway into an eight-lane expressway. Thika is an industrial town to the north-east of Nairobi. This was completed in 2012. There is also the laying down of the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Rail line. The 300 billion Shilling (Kenyan Shilling) project funded by China is meant to run parallel, business-wise, with the old truck road that was created over a century ago by the British. The project’s timeline was from 2015 to 2017, while the Nairobi-Uganda border line was scheduled to begin later.

Other key projects include the Galana-Kalalu irrigation project (of about one million acres) in the coast region, the Konza techno city, the expansion of power generation towards geothermal, wind and nuclear power production. Other projects include the expansion of the Port of Mombasa, and the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport’s Greenfield expansion project.

However, the flagship project that has captured the greatest social, political-economic interest is the Lamu Port Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor (LAPSSET). This is a set of infrastructural projects including a port, an 800 km expressway, a standard gauge railway and oil pipeline running from the historical Lamu town through northern-eastern Kenya, to the central town of Isiolo (300 km north of Nairobi), and on onwards to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, the northern neighbours of Kenya. This will be the second transport corridor in East Africa, the other being the southern corridor running from the Kenya’s coast to serve Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The LAPSSET and the other flagship projects are not without wider regional implications. The Northern corridor, including the Thika road highway project, is part of the wider plan, schematized to open alternative southern sea access for Ethiopia and Southern Sudan. Both have been left without reliable sea access after the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia and southern Sudan from the greater Sudan. This new corridor will be more critical to Southern Sudan than to Ethiopia. The unsustainability of depending on the hostile Sudan for the export of oil is obvious. The access to Southern Sudan’s oil and Ethiopian market, together with the intended development of the new oil fields

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in northern Kenya, makes this project an economic masterstroke for Kenya. The importance of this project is underscored by the recent interest shown on it by the Africa Union (Daily Nation 2015).

In Africa as elsewhere, the well-known justification for infrastructure investment is the assumed improvement of economic growth attributed to reduced transportation costs and increased accessibility (the so-called primary transportation benefits). These are believed to have impacts on other important sectors of the economy, as well as enhancing productivity and economic growth through the various channels: reorganization of production, better production and high-level private (inwards and foreign direct) investment, wider markets, increased specialization and economies of scale and also effects on labour market supply, labour costs and labour productivity. (Boopen 2006).

The main purpose of this paper is to interrogate the prevalent logic supposing a linear relationship between transport infrastructure and economic development. The findings are presented below and present a framework for a criticism on infrastructure-led economic development.

As the focus of this study was the Thika Superhighway, a survey was undertaken to demonstrate that a linear relationship between infrastructure and local development is not necessarily obvious. As part of the study thirty small-scale business owners were interviewed and a census was also conducted on new businesses established after the road was built. The various questions focused on the factors influencing the establishment of the businesses. Data was collected from three main towns along the highway, namely, Githurai, Ruiru and Juja. The thirty business owners who participated comprised ten business owners who were interviewed in each of the three main towns.

**Interrogating the Infrastructural Logic**

Despite the massive expansion of the transport infrastructure in Kenya, the question of the real impact of this considerable expansion is just beginning to shape the discourse on the difference between economic development, economic growth and what improved wellbeing the rollout will make in the country. The key issue is whether a superhighway like Thika Superhighway or the Standard Gauge Railway has any direct impact on the common people along or beyond the infrastructure (Ndii; and Ndemo 2014).

The effect of infrastructural expansion on real income or whether this improves real livelihoods has been controversial in developed countries. Literature review on theories of infrastructure-led economic development and studies elsewhere point to this controversy (Agenor 2006). It seems obvious that some of the literature on the impact of transport infrastructure generally shows a positive relation between infrastructure and economic development. Indeed, many studies done in Africa shows that the relationship between transportation infrastructure and economic development may actually be stronger in least developed countries than in more developed countries (Njoh 2009). Studies on railways in India found that railroads decreased trade costs and interregional price gaps, increased interregional and international trade, increased real income levels and that a sufficient statistic of the effect of railroad on welfare in the model (an effect that is purely due to newly exploited gains from trade) accounts for virtually all of the observed impact of railroads on real income in the data (Donaldson 2010). However, as Donaldson indicated the fact that over 40 000 km of rail lines were approved but never constructed, seemingly had no spurious effects.

Studies done in the United States of America concluded that those states that have invested in infrastructure tend to have greater output, more private investment and more employment growth. Some work has suggested that the public investment comes before the pick-up in economic activity and serves as a base, but cautions that much more work is required to spell out the specifics of the link between public capital and economic performance (Munnel 1990).

The impact varies from country to country. Transport infrastructure appears to have ‘normal’ rates of return in developed countries, extraordinarily high rates of return in industrializing countries and moderate rates of return in least developed countries. Studies imply that the effect of infrastructure is slow to occur but long-lived, although there is little time series
evidence to support this (Canning and Fay 1993). The expectation should be on the long run. Yet, infrastructure as the logic of economic growth and development, as used in Africa or elsewhere, is based on short-term realization (Ndii 2014; and Boopen 2006). In a study done about two decades ago, Canning and co-authors (1993) indicated that the long-term impact on the GDP of developed countries (United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany and France) was between five and twenty-five percent per annum. However, in the cases of Japan and Italy it was even as high as between forty and fifty percent per annum. Industrializing countries like South Korea and Chile posted the highest rates of return, which was estimated to be in excess of two hundred percent per annum, while in countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Kenya (with largely agricultural-based economies) it provided less than fifty percent return per year.

The problem of inadequate infrastructure development in Africa has been an important point in discussing why Africa has not industrialized. One sub-theme that intrudes in this discussion is that Africa relies too much on borrowed capital to build infrastructural stock. However, no country ever developed economically solely by relying on local capital. What Africa could do is to be ‘smart’ in infrastructural development, focusing on sectors like industrial parks and export processing zones, something that is being successfully done in East Asia and Ethiopia (African Development Bank (AFDB) 2018).

Criticism of Infrastructure-led Economic Growth

It is readily assumed that infrastructure services to GDP are substantial and that they generally exceed the cost of provision of those services. However, the relationship between infrastructure capital and economic growth is controversial. Recent studies focusing on the impact of highway improvements on country economies have found limited evidence that highways investments increase the size of local economies and certainly little support for claims of a dramatic productivity boost from increased infrastructure outlays (Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 1994; as well as Esfahani and Ramirez 2003). High spending by the Clinton Administration was based on the theoretical belief that large-scale investments in public infrastructure, such as the interstate highways, contribute to economic growth. Empirical support for the hypothesis is extremely controversial and consists of studies that are divided on both the magnitude and direction of the net effect of infrastructure spending on economic growth (Chandra and Thomson 2000). The relationship between public capital and private investment in many cases needs more scrutiny, as governments use public investment and private companies to create infrastructure, especially investment in transport infrastructure (Eberts 1990). In addition, Chandra and Thomson point out that transport infrastructure improvement may lead to ‘leakages’in non-metropolitan areas by inducing some economic activities to shift from these areas to nearby metropolitan ones as a result of lower transportation costs. This is important in Kenya, where feeder roads would normally remain poor. The net impact on such investment on aggregate output and earnings remains an empirical question. Furthermore, the high cost of paving roads challenges infrastructural investment as a strategy to stimulate growth in non-metropolitan areas.

Critics like Chandra and Thomas point out that empirical work overstates the impact on productivity by ignoring other factors and the fact that the direction of causation between public investment and output growth is unclear. The role of transport infrastructure in the process is little understood. The endogeneity issue is ignored in the empirical assessment of the relationship between highway construction and growth because of the endogenous influence on the growth. By so doing, the ‘positive studies’ incorrectly characterize the relationship between new highways and economic growth. Chandra and Thomas demonstrate that highways are exogenous to the non-metropolitan areas they pass through. In the United States of America, researchers found that new interstate highways raise earnings in counties that benefits directly from the new construction, relative to counties that did not receive such infrastructure. They also pointed out that studies showing positive impact relied on inferences made from a limited group of industries in the state of Minnesota and ignored the possible endogeneity of highway spending (Stephanedes and Eagle 1986).
Further research did not find that job growth or per capita income in Florida counties was a function of highway spending (Wiseman 2010). Using quasi-experimental instead of regression methods, Rephann and Isserman (1994) found that new interstate highways had a significant impact on earnings in services, retail, trade, and manufacturing and in transportation and public utilities. In counties with medium-sized towns (population above 25,000) but not near an urban area, significant and positive impact was identified for retail trade industries and government. It did not have a positive and significant impact on earnings in these adjacent to counties with a new interstate highway. Some cross-sectional evidence showed that output levels are positively related to the amount of transportation infrastructure in a country. However, there is little time series evidence that increases in infrastructure spending lead to immediate output (Canning and Fay 1993). Cunning and Fay conclude that infrastructure capital should not be regarded as national factors of production but rather as a condition for higher rates of economic growth and that doubling of the road stock leads to roughly 1% of higher growth in real GDP per year. A compounded growth adds up to a sizeable effect on output over a period of time. Moreover, infrastructure formation requires resources to be taken away from production of the final good; therefore even if infrastructure accumulation may enhance economic growth through increased specialization, it has as retarding influence on growth as a result of its resource costs (Bougheas, Demedriades and Mumuneas 1999).

Goode and Hastings (1989) find results similar to those by Rephann and Isserman. The authors find that proximity to a limited access highway had a positive impact on manufacturing plant location in small metropolitan counties but not in non-metropolitan counties. Chadra (2000) as well as Rephann and Isserman (1994) found that a new highway may also reorganize activity within the region by concentrating growth in retail and service industries in counties that the new interstate highway passes through. The positive results in metropolitan areas may be because firms look for networks, labour and markets in higher-density areas.

While substantial studies found high returns on transport infrastructure investment, the robustness of the results has been questioned in other empirical studies. There has been an increase in more cautious studies.

For total earnings, Rephann and Isserman report, the cumulative growth ranges between six and eight percent, but this is 24 years after the initial opening of the highway in a county. Earnings grew by five to eight percent in the services and retail industries over the same period. However, in counties adjacent to the highway counties, total earnings fell by one to three percent for industries and eight to eleven percent. Using estimates derived from a seemingly fixed-effects model, the net effect of a new interstate highway on regional growth is found to be essentially zero.

Holz found that previous findings of the positive impact of public capital stock may have arisen due to a failure to account for the endogeneity of public stock. By controlling for the unobserved, state-specific characteristics, Holz also effectively demonstrated that there is no relationship between aggregate public-sector capital and private productivity (Holz-Eakin 1994). By utilising similar methods Evans and Carres (1994) also arrived at comparable findings. In a study that focused on the impact of rural improvement projects in Vietnam, Mu and Walle found that ‘heterogeneous’ impacts across geographic, communities and households should be attributed to a whole range of factors that shape the strength of the developmental impact (Mu and Walle 2007). However, in a case study conducted in India on the overall role and effect of infrastructure projects, the indications were that such projects had a positive impact on local development in that country (Sahoo and Dash 2009).

By working through the literature, it is evident that one of the areas that the sources seem to insufficiently clarify and do not necessary have consensus on, is the role of infrastructure in the process of development. It seems that this aspect is also not clearly understood. Esfahani and Ramirez point out that most studies of economic growth consider the role of infrastructure and its possible positive effects by including infrastructure indicators on the right hand side of reduced-form models. However, this is inadequate,
because to understand the process of growth, one needs to go beyond the aggregate and distant relationships and to uncover the mechanisms through which various factors shape aggregate performance. This means there are other variables, for example institutions, including law and order as was clearly illustrated by Phillippe and Martins (1995) a number of years ago. Eberts (1999) found statistically significant positive effects on small-scale businesses, but lesser impact on large-scale firms. This study confirms this among small-scale businesses along Thika Highway road in Kenya.

Interesting findings are those by Eberts (1999), who indicated that possible statistically significant effects are only in small-scale businesses, with lesser impact on large-scale investments. Highways therefore have a differential impact across industries. Some particular industries, it seems, grow as a result of reduced transportation costs, whereas others contract as economic activities reposition. This may explain why along Nairobi’s Thika Road few manufacturers have been established there after the highway was improved.

In addition, highways affect the spatial allocation of economic activities, in the sense that they raise the level of economic activity in the areas that they pass directly through, but they also motivate economic activities to draw away from adjacent counties (Chandra and Thomson 2000). However, in Africa, such infrastructure projects like airports, paved roads and power plants are often built for political gain (AFDB 2018).

This view seems to be gaining currency among researchers – for example, Holl (2004) and Rephann and Isserman (1994). Holl finds that motorways affect the spatial distribution of manufacturing establishment at the municipality level, and that the strength of the impacts differs across sectors and space. Most benefits are concentrated near the new infrastructure. Firms prefer locations closer to new motorways than distant municipalities because poor infrastructure imposes costs on trade within and between counties. Infrastructure can facilitate both domestic and international trade. Firms with increasing returns sectors tend to locate to counties or countries with the best domestic infrastructure (Martin and Rogers 1995). Examining the effectiveness of highway investment as an economic tool, Rephann and Isserman found that interstate highways in the United States of America had positive effects on interstate counties in close proximity to large cities or having some degree of prior urbanization such as a city with more than 25 000 residents. Rural interstate and off-interstate counties exhibited few effects.

The debate in Kenya on the impact of highway and road infrastructure has been limited to newspaper commentaries, and even in this space there has been only a few sparsely spread contributions. The message in these contributions was generally framed along the lines of the assumptions of the literature reviewed above (Mbataru 2014). As a result of the mixed bag of results, many scholars have interrogated the logic of rolling out mega projects, rather than intervention on human resources (Ndii 2014; Ndemo 2014; and Kanyinga 2015). Overall, there is no consensus on the impact of infrastructure on development. Researchers concede that the relationship between infrastructure and economic development is strongly dependent on country, type of infrastructure and period under study. As indicated in the African Infrastructure Development Index (developed by the African Development Bank) in the 39 African countries surveyed, information and communications technologies (ICT), roads and electricity contributed 0.99 percentage points in GDP growth between 1960 and 2005 (AFDB 2018). Although the situation may have changed in terms of the precise statistics, these aspects do contribute to growth and development.

**Research Findings**

The expansion of Thika Road was based on the logic that the country was losing about 10 billion shillings every year, due to wear and tear and fuel consumption during traffic jams. The highway was one of the key Vision 2030 projects. As studies reviewed here suggest, these costs might not be minimized with the expansion of the road.
A crucial question in the study was whether the road motivated commercial initiatives. Asked whether the new road motivated them to start their business, a majority of respondent said it did not, as Figure 1 below indicates.

**Figure 1: The role of the new road in motivating business start-ups**

Of the thirty small-scale business people interviewed along Thika Highway in Kenya, 37 percent said they started their businesses after the highway was upgraded. According to 47 percent of the respondents their business has expanded after the upgrade. This compares to forty percent of those who said they started before the upgrade. Only ten percent of the two groups said their businesses has stagnated because of the upgrade. On a scale of one to ten (1 to 10) with one being very bad and 10 being very good, the mode was seven, which implies that those persons in business considered their businesses to be doing quite well.

In terms of sales, 67 percent said that the improved road has boosted their business. However, 47 percent said the upgrading of the highway has brought more competition, so that the new road cancelled out the potential benefits, a point alluded to by Chadra and Thomson (2000) on the fact the highways motivate other business to relocate to the areas where the new road passes to take advantage of new favourable factors like lowered costs of transport.

On the reasons for starting their businesses, 53 percent said they started their businesses on expectation of higher income. Other reasons cited for starting business along Thika Road were cheaper accommodation (27 percent) and proximity to their ancestral homes. Only seven percent said they started their business along the highway for lack of alternatives, which may confirm research by Eberts (1990) that there is no known relationship between public investment on infrastructure and household decisions.

As one could have expected, 67 percent of those persons that started their business before the road expansion occurred indicated that the increase in passengers along the improved highway was a major boost to their business. As residential estates along the road also developed, forty percent of these respondents attributed the improvement in their businesses to the residential expansion along the road.

The main problems facing the small-scale business along the highway are a lack of space, the rising competition, and harassment by the county government. As a result, 33 percent of those interviewed indicated that the daily fee charged by the county officials for operating along the road ate into their profits. Another problem was the general lack of capital to expand businesses.

It appears that most businesses hardly expanded and few business owners diversified, although 57 percent indicated that they intended, or were willing to expand, if they could get more capital. Other social-economic process observed was the social capital characteristic in the clusters analysed. Most clusters operated along road junctions coinciding with a bus stage. All clusters had some form of Chama (merry-go-round) or self-help group. The Muigai-in boda boda (motorcycle taxis) group is morphing into a Matatu (van taxis) group and has acquired three vans. The group organize monthly bulk buying of household consumer items like food for distribution among its members.

The case and results of the Thika road study is in correlation with findings of previous studies done in the United States about the favourable returns from the service businesses compared to industry (Chandra and Thomson 2000). Studies have shown that there often is substantial expansion of service businesses along new or improved roads. However, there is little manufacturing established along the roads, although some industrial developments have branched out along the bypasses such as those leading into the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. They obviously intend to take advantage of proximity and access to the airport.
The service businesses that have moved or that have been started along Thika Road include supermarkets as well as the creation of new malls. The following five new supermarkets were started: Uchumi, Nakumatt, Kassmart, Tusks and Naivas. In addition, several major malls have been established or are in the process of doing so since the completion of the road. These include the Thika Road Mall (TRM), and the Garden Estate Mall (which will be the biggest mall in the eastern and central Africa region). In addition, there is also the Juja Mall and unicity of the Kenyatta University. The expansion of the highway also attracted many real estate speculators and investors. Previous studies and media reports have reported strong settlements along Thika Road, which has led to soaring property prices.

The international service businesses that have moved to Thika Road are the Subway food chain (from the United States of America), Woolworths (from South Africa), and Xgma Kenya Limited (China). No new factories have been established since the road was completed. From this, the study confirms previous research that industry (manufacturing firms specifically) will consider factors other than just the improved or new transport infrastructure in making decisions to relocate (Martin and Rogers 1995).

Concluding Remarks

Although new transport infrastructure in Africa could be interpreted as good development that would stimulate local growth, it does not necessarily translate into better livelihoods for persons living in the specific region or area of new transport infrastructure. In interrogating transport infrastructures and development, it would be important to take into consideration that there are many other social and economic factors that may influence local economic development, for example national economic growth and development, the creation of other amenities, and policy development and implementation.

The study confirms that most of the economic activities along Thika Superhighway in Nairobi are informal small-scale businesses. These businesses along the road are mostly operated by women, and the majority of them focus on food and beverages, or are small-scale transport enterprises. There has been and is, however, a rise in large service investments along the road, such as hotels, malls and retail businesses. It may be possible that the impact on wider economic development is slow and not easily perceptible, but other endogenous factors may have led to the rapid expansion of particular businesses like services (as contrasted to manufacturing). Such endogenous factors are for example the large movements of people seeking ease of transport and housing along the improved highway.

Bibliography


Introduction

The South African Parliament became a site of noisy and sometimes violent contestation following the fifth democratic elections in 2014. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), then a new addition to the opposition benches, were strident about executive abuse of power and public money. In March 2014, the then Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, found that President Jacob Zuma had unduly benefited from security upgrades at his Nkandla home and recommended that he pay back the money to the state (Public Protector 2014). These findings, together with related scandals of executive abuse of power and state capture over the next four years, foregrounded the potential and limits of legislative oversight (see, for example, Bhorat et al. 2016).

The reluctance of the ANC in parliament to deal with the Nkandla upgrade scandal as part of its formal oversight responsibilities was challenged by a vocal EFF social media campaign titled #PayBackTheMoney, which brought Parliament to a halt on several occasions and raised public awareness about executive accountability in parliament. In August 2015, party political interests prevailed when the ANC-dominant National Assembly exonerated the President from any liability. This was reversed by a Constitutional Court Judgement (31 March 2016) which ruled that the President was required to pay back, and that the oversight conducted by Parliament was lacking (Constitutional Court 2016).

In October 2015, a national student uprising against financial exclusions from higher education led to a storming of parliament calling for #FeesMustFall (Booysen 2016). The two-week protest led to the government conceding to freeze fee increases at 0% for 2016 but left unresolved the role of parliament in steering budget decision-making. Robust debate on executive decisions, budget allocations and implementation progress is the role of Members of Parliament (MPs), as representatives of the people that is mandated in Chapter Four of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Section 42(3) of the Constitution states that Parliament should secure government by the people by "scrutinising and overseeing executive action" (Republic of South Africa 1996).

In addition to dealing with the legislative process Parliament is required (in Section 52.2 of the Constitution) to oversee the exercise of executive authority and hold organs of the state accountable (Republic of South Africa 1996). These constitutional provisions are echoed in Section 2.1 of Parliament’s Oversight and Accountability Model (2009a), which defines oversight as “a constitutionally mandated function of legislative organs of state to scrutinise and oversee executive action and any organ of state.” Accountability (Section 2.2) is defined as a ‘social relationship’ requiring explanation and justification of actions.

Oversight, as a process of approval and review, complements accountability, as a process of responsiveness and answerability. Together they represent the process through which the executive accounts for the distribution and management of public resources, and the legislature ensures mandates are met. In this process, public trust is secured. Oversight therefore implies supervision. It is a

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process of looking over a set of activities to make sure commitments are met. Focused attention is given to failures to carry out mandates due to inefficiency or poor productivity.

Parliamentary process is premised on an implied democratic contract between citizens, elected representatives and the state. Versions of representative democracy advocate that checks and balances between the people, the powerful and the polity ensure participation and fairness in decision-making. Democratic practice is signified as a cycle of accountability, and a balance of power, between legislators (as representatives of the people), the judiciary (rule of law) and the executive (the power of the state). This cycle of accountability ensures that rules and incentives are predictable and reliable even if the outcomes are not. Figure 1 provides a simple representation of this process.

**Figure 1: The implicit democratic contract**

Being a representative of the people is always difficult. It is for this reason that Iris Marion Young (2000:16), in the opening of her book *Democracy and Inclusion*, claims that “democracy is hard to love”. Representation is a greater challenge in a system based on proportional party representation, rather than constituencies, as direct accountability to the people is mediated through party structures. It can be difficult to look beyond party political issues to the public good when making decisions in parliament. This tension between party and public interests operates at the core of democratic practice and legislative oversight. Young (2000) argues that despite the open intentions of democracy, debates and decision-making processes tend to favour the privileged or vocal. This tension between the principle and the practice of representivity is embedded in the complex exercise of oversight.

This article documents the establishment and early operations of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) in order to examine the complexity of fiscal oversight. The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (2009) extends the traditional oversight functions of Parliament from approval and review to amendment. However, matters of the fiscus (revenue, budgets and appropriations) are technical, so the executive (and in particular National Treasury) tends to dominate debates. The establishment of the PBO is intended to shift the imbalance in fiscal oversight by enabling Parliament to engage more confidently using independent and reliable data and analysis.

An exploration of the role of the PBO in addressing issues of executive dominance and member capacity was undertaken through qualitative case study research. First, a review of available research on legislative oversight and independent fiscal institutions was undertaken. The resulting analysis provided a framework for the collection and analysis of the case data (see section on minding the executive and the money). The research included interviews with the director, office manager, five of the PBO professional staff members (analysts) and a parliamentary official (PO), as well as documentary analysis of the relevant policy and related parliamentary or PBO documents. This includes minutes of parliamentary debates and discussions that were about or involved the PBO.
Minding the Money

Provincial and national legislatures are required to hold their respective executives and implementing departments accountable on behalf of the people (Republic of South Africa 1996). In other words, members of legislatures act in the public interest, as one part of a balance of power with the executive and the judiciary. The concept of oversight implicit to the separation of powers has its roots in liberal understandings of the state. Hobbes (1968) and Locke (1966) suggest that democratic state institutions are the result of a social contract in which rational individuals (men) cede some freedom for the common protection of life, civil liberty and property. The legislature operates as watchdog, at the interface between the state (the institutions in common) and society (an open diverse space), to secure common interests.

In many democratic systems, legislatures, sustained by civic engagement and public participation, comprise the formal space for contestation. Such engagement is enriched by competitive politics and active civil society. Putnam’s (1993) writing on social capital, although contested, suggests that reciprocal engagement builds high levels of social trust and co-operation, which enables development (see for example Schuurman 2003, Bebbington 2004 and Fine 2008). This trust is premised on a commitment to political equality and the common good, tolerance of differences and civic participation. Rotberg and Salahub (2013) note that this tradition is missing in many sub-Saharan African countries due to one party dominance or authoritarian government, which limits legislative oversight to ‘form without substance’.

In a study of 88 legislatures, Yamamoto (2007:9) uses “the review, monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy and legislation” as a working definition of legislative oversight. This suggests that parliaments have an oversight role at each stage of the legislative and policy implementation process. Their key functions would include questioning the executive to ensure answerability, approving policy and appointments, sanctioning illegal actions, ensuring appropriate use of public monies, tracking implementation and improving transparency. These together would, in principle, deepen public trust and improve delivery.

In practice, however, oversight, like any other process, is about power. The effectiveness of parliaments in exercising oversight is dependent of the nature of the state, the political system, the socio-economic conditions and history of particular societies. The context does matter. In a presidential system, for example, if the president’s party differs from the majority party, rigorous oversight can lead to stalling or obstruction. Similarly, in a parliamentary system where the same party controls the executive and the legislature, oversight can be directed to internal party concerns, cutting out opposition party competition and reducing oversight potential (Yamamoto 2007:13).

Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olsen (2006) claim that oversight processes combined with strong legislatures define whether a country can be (at least formally) democratic, and enable legislatures to promote democracy and good governance. Such oversight requires political will from an executive committed to the review and answer process, and a legislature willing to check and sanction. Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and O’Brien (2012:9) argue that a “general lack of government responsiveness, especially in those political contexts where there is ‘executive dominance’ and limited scope for constructive parliamentary engagement” limits the potential of legislative oversight in holding the executive to account.

Fiscal oversight is a function performed by legislatures to shape the allocation of public resources to meet government priorities and ensure allocative and service delivery efficiency. The idea of legislative ‘power of the purse’ originates from medieval England when the Magna Carta guaranteed that the king would not raise taxes without the consent of the barons (Fölscher 2006). Over time, the power to authorise public expenditure moved away from the king to the legislature. Now most legislatures have

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2 Locke viewed human nature as more civic than Hobbes did, and his understanding laid the basis for the notion of a separation of powers. Much later John Rawls (1971) uses the heuristic device of the veil of ignorance to argue that liberal democratic institutions should secure social justice (equity) as well as liberty.
the power to approve and review budgets, and many have powers of amendment (Stapenhurst et al. 2012).

The most common role for parliaments is to approve annual budgets and expenditure estimates, and check spending against targets. While these activities require the executive to account, it is the power to amend money bills that provides policy impetus to oversight. Krafchik and Wehner (1998:4) argue that “… amendment powers could substantially change Parliament's engagement with the Budget from a rubberstamp exercise to effective oversight.” According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 42% out of 150 legislatures globally have budget amendment powers ranging from developing the budget in its entirety to limited reforms (IPU and UNDP 2017). These amendment powers provide an important opportunity for legislatures to engage the executive on policy choices. However, many members of parliaments (MPs) lack the technical expertise and capacity to challenge executive authority in debates and committees.

Wehner (2006) develops a methodology for assessing the institutional capacity of parliaments to undertake fiscal oversight of the budget. The areas include formal powers to amend budgets, prevent spending pending approval and executive flexibility during implementation. Institutional ability is related to when the budget is tabled, committee involvement in budget scrutiny, and parliamentary access to research capacity. The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) review of parliamentary capacity using the Wehner method shows that African parliaments lack the institutional capacity to exercise the formal powers of fiscal oversight (CABRI 2008 and 2015).

The complexity of state financing and expenditure processes makes it increasingly difficult for MPs to work through all the budget documentation and process. The recent growth in the establishment of parliamentary budget offices (PBOs) is related to the need to enhance the capacity of legislatures to oversee and amend budgets, especially in contexts where there is executive dominance, or where parliaments are de facto marginalised from decision-making processes (Stapenhurst et al. 2012). The United States Congress and the Kenyan Budget Offices were set up over 30 years ago but Mexico, Uganda, Korea and South Africa (among others) have been established in the past 20 years to enhance the legislature’s ability to exercise fiscal oversight (Njuguna and Makau 2009; Kopits 2011).

PBOs assist legislatures in budget oversight by providing independent technical analysis on the implications of fiscal policy. In this regard, they are mostly small, technical units, appointed by government, that produce reliable and useable macro-economic reviews and budget analyses to support parliament’s approval and amendment process. Santiso and Varea (2013) argue that PBOs can and do strengthen parliamentary effectiveness and executive accountability by enabling constructive debate through the provision of information to members with limited capacity and time.

The Establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office

The Republic of South Africa is a multiparty constitutional democracy, in which Members of Parliament (MPs) are selected according to parties’ proportional representation of the vote. The President is elected by the National Assembly (NA), one of two chambers of Parliament, as Head of State and Government. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) represents the elected provincial legislatures which govern each of the country’s nine provinces. The President and his executive are accountable to Parliament, which can recall him through a vote of no-confidence. The two chambers of Parliament constitute the legislative arm, with executive power located in government. Elections are held every five years.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) grants Parliament powers to oversee the budget process, from planning to approval of budgets, assessment of implementation per department, and finally evaluation. Prior to the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (2009) these powers were restricted to approval and review. The Money Bills Amendment Act enables Parliament to amend money bills before they are enacted. This is a significant shift in the formal fiscal oversight powers of parliament.
The then Speaker of Parliament, Max Sisulu (2010), notes that the Act provides an opportunity for Parliament to fully exercise its oversight obligations.

The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, a key new oversight tool, enables Parliament to hold government accountable. For the first time, the South African Parliament has the power to amend the budget, giving us the teeth to do effective oversight. The challenge now is for committees and individual Members of Parliament to put their shoulders to the wheel and turn theory into practice and potential into concrete results (Sisulu 2010).

Setting up the Parliamentary Budget Office

The chairperson of the NCOP, Mninwa Mahlangu, presented a review of the work of the fourth Parliament during the debate on Parliament’s 2013 budget (Mahlangu 2013). He noted that the first objective of the fourth Parliament’s strategy was to strengthen oversight and ‘establish a strong culture of overseeing executive action’. The implementation of the Money Bills Act and the establishment of the PBO were noted as an important support to stronger executive oversight.

To support implementation of the Money Bills Act the Parliamentary Budget Office was launched in February this year … The office will specialise in producing high-quality research and analysis of fiscal policy and provide independent, objective and professional advice to Parliament on fiscal matters (Mahlangu 2013).

The Money Bills Amendment Act was implemented in two phases. The first phase involved the establishment of Finance and Appropriations Committees in both houses, as well as processes for considering and adopting the Fiscal Framework and compiling the Budgetary Review and Recommendation Reports (BRRR). These committees enable Parliament to consider, review and change money bills (Verwey 2015). The second phase involved the research for the establishment of the PBO. Two working task teams were established, one political and one administrative. The Administrative Task Team was chaired by the Secretary of Parliament and dealt with the formal legal and administrative issues related to the establishment and operations of the PBO (Interviews with Analysts 2015).

The Political Task Team comprised the Chairs of the NA and NCOP, and the Finance and Appropriations Committees in both houses. This committee was chaired by the Speaker and conducted a study over two years to identify the most appropriate model for the proposed PBO. Their work focused on the form of organisation that would best support members in the exercise of their oversight and amendment duties. As Speaker Max Sisulu (2013) noted:

To consolidate the implementation process, the Presiding Officers decided that a Study Tour of relevant countries be undertaken to explore the role and capacity of legislatures in budget processes, and specifically the functions of agencies established to assist and advise members.

We undertook tours in 2010 and 2011 to the following countries: Kenya, Germany, Sweden, Republic of Korea and Japan. The study tours have largely revealed that, while pursuing a common objective, namely the exercise of effective oversight over state finances, different countries have modelled their budget offices in a manner that suits a country’s specific requirements. Essentially, this means that there is “no one size fits all”.

In addition to the study visits, the current Director of the PBO, Professor Mohammed Jahed, was seconded from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to provide technical and analytical support for this process. This meant that all the available studies on PBOs were analysed, and lessons considered, in the design of the PBO (Jahed 2011a and 2011b). Jahed (2011b) notes that key lessons were to work within South African realities to provide fiscal information and policy implications to MPs in order to improve fiscal oversight capacity. Following several presentations and discussion in the various committees, the PBO was launched on 25 February 2013 with Professor Jahed acting as Director.

Over the initial six months, processes were put in place to establish the institution by appointing a Director, finding offices and allocating budgets. The
appointment of Professor Jahed was announced on 11 June by the Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP. Professor Jahed shared an office on the parliamentary precinct with a newly appointed office manager and executive assistant for about ninety days from October to December. The office manager comments “I thought he was joking – this is Parliament” (Jahed 2015). They struggled to get office space and had to fight through the parliamentary administrative system to secure the space they currently occupy over the road from Parliament.

A key tension in the establishment process was a lack of clarity about the resourcing and autonomy of the PBO. This tension is a function of the Act, which makes the Director accountable to Parliament, and the budget subject to parliamentary transfers. The PBO use the parliamentary administrative system to secure office space, recruit staff, administration and contracting. This means that even though the Director and the Secretary are of equivalent rank, the Secretary is the accounting officer.

Blurred accountability lines led to inefficiencies in administrative processes, as the PBO had to “take off your hat, and say, sorry sir, but can we …” (PBO Office Manager 2018). It took the PBO three rounds of advertising and interviews to appoint six analysts by July 2014 and the senior analyst positions remained vacant. Only seven of the nine posts were filled at the end of 2016 due to a lack budget to fill posts, a long process of appointing people and a limited pool of applicants (Jantjies 2016). One vacancy for a policy analyst remains in July 2018, five years later (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: PBO Organogram**

![PBO Organogram](https://www.parliament.gov.za/parliamentary-budget-office)

Despite the teething problems, the team began producing reports in late 2013 and had set up office by early 2014 (PBO Director & Office Manager 2015). The PBO intends to remain a small technical unit of twelve until there is a need to extend its scope beyond the finance committees. The parliamentary official (PO) suggested that that the PBO “started at snail’s pace” (Parliamentary official 2015). The budget for the first year of operations was 18 million South African Rand (ZAR). This was spent primarily on salaries (78%) and on the setting up process (22%) (PBO Strategic Plan 2014: 15). In 2016, Jantjies (2016) noted that the “PBO budget allocation hasn’t reached its legislated requirement”, which weakens its support of fiscal oversight in Parliament.
The PBO was set up with support from the presiding officers committed to improving the quality of oversight in Parliament. However, a political “changing of the guard” after the 2014 elections required the PBO to “start over” in terms of getting the new Speaker and Secretary on board (Jahed 2015). “Sisulu embraced the PBO as part of his legacy but the current (new parliamentary) leadership don’t view it that way” (Parliamentary official 2015). The PBO had to engage all the caucuses and chief whips during the setting up process to ensure that they had political support, and then repeat the process a year later after the elections. Political will is critical to the success of the PBO – “if the client is happy then we are OK” (Jahed 2015).

Speaker Baleka Mbete noted in her July 2014 budget vote that the PBO’s role is “to assist Members of Parliament to make sense of the tangle of numbers and notes that represent the Fiscal Planning Framework of the Executive”. However, she also stresses that the PBO does not provide advice or criticism, and that going forward, “the Fifth Parliament must determine the final form of the Budget Office”. In her June 2015 budget vote, she emphasised the importance of oversight to ensure that legislatures inject constituents’ concerns into policy. The PBO is seen to play a critical role in this process, especially as part of the process of overseeing the implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP).

The Parliamentary Budget Office is increasingly expanding its value and reach. … As we align our oversight responsibilities, the Executive Authority of Parliament has since instructed the Parliamentary Budget Office to assume a central role in oversight of the NDP …

Doing the Work

The PBO has two mandates in terms of the Money Bills Amendment Act: firstly, to provide independent analysis to support the Finance and Appropriations Committees in matters related to Money Bills, and secondly, to build the capacity of MPs to engage on financial issues. International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysts, Makau and Page (2014:3), in assisting the PBO to structure the work, note that the PBO will face increasing demands for support from the Finance and Appropriations Committees. They suggest the importance of developing a mechanism to prioritise requests as meeting strategic commitments in the form of “annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports will already strain limited resources” (see Table 1).

Table 1: Output indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance indicators</th>
<th>Estimated performance 2014/5</th>
<th>Target 2015/5</th>
<th>Target 2016/7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of policy, economic and fiscal review and outlook reports (biannually)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of economic and fiscal briefs (quarterly)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of research reports requested by the Houses relating to money bills and the budget including unfunded mandates (annually)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of capacity building interventions for members of Parliament (biannually)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of collaborations with research structures of Parliament (quarterly)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of stakeholder surveys (biannually)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated budget totals (million Rand)</td>
<td>18.4*</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is drawn from the PBO Strategic Plan: 13 and 15. The figures are estimates.
One of the challenges for the PBO is managing demand (Interviews with Analysts 2015). In addition to their required annual targets, it receives requests from individual MPs or parties. The PBO tries to respond to these often with a very short turnover time. They have provided a range of inputs to the various financing committees on issues such as the sovereign credit rating, explaining audit outcomes, retirement reform or intergovernmental fiscal relations. However, this additional work needs to be carefully managed (Jahed 2015).

The PBO needs the support of politicians to do its work, but at the same time has to provide non-partisan support to all parties (Jahed 2015). Analysts have to avoid voicing their opinions and avoid recommendations when providing input (Interviews with Analysts 2015). This requires careful diplomacy. Analysts find this a challenge, particularly when many MPs do not understand basic economic principles. Many of the analytical reports need to be reworked for MPs to ensure that they can be understood and used in parliamentary and committee debates (Interviews with Analysts 2015).

**Figure 3: PBO work process and functions**

> **Consideration of money Bills**  
> **Identify specific analysis and research required for decision making**

**Committee Chairpersons**

- Submit request to the Executive Authority
- Consider specific request from committees
- Forward requests to Director PBO

**Executive Authority**

- Analyse
- Advise
- Build capacity
- Facilitate discussions

**Parliamentary Budget Office**

**NA and NCOP Finance and Appropriations committees**

Source: PBO Strategic Plan, 2014: 8.

Despite a specific work process, mapped in Figure 3, which processes requests through Finance Committee Chairs to the Executive Authority (the Speaker) and finally to the PBO, the PBO supports Parliament in areas broader than its formal mandate. The 2015/16 Annual Report of Parliament (2016: 48) documents 32 advisory and analytical reports from the PBO, which exceed the given target by 18 units. The reason given is ‘ad-hoc requests emanating from Parliamentary Committees’. In addition to the regular quarterly economic briefs and budget reviews, the PBO produced overviews on seven areas of the National Development Plan (NDP), at the request of Parliament, as well as analytical reports on other issues (Mbete 2015).

Table 2 provides a sample of outputs as an indicator of the work done annually. Other years are less intensive, but the work process is similar, as requests are filtered from Parliamentary Committees via the Speaker to the PBO. This work dovetails with the annual budget process as indicated in Figure 4.

Through the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, of 2009, we are empowered to amend the budget.

In this regard, Committees are required to annually assess the performance of each national department, and to submit Budgetary Review and Recommendation Reports (BRRRs) to the Assembly – after the adoption of the budget but prior to the adoption of the report on the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS).
As these BRRRs may include recommendations on the future use of resources, they form one critical part of Parliament’s engagement with the Budget (i.e. the main appropriation) the following year (Mbete 2015).

Parliament values the support, leading the speaker to note in the 2018 budget speech that “we have highlighted to the Minister of Finance the need for this Office to be funded in order for its support to be extended to all Portfolio Committees” (Mbete 2018).

Table 2: Sample of Outputs produced: 2015/16 Financial Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget analysis reports</th>
<th>NDP Analytical Reports</th>
<th>Quarterly Economic Briefs (QEB)</th>
<th>Other Analytical Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Medium term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS)</td>
<td>1. Quality Basic Education Alignment and Progress</td>
<td>1. 1st Quarter QEB: April-June</td>
<td>1. ESKOM Appropriations Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• South African Revenue Services (SARS)</td>
<td>7. Protect Our Environmental Assets and Natural Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. The involvement of Public Accounts Committees (PAC’s) in the budget process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accounting Standard Board-ASB1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Department of Police Budget Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jahed 2016: slide 19.

The PBO’s work is clustered in three broad areas: economic, public finance and public policy reflected in the structure of the organisation (Figure 3). This form of organisation was developed to reflect the legislative mandate and as part of a broad consultation process to focus the work of the PBO initially. However, it is difficult to separate the different activities in practice – “the lines are blurred between economic, finance and policy” - and the analyses are often interdependent (Interviews with Analysts 2015). The analysts, who started at different times, and comprise a team of 6 by July 2014, use the Act and strategic outputs to guide their outputs. The team had to work out what they did as they did it and are reflective about their work as a learning process in “members’ understanding and we are also adapting” (Interviews with Analysts 2015).
During a number of conversations with analysts three challenges in relation to the work of the PBO were highlighted (Interviews with Analysts 2015). The first is managing expectations in relation to the technical capacity MPs, then clarity on mandates and access to accurate, and reliable data as a third challenge. The first is related to expectations about what can be delivered and what the PBO can actually do to boost oversight knowledge and capacity. A large chunk of time is spent on formal and informal capacity building for MPs. This involves (Jahed 2016: Slide 17):

1. Formal: Partnership with academic institutions to develop a formal programme for MPs on fiscal and monetary matters, with a focus on oversight

2. In-house capacitation of MPs through the production of informative products, including presentations of technical work to Committees during seatings.

3. Dedicated technical support to Parliamentary Committees during the oversight visits of Committees.

Analysts interviewed noted that they did not do disciplinary-based technical reports. Their work is to enable MPs to understand the implications of fiscal policy so they can make better informed decisions. This means they have to keep the analysis simple, informative and independent. “So, we cannot advise, but do we just translate into plain language?” (Interviews
with Analysts 2015). In addition, they spend much of their time in committees explaining.

The work is more mentoring and tutoring rather than hard hitting analysis. … Our work is a big capacity-building exercise formally and informally. We will always help and explain. That's why we need the space (Interviews with Analysts 2015).

The second issue is related to where the mandates of the various oversight support initiatives begin and end. Within parliament this refers to researchers and content advisors. This is partly resolved by the PBO’s focus on the four finance committees, since researchers and content advisors support other committees. Nonetheless, there are concerns about duplication, turf and job security as the PBO is seen to be more and more effective. In addition, content advisors and researchers also lack capacity. The PO suggested that additional focus should be placed on empowering the researchers to provide similar support to MPs (Parliamentary official 2015).

The extension of the technical capacity (staff) of the PBO to support other committees, as indicated in the 2018 Budget Vote, may exacerbate these duplications, although this has been put on hold due to budget constraints (Annual Report (2016/17:56). Even without this additional capacity, the brief of the PBO has expanded to include tracking of performance of the NDP, additional research reports as required by the Presiding Officers and analysing the links between budget allocations and policy outcomes (Jahed 2016). The staff will be stretched to deliver on all these mandates, and some prioritisation may be necessary if the additional budget is not provided.

The third challenge relates to access to reliable data. The legislation does not give the PBO powers to request information for analysis (Jantjies 2016). The PBO buys some data, and also relies on partnerships with research institutions and universities. They also use information from StatsSA and National Treasury. Although Calitz, Siebrits and Stuart (2013) argue convincingly that South Africa has an internationally recognised record of good fiscal management and a transparent budget process, the PBO has to be seen as providing independent and reliable evidence to back up their analysis. Treasury data is associated with the politics of the Executive.

Members asked if the Parliamentary Budget Office interacted with the Treasury. Was the basis of this report the same as that which Treasury used to produce the budget? Members wanted a narrative to accompany the graphs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) 2014a).

Concluding Remarks

The review of current research suggests that fiscal oversight is an essential part of ensuring rigour and accountability in democracies. However, the ability of parliaments to effectively exercise oversight depends on the political system, the legislature’s formal powers (especially in relation to amendment), the extent of executive dominance, the political will to engage, member commitment to sanction and capacity to review, amend and approve budgets. PBOs can improve the institutional capacity of parliaments. So, is the PBO meeting its mandate? Is fiscal oversight improving?

The PBO team in 2015 cautiously thought yes. The PBO meets its formal commitments in terms of annual, semi-annual and quarterly research and reports. It also provides support to the four finance committees evident in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s minutes which show that members of the PBO participated in at least 50 committees over 2014 and 2015, and many, many more over the following three years. They even did six in 2013. Research suggests that an ability to produce the required outputs is what enables the new institution to prove its independence and its value (Johnson and Stapenhurst 2008).

The PBO has continued to produce outputs that are valued by parliament and show up as changes to budgets before approval. This is a significant improvement in oversight capacity. CABRI’s 2008 and 2015 surveys study the role and capacity of legislatures as part of a broader study on budget practices in Africa (CABRI 2008 & 2015). South Africa’s capacity index was 0.17 in 2008, prior to the implementation of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure, and 0.41 in 2015 (CABRI 2015:7). This is due to the implementation of the Money Bills Amendment Act, which improved formal oversight capacity with powers of amendment, but organisational capacity also improved, arguably due to the PBO.
**Table 3: Progress in fiscal oversight since the establishment of the PBO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations by Appropriations Committees</th>
<th>Number of Recommendations by Finance Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2013 | • On 2012 MTBPS: 4 recommendations  
      • Adjustments Appropriation Bill: 1 recommendation  
      • On Division of Revenue (DoR) Amendment Bill: 0 recommendations  
      • Proposed DoR and conditional grant allocations to provincial/local spheres as per 2013 MTBPS: 0 recommendations  
      **TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS: 5** | On 2012 Revised Fiscal Framework: **4 recommendations** |
| 2014 | • On 2013 MTBPS: 6 recommendations  
      • Adjustments Appropriation Bill: 3 recommendations  
      • On DoR Amendment Bill: 7 recommendations  
      • Proposed DoR and conditional grant allocations to provincial/local spheres as per 2013 MTBPS: 8 recommendations  
      **TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS: 24** | On 2013 Revised Fiscal Framework: **8 recommendations** |
| 2015 | • On 2014 MTBPS: 10 recommendations  
      • On DoR Amendment Bill: 5 recommendations  
      • Proposed DoR and conditional grant allocations to provincial/local spheres as per 2014 MTBPS: 5 recommendations  
      **TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS: 20** | On 2014 Revised Fiscal Framework: **9 recommendations** |
| 2016 | • On 2015 MTBPS: 14 recommendations  
      • Adjustments Appropriation Bill: 3 recommendations  
      • On New Development Bank Special Appropriations Bill: 4 recommendations  
      • On DoR Amendment Bill: 5 recommendations  
      • Proposed DoR and conditional grant allocations to provincial/local spheres as per 2015 MTBPS: 2 recommendations  
      **TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS: 28** | On 2015 Revised Fiscal Framework: **12 recommendations** |

Source: Khumalo 2016: Slide 19.
Khumalo (2016), from the Finance and Fiscal Commission, notes that the number of recommendations made by the finance committees rose steadily from 2014 to 2016 following the establishment of the PBO. Table 3 shows this increase, as well as the number of recommendations accepted by Treasury, showing the influence of fiscal oversight. PBO staff suggested in 2015 that MPs were already asking more informed questions because they now know what Treasury and the Executive are supposed to do in relation to Money Bills. “The level of engagement between the Committees and the Executive has improved in my perception” (Interviews with Analysts 2015). This is confirmed by the Speaker in the 2018 Budget Vote:

Since the establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), Parliament’s ability to engage with, and interrogate, both budgets and budgetary outcomes has been significantly elevated. We must continue to build the support available to committees so that they play a proactive role in the budget process as envisaged by the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Mbete 2018).

Improved ability to exercise fiscal oversight of the executive is an important outcome of establishing the PBO. This point is noted in many of the committees that the PBO attends. For example,

The Chairperson said he felt much more free to engage the Department. The presentation also pointed to pertinent issues regarding economic and fiscal review. It is important to engage with the issues deeply. … The graphs and explanations in the presentation were helpful. (PMG 2014b).

Similarly, in a discussion between the Auditor-General and the Committee on Water and Sanitation:

The Chairperson said he was concerned about the flouting of value for money, as illustrated by the PBO’s presentation, and asked what recourse there was for Parliament in that regard. This referred to previous delivery performance versus expenditure, seeing that the DWS was understood to be spending 93% of its budget, whereas the targets outlined in the APP had not been met as expected (PMG 2014c).

The PBO helps to honour the implicit democratic contract in which people vote, the executive decides and implements, parliaments check and courts protect. However, the assumption that improved fiscal oversight (and monitoring) will resolve the challenge of executive and party dominance must still be tested. To date, party politics have prevailed in critical oversight moments. Raymond Suttner (2015) argues that MPs tend to be beholden to ‘party bosses’, not because of the list system associated with proportional representation, but because:

The fact remains that MPs are ‘beholden’ to their parties in every system and we need to consider whether that is an important barrier or an explanation for why MPs in South Africa do not hold members of the executive accountable as they are meant to, or take stands according to their consciences.

Improving oversight capacity is hard in any political system as MPs have to straddle the line between party politics and national development, especially when they seem to be out of alignment. In one-party dominant systems, internal politics and patronage relationships can affect decision-making as much as poor capacity and executive dominance (Turok 2014). This requires a shift in the politics of parliament from party-line decision-making to more informed engagements based on facts and implications. The PBO has made important inroads into improving the quality and focus of fiscal engagements and improving the capacity of MPs to debate money bills. The PBO should be wary of expanding its mandate, as the focus on budgets is important in the face of corruption and state capture (Madonsela 2016). Eroding institutionalised executive dominance and ensuring accountability is likely to remain the domain of opposition parties, with support from the PBO.
Bibliography


‘... National Treasury made it very clear that the heart of the problem was that there were just no consequences in government. If someone did not do their work, nobody asked any questions of the culprits, and those people were still there. They should be fired’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012b).

Introduction

This case study considers government structures and functions where the administrative systems demonstrate weakness and public service provision is threatened. The South African Constitution prescribes that in a case where provincial government departments are underperforming, due process should ensue to ensure that citizens continue to receive services in relation to the social contract which guarantees their rights regarding public services. This case study explores, firstly, the background to provide a context to the issues of government and the constitutional values espoused in Chapter 10 of the 1996 Constitution. Secondly, the relevant measures in place to ensure that government departments are accountable are analysed. This is also because the use of public resources requires systems in place which support the effective and efficient use of those resources. Thirdly, an actual case study of the national intervention in the Limpopo province using section 100(1)(b) is undertaken. It is necessary to highlight that this is regarded as the most severe form of intervention, and it has not taken place anywhere in South Africa on this scale since the advent of democracy in 1994.

Brief Background to Government Structures and Functions

Public administration is premised on the provision of services to citizens in a sustainable manner. The manner in which governments organise their structures and functions determines whether goals of government would be achieved. Such an organisation of structures and functions constitutes an act of administration and governance. That is, the legitimacy and public trust of such structures is one of the determinants of whether public governance and administration are regarded as effective and efficient, thereby serving the needs of the communities. In most developing countries, including South Africa, there are many cases of inequality challenges, where the societal economic privileges are not distributed equitably among communities. This is usually measured through the gini-coefficient of the World Bank, which recently identified South Africa and Brazil as the most unequal societies in the world. In most developing countries, it could also mean that government systems, structures and functions are battling to realise the equitable provision of services. In this regard, governments are required to remodel their structural and functional arrangements which seek to consider how services should be made accessible to their communities.

The constitutional structure of the South African government is made up of three spheres. As outlined in Chapter 3 of the 1996 Constitution, these are constituted as the national, provincial and local government spheres. This composition is meant to ensure that governmental functions and activities are properly streamlined to achieve predetermined goals. In undertaking such responsibilities, the question of
what values and principles as espoused by public officials (both elected and appointed) are provided for in Chapter 10 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa as replicated below.

**Basic Values and Principles Governing Public Administration**

Outlining the core values and principles is necessary to underscore the need for public officials to understand the glue that binds South African society together. Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles:

- A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.
- Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.
- Public administration must be development-oriented.
- Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.
- People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making.
- Public administration must be accountable.
- Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.
- Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.

Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.

The above principles apply to administration in every sphere of government; organs of state; and public enterprises. National legislation must ensure the promotion of the values and principles listed in the subsection above.

The foregoing constitutional provisions pertain to the expected conduct of government officials. These principles have set out to provide a framework on how the business of government needs to be conducted by officials responsible to certain actions and decisions. The underlying assumption is that such a lack of conduct and responsible conduct and decision-making could lead to a collapse in government processes and systems.

**How National Government Intervention Should Relate to the Principles of Cooperative Governance?**

The constitutional mandate for the interaction among the different spheres of government is an imperative in guiding the actions of government departments and agencies. This means that even the invoking of section 100 to support a provincial administration which is considered to have failed in undertaking its constitutional responsibilities should still consider the principles of cooperative governance to restore and maintain effective and efficient administration as well as the provision of basic services to the community. This consideration is made because an intervention of this nature is a form of intergovernmental relation and also seeks to restore the normal functioning of a government department. Therefore, this case study of the national government supervision of Limpopo provincial government should be viewed in relation to adherence to the key constitutional provisions, especially the manner in which principles of cooperative governance should be applicable or need to be taken into consideration.

As highlighted above, Chapter 3 of the 1996 Constitution considers a question relating to the principles of cooperative governance. These are considered in the South African constitution to be issues pertaining to intergovernmental relations and seek to argue about how different organs of state and different spheres of government, among others, need to relate when conducting their activities. In other words, the manner in which issues of duplicating and complementing of one another’s roles needs to be enhanced and promoted. Sections 40 and 41 of the 1996 Constitution prescribe that “In the
Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (South Africa 1996). All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles in this Chapter 3 and must conduct their activities within parameters that it (Chapter 3) provides. Furthermore, all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must:

- preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;
- secure the well-being of the people of the Republic;
- provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole;
- be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people;
- respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres;
- not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution;
- exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and
- co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by:
  - assisting and supporting one another;
  - informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest;
  - co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another;
  - adhering to agreed procedures; and
  - avoiding legal proceedings against one another.

An Act of Parliament must:

- establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations; and
- provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes.

An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.

If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of the above have been met, it may refer a dispute back to the organs of state involved. This is further spelt out by other government policies on IGR such as Intergovernmental Relations Frameworks Act 13 of 2005. This legislative provision seeks to “establish a framework for the national, provincial and local governments to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations. It is also intended to ensure that the provision for mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the settlement of intergovernmental disputes and matters related to these issues” (South Africa 2005:2).

In order to understand these key principles, section 40(1) of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for the government to consider the following aspects (Republic of South Africa 1996; Smith 2002; de Visser 2009):

**Distinctiveness**

De Visser (2009) argues that this concept of distinctiveness is closely associated with a notion of autonomy regarding the different spheres of government from one another. In particular, distinctiveness makes provision for each sphere of government to have its own protected functions. These protected functions should also be applicable in Schedules 4 and 5 of the 1996 Constitution, which deal with the functional areas of concurrency by the national government and province and also those functional areas exclusive to provinces.
**Interdependence**

The notion of interdependence considers how the different government institutions, especially the three spheres, should be able to collaborate and cooperate in the quest to deliver public services or in undertaking governmental administrative processes. In this regard, the understanding is that the constitution acknowledges the fact that the success of government spheres or institutions is mainly dependent on one another rather than on those individual spheres or institutions. According to Smith (2002), consideration should be given to the basis of how each sphere depends of the other for proper fulfilment of constitutional duties and obligations. In this way, this constitutional provision is necessary, as it highlights the inherent mutual reliance of the various spheres of government in performing their functions.

**Interrelatedness**

The question of interrelatedness deals with issues pertaining to how supervision of the ‘lower’ spheres of government is done. This consideration is premised on the fact that there is ‘an equality principle’ within the different spheres where some spheres are regarded as ‘bigger’ and others ‘smaller’. Obviously, on the basis of how the concept of sphere is considered, this constitutional imperative provides a paradox to an understanding of ‘bigger and smaller spheres’. Smith (2002) considers section 41(h) of the 1996 constitution as making it ‘a duty’ for all the spheres to cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith.

The constitutional provisions of distinctiveness, interdependence and interrelatedness are necessary to understand their relevance in the case of application to Limpopo Province. This means a careful consideration should be made in relation to whether these key considerations have been considered during the process of putting the province under national intervention. Thus, in implementing section 100 of the 1996 Constitution, how was observance to these constitutional provisions before, during and even after putting the provincial departments under administration? Does this section cease to be observed once the national government has taken over the provincial administration, even if it is partial and to what extent? This observation highlights a gap in the manner in which section 100 intervention should be aligned to sections 40 and 41 dealing with issues of cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations. However, even after considering and arguing about the alignment of these different sections of the constitutions the practical reality would remain very difficult to implement, because in section 100, the higher spheres of government are seen to be instituting corrective measures or intervening, while in sections 40 and 41, the focus is mainly on those government departments whose administration is regarded as fairly effective and efficient.

**Principles of the Public Financial Management Dispensation**

In view of the foregoing constitutional puzzles, it becomes necessary to also consider principles of public financial management that seek to regulate fiscal policy for consideration of national and provincial government. In this consideration, a proper context in the discussion of invoking section 100 of the constitution is enriched. The purpose of Public Finance Management Act, 1 of 1999, considers the regulation of public financial management in both the national and provincial spheres of government. This Act is legislated to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the regulation of revenue, expenditures, assets and liabilities of government. Furthermore, the issues pertaining to responsibilities of individuals entrusted with financial management are regulated as well as other matters of relevance. In particular, the PFMA gives effect to section 216(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. This constitutional provision requires national legislation to establish a national treasury as well as to prescribe the measures that will "ensure transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government." This will be facilitated by introducing "generally recognised accounting practice; uniform expenditure classifications; and uniform treasury norms and standards" (South Africa 1996). National Treasury is responsible for enforcing compliance with the above measures.

In essence, a thorough consideration of the above aspects in government departments ensures that public resources are handled in a highly responsible and professional manner as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. The establishment of the National
Treasury is also relevant especially in relation to Chapter 10 of 1996 Constitution, which seeks to identify particular values and principles needed to be upheld by officials in the employment of various government institutions in handling public resources. It is understood that the handling of these public resources is designed in a manner which is required to promote transparency and accountability in the public service. A necessary consideration of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997 should be made. This is because this Act was promulgated “to promote cooperation between the national, provincial and local government spheres on fiscal, budgetary and public financial matters. It is also meant to prescribe a process for the determination of an equitable sharing and allocation of revenue raised nationally and to consider similar matters as highlighted” (South Africa 1997).

Section 100 in the 1996 Constitution

While the discussion above pertaining to the principles of cooperative governance is meant to provide an understanding of how intergovernmental relations activities should be coordinated, this sub-section is an attempt to consider how section 100 of the 1996 Constitution provides the national government responsibility over provincial government. In an analysis of this section, it is clear that while the constitution provides prescription of this matter under cabinet responsibilities, the question of intergovernmental relations cannot be ruled out. This issue of intergovernmental relations is supported by the fact that two spheres of government would be interacting among themselves. Further, the crux of this section also seeks to regulate how provincial governments are accountable to national government and how should national government consider issues of underperformance in provinces. In acting in this manner, a linkage with the constitution’s basic values and principles governing public administration is established, especially the ones considering enforcement of accountability and the economic, effective and efficient use of public resources, among other things. Further, provincial administrations have a responsibility in line with section 125 of the 1996 Constitution, which provides a detailed prescription to the provincial executive authority regarding the implementation of this constitutional mandate. De Vos (2011:1) considers this kind of a system as a “quasi-federal established by the 1996 Constitution”, where the national government is able to intervene in provincial government matters and the nature of their relationships. This argument represents constitutional provisions pertaining to the manner in which the national government in South Africa undertakes its responsibilities over provincial government departments which have not been properly functional.

National Supervision of Provincial Administration

Accordingly, when a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation or the Constitution, the national executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation, including:

- issuing a directive to the provincial executive, describing the extent of the failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations; and
- assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that province to the extent necessary to:
  - maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for the rendering of a service;
  - maintain economic unity;
  - maintain national security; or
  - prevent that province from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole.

- If the national executive intervenes in a province in terms of subsection 100 (1) (b) of the 1996 Constitution:-
  - it must submit a written notice of the intervention to the National Council of Provinces within 14 days after the intervention began;
the intervention must end if the Council disapproves the intervention within 180 days after the intervention began or by the end of that period has not approved the intervention; and

- the Council must, while the intervention continues, review the intervention regularly and may make any appropriate recommendations to the national executive.

While a considerable contextual discussion is advanced in this case study to ensure the manner in which administration of provincial government should be done by national government, the above discussion regarding subsection 100(1)(b) constitutes the main focus of this case study. It is also necessary to recognise that several other provincial government departments have been placed under section 100 administration before. These include the Eastern Cape Department of Education in 2012, Gauteng Department of Health in 2012, and Free State Department of Human Settlements in 2012. In the main, the reason for getting these provincial departments under national government administration as prescribed by section 100 is due to financial maladministration. However, what is noticeable is that the invoking of section 100 was never before implemented with the subsection 100(1)(b) and with five provincial departments at once as with the case in Limpopo Province during December 2011. During early January 2015, the national government intervention team’s departure was ratified by the National Council of Provinces as required by the Constitution.

From the brief background discussion above, which sought to consider the broader analysis and understanding of the context of public administration, where the relevance of section 100 is positioned, a discussion on how government departments are kept accountable is undertaken below.

**Measures Intended to Keep Departments Accountable**

South Africa is a constitutional democracy, which seeks to ensure that public resources serve the interests of the society at large. The provision of constitutional bodies in the 1996 Constitution serves this purpose of guardianship of the democracy of South Africa. The recent debates in Parliament regarding the failure of most government institutions to account in the use of public resources need to be taken into account. For example, this is also highlighted by the National Treasury (2012) when reporting to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of Public Service and Administration of 06 June 2012, where the following was acknowledged:

- there was a lack of accountability in most government departments, especially those that we put under administration;

- there was a pervasive attitude of not taking responsibility and finger pointing;

- if personnel were not seen as doing their jobs, swift and decisive decisions were not taken against them and that they must know that they would be fired if they were guilty of this; and

- an emphasis was placed on the fact that corruption was a problem that must be squarely addressed and rooted out.

While the foregoing demonstrates the need to improve the financial and governance matters of government departments, the concomitant legally compliant actions from public officials are imperative. In this regard, a discussion pertaining to who ensures that public institutions should be kept to account is necessary for this case study. Such a discussion is intended to provide an understanding of how should control measures as well as monitoring systems are put in place to intervene before the situation gets dire, where the invoking of section 100 becomes necessary as in the cases in Limpopo, Free State and Gauteng. These measures are discussed below.

**Departmental Internal Control Systems**

The management of public institutions requires a professional approach and implementation of the necessary administrative procedures. There are several important legislative provisions underpinning the notion of a professional public service in order to maintain the integrity of public institutions. Obviously, the Public Service Act of 1994 was one of the main documents intended to provide regulations pertaining to the manner in which the administration, organisation as well as human resource management
issues of public service departments should be taken into consideration. Further, a discussion document on building a “capable, career oriented and professional Public Service to underpin a capable and developmental state in South Africa” generated by the Public Service Commission (2014) considers the element for building this capable, career-oriented and professional public service. In supporting and strengthening internal control systems, issues pertaining to a values-driven public service, merit-based recruitments, career-pathing, performance management, competent leadership, relevant training interventions and the supporting roles of Public Service Commission should be taken into consideration (Public Service Commission 2014:17).

**Executive Authority**

The second layer of departmental accountability is usually at the level of the executive authority. At the provincial spheres, this is usually the responsibility of the MEC whose role is to provide oversight on ensuring that the mandate and policies of government find resonance with the practical realities and plans of a particular government department. The fundamental question also relates to the manner in which reports regarding performance and expenditure are discussed at the executive level chaired by the premier of a particular province. This is a critical internal level which monitors activities and therefore serves to indicate whether departments are either succeeding or failing in their respective mandates. Section 133 of the 1996 Constitution prescribes to the members of executive councils that:

- The members of the Executive Council of a province are responsible for the functions of the executive assigned to them by the Premier.

- Members of the Executive Council of a province are accountable collectively and individually to the legislature for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

- Members of the Executive Council of a province must act in accordance with the Constitution and, if a provincial constitution has been passed for the province, also that constitution; and provide the legislature with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.

The above provides clear indications as to what should be considered in cases where certain responsibilities (both individual and collective) are not addressed at a departmental level. This is because the establishment of provincial government departments seeks to become the implementation machinery of the policies passed at the provincial legislature and are assented to by the premier.

**Provincial Legislatures**

The role of the legislatures is to undertake oversight responsibility over the executive. This is also detailed in the 1996 Constitution, where section 114(2) promulgates that in exercising its legislative power, a provincial legislature must provide for mechanisms:

- to ensure that all provincial executive organs of state in the province are accountable to it; and

- to maintain oversight of the exercise of provincial executive authority in the province, including the implementation of legislation; and any provincial organ of state.

**Auditor General**

Chapter 9 of the 1996 Constitution makes provision for at least six state institutions to support the constitutional democracy in South Africa. These include the Office of the Auditor General, which is mandated to audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of public sector institutions, including provincial departments. It is a constitutional requirement that these audit outcomes be made public (South Africa 1996).

**Public Protector**

The Office of the Public Protector is another prominent Chapter 9 institution which also derives its powers and functions from the 1996 Constitution and the Public Protector Act 112 of 1995. For example, an investigation into On-Point Engineering, which was doing business with the Limpopo government’s Department of Public Roads and Transport, found that the company was awarded an irregular contract worth about 50 million Rand without following proper tender procedures.
Public Service Commission

The Public Service Commission is a Chapter 10 institution which derives its mandates from the basic values and principles as discussed earlier in this case study. The Commission is empowered to constantly investigate, monitor and evaluate the organisation of the public service. Several investigations reports pertaining to the Commission’s mandate have been completed and are readily available in its offices. These investigations include the achievements and failures in the implementation of government programmes.

In summary of the above discussion regarding measures to keep department accountable, the Auditor General of South Africa has considered the following model as a guide to strengthening government oversight responsibility:

**Figure 1: Measures to keep department accountable (Zungu 2015)**

Figure 1 above serves to highlight the current patterns regarding issues of oversight and accountability as considered by the Auditor General of South Africa. In this regard, the three levels of oversight which consider both internal and external approaches should be borne in mind, as they are pivotal in an attempt to ensuring an accountable government (Zungu 2015). The discussion regarding the measures in place to hold public service departments to account is crucial. This is because the effective and efficient functioning of government institutions is also influenced by the strength of levels of oversight to keep government departments accountable. Again, this discussion is intended to provide a context for the application of section 100, where the strengths or weaknesses of these measures should be observed. A case study of national government supervision of the Limpopo province is presented below.

**Case Study: National Supervision in Limpopo Province**

Remenyi and Money (2012:88) view case study research as “multi-dimensional where relationships, institutional political issues and some patterns of...”
influence” are noticed. In this way, these authors (Remenyi and Money 2012) believe that clear “interactive institutional processes” which may not always be evident are considered. In a description of what case study research involves, Leedy and Ormrod (2001:149) consider case study research as a qualitative research design and remind us that it is often used where the situation is either “little known or poorly understood”. This is usually referred to as an explorative study. In a case of the national government, where the Limpopo provincial government was placed under administration under section 100(b) of the 1996 Constitution, several of these views by scholars (Leedy and Ormrod 2001; Remenyi and Money 2012) above have been incorporated. This is evidenced through the provision of the background discussion above, case study methods and pertinent issues in relation to the problems of governance and administration which have led to the national executive deciding to place the five Limpopo provincial government departments under administration.

Furthermore, the investigation of this case study involved two key primary methods for the collection of primary data. The collection of data was done in a two-stage process, namely, official document analysis and unstructured interviews. Firstly, the analysis of documents has added value to this case study. These official documents have been useful to highlight detailed data regarding what has informed the decision to put the provincial government under administration using section 100(b). These documents included a) Media Statement on Joint Ministerial Team on Limpopo Section 100 intervention; The Status Report by the National Treasury and Department of Public Service and Administration of 6 June 2012; State of the Province addresses (2012/2013; 2014/2015 and 2015/201); as well as several other relevant documents for this purpose.

Secondly, unstructured interviews were used for this explorative case study approach. This is because the nature of the problem at hand required that the relationship between the Limpopo provincial administration and the national government, especially the National Treasury, be explored. In such an approach where unstructured interviews were used, the respondents were given an opportunity to consider pertinent issues that led to the decision by the Cabinet to put the Limpopo provincial government under administration. In this way, several senior government officials who were interviewed were central and privy to the intervention and understood the detailed technicalities of applying section 100 in Limpopo Province. The identity of these respondents has been concealed for their personal protection.

The unstructured interviews and analysis of official documents pertaining to the effecting of section 100(b) for Limpopo provincial government departments are complementary in nature. This is because the interviews were able to bridge gaps and respond to some of questions highlighted during the official document analysis stage.

**Scrutiny of the Case**

During 2009, South Africans participated in their national and provincial government elections and Jacob Zuma was elected as the new President of South Africa, succeeding President Kgalema Motlanthe. Mr Cassel Mathale was appointed as the Premier of Limpopo Province, since he was also serving at the same time as African National Congress (ANC) provincial chairperson. It is during Mr Cassel Mathale’s premiership that the Limpopo Provincial Government was put under administration due to its financial collapse. In his State of the Province Address of 2012, immediately after section 100(1)(b) was invoked for the Limpopo Provincial Government to be placed under national administration, the Premier blamed “historical context” for the problem of overdraft which his administration inherited. He argued that “the administration is primarily in relation to the overdraft which has a historical context. We have been aware of the situation and the provincial overdraft strategy was developed this matter long before we were placed under administration” (Limpopo State of the Province Address 2012:10). However, according to the National Treasury (2012) in its presentation to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), the provincial administration was warned several times during the earlier part of 2011 until the accumulated unauthorised expenditure amounted to R2.7 billion. This meant that the provincial overdraft facilities with the commercial bank and South African Reserve Bank (SARB) were exhausted. Part of what has prompted the National Cabinet to invoke section
100 was Limpopo provincial government’s request for financial assistance because it was unable to pay the salaries for its public servants (such as health care professionals, teachers, clerks, administrators, among others), especially for December 2011.

The invoking of section 100(b) of the 1996 Constitution was considered by the national executive. In this case, a decision was made in which five provincial government departments were placed under administration by the national government on 5 December 2011. These provincial departments are: Public Works, Basic Education, Provincial Treasury, Health and Roads and Transport. The overall assessment by the National Treasury took into account the fact that effective and efficient administration of these departments had come to a complete collapse and needed urgent national intervention, especially in terms of compliance with section 36 of Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, which requires accounting officers of dysfunctional government entities to surrender their functions to the National Treasury (Government Communication and Information System 2012; National Treasury 2012). This was as a result of repeated warnings made by the National Treasury to these Limpopo provincial departments regarding the management of their public finances (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012a). The following are the key problems identified which led to the invoking of Section 100(1)(b) (Government Communications and Information Systems 2012; Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012a):

**Provincial Department of Treasury**

While the Provincial Treasury had received an unqualified audit outcome by the Auditor General during 2010/2011 financial year, it is highlighted that this provincial department was unable to perform its functions properly. The areas of performance where the department failed to perform included the following: banking and cash management; poor expenditure monitoring; poor budget planning; and failure to monitor infrastructure development.

**Provincial Department of Health**

This provincial department is responsible for ensuring that key provincial health issues including the proper functioning of hospitals is maintained. Its audit outcome for the financial year 2010/2011 was a dis claimer due to insufficient audit evidence provided to the Auditor General. The failure of this department is, however, related to some of the following key aspects: there was R400 million of irregular expenditure of goods and services; contravention occurred with regards to supply chain management regulations; R138.2 million unpaid accruals and poor asset management; and unauthorised expenditure of R340 million by March 2011.

**Provincial Department of Public Works**

The Department of Public Works is usually responsible for managing government facilities and buildings on behalf of other provincial government departments. This provincial department obtained a qualified audit outcome during the financial year 2010/2011. This was ascribed to a number of reasons, including the problems with asset management and inability to verify assets; the violations of supply chain management regulations, including awarding of tenders without following proper bid processes; the modification of existing contracts to increase tender values; and the lack of putting safeguards in place where tenders were awarded without the interests of the bidders.

**Provincial Department of Roads and Transport**

The activities of the Department of Roads and Transport include the provision of public road traffic safety and infrastructure. For 2010/2011 financial year, this department received a qualified audit outcome. Part of the reason for this kind of an audit opinion was the lack of contract management system in the department; the weak internal control systems with the accounting officer failing; and the lack of oversight on the Limpopo Road Agency.

In this case, especially due to lack of contract management systems, commitments of about R84.5 million were not verified. At the end of March 2011, an accumulated unauthorised expenditure of R67 million rand was recorded.
Provincial Department of Basic Education

The Department of Basic Education is at the core of implementing basic education policy in supporting schools within this bracket to ensure the provision of quality education. During the 2010/2011 financial year, this department was also given a qualified audit for its financial performances. In fact, the department has received national media coverage attention for the wrong reason – failing to deliver text books to many schools in the province, thus failing to execute some of its basic responsibilities. Some of its key problems included firstly poor management of human resource functions with 2 400 excess of teachers, and 200 teachers who would not be accounted for physically. This exercise alone was costing the department one billion rand annually. Secondly, there was accumulated unauthorised expenditure of R2.2 billion, and, thirdly, accruals were recorded at R189 million and overspending was projected.

The issue of good governance in the provision of basic services is crucial. The question of vacancies in key positions, instability in leadership, ineffective management performance management approach as well as ineffective internal control systems have been considered as key to the failure of the Limpopo provincial government to undertake its basic responsibilities (Auditor General 2013:4-5). In the main, the above discussions regarding governance and administrative challenges demonstrate highly incompetent systems that contribute to ineffective, inefficient and unaccountable government.

In his public response to the Limpopo Legislature, the Premier trivialised this matter and asserted that, “according to the Auditor General our province is leading in terms of financial record keeping. In terms of the audit report, nine of our departments, namely, Provincial Treasury; Roads and Transport; Public Works; Office of the Premier; Safety, Security and Liaison; Sport, Arts and Culture; Economic Development, Environment and Tourism; Agriculture; and Cooperative Governance, Human Settlements and Traditional Affairs have performed good in area of financial record keeping. It is worth mentioning that our province is the only one that has managed to have nine departments with good financial record keeping. So says the Auditor General” (Limpopo State of the Province Address 2012:9-10).

Obviously, the Premier’s assertions may be correct, as the issue of good financial record-keeping is often linked to the obtaining of qualified audit outcomes from the Auditor General. While this audit outcome demonstrates that financial record-keeping has been taking place, it however shows that good governance and basic financial management skills may be lacking. What may need further interrogation pertains to the question of whether indeed Limpopo is the “only province” in which nine departments had good financial record-keeping. If this is true, then one would argue that all other provincial departments should be placed under national government administration.

Further, in the records of Parliament, which considered the issue of section 100 interventions for several provinces, the Deputy Director General of Intergovernmental Relations in the National Treasury made it clear that “the heart of the problem was there was no consequence in government. If someone did not do their work, nobody asked any questions to the culprits and those people were still there and that they should be fired” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012b). Further, the Auditor General and the Department of Public Service and Administration agreed with this assertion regarding the accountability of officials as at the heart of the problem. The parliamentary committee concluded its discussion of the matter by agreeing that a lack of accountability in government is a key problem as manifested in these departments which have been placed under section 100 interventions.

In its intervention, using section 100 of the Constitution, both the Premier and MEC of Finance in Limpopo Government have in their 2015 public addresses highlighted satisfaction regarding the progress made due to the intervention team. In this regard, during 2014, section 100(1)(b), as the most severe form of intervention, which allows national government to take over the entire administration, was reduced to section 100(1)(a), which mainly required regular reporting on administrative and financial management of the departments under administration. The Premier highlighted that there has been improvement in the administration and corporate governance of the province, especially its financial management systems. A further handing over of disciplinary cases by the section 100
administrators to the provincial administration to proceed with the disciplinary processes including those of accounting officers has taken place during 2015 (Limpopo Treasury 2015:5).

The MEC of Finance concurs and further highlighted the fact that:

- the province has eliminated the provincial overdraft;
- made a reduction to its unauthorised expenditure;
- contributed to the overall financial management in the province;
- actions (disciplinary) have been meted against officials who have been found contravening the law;
- instituted both internal disciplinary processes and criminal charges against those who have been found participating in corrupt activities;
- establishment of the provincial infrastructure development hub which seeks to assist in fact tracking infrastructure delivery in the province;
- compliance to 30 days invoice payment has been significantly improved; and
- the restoration of provincial financial management systems.

In order to maintain these recorded improvements, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed between the Limpopo provincial government and the National government regarding the transition from section 100(1)(b) to section 100 (1)(b). This arrangement was further set out to address the following issues and bring them to finality:

- disciplinary cases which are proceeding;
- strengthening of the Chief Financial Officers’ offices to ensure that financial accountability is enhanced;
- build the relevant and required capacity for the infrastructure development and delivery in the province;
- effect improvements on issues pertaining to records management;
- address and respond to the issues pertaining to the litigations against provincial government; and
- institute general compliance and improvements with regard to the legislation.

There is no doubt that the collapse of the provincial administration has been a serious embarrassment to government and the people of Limpopo Province. What seems to have improved the situation, however, is the intervention team and the inter-ministerial committee which was placed on the ground to operationalise these intervening powers as prescribed by the 1996 Constitution. Obviously, in view of the above discussion pertaining to these accountability problems, the question that arises is who is constitutionally responsible for enforcing accountability in government? (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012b:1,7).

**Limpopo Government’s Accountability System**

This is an important consideration, because government departments are mandated to provide services in the interest of the public. In this case, when their internal controls fail (as indicated earlier) then outside mechanisms should serve as backup in order to avoid a complete collapse to the system, as happened in the Limpopo provincial government during 2011. Neither the Provincial Executive Committee nor the Provincial Legislature (as represented by the Portfolio Committee on Finance) in Limpopo played their role. This is because both of these are accountability mechanisms in place to check the budget approvals and implementation (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012a:3).

Upon the failure of both the Provincial Legislature and Provincial Executive Committee, the National Treasury had to intervene. This was because the parliamentary records show a discussion where a member of the opposition party (Democratic Alliance) raised a question of who had been given the warnings of financial problems. In response, the national Treasury indicated that the head of the Provincial Treasury was notified in June and September 2011 during the Budget Council process where interactions to
highlight risks and how they needed to be addressed usually occur (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012b:3).

The issue that may arise, in regard to the earlier discussion in this case study about the measures necessary to keep government departments accountable, is the fact that there has not been any indication of the role played by any of these bodies. These are: the internal control systems (chief financial officers and supply chain management, among others), the executive council, provincial legislature (Standing Committee on Public Accounts and Portfolio Committee on Finance). What has been clear, however, is that the current accountability model has inherent challenges which may require attention in order to ensure that similar situations of administration collapse are not repeated. Part of the problem lies within the electoral system, which is key in configuring the composition of provincial legislatures. In most cases, the rank and file members of political parties are often placed in the legislature with expectations to keep their seniors (in the political parties) to account. In a practical circumstance, this model could not be effective, especially in cases where senior members (usually members of the executive councils) are not beyond reproach in their ethical and financial conduct.

Conclusion

This case study is of specific relevance, as it considers issues related to government structures and functions, especially where the administrative systems demonstrate major weakness and public service provision is threatened. This discussion highlights the key constitutional provisions prescribed in a case of underperformance of provincial government departments: there is a necessity for due process to occur to ensure delivery of services. Hence, from a teaching and learning point of view, the case study has value to students of public affairs in South Africa. Of note is the application of the principles inherent in the South African Constitution (specifically section 100(1) b). In addition, focus could fall on an “overdraft facility with historical context”, and the effectiveness of accountability measures used to maintain effective and efficient governance and administration of public institutions, to mention just a few aspects that could generate discussions and analysis.

This case study dealt with the issue of government departments having a role to play in the provision of public service. A disruption to such could be tragic, as evidenced in this case study, and has dire consequences for the government and population. It is very clear that the failure to ensure effective and efficient government should be an anomaly, as accountability systems need to always ensure that those entrusted with governance are beyond reproach in their conduct. This case study has clearly demonstrated that the Limpopo government has failed to deliver services, and that the financial management systems have been highly compromised, especially in the five departments that were put under administration. It is therefore necessary to ensure that credible bodies and institutions should be established or the existing ones strengthened in order to ensure that public resources are fully accounted for.

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A DESCENTRALIZAÇÃO E AUTONOMIA LOCAL NA ÁFRICA SUBSAARIANA

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Gonçalves Jonas Bernardo Zavale²

Introdução

Introduzimos o artigo referindo que a nossa tese é de que, o processo de descentralização e autonomia local (municipalização) é um processo imposto de fora para dentro dos países africanos pelas Instituições Financeiras Internacionais, como contraponto dos empréstimos e doações; que esta descentralização usa os mesmos instrumentos (autonomia financeira e autonomia política), mas que os resultados não correspondem às expectativas, não apenas porque os estados africanos não estavam muito interessados na descentralização política, dando prioridade à construção da unidade nacional. Em segundo lugar, os estados pós-coloniais revelam desde muito sinais de neopatrimonialismo, isto é, em que não existe verdadeira distinção entre público e privado e em que a elite procura assegurar os proveitos derivados da modernização económica. Finalmente, as medidas de descentralização foram, em muitos casos, observadas pelos eleitos.

Metodologicamente, faz-se uma análise comparada de dez países da África subsaariana, verificando-se que os instrumentos de políticas adotadas são muito semelhantes, não fosse essa política imposta pelas mesmas organizações financeiras internacionais. Entendem estas organizações que o sucesso das doações e empréstimos implicam um processo de ajustamento que se traduz na reforma do Estado, um que a descentralização é um elemento essencial. Na impossibilidade de analisarmos em pormenor os dez países, debruçamo-nos, em maior profundidade, sobre o caso de Moçambique. Estruturalmente, o artigo combina oito pontos essenciais, conforme o corpo do texto.

Os Estados Africanos Pós-coloniais

Um quarto de século após a independência, os estados africanos ao sul do Sara estavam na coda do desenvolvimento e, em muitos casos, eram considerados estados falhados.

Englebert (2000) faz uma síntese das razões explicativas do falhanço dos estados africanos. Assim, alguns usam a teoria da dependência para explicar a exploração do continente africano e o seu subdesenvolvimento. Já outros explicam o atraso pelo comportamento de políticos e burocratas, mais preocupados com os seus próprios benefícios do que com o desenvolvimento do país. Em terceiro lugar, o colapso dos estados africanos dever-se-ia à incapacidade de desenvolver e implementar políticas públicas e sociais. Em quarto lugar, a estagnação, fraca governação e o Estado débil deriva do baixo nível de cultura cívica e capital social. Para outros, a diversidade étnica deu origem à polarização política e reforço de grupos de interesses que repartem entre si os recursos do Estado. Finalmente, para alguns académicos os políticos africanos herdaram as políticas artificiais do colonialismo, apropriando-se dos seus benefícios em proveito próprio, uma estratégia que denominam de neo patrimonial, com propensão para a corrupção, clientelismo, nepotismo e regionalismo. Em conclusão, os estados africanos não criaram estruturas, capazes de se imporem como legítimas.

Thies (2007) desenvolve a sua explicação com recurso à teoria predadora. Segundo este autor, os dirigentes desses países construíram um Estado predador ao serviço da sua própria sobrevivência. E, nesse sentido, desenvolveram várias atividades. Assim eliminam e neutralizam os seus rivais exteriores; neutralizam e

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pacificam rivais internos; protegeram os grupos que os suportam; e finalmente, extraíram recursos da população do território para poderem manter as três atividades e permanecerem no poder. O Estado não é, assim, o resultado dum contrato social, mas um instrumento de domínio do grupo dominante que desta forma se apropria dos recursos do país, não estando interessado no desenvolvimento econômico.

Herbst (2000) procura responder às seguintes questões: porque é que os estados são ineficientes em África? Porque são incapazes de fazer, o que é suposto fazer? Porque é que mais políticas, corrupção e venalidade parecem endêmicos e intrínsecos aos estados africanos?

Segundo o autor, é pressuposto o Estado providenciar certos bens públicos, lei e ordem, defesa, execução dos contratos e infraestruturas; mas em África isto, em grande medida, não acontece. Fala-se em falhanço e mesmo colapso de certos estados (Libéria, Serra Leoa, Somália, Congo Zaire, Guiné-Bissau). E isto é uma questão de herança colonial. Na verdade, os estados africanos não desenvolveram instituições que efetivamente controlem e policiem o seu território; não desenvolveram instituições capazes de mobilizar recursos; e sem instituições, falta a democracia e estrangula-se o desenvolvimento econômico e social.

Crise dos Anos Oitenta e Falhanço dos Estados

Cerca de 20 a 30 anos após a independência a generalidade dos países africanos falharam como estados, sendo caracterizados como subdesenvolvidos. O estado de desenvolvimento foi reforçado pelo autoritarismo, instabilidade política conflitos étnicos e religiosos e guerras civis (indica alguma referência desta posição).

Rotberg (2002) define o Estado falhado quando existem guerras civis entre grupos ou comunidades. Em segundo lugar, estes estados são incapazes de controlar as suas fronteiras. Regra geral, o poder oficial limita-se à capital. Em terceiro lugar, os estados africanos, na generalidade eram incapazes de fornecer aos cidadãos, segurança, educação, serviços de saúde e justiça. Na verdade, as instituições políticas administrativas, a existirem, não funcionam. Os militares, apesar de muito politizados, são possivelmente a única instituição que funciona. Por outro lado, a corrupção invade toda a sociedade. Finalmente, os estados falhados transformam-se em “Collapsed States”. É o caso do Líbano, Somália, Afeganistão e Serra Leoa.

A reconversão dos estados africanos vai depender de dois fatores: a queda do bloco soviético que deixa de apoiar determinados estados e o chamado “Washington Consensos”, segundo o qual a ajuda das instituições internacionais deve estar dependente da criação de estruturas democráticas e da aceitação da economia de mercado.

Isto vai significar que a ajuda das organizações internacionais ficará à condicionada a aceitação duma ideologia neoliberal (Young 2004).

Organizações Internacionais e Reforma do Estado

Como dissemos atrás as instituições financeiras internacionais exigem a boa governação dos estados africanos. E isso não acontece na generalidade dos países de África. E por isso impunham processos de ajustamento que apontavam fundamentalmente para uma economia de mercado e um sistema político democrático. O conceito usado era o de boa governação (ver o Quadro 1).

Quando o problema dos empréstimos se coloca as organizações financeiras têm de antemão uma grelha de análise que implica a classificação dos países conforme a estabilidade institucional, capacidade organizativa do Estado, grau de legitimidade dos governos e tipos de políticas. Desta forma, os estados podem ser classificados em colapsados (Somália, Iraque, Afeganistão); ditaduras personalizadas (Guiné Equatorial); Estados minimamente institucionalizadas (Quênia, Moçambique); institucionalizados, mas não democráticos (Coreia do Norte, China); e estados com democracia e economia de mercado institucionalizadas (África do Sul).

O auxílio financeiro vai ser associado a pacotes de medidas político-económicas, sendo o programa de implementação monitorizado. Numa fase posterior, as exigências na esfera do Estado implicam a descentralização e democracia local, porque se entende que a competição entre os governos locais pode contribuir melhor para a satisfação das necessidades dos cidadãos (Campbell, 2001), já que os serviços ficam mais próximos e o seu funcionamento sujeito ao controlo dos eleitores.
## Quadro 1: Conceito de Boa Governação

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instituição</th>
<th>O que é governação</th>
<th>O que é boa governação</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banco Mundial (WorldBank)</td>
<td>Processo e instituições através das quais as decisões são tomadas e a autoridade é exercida num país</td>
<td>Inclusão e prestação de contas em três áreas: seleção, responsabilização e substituição das autoridades; estabilidade e não-violência; eficiência das instituições, regulação, gestão dos recursos; respeito pelas instituições, leis e interações entre os atores na sociedade civil; negócios políticos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programa de Desenvolvimento das Nações Unidas (UNDP)</td>
<td>Exercício das autoridades econômicas, política e administrativa para gerir as políticas do país, a todos os níveis. Compreende os mecanismos, processos e instituições através dos quais os cidadãos e grupos articulam os seus interesses, exercem os seus direitos, cumprem as suas obrigações e negociam as suas diferenças.</td>
<td>Implica a participação, a transparência, prestação de contas e assegura que as prioridades econômicas sejam baseadas no consenso da sociedade e que as vozes dos mais pobres e mais vulneráveis sejam ouvidas no processo de decisão e na alocação de recursos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI)</td>
<td>As propostas do FMI são limitadas aspetos econômicos da governação em dois pontos; suporte do desenvolvimento e da manutenção da transparência e estabilidade econômica e aumento de regulação adequado à eficiência do setor privado</td>
<td>Assegura a regra do direito, melhorando a eficiência e prestação de contas do setor público, afastando a corrupção.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agência Americana de Desenvolvimento (USAID)</td>
<td>Capacidade do governo para desenvolver uma eficiente, efetiva e um responsável processo de gestão política, aberto à participação dos cidadãos, com fortalecimento da democracia e do sistema de governo.</td>
<td>Governança democrática: transparência, pluralismo, envolvimento dos cidadãos no processo de decisão, representação e prestação de contas; focos em cinco áreas: fortalecimento do legislativo; descentralização e democracia local; anticorrupção, relação civis/militares e melhoria do processo de implementação.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Descentralização: Fundamentos e Análise comparada

Como vimos atrás, as organizações internacionais têm insistido e imposto como condição da ajuda financeira o desenvolvimento de um processo de descentralização. Mas a descentralização não é um conceito monolítico (Smoke 2003), já que varia com a cultura administrativa. As mais importantes potências coloniais (França e Inglaterra) têm conceitos diferentes. Mas, em termos gerais, pode dizer-se que o fenômeno implica a limitação do governo central e o aparecimento de entes políticos locais.

Desconstruindo ainda mais o conceito de descentralização, pode dizer-se, em primeiro lugar, que o processo implica melhoria da eficiência, governação, equidade e redução da pobreza. A ideia é de que quanto mais próximos os serviços estiveram perto dos cidadãos, melhor para estes. Em segundo lugar, a descentralização implica que a maior parte da receita é cobrada localmente, através de impostos e taxas municipais e que são criadas estruturas locais capazes de implementar políticas públicas e sociais, designadamente no âmbito social. Finalmente, o poder local (Municípios para o caso de Moçambique) deve ser legitimado pelo voto popular. Na verdade, não se pode falar de descentralização sem eleições locais. O que significa que descentralização se distingue de desconcentração. Neste último caso os serviços são transferidos da capital para a periferia, mas os funcionários são agentes da administração central e recebem ordens e orientações do poder central. Não existe autonomia política, nem mesmo autonomia financeira e administrativa. O Estado como que se espalha pelo território nacional.

Todavia, a descentralização não é uma panaceia para todos os problemas dos países africanos. Na verdade, por exemplo, pode existir corrupção, quer a nível central, quer a nível local. Por outro lado, nem sempre as reformas se consolidam ou se convertem em casos de sucesso (Wunsch, 2001).

Análise Comparada

A USAID (2010), no âmbito de “Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa...” selecionou 10 países, nomeadamente: “Botswana; Burkina Faso; Ethiopia; Ghana; Mali; Mozambique; Nigeria; South Africa; Tanzania e Uganda” (Zavale 2015).

Nesse estudo, as dimensões consideradas para análise foram: tipo de regime político; sistema político dos governos locais; legislação/justiça dos governos locais; autonomia política, fiscal e financeira.

O estudo refere que, o sistema político dos países analisados é caracterizado pela forte presença de governos desconcentrados do Estado (Províncias, Distritos, Localidades e Povoações) e coincide nalguns casos no campo de ação das atividades dos órgãos democraticamente eleitos (Municípios). Adicionalmente a esses órgãos, encontram-se igualmente as denominadas Autoridades Tradicionais (ou Régulos) (ATs) que foram igualmente chamadas a participar no processo de governos desconcentrados por um lado, e, por outro, nos governos da autonomia local conforme lei 2/97 conjugado com o Decreto 11/2005 (art. 69º).

Todos os órgãos ao serviço do poder central (Províncias, Distritos, Localidades e Povoações) coexistem na governação do país e no policiamento dos governos municipais estruturas impostas pelas instituições financeiras internacionais (USAID 2010).

Nos países sob análise do referido estudo refere ainda que existem esforços de introdução de reformas administrativas, tendo em conta os compromissos assumidos com os doadores internacionais (ver o Quadro 2).
**Quadro 2: Descentralização Política de 10 países africanos**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>País</th>
<th>Grau de Liberdade</th>
<th>Descentralização política Lei (Ano)</th>
<th>Eleições das SNG(^3) (Ano)</th>
<th>Níveis Eleitos dos “SNG”</th>
<th>Eleições Diretas ou Indiretas dos SNG</th>
<th>Observações</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Livre</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Direta</td>
<td>Eleições Municipais, poderes locais não eleitos, Autoridades Tradicionais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etiópia</td>
<td>Parcialmente livre</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ambas</td>
<td>Eleições na kebeles, woredas e Estados em todas as áreas, também nível da &quot;zona&quot;, num estado regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gana</td>
<td>Livre</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Direta</td>
<td>Distritos: 70% de assentos eleitos, 30% nomeado pelo presidente; conselhos locais “não totalmente” eleitos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Livre</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ambas</td>
<td>Eleições realizadas diretamente nos municípios, de forma indireta para Células, regiões, e no Conselho Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>África do Sul</td>
<td>Livre</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Direta</td>
<td>As eleições municipais do conselho são mistas entre ala e PR; representantes do “NCOP”(^4) eleitos por assembleias regionais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzânia</td>
<td>Parcialmente livre</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1 (ou 2)</td>
<td>Direta</td>
<td>Eleições realizadas ao nível distrital em todas as áreas, com alas como círculos eleitorais, também a nível das aldeias em áreas rurais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Parcialmente livre</td>
<td>1993, 1995, 1997.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3 (ou 5)</td>
<td>Ambas</td>
<td>Eleições na aldeia, sub-condado, distritos (LC 1,3,5); níveis paroquiais, condados em algumas áreas (LC 2, 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

3 SNG – Significa subnational Government.

4 Significa National Council of Provines (South Africa).
As leis dos órgãos locais são relativamente significativas nos países analisados (Quadro 2). Consistem na descentralização política, ao constituir órgãos locais democraticamente eleitos, delegando responsabilidades nos órgãos locais de gestão, tais como: tomada de decisão; planeamento; administração; e implementação de políticas públicas locais e sociais.

A aprovação da “lei dos governos locais”, nos Estados apresentados no

Quadro 2 tornou-se fundamental na nova agenda da Administração Pública (AP) desses países. De igual modo, tem permitido que as autoridades locais democraticamente eleitas se tornem elementos fundamentais na estrutura da governação a nível local, dotadas do poder de recorrerem aos tribunais (internos e internacionais), bem como de prosseguirem objetivos e interesses das comunidades locais.

O restabelecimento das estruturas dos poderes locais democraticamente eleitos nos países analisados foi igualmente reconhecido pelas populações locais, embora os regimes políticos continuem a impor orientações centralizadoras, de forma ativa, por meio dos seus órgãos desconcentrados que controlam os governos locais eleitos (os municípios). Essa situação leva muitas vezes as autarquias locais a governarem num ambiente híbrido forçada pela “musculatura” do poder central em conluio com impulsos do(s) partido(s) preponderante(s) por um lado. E, por outro, pela força da lei das autarquias locais.

Todavia, a modernização administrativa nos países africanos sob análise (Botswana; Burkina Faso; Ethiopia; Ghana; Mali; Mozambique; Nigeria; South Africa; Tanzânia e Uganda) é dicotómica conforme nos referimos acima. Contudo, só com tempo pode vir a ter “pés” para andar.

Retomando o fio à meada, a modernização consiste na descentralização política, administrativa e financeira dos órgãos locais eleitos, e na descentralização de decisões na gestão de assuntos locais quanto ao planeamento e implementação de políticas públicas e sociais. Mas quase apenas na letra da lei. Na letra da lei porque, conforme Fernando Ruivo sabemos que, uma coisa é a “Law in the books”, o direito das normas oficiais, outra coisa é a “law in action”, o direito realmente praticado (Ruivo 2000).

De acordo com a literatura (OCDE 2008; USAID 2010), o modelo de atribuição de poderes por meio de delegação (descentralização e desconcentração), nos países africanos constantes nos Quadros 1 a 4, tem constituído uma descentralização inacabada e/ou em construção se vista a parca aplicação da law in the books, isto é, das leis internas.

No entanto, esta nebulosa indefinição político-jurídica, aliada à pressão local para a explicação de oposição por parte dos poderes desconcentrados, conduz a que o espaço municipal, em diferentes casos, se constitua como palco de múltiplas e diversas encenações no que toca à intensidade e modalidades de intervenção no domínio da ação local.

Assim, o processo de normatividade prática relativa constituído na “law in action” pode não coincidir com a normalidade oficial, assumindo algumas autarquias, de modo algo informal e por via da sua proximidade tanto a problemas como a cidadãos, “competências” reais que não constam do seu enquadramento oficial e/ou a razão da sua criação legal.

Segundo a USAID (2010), a interferência do poder central nos assuntos dos poderes descentralizados (os municípios) é visível na despesa por setor de atividade, conforme ilustrado no Quadro 3.
Quadro 3: Descentralização de despesa por setores públicos em 10 países africanos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>País</th>
<th>Educação</th>
<th>Saúde</th>
<th>Saneamento básico</th>
<th>Outros</th>
<th>Estrutura de serviços públicos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Primária (Local)</td>
<td>Primária (?)</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e estradas</td>
<td>Unificada (a partir de 2010) (centralização parcial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Primária</td>
<td>Primária (Local)</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e NRM*</td>
<td>Unificada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etiópia</td>
<td>Primária e Secundária</td>
<td>Primária e Secundária</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e estradas</td>
<td>Dividida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gana</td>
<td>Primária (Local) e Secundária</td>
<td>Primária (Local) e Secundária</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e estradas</td>
<td>Dividida (lim. implementação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Primária e Secundária (rgl)</td>
<td>Primária (Local) e Secundária</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e estradas</td>
<td>Dividida (lim. implementação)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moçambique</td>
<td>Infraestruturas</td>
<td>Infraestruturas</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Estradas</td>
<td>Unificada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigéria</td>
<td>Primária (Local) para Terciária</td>
<td>Primária (Local) para Terciária</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Estradas, etc.</td>
<td>Dividida (Federal, estadual e LGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>África do Sul</td>
<td>Primária (Local) e Secundária</td>
<td>Primária (Local) e Secundária</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Estradas, etc.</td>
<td>Dividida (negociação central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzânia</td>
<td>Primária</td>
<td>Primária Hospitais primários</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Extensão AG. E estrada</td>
<td>Unificada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Primária (+)</td>
<td>Primária (+)</td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Terra e estradas</td>
<td>Dividida (centralização parcial)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fonte: USAID 2010:23.

Observação: *Natural Resource Management also National Resistance Movement (Uganda) (NRM)

O Quadro 3 e 4 mostram as principais áreas comumente “descentralizadas” nos países sob estudo, como sejam a saúde, educação, água, saneamento básico e infraestruturas, bem assim como a responsabilidade dos serviços de registos, e algumas responsabilidades da economia local. O Quadro 4 ilustra a descentralização fiscal nos dez países analisados. Mas em muitos casos não passa da letra de lei. A interpretação dos quadros mostra de forma clara o que tem sido levado a cabo nos países sob estudo, embora com a arbitragem do sistema centralizador ainda não é maior e, só será efetiva quando os assuntos de educação, saúde, transportes entre outras áreas de competência dos governos locais eleitos passarem efetivamente para a sua responsabilidade política, administrativa e económica. Contudo, o quadro 4 por sua vez ilustra ainda a tendência ténue dessa transferência das competências dos Órgãos Locais do Estado.
## Quadro 4: Descentralização fiscal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>País</th>
<th>SNGs(^5) (% de Nat’l. Despesas (% aprox))</th>
<th>Receita de SNGs própria de fonte Tributária (% aprox.)</th>
<th>Bases SNG principais impostos e Fontes</th>
<th>As principais fontes da Intergovernmental Transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>To Be Determined (TBD)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Imposto sobre imóveis</td>
<td>“Revenue Support Grant**”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Imposto de mercado; imposto de habitação</td>
<td>Subvenções gerais; verbas para construção</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etiópia</td>
<td>&lt; 4</td>
<td>Estados 45 – 80 “woredas” 80 – 90</td>
<td>Alguns impostos de renda variam consoante cada Estado</td>
<td>Doações em bloco; subvenções para fins especiais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gana</td>
<td>12 - 15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Taxas, multas, taxas de imóveis</td>
<td>Fundo Distrital de Assembleias Comum (DACF) (5% - 7,5% para os governos subnacionais)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>&lt; 3</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>“Headtax Property sales”</td>
<td>Fundo de investimento (ANICT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moçambique</td>
<td>&lt; 2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Taxas; venda de imóveis</td>
<td>Fundo de Compensação Autárquica (FCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigéria</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Imposto sobre imóveis</td>
<td>Conta Federal (aprox. 47% a SNG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>África do Sul</td>
<td>40 + (TDB)</td>
<td>Província &lt; 10 (TBD)</td>
<td>Imposto sobre imóveis (local)</td>
<td>Repartição equitativa (36% a SNG); transferências condicionadas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzânia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>“Servicelevies Fees”</td>
<td>Subvenções para Desenvolvimento de Capital; transferências condicionadas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>40 +</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>IRS Formado</td>
<td>Subvenções de equalização Incondicionais e Condicionais (35% a SNG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fonte: USAID 2010.

Independentemente da imperfeição do processo de descentralização e desconcentração, ambos os poderes detêm uma responsabilidade conjunta, conforme apresentado no Quadro 5.

Em suma, as leis nacionais que constituíram os governos municipais nos países sob análise constituem um início de uma etapa longa de aprendizagem e absorção das democracias ocidentais pelos regimes políticos africanos, desde a sua emergência nas décadas 50 a 90 do século XX.

\(^5\) SNGs significa Sub-national Government.
Quadro 5: Descentralização e controlo do serviço público – setor da educação.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desde</th>
<th>Características</th>
<th>Exemplos de casos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desconcentração</td>
<td>Ministério da Educação emprega professores; as direções provinciais de educação são responsáveis pela gestão e administração de professores; SNGs detêm pouca autoridade neste setor.</td>
<td>Burkina Faso e Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegação</td>
<td>Ministério da Educação estabelece regras e paga salários; SNGs “transferem” os salários do Ministério para professores.</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlo de contrato</td>
<td>SNGs nomeia e contrata professores; sindicato dos professores negocia com o Ministério da Educação (salários, estabilidade laboral – cargos?) de facto</td>
<td>África do Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolução</td>
<td>SNGs nomeia e contrata professores; Funcionários do Ministério da Educação detêm pouco ou nenhum controlo</td>
<td>Etiópia e Nigéria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fonte: USAID 2010.

O caso de Moçambique


Estas reformas resultaram num sistema de governação local de dois tipos: o primeiro tipo tem a ver com a descentralização através da municipalização (lei 2/97) do território nacional iniciada com 33 municípios que até a data da elaboração do presente artigo conta com um total de 53 Municípios.

A implementação da lei 2/97, de 18 de fevereiro foi significativa, com a introdução de alterações profundas da Lei das Autarquias Locais como poder local, em oposição ao poder central representado pelas miniaturas do Estado (Governos provinciais, distritais, localidades e povoações) consagradas pela lei 1/2008.

Aleido Pacote Autárquico trouxe uma nova abordagem no mapa ao poder local (governos descentralizados e desconcentrados) em Moçambique, mas matando o Princípio de Gradualismo, que só permite avançar para o estabelecimento de novas autarquias se as povoações obedecerem a determinados critérios constitucionais.

O processo de criação gradual das autarquias é subdividido em duas áreas distintas. A primeira tem que ver o caráter territorial e consiste no alargamento do mapa autárquico no território nacional. A segunda tem que ver igualmente com o caráter funcional. O gradualíssimo funcional consiste nas transferências de competências do Estado para as municipalidades, de acordo com o Pacote Autárquico.

E, finalmente, o segundo tipo do sistema de governação em Moçambique tem a ver com a desconcentração administrativa através do modelo de governação provincial, distrital, localidades e povoações no resto do território nacional (Lei 8/2003).

A lei 8/2003 estabelece princípios e normas organizacionais, bem assim como competências e funcionamento dos órgãos desconcentrados (Órgãos Locais do Estado), em harmonia com os art. 185º e 186º, conjugados com o n.º 1 do art. 135º da Constituição da república de Moçambique.

A desconcentração administrativa consagrada pela lei 8/2003 sobre Órgãos Locais do Estado (Provincias, Distritos, Postos Administrativos, Localidades, Povoações e Zonas urbanas: cidades e vilas) constitui a base do desenvolvimento económico, nacional e cultural e contribui para a unidade e integração nacional.

Todavia, este modelo (de desconcentração administrativa) surge em contraposição do discurso descentralizador dos doadores internacionais. Como refere René Otayek, verifica-se, pois, nos países a Sul...
do Sara um processo não de descentralização, mas de desconcentração, "que só marginalmente abala a preeminência do centro, não induz nenhuma redistribuição de poder e autoriza o Estado a valer-se da sua capacidade de reforma segundo os preceitos do Banco Mundial e dos peritos internacionais construindo em <comunidade epistémica>, alargada a certos responsáveis do país (chefe de Estado, funcionários internacionais, peritos nacionais, etc.) que com eles mantêm "transações de conluio" (Otayek 2007).

Assim, socorrendo-nos ainda do das palavras Otayek (2007), vale a pena referir que, a descentralização parece um assunto estratégico para o poder político, que a usa como prova da sua conversão à ordem democrática, sem que a sua natureza política seja posta em causa visto alargamento do modelo da desconcentração administrativa consagrada pela lei 8/2003 em oposição à lei 2/97.

Para Otayek (2007),a descentralização representa um recurso político e institucional de que os poderes pós-transacionais se apropriam e reivindicam como prova da sua conversão à ordem democrática, sem que, todavia, seja fundamentalmente posta em causa a sua natureza autoritária: em duas palavras, mudar tudo para que nada mude"(Otayek 2007).

Partindo desta ideia e conforme autor, vale a pena referir ainda que a descentralização pode ser vista em Moçambique como menos o sintoma da democracia bemimplementada do que a avaliação das capacidades de adaptação do sistema político à repartição de força induzida pela transformação do contexto interno (reivindicações democráticas, despertar da sociedade civil) e internacionais (Consenso de Washington) cuja conjugação leva ao descomprometimento do Estado e à sua reorganização em benefício de novos agentes infraestatais e de novos modelos de regulação libertos da sua tutela" (idem).

Avaliação da Descentralização em Moçambique

A literatura sobre avaliação científica das reformas de descentralização que tem tido lugar em Moçambique é escassa.

A nossa observação crítica assume uma particular relevância no que respeita à situação da retórica política que tem tido lugar no país conjugada com alguns trabalhos empíricos que embaciam as generalidades sociais do país sobre a política reformista daquela política descentralizadora e raramente sem objeções da sociedade civil e de comunidades académica.

Todavia, num estudo realizado em Moçambique intitulado Avaliação Relativa da Eficiência na Gestão dos Municípios Moçambicanos sem 2015, lê-se nele que, apesar da descentralização em curso no país o resultado é ténue, porque a margem da governação descentralizada no país, depende essencialmente do poder central. Segundo este estudo, a fragilidade da descentralização em Moçambique reside, por exemplo, na falta das receitas locais, capital institucional, orçamento participativo das comunidades locais, entre outros aspetos que não cabem neste artigo a sua enumeração.

No primeiro exemplo relativo ao défice das receitas locais, o estudo refere que os governos locais eleitos vivem com as “conchas” das mãos voltadas para o poder central e agentes financeiros internacionais pedindo perpetuamente “ajuda”, o que significa que o poder fiscal destes é limitado para financiar políticas públicas (e sociais) locais. Como resultado, os níveis de serviço público prestado pelos governos eleitos (incluindo poderes desconcentrados) às comunidades locais são deficitários e ficam aquém do espectável. O estudo em referência avança ainda a ideia de que, as receitas locais são também um outro problema a ter conta no contexto da atual jurisdição dos governos descentralizados. Elas são uma miragem fruto a ausência da cultura nacional de pagamento de impostos e taxas municipais pelos munícipes quer aqueles que residem nos centros urbanos e quer aqueles das zonas rurais. Esta situação leva a insustentabilidade da governação das autarquias locais em Moçambique. O resultado final do problema do défice das receitas locais em geral, dá lugar a que, os governos descentralizados governem com defeito porque vivem constantemente na dependência absoluta das transferências do poder central e/ou das agências financeiras internacionais. Esta dependência dos governos descentralizados em relação ao centro e agências internacionais contribui negativamente para ingerência nos assuntos (competências) internos pelo poder central e nalguns casos pela pelas agências internacionais financeiras, em conluio com sucessivos
governos de Moçambique. Além disso, contribui para falta de responsabilidade dos gestores locais perante interesses das pessoas e do desenvolvimento local.

Quanto à questão do capital institucional, o estudo acentua a ideia de que as instituições são por natureza pilares essenciais no desenvolvimento económico, social e político de um país. Em Moçambique, as instituições dos governos locais estão longe dessa realidade porque são novas e ténues. Desde logo, o estudo mostra de forma clara e objetiva que a tomada de decisão pelos governos eleitos não é sistemática e os mecanismos de responsabilização entre funcionários e gestores municipais são inadequados. Além disso, existe escassez de funcionários com capacidades técnicas necessárias para o desempenho organizacional. A esta situação junta-se o problema dos salários baixos pagos aos funcionários públicos e agentes do estado. Por sua vez, esta situação leva igualmente a que os recursos humanos organizacionais procurem alternativas no setor privado com fito de aumentar os seus baixos rendimentos e, como consequência, assiste-se a emergência do fenómeno vulgarmente denominado por “bolada” no seio do setor público e privado em Moçambique.

Já em relação à questão do orçamento participativo é também diminuto. O estudo acima referido mostra igualmente sobre este aspeto que, só se pode falar de orçamento participativo mediante acesso à informação pelos cidadãos na Administração Pública conforme a Lei, 34/2014, de 31 de dezembro e nunca o contrário pelo menos em Estado de direito. A informação é importante para atingir a participação das comunidades locais e/ou sociedade civil sobre assuntos que lhes diz respeito quotidianamente por um lado, e por outro, para avaliar os seus representantes no poder político bem como o desempenho dos servidores Públicos locais. Para usarmos a expressão de Erving Goffman nunca pode ser o contrário no Estado de direito. A avaliação da responsabilidade dos governos descentralizados depende em larga medida do tipo de informação disponível às comunidades, de forma minimamente compreensível, sobre como os recursos escassos tem sido geridos pelos gestores públicos locais. Mas também é verdade que essa avaliação pelas comunidades requer uma cultura cívica, capaz de se envolver de forma eficiente com governos locais eleitos exigindo os seus direitos. Como refere Nick Devas (2005), este aspeto é uma das combinações relativamente rara na maior parte dos países a Sul do Sara, em que Moçambique faz parte.

De resto, não é possível esgotar neste artigo a análise dos resultados do processo e/ou do impacto de implementação da política de descentralização em Moçambique. Conforme se sugere no presente artigo, o processo tem atravessado várias fases conforme apresentamos no Quadro 6.
Quadro 6: Documentos selecionados sobre a política de descentralização e estratégia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Título</th>
<th>Autor(es)</th>
<th>Instituição</th>
<th>Tipo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Maio de 2005</td>
<td>Política e Estratégia de Desenvolvimento Autárquico em Moçambique (PEDAM) para 2005-2010 (Proposta)</td>
<td>MAE, Direção Nacional de Desenvolvimento Autárquico (DNDA) (PDM)</td>
<td>MAE, DNDA (PDM)</td>
<td>Política sectorial/ documento de estratégia (proposta final)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Agosto de 2005</td>
<td>Estratégia Nacional de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (ENPFD)</td>
<td>MPD, DNPO</td>
<td>MPD, DNPO</td>
<td>Proposta preliminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Março de 2006</td>
<td>Formulação de uma “Política e Estratégia Nacional de Descentralização (DPED). Opções de Políticas para as Reformas de Descentralização”</td>
<td>David Jackson, Leonardo Romeo e Teodoro Waty</td>
<td>MDP/PPFD</td>
<td>Estudo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Novembro de 2006</td>
<td>Proposta de Anteproyeto da Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento (PND)</td>
<td>Teodoro Waty e Machatine P. Munguambe</td>
<td>UTRESP</td>
<td>Versão preliminar do documento de política</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Novembro de 2009</td>
<td>Política Nacional de Descentralização e Estratégia de Implementação (PNDEI) (Proposta)</td>
<td>José Óscar Monteiro e José Jaime Macuane</td>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Versão preliminar do documento de política</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Setembro de 2010</td>
<td>Plano Estratégico do Setor da Administração Local (PESAL)</td>
<td>MAE.</td>
<td>MAE.</td>
<td>Plano Estratégico do Ministério (PEM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Agosto de 2010</td>
<td>Plano Nacional de Descentralização e Estratégia de Implementação (PNDEI) (Proposta)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finalmente, é de assinalar que a descentralização em Moçambique tem adotado uma orientação participativa. Esta orientação deve ligar-se à intervenção no processo das entidades tradicionais (Nguenha 2009), que participam no processo de descentralização, recuperando algumas das funções que tinham tradicionalmente.

**Conclusão**

Em suma, podemos concluir que o processo de descentralização em África ocorreu como o resultado do falhanço do Estado nacional e imposição das Agências Financeiras Internacionais. Entendiam que financiando diretamente as organizações locais, a ajuda não se perdia nos labirintos do poder da...
burocracia central. O processo tem sido, todavia, implementado muito gradualmente, não se fazendo sentir de forma constante os benefícios desta política.

Sem fazer uma integração exaustiva do processo de descentralização nos dez países analisados, podemos concluir, todavia, que usaram instrumentos semelhantes em ordem a prosseguir objetivos de descentralização. Todavia, como se trata de países de cultura política diferente, marcada pelo passado colonial, os resultados não são necessariamente iguais. E neste aspeto é oportuno chamar a atenção das autoridades tradicionais que foram chamadas a participar no processo da autonomia local. O seu papel, as suas práticas são naturalmente diferentes, mesmo em Moçambique, o que torna os resultados não completamente coincidentes.

Em geral também, o processo é gradual, pelo que permanecem largamente formas de desconcentração administrativas, como é o caso de Moçambique.

Relacionamos, assim, imposição de um modelo internacional pelas agências Internacionais, cultura política e história de cada país e neste aspeto, percebemos que este trabalho significa um contributo para área de estudo.

Acresce que a descentralização administrativa vem estando associada ao reconhecimento das autoridades tradicionais e que o Estado central continua no comando da administração desconcentrada.

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República de Moçambique: Diplomas ou Legislação


BOOK REVIEW

Kate Philip (2018)

Markets on the Margins: Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development

Melton UK: James Currey

222 pages


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**Book Review Article by Prof Howard Richards**
(University of Santiago, Chile)

This book provides an eyewitness account of South Africa’s unsuccessful efforts to end mass unemployment and mass poverty. But it is more than an eyewitness account. It is a participant observer account. The author is a scholar-activist who has been deeply involved in thinking through the economic rationale, designing and implementing key programmes and projects. She is equally at home in the Union Buildings in Pretoria, and in remote country villages.

Although there are flashbacks to key moments of South Africa’s early history, the story line begins in earnest in 1987. Hovering in the background, unspoken but present, there stands the historical fact that there was no unemployment in Africa before colonialism. Julius Nyerere made the point that African languages had no word for it. There was nothing in their cultures for such a word to name (Nyerere 1968). One famous way the Europeans created unemployment was by
compelling the Africans to have money to pay taxes, and therefore to seek employment to have money — or, to be more realistic, to thereafter be forced to do hard labour for low pay under the pretext that they needed employment to pay the tax. Philip recounts as additional background the land act of 1913, which assigned all prime agricultural land to whites, the separation of families as men were recruited to leave rural areas to provide cheap labour in mines and cities while living in single sex barracks, and from 1948 on the apartheid system that strictly controlled access to whites-only areas, spatially segregating coloureds and Asians as well as blacks.

In 1987 the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called a twenty-one-day strike in the mines that ended in a settlement only marginally different from complete defeat. The most visible and active strikers — 40,000 of them — were dismissed, blackballed, and not allowed to return to work in any mine ever. Their dismissal was part of a larger process that began earlier and continued later of continually reducing the number of workers needed in the mines, sometimes by replacing them by mechanization and sometimes by closing mines.

In response, the NUM (whose then president was Cyril Ramaphosa, now the President of South Africa) proposed to organize worker-owned cooperatives to provide employment for the comrades who had been dismissed and blackballed. The union called for a feasibility study to be done by a former president of the National Union of South African Students, who had distinguished herself as an anti-apartheid and pro-union activist (who was Kate Philip, now the author of this book).

The leaders of the NUM knew their Marx, but they did not know their Keynes. They knew that workers were paid less than the value of what they produced, especially when their families lived in the hinterlands and grew some of their own food, thus lowering the minimum a worker could be paid and still survive; they knew the South African elite was accumulating surplus value made possible by the underpaid labour of the workers and using it to create an interlocking network of core industries that dominated virtually every branch of the South African economy; they knew that while the workers were poorly organized and lacked means of production under their own control, employees would be forced to accept employment under the terms and conditions set by employers. However, they did not fully appreciate the significance of Keynes’s observation that “… the celebrated optimism of traditional economic theory, which has led to economists being looked upon as Candides, who, having left this world for the cultivation of their gardens, teach that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, provided we let well alone, is also to be traced, I think, to their having neglected to take account of the drag on prosperity which can be exercised by an insufficiency of effective demand” (Keynes 1936:33).

Two key takeaways from the first eight chapters of the book are: (1) Although there were some successes, in the end starting co-ops was unable to create jobs on a scale sufficient to make a real difference. In 1993 it was replaced by other job-creation strategies. (2) The co-ops that did well or relatively well acted more like other businesses, attenuating distinctive features derived from democratic and egalitarian ideals.

Although briefly noting these two takeaways may make the book sound dull, actually the detailed accounts of what worked and what did not work are well written and fascinating as well as useful.

The next chapter describes a shift to supporting individual (and sometimes group) micro-enterprises rather than co-ops. The micro-enterprise approach was encouraged by an initial success at the Arnot coal mine in Mpumalanga Province. Retrenched miners were able earn a living comparable to what they had earned in the mines by buying fifty or so live chickens from a farmer and then hawking them one by one at a mark-up over wholesale. But, once again, on the whole and on the average, in spite of the supportive efforts of the NUM, its spinoffs, and other agencies, micro-enterprise incomes were disappointingly low. They were too low to raise people out of poverty, and not capable of replication on a scale sufficient to solve the problems.

Subsequent chapters chronicle the rise and fall of microcredit as a cure-all that would enable the poor to self-employ themselves out of poverty.
They also chronicle efforts to help the poor and unemployed to access larger and more distant markets, eventually including international markets. Those efforts encountered two characteristic obstacles. One was the culture-shift required to teach economic literacy to people who were accustomed to face-to-face interaction in local communities. The poor and excluded had to learn the many formalities required to sell to anonymous strangers far away. The second was the hard fact that anything the buying public wanted and could pay for was already being produced by efficient, modern, highly capitalized firms. Somebody else got there first.

Later there was a sea-change in development ideology at a global level, crystallized by the 2001 edition of a document called Business Development Services for Small Enterprises: Guidelines for Donor Intervention (Committee of Donor Agencies 2001). It was appropriately called “the Blue Book.” By 2001, labour union development efforts had become thoroughly enmeshed in the public policies of the democratic government of South Africa, and public policy in turn was thoroughly enmeshed in the thinking of international donor agencies. The membership of the committee that wrote the Blue Book was a who’s who of the major international donor agencies. Whatever might have been the current thinking of the New Guard of 1987 that had become the Old Guard of 2001, they had become de facto dependent on governments and donors. They had to try to understand the Blue Book and live with its principles.

Now the buzz was the worry that government subsidies and NGO subsidies were crowding out private initiatives. The barriers to small enterprise development were to be found not so much in the lack of capital among the poor, as in their lack of willingness to borrow and their lack of access to banking services, and also in the lack of formal property rights, which would empower the poor to mortgage their houses to take out loans to start businesses (De Soto 1989). Exhibit One among obstacles to development were the loan sharks who charged exorbitant rates of interest. The poor were forced to turn to sharks in the absence of banks – an absence which was in turn to be explained by the presence of subsidies from NGOs and government agencies. The latter made the mistake of trying to do for the poor what the poor would do for themselves when the economic fundamentals were set right.

The role of organizations like the spinoffs from the NUM and the government agencies that the author worked for was supposed to be reduced to “facilitating” a market development approach.

Phillip patiently explains why the market development approach did not work, and toward the end of the book makes a few remarks about public employment programmes. One hopes that she is preparing a sequel that will give a full account of public employment programmes in South Africa and of her own views about them.

As the worldwide trend toward employment that is more precarious, less well paid and scarcer continues and accelerates, the rest of the world would be well advised to see its own future in the extreme inequality and massive structural unemployment of South Africa. The specialists and generalists of the rest of the world should read this book. Although they will find very little in it that will show them how to solve the problems, they will find a great deal in it about what has already been tried and did not work.

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**Bibliography**


BUILDING A PEOPLE-CENTRED, PEOPLE-DRIVEN PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION CULTURE IN AFRICA FOR YOUTH EMPOWERMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Richard Levin

Abstract

The focus of this article is on the important issue of building a people-centred, people-driven public service and administration culture in Africa for youth empowerment and development. The global discourses on (new) public administration, good governance as well as the corporate capture of the state have influenced and shaped people-centred and people-driven approaches to governance and development. A new relationship between the public service and broader society characterized by a social contract that puts the interests of people first and at the centre of policy implementation is required. An overall development orientation based on people’s needs, participation in policy formulation and implementation are central for partnership-building between state and society to drive Africa’s transformation. The youth of Africa is a growing demographic in contrast with other continents and its aspirations must be met in a context of ongoing corporate capture of the state by global forces of monopoly capital through multinational companies, which continue to drain billions of US$ from the continent through illegal activities and “mis invoicing”. Empowering the youth requires foresight and innovation and the leveraging of technology for capacity development and sustainable interventions driven by communities and their youth. New thinking, doing things differently and securing regular and predictable labour-intensive work is a challenge that we need to overcome on the continent. The African Union’s commitment to building capable developmental states and people-centred development through Agenda 2063, the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, together with the African Youth Charter provide frameworks through which these objectives can be attained.

Keywords: People-centred, people-driven, governance, development, public service, public administration, culture, youth empowerment

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L’ÉDIFICATION D’UNE CULTURE DE SERVICES PUBLICS ET D’ADMINISTRATION ORIENTÉS ET MENÉS PAR LES PERSONNES POUR PERMETTRE L’AUTONOMISATION ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DES JEUNES.

Richard Levin

Résumé

Cet article se concentre sur l’importante question de l’édification d’une culture de services publics et d’administration orientés et menés par les personnes pour permettre l’autonomisation et le développement des jeunes. Les discours mondiaux sur la (nouvelle) administration publique, la bonne gouvernance ainsi que la capture de l’État par les entreprises ont influencé et façonné des approches de gouvernance et de développement orientés et menés par les personnes. Une nouvelle relation entre le service public et la société en général, caractérisée par un contrat social qui place les intérêts des gens au premier plan et au centre de l’application des politiques, est nécessaire. Une orientation globale du développement basée sur les besoins des gens, leur participation à la formulation et à l’application des politiques est essentielle pour établir un partenariat entre l’État et la société afin de stimuler la transformation de l’Afrique. La jeunesse africaine représente un groupe démographique croissant par rapport à ceux des autres continents et ses aspirations doivent être satisfaits dans le contexte de la capture de l’État continue par les forces mondiales du capital monopolistique à travers des sociétés multinationales qui continuent à priver le continent de milliards de dollars américains à travers des activités illégales et des « fausses factures ». L’autonomisation des jeunes exige de la prévoyance et de l’innovation, et la mise à profit de la technologie pour le développement des capacités et des interventions durables menées par les communautés et leurs jeunes. De nouvelle manière de penser, agir différemment et assurer des activités à forte intensité de main-d’œuvre régulières et prévisibles constituent des défis que nous devons surmonter sur le continent. L’engagement de l’Union africaine à l’édification d’États développementistes compétents axés sur les personnes dans le cadre de l’Agenda 2063, la Charte africaine des valeurs et des principes de la fonction publique et de l’administration, ainsi que la Charte africaine de la jeunesse, offrent des cadres permettant d’atteindre ces objectifs.

Mots clés: orienté par les personnes, mené par les personnes, gouvernance, développement, service public, administration publique, culture, autonomisation des jeunes

CONSTRUÇÃO DE UMA CULTURA DE UNÇÃO E ADMINISTRAÇÃO PÚBLICAS CENTRADA NAS PESSOAS EM ÁFRICA PARA A CAPACITAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO DA JUVENTUDE.

Richard Levin

Resumo
O artigo centra-se na questão importante da construção de uma cultura de função e administração públicas centrada nas pessoas em África para a capacitação e desenvolvimento da juventude. Os discursos globais sobre (a nova) administração pública, boa governação, bem como a captura corporativa do Estado influenciaram e moldaram as abordagens centradas nas pessoas e orientadas para às pessoas em termos da governação e do desenvolvimento. É necessária uma nova relação entre o serviço público e a sociedade em geral, caracterizada por um contrato social que coloca em primeiro lugar as necessidades das pessoas e no centro da execução das políticas. Uma orientação global para o desenvolvimento baseada nas necessidades das pessoas, a sua participação na formulação e implementação de políticas são fundamentais para a construção de parcerias entre o Estado e a sociedade para impulsionar a transformação da África. A juventude da África é uma demografia crescente em contraste com outros continentes e as suas aspirações devem ser satisfeitas no contexto da captura corporativa contínua do Estado pelas forças globais do capital monopolista através de empresas multinacionais, que continuam a drenar milhares de milhões de dólares americanos do continente através de atividades ilegais e “adulteração de faturas comerciais”. A capacitação dos jovens exige a previsão e a inovação e a alavancagem da tecnologia para o desenvolvimento sustentáveis impulsionadas pelas comunidades e pela sua juventude. Novas maneiras de pensar, de fazer as coisas de forma diferente e garantir um trabalho regular e previsível da mão-de-obra intensiva é um desafio que temos de superar no continente. O compromisso da União Africana de construir Estados de desenvolvimento capazes e desenvolvimento centrado nas pessoas através da Agenda 2063, a Carta Africana dos Valores e Princípios do Serviço Público e da Administração, juntamente com a Carta Africana da Juventude, fornecem quadros através dos quais estes objetivos podem ser alcançados.

Palavras-chave: Centrado nas pessoas, orientado para as pessoas, governação, desenvolvimento, função e administração públicas, cultura, reforço do papel dos jovens e da juventude

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TOWARDS CONSOLIDATING SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROGRESS IN GHANA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Patrick Tandoh-Offin* and Gbensuglo A. Bukari**

Abstract

This paper is an analytical review of relevant discourses on the dichotomy between efforts at democratic governance and socio-economic development in Ghana. It also examines the intricate relationship between governance and socio-economic development within the framework of Ghana’s Fourth Republican Constitutional Democracy since 1992. Good governance, it is argued, must link a political system with its environment as a development framework within which socio-economic development can be accomplished. To the extent that governance has been accepted as the basis for equitable and more inclusive distribution of development programmes and projects, its potency as an automatic panacea for development generally has been a source of major disagreements. The review of Ghana’s democratic and socio-economic development processes underscored the linkages between good governance and socio-economic development. The paper therefore concludes that good governance has a role to play in sustaining democratic development and generating socio-economic development in emerging democracies like Ghana.

Keywords: Ghana, governance, democracy, socio-economic development, sub-Sahara Africa

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CŒURER À LA CONSOLIDATION DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SOCIOÉCONOMIQUE DURABLE: PROGRÈS RÉALISÉS AU GHANA ET EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE

Patrick Tandoh-Offin* et Gbensuglo A. Bukari**

Résumé

Cet article est un examen analytique des discours pertinents sur la dichotomie entre les efforts de gouvernance démocratique et le développement socioéconomique au Ghana. Il examine également la relation complexe entre la gouvernance et le développement socioéconomique dans le cadre de la quatrième démocratie constitutionnelle républicaine du Ghana depuis 1992. Il est avancé qu’une bonne gouvernance doit associer un système politique à son environnement en tant que cadre de développement dans lequel le développement socioéconomique peut être réalisé. Dans la mesure où la gouvernance a été acceptée comme base d’une distribution équitable et plus inclusive des programmes et projets de développement, son efficacité en tant que panacée automatique pour le développement a généralement été une source de désaccords majeurs. L’examen des processus de développement démocratique et socioéconomique du Ghana souligne les liens entre la bonne gouvernance et le développement socioéconomique. Par conséquent, l’article conclut que la bonne gouvernance a un rôle à jouer pour soutenir le développement démocratique et favoriser le développement socioéconomique des nouvelles démocraties comme le Ghana.

Mots clés: Ghana, gouvernance, démocratie, développement socioéconomique, Afrique subsaharienne

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NO SENTIDO DE CONSOLIDAR O DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIOECONÔMICO SUSTENTÁVEL: O PROGRESSO EM GANA E SUBSAARIANA

Patrick Tandoh-Offin* e Gbensuglo A. Bukari**

Resumo

Este documento é uma análise dos discursos relevantes sobre a dicotomia entre os esforços no sentido da governação democrática e o desenvolvimento socioeconômico no Gana. Examina também as relações complexas entre a governação e o desenvolvimento socioeconômico no âmbito da Quarta Democracia Constitucional Republicana do Gana desde 1992. Argumentam que a boa governação deve associar um sistema político ao seu ambiente como um quadro de desenvolvimento no âmbito do qual o desenvolvimento socioeconômico pode ser realizado. Na medida em que a governação foi aceite como base para uma distribuição equitativa e mais inclusiva dos programas e projetos de desenvolvimento, a sua potência como panaceia automática para o desenvolvimento tem sido, em geral, fonte de grandes desacordos. A revisão dos processos de desenvolvimento democrático e socioeconômico do Gana sublinhou as ligações entre a boa governação e o desenvolvimento socioeconômico. O documento conclui, portanto, que a boa governação tem um papel a desempenhar no apoio ao desenvolvimento democrático e na geração de desenvolvimento socioeconômico em democracias emergentes como a da Gana.

Palavras-chave: Gana, governação, democracia, desenvolvimento socioeconômico, África Subsariana

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SYNERGY IN SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION: EMBEDDEDNESS AND COMPLEMENTARITY IN FIGHTING HIV/AIDS IN UGANDA

Roberts Kabeba Muriisa* and Asasira Simon Rwabyoma**

Abstract

Since its discovery in the early 1980s, HIV/AIDS has surpassed other diseases in terms of its spread and impact. With a national prevalence of 6% in 2016 compared to 7.3% in 2011 (Ministry of Health – Uganda 2016), the country has made significant progress in mitigating the spread of HIV/AIDS and related death. There is continued decline in HIV/AIDS-related deaths, fewer new infections in all age groups, and there are over one million people on treatment. Uganda is one of the first countries to embrace open public discussion and disclosure of one's HIV/AIDS status and to promote access to treatment and medication by people infected with HIV/AIDS. This paper looks at what enabled Uganda to achieve these successes. Using the synergy lens, this paper discusses managing HIV/AIDS in Uganda. The paper is based on secondary data analysis and concludes that without synergy successes in HIV prevention and treatment could not have been achieved in Uganda.

Keywords: HIV/AIDS, synergy, complementarity, embeddedness, Uganda

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SYNERGIE DANS LA PRESTATION DE SERVICES SOCIAUX: INTÉGRATION ET COMPLÉMENTARITÉ DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE VIH/SIDA EN OUGANDA

Roberts Kabeba Muriisa* et Asasira Simon Rwabyoma**

Résumé

Depuis sa découverte au début des années 1980, le VIH/sida a dépassé les autres maladies en termes de propagation et d'impact. Avec une prévalence nationale de 6% en 2016, contre plus de 7,3 % en 2011 (ministère de la Santé - Ouganda 2016), le pays a réalisé des progrès significatifs dans l’atténuation de la propagation du VIH/sida et des décès connexes. L'Ouganda est l’un des premiers pays à s’engager dans un débat public ouvert et la divulgation de son statut VIH/sida et à promouvoir l’accès au traitement et aux médicaments pour les personnes infectées par le VIH/sida. Cet article examine ce qui a permis à l'Ouganda d'obtenir ces succès. En se plaçant dans la perspective de la synergie, cet article examine la gestion du VIH/SIDA en Ouganda. L'article est basé sur une analyse de données secondaires et conclut que sans synergie, les succès en matière de prévention et de traitement du VIH n’auraient pas pu être obtenus en Ouganda.

Mots clés: VIH/SIDA, synergie, complémentarité, intégration, Ouganda

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SINERGIA NA PRESTAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS SOCIAIS: INCORPORAÇÃO E COMPLEMENTARIDADE NA LUTA CONTRA O VIH/SIDA NO UGANDA

Roberts Kabebe Muriisa* e Asasira Simon Rwabyoma**

Resumo

Desde a sua descoberta no início dos anos oitenta, o VIH/SIDA ultrapassou outras doenças em termos de propagação e impacto. Com uma prevalência nacional de 6% em 2016 em comparação com mais de 7,3% em 2011 (Ministry of Health – Uganda 2016), o país fez progressos significativos na mitigação da propagação do VIH/SIDA e mortes relacionadas. Continua a registar-se um declínio das mortes relacionadas com o VIH/SIDA, menos novas infeções em todas as faixas etárias e mais de um milhão de pessoas em tratamento. O Uganda foi um dos primeiros países a abraçar o debate público aberto e a divulgação do seu estatuto de VIH/SIDA e a promover o acesso ao tratamento e à medicação por pessoas infetadas com VIH/SIDA. Este artigo analisa o que fez o Uganda registar estes sucessos. Usando a lente de sinergia, este artigo discute a gestão do VIH/SIDA no Uganda. O artigo baseia-se na análise de dados secundários e conclui que, sem sucesso de sinergia na prevenção e tratamento do VIH, não poderia ter sido registado no Uganda.

Palavras-chave: VIH/SIDA, sinergia, complementaridade, integração, Uganda

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CREATING THE PHARMACIES OF THE FUTURE – INNOVATION THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE USE OF TECHNOLOGY

Kurt Firnhaber, Shabir Banoo, Mpato Mokobori and Belinda Strydom*

Abstract

In view of the growing number of chronic patients in the public sector, South Africa has made major progress in scaling up access to treatment and care services for priority public health diseases, including HIV. This scaling-up of services for a growing number of chronic patients in public sector facilities has placed significant strain on the health system’s ability to deliver optimum pharmaceutical services to public hospitals and primary health care clinics. In 2012, Right to Care, a non-profit organization, implemented the first robotically supported pharmacy in a South African public sector facility at the Themba Lethu Clinic, a high-volume HIV treatment and care facility, at Helen Joseph Hospital in Johannesburg. At the time, the Themba Lethu Clinic was the largest HIV clinic in the country, with over 17,000 patients in care. While pharmacy automation demonstrated significant reductions in waiting times and increased quality of care for patients, other benefits of improved delivery of pharmaceutical services were realized in terms of stock control, operational efficiencies, management reporting and the use of pharmaceutical human resources. Despite its successes, this initial pilot in pharmacy automation also indicated limitations in the current automation technology to meet the needs of the public sector environment in South Africa and highlighted the need for further innovation to meet these unique requirements.

In response to this need, Right e-Pharmacy, together with its local and international partners, piloted Pharmacy Dispensing Units (PDUs) to provide chronic medication to public sector patients in South Africa. This pilot explored the decanting strategy of allowing patients who take chronic medication to collect their monthly refill from an alternative site that is easily accessible without compromising the quality of service rendered.

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Keywords: HIV/AIDS, pharmacy, dispensing, automation, chronic patients, public sector
CRÉATION DE PHARMACIES DU FUTUR - L’INNOVATION GRÂCE À L’UTILISATION APPROPRIÉE DE LA TECHNOLOGIE

Kurt Firnhaber, Shabir Banoo, Mpato Mokobori et Belinda Strydorn*

Résumé

Compte tenu du nombre croissant de patients de maladies chroniques dans le secteur public, l’Afrique du Sud a réalisé des progrès importants dans l’intensification de l’accès aux services de traitement et de soins pour les maladies prioritaires de santé publique, y compris le VIH. Cette intensification des services pour faire face au nombre croissant de patients chroniques dans les établissements du secteur public a mis à rude épreuve la capacité du système de santé à fournir des services pharmaceutiques optimaux aux hôpitaux publics et aux cliniques de soins primaires. En 2012, Right to Care, une organisation à but non lucratif, a implanté la première pharmacie assistée par robot dans un établissement public sud-africain de la clinique Themba Lethu, un centre de traitement et de soins du VIH à grand volume à l’hôpital Helen Joseph de Johannesburg. À l’époque, la clinique Themba Lethu était la plus grande clinique VIH du pays, avec plus de 17 000 patients pris en charge. Bien que l’automatisation de pharmacie ait permis de réduire considérablement les temps d’attente et d’améliorer la qualité des soins aux patients, d’autres avantages liés à l’amélioration de la prestation de services pharmaceutiques se sont concrétisés en ce qui concerne la gestion des stocks, l’efficacité opérationnelle, les rapports de gestion et l’utilisation des ressources humaines pharmaceutiques. Malgré ses succès, ce premier projet pilote d’automatisation de pharmacie a également révélé les limitations de la technologie d’automatisation actuelle de répondre aux besoins de l’environnement du secteur public en Afrique du Sud et a souligné la nécessité d’innovations supplémentaires pour répondre à ces exigences uniques.

En réponse à ce besoin, Right e-Pharmacy, avec ses partenaires locaux et internationaux, a piloté des unités de distribution de médicaments (PDU) pour fournir des médicaments chroniques aux patients du secteur public en Afrique du Sud. Ce pilote a exploré la stratégie de décantation consistant à permettre aux patients, pour le renouvellement des médicaments pour des maladies chroniques, de les obtenir d’un autre site facilement accessible sans compromettre la qualité du service rendu.

Mots clés: VIH/SIDA, pharmacie, distribution, automatisation, patients de maladies chroniques, secteur public

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CRIAÇÃO DAS FARMÁCIAS DO FUTURO – INOVAÇÃO ATRAVÉS DA UTILIZAÇÃO APROPRIADA DA TECNOLOGIA

Kurt Firnhaber, Shabir Banoo, Mpato Mokobori e Belinda Strydom*

Resumo

Tendo em conta o número crescente de doentes crónicos no setor público, a África do Sul fez grandes progressos no aumento do acesso aos serviços de tratamento e cuidados para doenças de saúde pública prioritárias, incluindo o VIH. A ampliação dos serviços para o número crescente de doentes crónicos em instalações do setor público tem colocado uma pressão significativa na capacidade do sistema de saúde ao fornecer serviços farmacêuticos ótimos a hospitais públicos e clínicas de cuidados de saúde primários. Em 2012, o Right to Care, uma organização sem fins lucrativos, implementou a primeira farmácia apoiada roboticamente numa instalação do setor público sul-africano na Clínica Themba Lethu, uma instalação de tratamento e cuidados de VIH de alto volume, no Hospital Helen Joseph em Joanesburgo. Na altura, a Clínica Themba Lethu era a maior clínica de VIH do país, com mais de 17 000 pacientes em cuidados. Embora a automatização da farmácia tenha demonstrado reduções significativas nos tempos de espera e aumentado a qualidade dos cuidados aos doentes, outros benefícios da melhoria da prestação de serviços farmacêuticos foram realizados em termos de controlo de existências, eficiência operacional, relatórios de gestão e utilização de recursos humanos farmacêuticos. Apesar dos seus sucessos, este piloto inicial em automação de farmácias também indicou limitações da tecnologia de automação atual para atender às necessidades do ambiente do setor público na África do Sul e destacou a necessidade de mais inovação para atender a estes requisitos únicos.

Em resposta a esta necessidade, a Right e-Pharmacy, juntamente com os seus parceiros locais e internacionais, pilotou Unidades Dispensadoras De Medicamentos para fornecer medicação prescrita para situações clínicas crónica aos pacientes do setor público na África do Sul. Este piloto explorou a estratégia de decantação de permitir que os pacientes que tomam medicação crónica recolham a sua recarga mensal a partir de um local alternativo que é facilmente acessível sem comprometer a qualidade de serviço prestado.

Palavras-chave: VIH/SIDA, farmácia, distribuição, automatização, doentes crónicos, setor público

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THIKA SUPER HIGHWAY IN KENYA

Patrick Mbataru

Abstract

Infrastructure development is taken as a sine qua non of economic development. This link is however increasingly viewed as spurious at worst or not clearly understood at best. This paper looks at the arguments against the notion that infrastructural development necessarily has an impact on economic development where such projects are rolled out. Whereas the paper does not claim to prove the argument that there is no direct link between infrastructure stock and economic development, it adds to similar literature by analysing the impact of a major road project in Kenya ten years after it was commissioned. It affirms that service businesses benefit most from such infrastructural expansion in comparison to manufacturing investment.

Keywords: Infrastructure projects, Kenya, flagship projects, project impact, road improvement, Thika Road

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UNE ANALYSE DE L’INFLUENCE DE LA RÉALISATION D’INFRASTRUCTURES ROUTIÈRES SUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL: LE CAS DE L’AUTOROUTE THIKA AU KENYA

Patrick Mbataru

Résumé

Le développement des infrastructures est considéré comme une condition sine qua non du développement économique, mais ce lien est de plus en plus perçu comme trompeur au pire ou, au mieux, mal compris. Cet article examine divers arguments contre l’idée que le développement des infrastructures a nécessairement un impact sur le développement économique où de tels projets sont déployés. Bien que l’article ne prétende pas prouver l’argumentation de l’absence d’un lien direct entre le stock d’infrastructures et le développement économique, il apporte un soutien à la documentation similaire en analysant l’impact d’un projet routier majeur au Kenya dix ans après sa mise en service. Il affirme que les entreprises de services bénéficient le plus de cette expansion des infrastructures par rapport aux investissements manufacturiers.

Mots clés: projets d’infrastructure, Kenya, projets phares, impact du projet, amélioration des routes, route de Thika

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Resumo

O desenvolvimento das infraestruturas é considerado uma condição *sine qua non* do desenvolvimento econômico. Esta ligação é, no entanto, cada vez mais vista como espúria na pior das hipóteses ou não claramente compreendida na melhor das hipóteses. No artigo, o autor investiga vários argumentos que tentam contestar que o desenvolvimento das infraestruturas tem necessariamente um impacto no desenvolvimento econômico quando esses projetos são lançados. Embora o objetivo não seja fingir provar o argumento sobre a espúria do inventário de infraestruturas no desenvolvimento econômico, acrescenta à literatura semelhante, analisando o impacto de um grande projeto rodoviário no Quênia dez anos após a sua encomenda. Confirma a noção de que as empresas de serviços beneficiam mais desta expansão de infraestruturas em comparação com o investimento na indústria transformadora.

**Palavras-chave:** Projetos de infraestruturas, Quênia, projetos emblemáticos, impacto de projetos, melhoramento rodoviário, Estrada Thika

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THE POWER OF THE PURSE: FISCAL OVERSIGHT AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE

Anne Mc Lennan

Abstract

The separation of legislative, executive and judicial authority to prevent monopoly or abuse of power is fundamental to democratic practice. As part of the democratic process, legislatures exercise oversight of the executive through processes of approval (of budgets and plans) and review (of progress). Legislative oversight is hard, as it involves balancing party politics with public interest. In South Africa, the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to “provide independent, objective and professional advice and analysis” provides insight into the potential and limits of fiscal oversight. This article documents the establishment and early operations of the PBO. The findings show that the PBO plays an important role in building fiscal oversight capacity through the provision of policy advice and briefings. However, even with this additional support, members struggle to rise above party political issues and executive dominance to fully exercise fiscal oversight powers.

Keywords: Parliament, fiscal oversight, accountability, legislatures, executive authority, South Africa

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LE POUVOIR DU PORTEFEUILLE: LA SURVEILLANCE FISCALE ET LE BUREAU PARLEMENTAIRE DU BUDGET SUD-AFRICAÏN

Anne Mc Lennan

Résumé

La séparation de l’autorité législative, exécutive et judiciaire pour empêcher le monopole ou l’abus de pouvoir est fondamentale pour la pratique démocratique. Dans le cadre du processus démocratique, les organes législatifs de surveillance exercent un contrôle sur l’exécutif par le biais de processus d’approbation (de budgets et de plans) et l’examen (des progrès accomplis). La surveillance législative est difficile, car elle implique la mise en balance de la politique partisane avec l’intérêt public. En Afrique du Sud, la création d’un Bureau parlementaire du budget (PBO) pour « fournir des conseils et des analyses indépendants, objectifs et professionnels » donne un aperçu du potentiel et des limites de la surveillance fiscale. Cet article documente l’établissement et les premières opérations du PBO. Ses conclusions indiquent que le DPB joue un rôle important dans le renforcement des capacités de surveillance fiscale en fournissant des conseils et des exposés en matière de politique. Cependant, même avec ce soutien supplémentaire, les membres ont du mal à surmonter les problèmes de politique de partis et de domination de l’exécutif pour exercer pleinement leurs pouvoirs de surveillance fiscale.

Mots clés: Parlement, surveillance fiscale, responsabilité, législatives, pouvoir exécutif, Afrique du Sud

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Resumo

A separação da autoridade legislativa, executiva e judicial para prevenir o monopólio ou o abuso de poder é fundamental para a prática democrática. Como parte do processo democrático, as legislaturas exercem a supervisão do executivo através de processos de aprovação (de orçamentos e planos) e revisão (de progresso). A fiscalização legislativa é difícil, uma vez que implica equilibrar a política partidária com o interesse público. Na África do Sul, a criação de um Gabinete de Orçamento Parlamentar (PBO) para “prestar aconselhamento e análise independente, objetiva e profissional” fornece uma visão do potencial e dos limites da supervisão orçamental. Este artigo documenta o estabelecimento e o início das operações do PBO. As suas conclusões indicam que o PBO desempenha um papel importante no reforço da capacidade de supervisão orçamental através da prestação de aconselhamento e briefings sobre políticas. No entanto, mesmo com este apoio adicional, os membros lutam para superar as questões políticas partidárias e o domínio executivo para exercer plenamente os poderes de supervisão fiscal.

**Palavras-chave:** Parlamento, supervisão fiscal, responsabilização, legislaturas, autoridade executiva, África do Sul

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NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF LIMPOPO PROVINCE

Kedibone Phago

Abstract

While South Africa has strong elements of a federal state in respect of its provincial sphere, its constitutional provision indicates that the system of government is unitary in nature. This arrangement is necessary to take into consideration whenever issues of cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations are debated. In a broader context, it is necessary for spheres of government to streamline their systems to realise their basic developmental mandates towards communities. This requires the different spheres of government to take responsibility for both the achievements and underperformance to institute interventions that are geared towards maintaining the provision of quality public services. This study undertook to investigate national government’s interventions in the Limpopo provincial administration. This intervention was made to five provincial departments whose primary functions had collapsed due to rampant maladministration and corruption cases. An explorative case-study approach was undertaken in which unstructured interviews and official documents were used. This approach was necessary to determine the nature of the relationship between the Limpopo provincial administration and the national government pertaining to this intervention. Two key findings were that leadership tended to undermine and trivialise audit reports that sought to highlight areas of concern, and that there was a collapse of the accountability systems that are necessary for ensuring the effective and efficient functioning of provincial administration. The findings point to the urgent need to strengthen governance structures. In this case, establishing credible bodies and resourced institutions or strengthening existing ones is pivotal to accountability and proper public governance.

Keywords: National government intervention, Limpopo Province, provincial administration, Constitution, public financial management

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INTERVENTION DU GOUVERNEMENT NATIONAL DANS L’ADMINISTRATION ET LA GOUVERNANCE PROVINCIALES: LE CAS DE LA PROVINCE DU LIMPOPO

Kedibone Phago

Résumé
Bien que l’Afrique du Sud possède des éléments forts d’un État fédéral en ce qui concerne sa sphère provinciale, sa disposition constitutionnelle indique que le système de gouvernement est de nature unitaire. Cet arrangement doit être pris en compte lorsque des questions de gouvernance coopérative et de relations intergouvernementales sont débattues. Dans un contexte plus large, il est nécessaire que les sphères de gouvernement rationalisent leurs systèmes pour réaliser leurs mandats de développement de base vis-à-vis des communautés. Cela nécessite que les différentes sphères du gouvernement assument la responsabilité des réalisations et de la sous-performance dans la mise en place d’interventions visant à maintenir la prestation de services publics de qualité. Cette étude visait à enquêter sur les interventions du gouvernement national dans l’administration provinciale du Limpopo. Cette intervention a été entreprise dans cinq départements provinciaux dont les principales fonctions s’étaient effondrées en raison des cas de mauvaise administration répandue et de corruption. Une approche exploratoire d’étude de cas a été suivie dans le cadre de laquelle des entretiens non structurés et des documents officiels ont été utilisés. Cette approche était nécessaire pour déterminer la nature de la relation entre l’administration provinciale du Limpopo et le gouvernement national, en ce qui concerne cette intervention. Les deux principales conclusions sont que le leadership avait tendance à miner et banaliser les rapports d’audit qui cherchaient à mettre en évidence les sujets de préoccupation et que les systèmes de responsabilisation nécessaires pour assurer le fonctionnement efficient et efficace de l’administration provinciale s’étaient effondrés. Les conclusions soulignent le besoin urgent de renforcer les structures de gouvernance. Dans ce cas, la création d’organismes crédibles et d’instituts dotés de ressources ou le renforcement des instituts existants sont essentiels à la responsabilisation et à la bonne gouvernance publique.

Mots clés: intervention du gouvernement national, province du Limpopo, administration provinciale, constitution, gestion des finances publiques

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INTERVENÇÃO DO GOVERNO NACIONAL NA ADMINISTRAÇÃO PROVINCIAL E GOVERNANÇA: O CASO DA PROVÍNCIA DE LIMPOPO

Kedibone Phago

Resumo
Enquanto a África do Sul tem fortes elementos de um Estado federal em relação à sua esfera provincial, a sua disposição constitucional indica que o sistema de governo é de natureza unitária. Esta disposição deve ser tomada em consideração sempre que sejam debatidas questões de governação cooperativa e relações intergovernamentais. Num contexto mais amplo, é necessário que as esferas de governo racionalizem os seus sistemas para realizar os seus mandatos básicos de desenvolvimento para as comunidades. Para tal, é necessário que as diferentes esferas de governo assumam a responsabilidade tanto pelas realizações como pelo desempenho insuficiente na instituição de intervenções orientadas para a manutenção da oferta de serviços públicos de qualidade. Este estudo comprometeu-se a investigar as intervenções do governo nacional na administração provincial do Limpopo. Esta intervenção foi feita a cinco departamentos provinciais cujas funções primárias entraram em colapso devido a casos de má administração e corrupção desenfreados. Foi realizada uma abordagem exploratória de estudo de caso em que foram utilizadas entrevistas não estruturadas e documentos oficiais. Esta abordagem foi necessária para determinar a natureza de uma relação entre a administração provincial do Limpopo e o Governo Nacional relativa a esta intervenção. Foram identificadas duas principais conclusões que a liderança compromete e trivializa relatórios de auditoria que procuraram destacar áreas de preocupação, bem como o colapso de sistemas de responsabilização que são necessários para garantir o funcionamento eficaz e eficiente da administração provincial. As conclusões apontam para a necessidade urgente de reforçar as estruturas de governação. Neste caso, a criação de organismos credíveis e de instituições dotadas de recursos ou o reforço das instituições existentes é fundamental para a responsabilização e a boa governação pública.

Palavras-chave: Intervenção do governo nacional, província do Limpopo, administração provincial, Constituição, gestão das finanças públicas

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Pensando dar contributo no “Desenvolvimento e Governação do Setor Público” em África, o nosso artigo é baseado na tese de doutoramento em Ciência de Administração pelo programa da “Ciência Global” intitulado - Avaliação Relativa da Eficiência na Gestão dos Municípios Moçambicanos que impõe que o estudo se reflita no país de origem.

O artigo analisa a evolução dos estados de África subsaariana depois da independência. Grande parte destes estados atravessou grandes dificuldades financeiras. Como contrapartida das ajudas internacionais, foram impostas medidas e, em especial, a descentralização administrativa e a autonomia local. Este artigo explora esta política, referindo-se em especial a Moçambique, concluindo que nem sempre medidas semelhantes geram resultados semelhantes.

**Palavras-chave:** Descentralização; Autonomia local; Estados falhados; reforma do Estado.

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DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL AUTONOMY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Abstract

The article analyses the post-independent evolution of the states in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the states in the region have gone through great financial difficulties. As a counterpart to international aid, a number of measures have been imposed, in particular, administrative decentralization and local self-government. This article explores this policy, with particular reference to Mozambique. It argues that similar measures do not always generate similar results, and its intention is to contribute to the governance and democracy debate in African. It highlights the notion that decentralization and local autonomy (municipalization) is imposed from outside Africa by international financial institutions as a counterpoint to loans and grants; that decentralization uses the same instruments (financial and political autonomy), but results do not match expectations, not only because African states were not very interested in political decentralization, giving priority to the construction of national unity. Secondly, postcolonial states have long been a sign of neopatrimonialism, that is, there is no real distinction between public and private interests, and elites seek to secure gains derived from economic modernization. Finally, the decentralization measures were, in many cases, observed by elected representatives.

A comparative analysis of ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that policy instruments are very similar; indeed, these instruments were imposed by the same international financial organizations. These organizations understand that the success of donations and loans implies a process of adjustment that translates into state reform, in which decentralization is an essential element. In-depth analysis is conducted in the case of Mozambique.

This article is structured around eight essential points: first, an analysis of states in sub-Sahara Africa after colonialism, followed by a focus on the crisis of the 1980s with an emphasis on the “failure” of African states. Thirdly, the role of international investors in response to the political, economic and administrative crises in the region, followed by a focus on decentralization imposed on African countries by international donors.
The discussion on the Mozambican experience and the creation of democratic structures and a market economy is followed by concluding remarks on decentralization and local autonomy in Mozambique.

A quarter of a century after independence, a number of African states in sub-Sahara were considered failed states. Various authors discussed these issues and also used the dependency theory to explain the exploitation of the African continent and its underdevelopment. Others focused on the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats (focusing on their own benefits rather than development); the inability to develop and implement public and social policies; stagnation, weak governance and weak states (resulting from low levels of civic culture and social capital); ethnic diversity and political polarization; and the reinforcing of interest groups sharing state resources among themselves. Add to this the notions that African politicians inherited artificial policies of colonialism, appropriated assets for their own benefit (a strategy called neo-patrimonial with a propensity for corruption, clientelism, nepotism and regionalism) and that African states did not create sufficient legitimate structures.

Another explanation comes from predatory theory: leaders built a predatory state in the service of their own survival, neutralizing external and internal rivals, protecting groups that support them, extracting resources, and remaining in power. Therefore, the state is not the result of a social contract, but an instrument of domination by the dominant group, to appropriate resources rather than to ensure the economic development of the country. This raised pertinent questions about the inefficiency of African states, what they do and are supposed to do, and why bad policies, corruption and vandalism seem intrinsic in some cases. States are supposed to provide certain public goods, law and order, defence, enforcement of contracts and infrastructures, but it often does not happen. The failure or even collapse of certain states is also a matter of colonial heritage. Indeed, African states have not developed institutions that effectively control and police their territory; have not developed institutions capable of mobilizing resources; and without institutions, democracy is lacking and economic and social development is strangled. In the end, this research project in the management of municipalities in Mozambique led us to the conclusion that similar measures do not always generate similar results.

**Keywords:** decentralization, local autonomy, failed states, state reform

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LA DÉCENTRALISATION ET L'AUTONOMIE LOCALE EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE

J. A. Oliveira Rocha* et Gonçalves Jonas
Bernardo Zavale**

Résumé

L'article analyse l'évolution des pays d'Afrique subsaharienne après l'indépendance. De nombreux États ont connu des difficultés financières. En contrepartie de l'aide internationale, un certain nombre de mesures ont été imposées, en particulier la décentralisation administrative et l'autonomie gouvernementale au niveau local. Cet article explore cette politique, avec une référence particulière au Mozambique. Il affirme que des mesures similaires n'ont pas toujours produit des résultats similaires en Afrique et que son intention est de contribuer au débat sur la gouvernance et la démocratie en Afrique. Il met en évidence l'idée que la décentralisation et l'autonomie locale (municipization) sont imposées de l'extérieur de l'Afrique par les institutions financières internationales en contrepartie de prêts et de dons; la décentralisation utilise les mêmes instruments (autonomie financière et politique), mais les résultats ne correspondent pas aux attentes, non seulement parce que les États africains ne sont pas très intéressés par la décentralisation politique, mais qu'ils donnent la priorité à la construction de l'unité nationale. D'autre part, les États postcoloniaux ont longtemps été un signe de néopatrimonialisme, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'y a pas de distinction réelle entre les intérêts publics et privés, et les élites cherchent à obtenir des gains tirés de la modernisation économique. Enfin, les mesures de décentralisation, dans plusieurs des cas, ont été respectées par les représentants élus.

Une analyse comparative de dix pays d'Afrique subsaharienne indique que les instruments politiques sont très similaires; en fait, ces instruments ont été imposés par les mêmes organisations financières internationales. Ces organisations comprennent que le succès des dons et des prêts implique un processus d'ajustement qui se traduit par une réforme de l'État dans laquelle la décentralisation est un élément essentiel. Une analyse approfondie a été menée dans le cas du Mozambique.

Cet article est structuré autour de huit points essentiels: premièrement, une analyse des États d'Afrique subsaharienne après le colonialisme, suivie d'une analyse de la crise des années 1980 en mettant l'accent sur la « défaillance » des États africains. Troisièmement, le rôle des investisseurs internationaux face aux crises politiques, économiques et administratives dans la région, suivie par la décentralisation imposée aux pays africains par les donateurs internationaux. La discussion sur l'expérience mozambicaine et la création de structures démocratiques et d'une économie de marché est suivie de conclusions sur la décentralisation et l'autonomie locale au Mozambique.

Un quart de siècle après l'indépendance, un certain nombre d'États d'Afrique subsaharienne étaient considérés comme des États défaillants. Divers auteurs ont discuté de ces questions et ont également utilisé la théorie de la dépendance pour expliquer l'exploitation du continent africain et son sous-développement. D'autres ont mis l'accent sur le comportement des politiciens et des bureaucrates (se concentrant sur leurs propres avantages plutôt que sur le développement); l'incapacité à développer et à appliquer des politiques publiques et sociales; la stagnation, la faiblesse de la gouvernance et des États fragiles (résultant de faibles niveaux de culture civique et de capital social); la diversité ethnique et la polarisation politique; et le renforcement des groupes d'intérêt partageant les ressources de l'État entre eux. On ajoute à cela la notion selon laquelle les politiciens africains ont hérité des politiques artificielles de colonialisme, appropriés des biens pour leur propre bénéfice (une stratégie appelée néopatrimoniale avec une propension à la corruption, au clientélisme, au népotisme et au régionalisme) et que les États africains ne créent pas suffisamment de structures légittimes.

Une autre explication vient de la théorie prédatrice: les leaders ont construit un État prédateur au service de leur propre survie, neutralisant les rivaux externes et internes, protégeant les groupes qui les soutiennent, extrayant des ressources et restant au pouvoir. Par conséquent, l'État n'est pas le résultat d'un contrat social, mais un instrument de domination du groupe dominant, pour s'approprier des ressources plutôt que pour assurer le développement économique.
du pays. Cela a suscité des questions pertinentes sur l’inefficacité des États africains, sur ce qu’ils font et ce qu’ils sont censés faire, et les raisons pour lesquelles les mauvaises politiques, la corruption et le vandalisme semblent intrinsèques dans certains cas. Les États sont censés fournir certains biens publics, assurer l’ordre public, la défense, l’exécution des contrats et des infrastructures, mais cela n’arrive pas souvent. La défaillance ou même l’effondrement de certains États relève aussi de l’héritage colonial. En effet, les États africains n’ont pas mis en place d’institutions qui contrôlent et surveillent efficacement leur territoire; ils n’ont pas développé d’institutions capables de mobiliser des ressources ; et sans institutions, la démocratie fait défaut et le développement économique et social est étranglé. En fin de compte, ce projet de recherche sur la gestion des municipalités au Mozambique nous a permis de conclure que des mesures similaires ne génèrent pas toujours des résultats similaires.

*Mots clés: décentralisation, autonomie locale, États défaillants, réforme de l’État*

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BOOK REVIEW

Kate Philip (2018)

Markets on the Margins: Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development.
Melton UK: James Currey
222 pages

Book Review Article by Prof Howard Richards
(University of Santiago, Chile)

Book Summary

In 1987, workers in South Africa’s National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) staged a historic national strike, after which 40 000 workers from across southern Africa were dismissed from their jobs. To assist them, NUM set up a job-creation unit, starting with worker co-ops before shifting to a wider enterprise support programme. In this book, Kate Philip, who ran the programme for over a decade, charts the lessons of successive phases of enterprise development in the marginal economic contexts in which the programme operated.

The initial project-level focus of the co-op programme was unable to go to scale; the strategy shifted to the establishment of Development Centres, providing a wide range of business services to local entrepreneurs. Yet the strategy of local diversification through ‘local production for local consumption’ soon faced the reality that many local needs were already catered for by mass production in South Africa’s core economy, leaving little market space within which small enterprises could compete. Instead, the focus shifted to the local competitive advantages that might provide access into wider, external markets. Case studies look at the craft sector and the commercialization of products from the indigenous marula – with the marula programme building a value chain from the bottom up, breaking into national and global markets and contributing to the livelihoods of over 4 000 women in 42 rural villages.

Markets on the Margins concludes with reflections on the role of markets in such marginal contexts. Is there scope to make markets work better for the poor – or is the process always, inexorably, one of making the poor work for markets? And if markets are social constructs, how might they be constructed to achieve different distributional outcomes?
CRITIQUE DE LIVRE

Kate Philip (2018)
Markets on the Margins: Mine Workers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development. [Marchés sur les marges: les travailleurs des mines, la création d'emplois et le développement des entreprises].
Melton Royaume-Uni: James Currey
222 pages

Article de critique de livre par le professeur Howard Richards
(Université de Santiago, Chili)

Résumé du livre
En 1987, les travailleurs de l'Union nationale des travailleurs des mines d'Afrique du Sud (NUM) ont organisé une grève nationale historique, à la suite de laquelle 40 000 travailleurs d'Afrique australe ont été licenciés. Pour les aider, le NUM a mis en place une unité de création d'emplois, en commençant par les coopératives de travail avant de passer à un programme d'assistance aux entreprises plus large. Dans ce livre, Kate Philip, qui a dirigé le programme pendant plus de dix ans, définit les leçons tirées des phases successives du développement des entreprises dans les contextes économiques marginaux dans lesquels le programme était exécuté.

L'objectif au niveau du projet initial du programme coopératif n'a pas pu s'étendre à grande échelle; la stratégie a été modifiée pour cibler la création de centres de développement, fournissant un large éventail de services aux entrepreneurs locaux. Pourtant, la stratégie de diversification locale par la « production locale pour la consommation locale » a dû très vite faire face à la réalité que de nombreux besoins locaux sont déjà satisfaits par la production de masse dans l'économie centrale sud-africaine, laissant peu d'espace de marché aux petites entreprises. Alors, l'attention a porté sur les avantages concurrentiels locaux susceptibles d'offrir un accès à des marchés extérieurs plus vastes. Les études de cas portent sur le secteur de l'artisanat et la commercialisation de produits issus du marula indigène – avec le programme de marula mettant en place une chaîne de valeur en partant de la base, pénétrant les marchés nationaux et mondiaux et contribuant à la subsistance de plus de 4 000 femmes dans 42 villages ruraux.

Markets on the Margins se termine par une réflexion sur le rôle des marchés dans ces contextes marginaux. Existe-t-il des possibilités de faire fonctionner les marchés au bénéfice des pauvres - ou est-ce qu'il s'agit d'un processus qui obligera toujours et inexorablement les pauvres à travailler pour les marchés? Et si les marchés sont des constructions sociales, comment pourraient-ils être construits pour obtenir des résultats distributifs différents?
CRÍTICA DE LIVRO

Kate Philip (2018)


Melton UK: James Currey

222 Páginas


Artigo sobre a Critica do Livro pelo Prof. Howard Richards

(Universidade de Santiago, Chile)

Resumo do Livro

Em 1987, os trabalhadores da União Nacional de Mineiros (NUM) da África do Sul organizaram uma greve nacional histórica, após a qual 40 000 trabalhadores de toda a África Austral foram despedidos dos seus postos de trabalho. Para os ajudar, a NUM criou uma unidade de criação de emprego, a começar pelas cooperativas de trabalhadores antes de passar para um programa de apoio às empresas mais vasto. Neste livro, a Kate Philip, que geriu o programa durante mais de uma década, traça as lições das sucessivas fases de desenvolvimento empresarial nos contextos económicos marginais em que o programa funcionava.

O foco inicial a nível de projeto do programa de cooperação foi incapaz de ir para a escala; a estratégia mudou para a criação de Centros de Desenvolvimento, fornecendo uma ampla gama de serviços empresariais aos empresários locais. No entanto, a estratégia de diversificação local através da "produção local para consumo local" logo enfrentou a realidade de que muitas necessidades locais já eram atendidas pela produção em massa na economia central da África do Sul, deixando pouco espaço de mercado dentro do qual as pequenas empresas poderiam competir. Em vez disso, chamou-se a atenção para as vantagens competitivas locais que podem proporcionar acesso a mercados externos mais amplos. Os estudos de casos analisam o setor do artesanato e a comercialização de produtos provenientes da mácula indígena – com o programa de mácula a construir uma cadeia de valor de baixo para cima, invadindo mercados nacionais e globais e contribuindo para a subsistência de mais de 4 000 mulheres em 42 aldeias rurais.

O Markets on the Margins acaba por concluir com reflexões sobre o papel dos mercados nestes contextos marginais. Há margem para fazer com que os mercados funcionem melhor para os pobres – ou o processo é sempre, inexoravelmente, um de fazer com que os pobres trabalhem para os mercados? E se os mercados são construções sociais, como é que podem ser construídos para alcançar diferentes resultados de distribuição?
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